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
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A M E R I C A N
B I B L I C A L R E P O S I T O R Y .

DEVOTED TO

Biblical and General Literature, Theological Discussion, the History of Theological Opinions, etc.

CONDUCTED BY
JOHN HOLMES AGNEW.

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ARTICLE I.

REMARKS ON PRAYER.

By Calvin E. Stowe, D. D., Prof. of Biblical Literature in Lane Seminary, Cincinnati, Ohio.

In respect to prayer the scriptures plainly teach us two things. I. That it is our duty and privilege to pray for the things which we need with the expectation of receiving them.

This truth is taught in such texts as the following: He shall deliver the needy when he crieth; the poor also, and him that hath no helper. Ps. 72: 12. And it shall come to pass before they call I will answer; and while they are yet speaking I will hear. Isa. 65: 24. If any of you lack wisdom let him ask of God, who giveth liberally to all and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. James 1: 5. Open the New Testament and read attentively our Saviour's declarations as recorded in Matt. 7: 7—11. Luke 11: 5—13, 18: 1-8.

II. The scriptures also clearly teach us that the general promises above quoted, have actually been realized by those who, in a right spirit, have availed themselves of them. This truth is taught in passages like the following: The Lord hath heard my supplication. Ps. 6: 9. I sought the Lord and he heard me, and delivered me from all my fears. This poor man cried and the Lord heard him, and saved him out of all his troubles. Ps. 34: 4—6. Open the Old Testament and read the whole narrative. 2 Kings 19: 14—37. 2 Kings

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19 : 20. Then Isaiah the son of Amoz sent to Hezekiah saying, thus saith the Lord God of Israel, that which thou hast prayed to me against Sennacherib, king of Assyria, I have heard. v. 33. By the way that he came, by the same shall he return, and shall not come into this city, saith the Lord. vs. 35, 36. And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the Lord went out, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred four score and five thousand ; and when they arose early in the morning, behold they were all dead corpses. So Sennacherib, king of Assyria departed, and went and returned, and dwelt at Nineveh.

But we are not confined to scripture for the verification of these promises. Many a christian, in every age, has known and felt that his own prayers for particular blessings have been heard and favorably answered ; and such instances in the life of a christian are numerous, just in proportion to the simplicity and uniformity with which he relies on God. A few insulated cases of this kind, might be explained on the ground of accidental coincidence ; but when they occur uniformly and through a series of years, it is contrary to all the laws of sound reasoning to explain them in this manner.

I will illustrate my meaning by a few well authenticated examples. Henry Young Stilling was an eminent physician in the service of the Grand Duke of Baden. He died in the year 1812, and consequently was well known to many persons now living. His career was an extraordinary one. By his skill as an oculist, he restored more blind persons to sight than there are miracles recorded of our blessed Saviour himself. I have been acquainted with some of his children and grandchildren, and feel no doubt of the entire accuracy of the facts about to be related. Stilling was an intimate friend of the German poet Goethe, who will not be accused of credulity or superstition, and it was at Goethe's suggestion that he published the account of his own life from which the following incidents are taken. Goethe, in his autobiography, says of Stilling, "he had a round understanding—and an enthusiasm for all that is good, right, and true, in the utmost possible purity. His course of life had been very simple, and yet had abounded with events, and a manifold activity. The element of his energy was an impregnable faith in God, and in an assistance immediately proceeding from Him, which obviously justified itself in an uninterrupted provision,

and an infallible deliverance from every distress and every evil. He had experienced numerous instances of this kind in his life, and they had recently been frequently repeated ; so that, though he led a frugal life, yet it was without care and with the greatest cheerfulness ; and he applied himself most diligently to his studies, although he could not reckon on any certain subsistence from one quarter of a year to another. I urged him to write his life, and he promised to do so."

Such is the unequivocal testimony of Goethe, who was most intimately acquainted with him ; and surely no one will say that Goethe was a man to be beguiled by religious fanaticism, especially towards the latter part of his life, when he wrote the sentences which I have just quoted.

In youth, Stilling was extremely poor, destitute of the common comforts and necessaries of life. After a long season of anxiety and prayer, he felt satisfied that it was the will of God, that he should go to a University and prepare himself for the medical profession. He did not, at first, make choice of a University, but waited for an intimation from his Heavenly Father ; for as he intended to study simply from faith, he would not follow his own will in any thing. Three weeks after he had come to this determination, a friend asked him, whither he intended to go. He replied he did not know. "Oh," said she, "our neighbor Mr. T. is going to Strasburg to spend a winter there, go with him." This touched Stilling's heart ; he felt that this was the intimation he had waited for. Meanwhile Mr. T. himself entered the room, and was heartily pleased with the proposition. The whole of his welfare now depended on his becoming a physician, and for this, a thousand dollars at least, were requisite, of which he could not tell in the whole world where to raise a hundred. He nevertheless fixed his confidence firmly on God, and reasoned as follows : "God begins nothing without terminating it gloriously ; now it is most certainly true that He alone has ordered my present circumstances entirely without my co-operation.—Consequently it is also most certainly true, that he will accomplish every thing regarding me in a manner worthy of himself." He smilingly said to his friends who were as poor as himself—"I wonder from what quarter my Heavenly Father will provide me with money." When they expressed anxiety, he said, "Believe assuredly

that He who was able to feed a thousand people with a little bread lives still, and to Him I commit myself. He will certainly find out means. Do not be anxious, the Lord will provide."

Forty-six dollars was all that he could raise for his journey. He met unavoidable delay on the way, and while in Frankfort, three days ride from Strasburg, he had but a single dollar left. He said nothing of it to any one, but waited for the assistance of his Heavenly Father. As he was walking the street and praying inwardly to God, he met Mr. L., a merchant from the place of his residence, who says to him: "Stilling, what brought you here?" "I am going to Strasburg to study medicine." "Where do you get your money to study with?" "I have a rich Father in heaven." Mr. L. looked steadily at him and inquired, "How much money have you on hand?" "One dollar," says Stilling. "So," says Mr. L. "Well, I'm one of your Father's stewards," and handed him thirty-three dollars. Stilling felt warm tears in his eyes; says he, "I am now rich enough—I want no more." This first trial made him so courageous, that he no longer doubted that God would help him through every thing.

He had been but a short time in Strasburg, when his thirty-three dollars had again been reduced to one, on which account he began again to pray very earnestly. Just at this time, one morning, his room-mate, Mr. T—, says to him:—"Stilling, I believe you did not bring much money with you," and offered him thirty dollars in gold, which he gladly accepted as in answer to his prayers. In a few months after this, the time arrived when he must pay the Lecturer's fee, or have his name struck from the list of students. The money was to be paid by six o'clock on Thursday evening. Thursday morning came and he had no money, and no means of getting any. The day was spent in prayer. Five o'clock in the evening came, and yet there was no money. His faith began almost to fail; he broke out into a perspiration—his face was wet with tears. Some one knocked at the door. "Come in," said he. It was Mr. R—, the gentleman of whom he rented the room. "I called," said Mr. R—, "to see how you like your room?" "Thank you," says Stilling, "I like it very much." Says Mr. R—, "I thought I would ask you one other question; have you brought any money with

you?" Stilling says he now felt like Habakkuk when the Angel took him by the hair of the head to carry him to Babylon.* He answered, "No, I have no money." Mr. R— looked at him with surprise, and at length said, "I see how it is, God has sent me to help you." He immediately left the room, and soon returned with forty dollars in gold.

Stilling says he then felt like Daniel in the lion's den, when Habakkuk brought him his food. He threw himself on the floor and thanked God with tears. He then went to the College and paid his fee as well as the best. His whole College life was one series of just such circumstances. He was often in want of money, but he never asked man for it; for he had no man to ask; he asked God for it, and it always came when he needed it. Was he authorised to enter on a course of study with such prospects, and such expectations? The leadings of providence were such, that he had not a shadow of doubt that it was his duty to enter on this course of study; he prayed fervently for divine guidance, and felt that he had it; he availed himself of all the lawful means in his power for the supply of his own wants—and when he had no means of his own, he asked help of God—and never failed to receive what he asked for. He became one of the most useful physicians, and one of the greatest benefactors to the poor that the world has ever seen. He restored sight during his life, to nearly five thousand blind people, most of whom were very poor, and unable to render him any pecuniary reward.

What stronger proof can we have that God was his guide? Let us take a series of events of the same kind from the life of another person who lived a century previous, and was of a calling and character quite different from that of Stilling. Augustus Herman Franke was a parish minister in the city of Halle, with a small salary, barely sufficient for his own support, and no property except his books. He was a man of cool, deliberate judgment and extensive learning, and was benevolent on principle rather than impulse. His heart was affected with a view of the wretched condition of the children of the uneducated poor, in Halle, and was determined to

* See History of Bel and the Dragon in the Apocrypha, verses 33—39.

do something for their relief. In process of time he had a large orphan establishment, containing between three and four hundred children, entirely dependent on his exertions for their education, their clothing, and their daily food. His means of course were continually running short, and he had no other resource than prayer to God.

This was a resource which never failed. Hear his own testimony, as it has been confirmed by thousands of witnesses: "In the month of April, 1696, our funds were exhausted, and I knew not where to look for the necessary supplies for the next week. This caused me great distress; when some person, who is yet unknown to me, put into my hands a thousand dollars for the orphans. At another time when our stores were exhausted, we laid our case before the Lord, and had scarcely finished our prayer, when there was a knock at my door and a letter was handed in with \$50 in gold: \$20 soon after came, which completely supplied our wants, and we were taught that God will often hear prayer almost before it is offered. In the month of October, 1698, I sent a ducat to a poor and afflicted woman, who wrote me that it came to hand at a time when she greatly needed it, and she prayed God to give my poor orphans a heap of ducats for it. Soon after, I received from one friend two ducats; from another twenty-five; from two others forty-three; and from Prince Paul of Wertemburg five hundred. When I saw all this money on the table before me, I could not but think of the prayer of the poor woman, and how literally it had been fulfilled. In February, 1699, I was almost entirely without funds, though much was needed for the daily wants of the children and other poor. In this state of difficulty, I comforted myself with the promise of the Lord Jesus: 'Seek ye first the kingdom,' &c. When I had given out the last of our money, I prayed to the Lord. As I left my room to go into the college, I found a student waiting for me, who put \$70 into my hands. Soon afterwards, we were in the greatest want, but I trusted in the Lord and determined to go to my closet and spread my wants before him. I arose to go to my closet, and while on my way, a letter was put into my hands from a merchant, informing me that he had received a cheque for a thousand dollars, to be paid me for the orphan house. How forcibly did I feel the truth of the promise, '*Before they call I will answer, and while they are yet speaking I*

will hear.—Isa. 65: 24. I had now no reason to ask for assistance, but I went to my closet and praised the Lord for his goodness. At another time the superintendent of the building came to me and asked me if I had received any money for the payment of the laborers; ‘No,’ said I, ‘but I have faith in God.’ Scarcely had I uttered these words, when some one was announced at the door. On going to him, I found he had brought me thirty dollars. I returned to the study and asked the superintendent how much money he needed. He replied, ‘thirty dollars.’ ‘There they are,’ said I. At another time of great need, I prayed particularly, ‘Give us this day our daily bread.’ I dwelt upon the words *this day*, for we needed immediate aid. While I was yet praying, a friend came to my door and brought me \$400. At one time I was recounting to a Christian friend some of our remarkable deliverances from want, by which he was so much affected, that he even wept. While I was speaking, as if to confirm my statements, I received a letter containing a cheque for \$500. At another time I was in need of a large sum, but did not know where to obtain even ten dollars. The steward came; but having no money for him, I asked him to come again after dinner, and in the mean time gave myself to prayer. When he came in the afternoon, all that I could do was to ask him to come again in the evening. In the afternoon I was visited by a friend, with whom I united in prayer to God. As I accompanied my friend to the door, on his departure, I found the steward standing on one side, and on the other a person who put into my hands \$150. On another occasion, the superintendent began to pay the laborers with only fourteen dollars; but before he got through, he received enough to complete the payments. One of my orphan children who was about to go on a visit to his friends, came and asked me for two dollars to bear his expenses. I told him I should be glad to give them to him, but that I had not more than a half dollar in the world. This he could scarcely believe, as he had never discovered the least signs of poverty at the orphan house. I told him to return to me again after a short time. I thought of going to borrow the money, but being engaged in a piece of business which could not be postponed, and knowing that the Lord could easily send me the sum, if it was his will, I kept my seat. In less than a quarter of an hour, a person came in bringing me

twenty dollars. I was now able to give the boy his two dollars, which I did most cheerfully."

So uniformly did this assistance come, just when it was most needed, and through so long a series of years was it continued, that the old steward, instead of desponding, got into the habit of saying, when any great difficulty occurred, "Now we shall have reason again to admire the manner in which God will come to our aid."

This institution has become one of the largest and most useful in Europe. It frequently has from 2700 to 3000 pupils, and when I visited it in 1836, it was, in all respects, one of the most delightful schools I saw in the whole progress of my tour. Franke also instituted a bible press to furnish bibles cheap for the poor. This press has issued over two millions of copies of the whole Bible, and more than a million of the New Testament. He also established a large apothecary's shop, for furnishing medicines to the poor, which is still in active operation; and a benevolent book-store, which is now the largest in Germany. So much for the faith and the prayers of one man!

If any one can believe that such a long series of answers to prayer can be accounted for on the ground of accidental coincidences, such a man would scarcely be persuaded, though one should rise from the dead.

May every Christian expect such answers to prayer, as those which we find in the lives of Stilling and Franke?—Yes, every Christian who lives and feels as Stilling and Franke lived and felt, may expect such answers to prayer as Stilling and Franke had. God is no respecter of persons, and he regards every individual exactly according to the state of his heart. In every case, whenever the conditions are complied with, the promises are always fulfilled. These conditions are a right state of heart, entire devotedness to God, disinterested love to man, and unwavering confidence in the Lord Jesus Christ. These feelings must not be transient and fitful, but they must constitute the very habit of the mind. Without a full compliance with these conditions, confidence in prayer is presumption, it is not faith. A Universalist once said of a very benevolent evangelical neighbor of his, who was greatly prospered in his worldly affairs, "I do believe the Lord sometimes prospers those who give away money; for there is Col. M., the more he

gives away the richer he grows ; but it would not work with me at all." The Universalist was right ; it would not work with him as it did with Col. M. And why not ? Because he had not Col. M.'s single-hearted piety, and entire devotedness to God. It is not a state of mind which can be called up for a particular exigency, and continued only while that exigency lasts ; if it is not the habit of the mind it does not exist at all.

But are not the promises absolute to believing prayer ? And may we not of a sudden lay claim to the promises, though destitute of a devotional habit ? The first dawnings of a right state of heart may lay claim to the promises ; but we can have no evidence in respect to ourselves that we have a right state of heart, except as the result of habitual devotion. The promises are indeed absolute, but the Bible is written for beings who are supposed to have common sense, and who are bound to use that common sense in its interpretation. Our Saviour says, *All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.* But the drunkard who is destitute of money, would that others should give him rum ; is it therefore his duty, when he has money, to give rum to others ? This would be doing precisely as he would be done by, but would it be obeying the Saviour's precept ? Let common sense answer. Jesus says, *Give to him that asketh of thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.* Is it therefore your duty to give your money to any profligate who may ask you for it ? Again I say, let common sense answer. Our Saviour says, *When thou prayest enter into thy closet and shut thy door.* But if a man has no closet, or if his closet has no door, can he not pray ? And must he never pray in public ?

In none of the above cases is there any limitation expressed, but such limitations as common sense demands, are always to be understood ; and so are they to be understood in the promises relating to prayer. No promises that are given to prayer will subject God's omniscience to man's shortsightedness, or take the control of the world out of God's hand and place it in the hands of the poor mortal who prays.

It is always to be understood that the thing asked for, is a proper thing to be asked for, that it is asked for in a right spirit, and for the purpose of being applied to a right object, and always in entire submission to the will of God. *Ye ask*

and receive not because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts.

But may we always, in every case, when our prayer is acceptable, expect the very thing which we ask for?

The mother of Augustine was a woman of devoted piety, but her son was a youth of wild and dissipated habits. She prayed earnestly and long for his conversion, but apparently without success. At length he resolved to visit Rome. She, supposing that the temptations of that abandoned city would be his ruin, most earnestly begged of God to thwart his purpose. She felt a quiet assurance that God had heard her prayer, and that her desire would be granted; but to her amazement her son went to Rome. There he fell in with Christian society, and was converted. His mother then acknowledged that, though the particular thing she asked for was withheld, yet the deep desire of her heart, the desire which had prompted all her prayers, was granted. What was the fault in the prayers of this woman? Simply an ignorance of the means which God would use for her son's conversion, a thing she could not have known without special revelation. She prayed according to the knowledge which she had, and God answered her according to the desire of her heart.

This is a historical fact. Let us now *suppose* an example. A pious man in the city of Erfurt, in the reign of Maximilian, mourns over the corruptions of the church, and most earnestly longs for a reformation. He prays day and night, that the emperor may be converted, and feels that his prayer is accepted, and that his request will be granted. A charity student at law in the University, the son of a poor miner in a neighboring village, is walking with a friend that evening, when a sudden flash of lightning throws them both to the ground. He recovers, but finds that his friend is dead. This awful visitation is the means of his conversion to God, and he resolves on the spot to devote his whole life to the service of Christ in the ministry of the gospel. Is this an answer to the good man's prayers? He is praying for the conversion of the emperor as a means of reforming the church; but this young charity student is Martin Luther, a man whom God has qualified to do more for the reformation of his church than twenty such emperors as Maximilian could have done, had they been converted ever so thoroughly. We do not know, and we cannot always know, what are the best means

which God can employ for the accomplishment of his work ; but we do know the great ends he has to accomplish, and while we are praying sincerely and acceptably for Him to set in motion a particular instrumentality, towards the accomplishment of these purposes, he may in answer to our prayers set in motion another which is a thousand times more efficient.

But does not the Holy Spirit sometimes excite in Christians a particular desire for a particular object ? and incite them to pray for it with a full belief that this particular object will be gained ?

Such cases unquestionably may occur, and if we may trust the experience of Christians, they have occurred not unfrequently. In such cases, the desire is undoubtedly excited in order to lead Christians to pray more, and more earnestly, and thus prepare them for the reception of the particular blessing implored. The mistake consists in supposing that *all acceptable* prayer is of this distinctive character, and that this is the only prayer which deserves the name of the prayer of faith.

Some people talk and reason as if they supposed two or three Christians might, if they were only holy enough, go into a particular town, and there pray that every individual in that town might be immediately converted, and fully believe that their prayer would be literally answered, and that in consequence of this prayer and this faith, every individual in that town would be immediately converted, and that the only reason why the whole world is not thus converted at the present time, is, that Christians are not holy enough, or do not pray and believe in just this manner.

This idea, it appears to me, is uns scriptural and fanatical. If this be the correct idea of prayer, our Lord Jesus Christ, while he was upon earth, had holiness enough and faith enough to pray the whole world into the kingdom of heaven instantaneously, if it had been the will of God that the world should be so converted : and surely, he was not wanting in the exercise of prayer, rising up a great while before day and praying, and sometimes spending whole nights in prayer to God ; and it is but reasonable to suppose that he often prayed for those for whom he came to suffer and die, and for whom he was continually laboring. And undoubtedly, too, his prayers were heard, for he said to his Father, "*I know that thou always hearest me.*"

There are several instances in the Bible, where acceptable prayer has been offered, and God has heard and answered it, and yet the particular thing asked for has not been granted.

Gen. 17: 18—21. Abraham prays that Ishmael may inherit the promises which God had given him; God accepts the prayer, and tells him that it is accepted; and yet adheres to his previous determination that Sarah shall have a son who shall be the heir of the promises, and this, when it occurred, gave Abraham greater joy than if he had received the very thing he asked for.

Gen. 18: 16—33. Abraham intercedes for Lot. Who can read this narrative and not believe, that Abraham's intercession, though the thing he asked for was withholden, was both acceptable to God and profitable to himself?

2 Cor. 12: 7, 9. Paul prayed that a particular annoyance might be removed. What it was he does not inform us, and it is idle for us to conjecture. His prayer was accepted, the annoyance was not removed, but he had strength given him to bear it, and turn it to good account; so that he gloried in the very infirmity which had before troubled him, and from which he had thrice prayed to be delivered. He now feels it far better to have the infirmity, with the grace of God in enabling him to bear it, so that the power of Christ might be manifested in him.

The case of our Saviour is very remarkable, and well worthy our attention. Math. 26: 39—42. Mark 14: 35. Luke 22: 42. It was not the mere agony of crucifixion that our Saviour so much dreaded, but the untold, unutterable sorrow, connected with the hidings of his father's face from him in that dreadful hour, and the other sufferings connected with his death as an atoning sacrifice for our sins. When the hour approached, his human nature sunk, and he earnestly desired, if any other way were possible, he might be spared the agony.

Some have contended that Jesus feared he should die of his agony in the garden before he came to the cross, and he prayed to be saved from dying there; and the particular thing asked for was granted. In support of this interpretation, Heb. 5: 7, *he was heard in that he feared*, is quoted. The expression in the original is, *ἀπὸ τῆς σύλλαβσιας*, and *σύλλαβσια* in the New Testament does not mean *dread of death*, but it signifies *Godly fear*, (as it is translated in Heb. 12: 28,) or

piety. Compare Luke 2: 25. Acts 2: 5. 8: 2. 'A^w with the genitive means *on account of*, or *because of*. See Math. 18: 7. Luke 19: 3. Accordingly the meaning of the text is, *he was heard on account of his piety.* The passage indeed proves that his prayer was heard and accepted, but it does not prove that the particular thing asked for was granted.

Against this interpretation of our Saviour's prayer there are innumerable objections, both of a critical and moral nature.

1. It is by no means the obvious interpretation. No one, on first reading the passage, would ever imagine that Christ was praying to be saved from dying in the garden. Something else besides the narrative must put this idea into the reader's mind, or he would never have it.

2. It is contrary to the terms employed in the narrative. According to Mark 14: 35, Christ prayed, *Father, if it be possible let this hour pass from me.* Now, *hour* is the word generally used to signify the time of his death on the cross, as may be seen by consulting the following passages: John 7: 30. 8: 20. 12: 23, 27. 13: 1. 17: 1. Luke 22: 53. He prayed to be spared, if possible, the agonies of the atoning death. He was heard and answered by receiving strength to bear all that was laid upon him. Luke 22: 43.

3. The second time Jesus went away to pray he said, *My Father, if it be not possible that this cup pass from me except I drink it, thy will be done,* Matt. 26: 42. According to the interpretation we are considering, the meaning of this petition, divested of its figurative language, must be, *My Father, if it be not possible for me to survive this agony in the garden, if it be thy will that I never reach the cross, thy will be done.* Can any one suppose that Christ, as the words thus understood must imply, very nearly relinquished all hope of ever reaching the cross, concluded it was his Father's will that he should die in the garden, and composed himself to resignation?

4. The expressions which Christ uses, *Father, if it be possible, let it be so—if it be not possible, thy will be done, not as I will, but as thou wilt*, show that he was praying for what he scarcely expected would be literally granted. The petition is changed from the first form, as if he were sure that could not be granted. The progress of thought in the successive petitions, given by the different Evangelists, is a de-

cisive proof, to any one who will attentively consider it, that our interpretation is the correct one. But why should our Saviour pray for what he did not expect to get?

In all points, Christ was tried as we are, though without sin, Heb. 4 : 15, 16. This was one great object of his coming into the world, that he might feel just as we feel under our severest and heaviest trials, that we may have the comfort of knowing that he has perfect sympathy with us in our greatest distresses, Heb. 2 : 16, 18.

Now we often feel, in our heaviest trials, precisely as our Saviour must have felt in view of the cross, if our interpretation of these passages is correct. The father, when he sees his only child about to be torn from him by death, when all human hope is past, still cries out in agony, *if it be possible, let this cup pass from me*; but with sweet submission adds, *but if it be not possible, if this cup may not pass from me except I drink it, thy will be done*. He prays to be spared the blow if possible; it is a relief to him thus to pour out his heart in prayer, his heart would break if he were not permitted to do it. The particular thing asked for cannot be granted, but his prayer is heard and it is answered by giving him strength to bear the pangs from which he cannot be delivered. With such a prayer God is not offended; he is pleased with it. And what a relief it is thus to give utterance to our grief, and feel that we are pouring our sorrows into the ear of a kind-hearted Father, who would grant what we desire if it could be done consistently with our good, to feel that our blessed Saviour had the same intenseness of suffering and found the same mode of relief!

But what encouragement have we to pray, and how do we know our prayers are answered, if we receive not the very things we petition for? We know that our prayers are answered by the calm, sweet, submissive state of mind which acceptable prayer always produces. The Christian knows when God accepts and answers his prayer; for he feels the answer in the depths of his soul, and is sweetly at rest.

Supposing we should petition the Legislature of Ohio for onethous and acres of land in the north-west part of the State, for the benefit of an institution in Cincinnati, like that of Franke in Halle. The Legislature reply that this land is too distant for our inspection and care, and the profits of it exceedingly precarious; but they will give us in lieu of it,

twenty thousand dollars worth of real estate in Cincinnati, directly under our own eye, and the profits of which are certain and immediately available. Should we feel that the Legislature had denied our request? Would it diminish our confidence in them? Would it make us despair of the efficacy of petitioning?

The obedient and affectionate child just recovering from a fever, feels a strong appetite, and asks his father with proper feelings, and in a proper manner for a particular article of food, which the father knows (though the child does not) to be injurious. The father kindly receives the request, and in answer to it, gives a wholesome kind of food which the child gratefully accepts. In such a case, does the father feel, and does the child feel that the request was unavailing? Is not the thing really desired granted, though the particular thing asked for is withheld? The child's hunger is satisfied, and satisfied too in answer to his request; his health is promoted, and both father and son are happy, the one in giving, the other in receiving a blessing.

Acceptable prayer, and even the prayer of faith, does not always imply a perfectly definite conception in the mind in respect to the object of prayer, at least, not a conception which the petitioner is able clearly to embody in words. Indeed the devotional Christian, in his highest state of devotion often has desires in his heart too big for expression, pulsations towards God which surpass the mind's conception. Like Paul, he hears words unutterable, (2 Cor. 12: 4.)

Observe carefully the words in Rom. 8: 26, 27; "Likewise the spirit also helpeth our infirmities, for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the Saints, according to the will of God." There are times when we know not ourselves how to pray. The spirit within us intercedes for us. But is it with definite thoughts and full expressions? No, but with sighings unutterable. With feelings which no language can express, no mind clearly comprehend. But is not this praying in vain? beating the air? What! pray when we ourselves do not clearly comprehend our own prayer? Is not this an absurdity? No, for God, he who searches the heart, knows what is the mind of the

spirit in those ecstatic moments, even though we may not, for the spirit maketh intercession for us according to the will of God.

It was in reference to such a state of devotional feeling as this, that I once heard Dr. Payson of Portland say, that he pitied the Christian who never had desires in prayer which he could not clothe in language.

Another passage worthy of notice in this connexion is 1 John 5 : 14, 15. "And this is the confidence that we have in him, that if we ask anything according to his will he heareth us. And if we know that he hear us whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions we desired of him." The Apostle here affirms that, if we ask anything according to the will of God, he heareth us. If we know this, then we know that, though we may make mistakes both in the matter and manner of our petitions, yet God will so hear us that we shall receive what we in our inmost heart really and deeply desired, though it be not the very thing that was in our mind and upon our tongue while engaged in prayer. The Holy Spirit breathes into us a devotional life, and in the excitement of it, we pray according to the knowledge we have, and God accepts the prayer, not in proportion to our knowledge, but in proportion to our devotional feeling, which may far exceed our knowledge.

We have the same kind of assistance in prayer that we have in preaching. In preaching, the Holy Spirit does not furnish us with words nor with arguments, but excites us to a right state of feeling, and then we speak and argue according to our knowledge of language and reasoning. So it is in prayer. This erroneous idea respecting the prayer of faith seems to have arisen from interpreting passages peculiar to the Apostles' circumstances, and properly applicable to them only, as though they were of universal application. That there are promises peculiar to the Apostles no one can doubt. Such are those which direct them not to premeditate as to what they shall say when they are brought before magistrates, because the Holy Ghost shall teach them how and what they shall speak. Mark 13 : 11. Matt. 10 : 19. Luke 12 : 11. 21 : 14. That the same law of interpretation applies to the promises in John 14 : 13, 14. 15 : 7. 16 : 23, 24, is evident from the context. The promise in Matt. 18 : 19, 20, is shown from its connexion to be limited to the Apostles in the execution of their apostolic office.

There is also a special faith in respect to the working of miracles, to which special promises are given. Matt. 17: 14—21.

The same kind of faith also is alluded to in Matt. 21: 18—22. Mark 11: 12—26.

In respect to this passage, however, an objection has been started which deserves attention. It has been said that the duty of forgiveness being inculcated (Matt. 11: 25, 26,) proves that the promise is a general one, and does not refer to the faith of working miracles. The objection would be valid, if it could be shown that it was not the duty of the disciples to forgive, when they prayed for the faith of miracles; but if it was the duty of the disciples to forgive when they prayed for this kind of faith, as well as at other times, then this exhortation is altogether in place; though the faith of miracles is the particular faith alluded to.

Again it has been asked, What is the faith of miracles? is it anything else than faith in God? The faith of miracles is indeed faith in God, but it is faith in God for a specific purpose, directed to a specific end. I believe thousands of Christians now living have real faith in God—but have they the faith of miracles? can they repeat the mighty works of Christ and his apostles, or do they imagine that they can?

Faith in God generally, as it should be exercised by all Christians, is described in Heb. 11: 6; but the faith of miracles is a specific confidence, that God will enable us, for his glory, to perform a specific act, independently of the common laws of nature—an exercise of mind certainly very different from the general confidence, however strong it may be, that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. No one could safely venture to undertake to work a miracle without this specific belief; but it is not at all necessary for the proper discharge of the ordinary duties of a Christian life.

When the Holy Spirit really prompts Christians to ask for a specific object, for the purpose of preparing them for its reception, the exercise of mind is really the same as that which was required for the working of miracles, and is equally certain of being specifically responded to. Christians, and especially those who are highly devotional, not unfrequently are favored with such exercises; and they are often desirable. But the simple-hearted and devotional Christian

is not to be distressed because his faith does not always partake of this specific character; nor is the boisterous and bold to lift up himself and talk saucily to God, because he imagines himself to have this kind of faith. But the question occurs, why are we required to pray at all? Surely God needs no information as to our wants or necessities, and nothing that we can say can induce him to change any of his purposes, or make him any more desirous to promote his own glory, or the best interests of his creatures, than he now is. A Persian fable may help to illustrate this point. "One day as I was in the bath (says the fable) a friend put into my hand a piece of scented clay. I took it and said to it, art thou musk or ambergris? for I am charmed with thy perfume. It answered, I was a despicable piece of clay, but I was sometime in the company of the rose—the sweet quality of my companion was communicated to me, otherwise I should be only a bit of clay as I appear to be." The same idea is illustrated by 2nd Corinthians 3: 18. We are required to pray that our souls may be brought into contact with our God and Saviour, that his sympathies and feelings may flow into our hearts and transform us into his image, that we may thus be fit to receive the blessings that he gives, and learn to value them.

God neither converts nor sanctifies us by the direct exertion of his physical omnipotence; but by shedding abroad his love in our hearts, and as it were magnetizing our souls with his own unspeakable affection.

Moreover, the very existence of God would become a matter of indifference, if not of absolute scepticism, if our blessings were not to be sought and obtained by prayer. It is when we go to God as our Father, that we feel that he exists; and the mere philosopher, who barely proves the existence of God from the works of nature, has done very little towards convincing our hearts that God is, much less that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him.

While Stilling was at Strasburg, he was surrounded with sceptics and atheists, who advanced many arguments that he felt himself incapable of answering; but the tempter found nothing in him. These thoughts were in his heart, "He who so obviously hears the prayers of men, and guides their destiny so wonderfully and visibly, must beyond dispute be the true God, and his doctrine the word of God. Now, I have

always adored and worshiped Jesus Christ as my God and Saviour; he has heard me in the hour of need, and wonderfully supported and succored me; consequently Jesus Christ is incontestibly the true God; his doctrine the word of God, and his religion, so as he has instituted it, the true religion."

The arguing Christian may easily be ensnared by the sophistry of infidels, but the praying Christian never.

The same principle applies also to prayer for others, and intercessory prayer has additional benefits. Whenever we pray for others, we become deeply interested in them; and we cannot long pray for them without loving them. The Christian who is in the habit of praying for his enemies, finds no difficulty in obeying the precept of Christ which requires him to love them; but the prayerless person will find even the duty of forgiveness a very hard one.

It is a glorious privilege to be workers together with God in the great work of promoting the salvation of mankind, and that none may be deprived of a participation in so precious a privilege, the most efficient instrumentality is one in which all can unite, the poorest as well as the richest, the weakest as well as the strongest; the instrumentality of prayer. The poor, deserted, unfriended widow, feeble and helpless and dependent on charity for her daily bread, can lend a helping hand to the progress of God's chariot as really as Paul or Luther.

With two reflections we close our remarks on this interesting topic.

1. What a rich privilege the Christian has in prayer! The Christian, I mean, whose walk is consistent, whose devotion is uniform, who lives by the faith of the Son of God; for nothing short of this uniformly consistent life gives one a firm hold on the promises. The Christian who lives usually as the world live, cannot, when his exigencies seem to require it, suddenly work himself up into a spirit of prayer, any more than the man whose physical energies have been weakened and his health impaired by a long course of indolence and dissipation, can suddenly become healthy and vigorous, when placed in circumstances of distress and peril. My Christian friends, if you are not now in a condition which gives you firm hold on the promises, let not this day pass without a resolute effort in the strength of Christ, to plant your feet on this high ground of Christian confidence, and to maintain

your position there till this mortal shall have put on immortality, and faith be lost in vision. The promises authorize you, if you are what a Christian ought to be, to pray with the utmost confidence of receiving the blessing you seek, for your own advancement in every Christian virtue, and for the impartation of spiritual blessings to those in whom you are interested. 1 Thess. 4: 3. Luke 11: 5—13. You are authorized to pray, with the utmost confidence, for every temporal mercy which you need, and with the assurance that nothing will be withholden from you which will really promote your welfare. Matt. 7: 7—13. Ps. 85: 11. You are authorized to pray for the relief of your fellow-creatures in every time of distress, for the entire removal of sin and all its attendant wretchedness from the face of the earth, with the utmost confidence that not one of your petitions shall be unavailing before God. Ps. 102: 17, 21.

Every Christian, in every Christian community, that lives and prays aright, fills the sphere which he occupies with an atmosphere of spiritual blessedness, by which all who breathe it are benefitted, unless they obstinately reject its wholesome influences. Let no Christian, by a life of spiritual insensibility, deprive himself of the distinguishing privilege of his profession.

2. How miserable the impenitent who never offer acceptable prayer? God is no respecter of persons, he has none of those personal partialities and personal antipathies, irrespective of actual merit or demerit, by which our social feelings are so much characterized. As each one is in heart, so God regards him. He that loves and obeys God, has access to his mercy seat; he that neither loves nor obeys, makes himself a stranger and an alien from his Father's house. My impenitent friends, do you not desire access to the throne of grace, where the promises are so full and free? the hope so sure and certain? Poor, unhappy creatures indeed are you, if you have nothing but an arm of flesh to rely upon. How can that deliver your soul from spiritual death? How can that save you from the sorrows and miseries of *this* life even? How can that save you from the pangs of hell? Beware, there is a time when God will hear all who call upon him, and there is a time when he will refuse to hear, and that too a time of extremest agony. Read carefully Prov. 1: 20—33.

To-day if ye will hear his voice harden not your hearts.
Ps. 95: 7, 8.

ARTICLE II.

GREEK AND ROMAN EDUCATION.

By Rev. Albert Smith, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature, Middlebury College

THE science of education is in this country in its infancy. In America every thing is young, for we are a youthful people, just entered on a career of uncertain termination. That education should have made but little progress in this new world, will appear the less surprising, if we consider that no modern nation, the Germans alone excepted, can be regarded as possessed of a scientific and thorough knowledge of the subject; and that out of the countries of Luther and of Knox, there exists among no people of the present day any thing more than the rudiments of a system of public instruction. The nations of the old world are, in general, not so much in advance of us in this, as they are in other sciences and arts. And even if they were, we should still be disposed, on account of the difference between the political institutions of the two continents, to receive their doctrines with suspicion. If the emperor of China, of Austria, or of Russia chooses to give to his loyal subjects some form of education, we are apt to think that the system which would please him might not suit the genius of the "fierce democracie" with which we are in love. We have therefore in this matter set up for ourselves. If our religion must remain as its great Author left it, in government at least, and in education, we would make all things new. In the treatises, addresses, and reports in which the subject of education is discussed, many arguments are drawn from reason and common sense, and some from excited imagination, but from testimony and the experience of other nations, very few. Every man has his own scheme, and theories in abundance float loosely in the public mind. In this time of unsettled views, it may with reason be inquired whether we do not reject too rashly the collected wisdom of ages? If we look with contempt upon the spurious science of idolatrous and Mohammedan Asia; if we reject the monarchical principles of modern Europe; it may still be asked whether there comes to us no voice of instruction from antiquity? Do we require of our instructors that they should

love freedom and hate tyranny? Liberty has found no more enthusiastic defenders than the democrats of Athens, tyranny no more uncompromising foes than the republicans of Rome. Do we insist that masters who teach so wise a nation as ourselves should be distinguished in literature, science, and art? The glorious light of a free civilization, struggling through the gloom of the middle ages, as the splendors of the departed sun stream up behind the forests of the west, still reaches us from republican antiquity. The history, the constitutions, the eloquence of the ancient republics are the study of our statesmen and orators. The dead languages in which their literature is buried consume the best years of our choicest youth. An acquaintance with their poetry, philosophy, architecture, and sculpture is regarded as indispensable to the formation of a perfect taste. We admire the genius and the skill of the beauty-loving Greek, and look with reverence on the lofty dignity, the inflexible integrity, the self-sacrificing patriotism, and the unyielding perseverance of the stern republican of Rome. There is no enlightened monarchy in Europe in which the character, institutions, science, literature, and arts of the republicans of antiquity are not examined and admired. And surely it might be expected that in the great republic of modern times these subjects should excite a still deeper interest. It seems surprising that in this forming period of our institutions, and especially at a time when the attention of the people and governments of so many States is turned towards schemes of public instruction, there should be among us so little inquiry respecting the education of the ancients. Do we regard the subject as unworthy of investigation? Why not then despise the literature and science, the arts of peace and war with which this education was connected? We cannot imagine that the character of the ancient republicans, stamped with features of nobleness and beauty, happened into being. There existed somewhere a forming power. Is it supposed that this character is the offspring chiefly of the physical influences of climate and soil? The skies of Italy are sunny still, but they smile no longer on that noble race of men whose virtues St. Augustine has said, God rewarded with the dominion of the world. The air of Hellas is pure as ever, but it breathes not the spirit of the ancient time. The men of Greece and Rome, vigorous in body, heroic in spirit, and trained to self-control, rose not

from the earth by magic. If their characters were not formed by physical influences only, there must have been in the production of them some intellectual and moral process. What was that process? This question, which to us appears both interesting and important, we do not undertake to answer. It covers a field of investigation by far too extensive for our present limits. But in the belief that much is to be learned from antiquity, we propose to point out some of the characteristics of republican education as it existed in Greece and Rome. All men, it is said, are in some sense educated. But that only is appropriately called education by which, in the training of the body or the mind, some permanent effect is produced *by design*. With an occasional reference to the Spartan system, as furnishing the best specimen of the comparative roughness of the Doric race, we shall refer in what we say of the Greek education chiefly to Athens; because more is known of the Athenian education than of any other which existed among the ancients, and because intellectual education was carried at Athens to a perfection which has been seldom equalled.

One of the first things that strikes the inquirer into the practical education of the Greeks is *the commanding position of the state*. The idea of the state stood out among the nations of antiquity with far greater prominence than in modern times. With the ancients, the community was every thing and the individual nothing. Private happiness was of no account, and must be sacrificed to the smallest public benefit. For the state the child was born, for the state the man must live, and therefore the youth was to be educated for and by the state. We see this preponderating influence of the state illustrated in the most striking manner at Lacedæmon. It was not the man, but the Spartan, that filled the eye of the educator in the institution of the system which has immortalized Lycurgus. That famous law-giver aimed not at the development of the noble faculties of the human being, but at the formation of the useful qualities of the citizen. By meagre fare and rigid discipline he hardened the bodies of the youth, and by certain moral influences, skilfully applied, he strengthened the virtues of courage, self-government, patient endurance, and self-consecration to the welfare of the state. The result of his system was, that those hardy qualities of body and of mind which would be of greatest service to a nation of

warriors, were cultivated to an unnatural extent, while the intellect was suffered to lie dormant, and all the finer feelings of our nature were neglected or crushed. The idea of personal rights was not developed, and private education was prohibited. It was not without some show of reason that the enemies of the Spartans maintained that there was nothing surprising in the willingness of that people to die for their country, since with them life was a condition of intolerable hardship. But at Athens a milder spirit reigned. There the Ionic softness breathed its humanizing influence. No partition of lands or other attempts at community of property there suppressed the principle of individuality. No system of commons annihilated the refining and restraining influences of domestic life, and no moral machinery acting in precisely the same manner on all minds cast them as nearly as possible in one mould. Yet the principle that the child belonged to the state, and that the state was responsible for its education, was admitted and acted on. And it is worthy of particular remark that the first use which the state made of its power in relation to the offspring of its citizens was to extend the benefits of education to the whole body of the free born youth.* By the laws of Solon,† every

* Since it was required by law that all the boys should learn to read, it cannot be otherwise imagined than that the state made also provision for this purpose; although on this point there is much uncertainty in regard to the way in which the matter was arranged."—Schwartz Erziehungslehre I: 369.

"Solon left it just as little as Minos and Lycurgus to parents, how they should educate their children; but he constrained fathers, by laws, whose execution he committed to the members of the Areopagus, to give their sons an education suited to their rank and property."—Meiners Geschichte der Wissenschaften II: 59.

"For the awakening of intellectual activity and the moral education of the young citizens, an influence was especially exerted by the celebrated lawgiver of Athens, Solon: he, and even at an earlier period Draco, directed their whole attention above all things to sobriety (*σωφροσύνη*) and modest deportment (*σύκοσμια*) on the part of the youth, and marked out with entire accuracy what the free boys and young men should learn, and how they should be educated."—Cramers Geschichte der Erziehung, I: 233.

father was bound to teach his son at least to *read and to swim*, and the parent who had not done as much as this for his children had in old age no claim on them for support. Writing was learned at the same time with reading,* and to be ignorant of letters was a mark of the greatest disgrace. A man who was in this condition was regarded as wholly unworthy of the privileges of citizenship, and was branded with the ignominious epithet of "barbarian."† In regard to education the relation of Attica to Greece was very similar to that of New England in respect to the states of our confederacy. The intellectual superiority of the Athenians, however, was far more decided and striking than is that of New England. Athens was the school house of Greece. As the youth of New England now spread themselves through the country as teachers, so once the young men of Athens taught their less cultivated countrymen. So common was it to engage in teaching, that when a man had been long missing the proverbial expression was, "He is either dead or turned schoolmaster." The universal extent of education at Athens is indicated by a fact which occurred at one of the darkest periods in the history of that city. "In the time of the Peloponnesian war, Euripides was the favorite poet, not only in Greece but also in Sicily; hence many Athenian soldiers, after the unfortunate defeat in Sicily, were able to save their lives and improve their condition only by reciting to their masters the verses of Euripides. Besides, among those who were condemned to labor in the stone-quarries, the more cultivated were set at liberty by the Syracusan youth. How much intelligence and how much cultivation prevailed at that period among the common soldiers of the Athenians, we see not merely in this instance of the acquaintance of many with the tragedies of Euripides, but also in the fact that not a few of them were able to support themselves by instruction.‡

* Schwartz Erziehungslehre I: 374.

† "A knowledge of writing became about the same time general; not to be able to write was at Athens a reproach of barbarism, ($\mu\acute{\eta}\tau\epsilon\; v\ddot{a}\gamma\gamma\; \mu\acute{\eta}\tau\epsilon\; i\acute{p}\acute{a}\mu\acute{\eta}\alpha\tau\alpha$ —a proverbial mark of entire want of culture); institutions for instruction without doubt existed in great numbers."—Wachsmuths Hellenische Alterthumskunde II: 464, 16. (§ 141, 109.)

‡ Cramers Geschichte der Erziehung I: 285.

Athens was not the only Grecian state in which the whole body of citizens was required to be educated. We read that Pittacus, the Mitylenean law-giver, enacted that if any one committed a crime through ignorance, he should be put on the same ground as if he had done it in a state of intoxication, (i. e.) he should suffer a double punishment.*

It belonged to the government to regulate the time which was devoted to education. At Sparta, where individual interests were not recognized, the whole life of the citizen was spent in the service of the state. But at Athens personal freedom was more regarded. The youth was held to be the property of the state only till his twentieth year, and for the remainder of his life the man was his own. Something was left at Athens to the parent, and private education was not suppressed. As there were no common means of support as at Sparta, the amount of education acquired, depended, of course, to some extent on the rank and ability of the family. But every citizen was expected to exhibit a certain degree of culture, and every parent was obliged to cause his son to be instructed not only in some liberal art or other useful calling, but also in the two great departments—the physical and the intellectual—of a good education.† The law which required all the citizens of Athens to be able to read or write, was supported by public sentiment. Instruction in these branches was commenced at the age of seven, and was followed by thorough and long continued training in music and gymnastics. The schools were opened at sunrise, at which time the youth were required to be present with their luncheon, which was to be eaten at the proper hour under the palm trees, and after having spent the whole day in exercises either of body or of mind, were dismissed shortly before sunset. Seldom were they seen in the street without their teachers. At the age of eighteen, the young men, having made a public consecration of the long locks which had hitherto marked them as the devotees of science and the arts, took the citizen's oath. "I will not disgrace the sacred weapons, I will reverence religion and fight for the laws,—I will leave my native land not in a worse but in a better state than that in which

* So also the drunkard. Cramer I : 252.

† Cramer I : 245, 246.

I found it." After two years of probationary service in the militia, at twenty, education was complete.

It was the business of the state to watch over the *morals* of the youth, and to see that they were not corrupted either in doctrine or practice. The charge against Socrates was, not only that he had attacked the religion of the state, by encouraging the rejection of the national deities, but that, by teaching false doctrines, he corrupted the youth of Athens. With this notice of the relation which existed between education and the state, we proceed to sketch briefly some of the features of the education itself.

In the early period of Grecian history, the education of the Greeks was almost entirely *physical*. Aside from a few of the most prominent and useful virtues, such as courage, fortitude, and piety, the body was the great object of attention. The reason of this is obvious. Among all uncivilized nations, physical strength is of much greater importance than in a more advanced state of society. With them martial prowess is the highest virtue. Deeds of arms—of arms wielded by the hands—decide the most important questions. Bodily strength, skill in the use of weapons, swiftness of foot,—these are the things by which among such a people, property is acquired and held, honor and power secured, and life itself preserved. These are therefore regarded with respect and admiration, and if we add the power of eloquent speaking, we shall have the chief objects aimed at in the education of the early Greeks. To the Greeks of the heroic age, Hercules was the ideal of a perfect man. The aim of the educators of that period, has been concisely and elegantly summed up by Homer, in his statement of the view with which Peleus committed his son to the instruction of Phœnix. The line to which we refer has been translated by Cicero, "*Ut illum efficeret oratorem verborum, actoremque rerum*"—that he might make Achilles in language an orator, and in deeds, a hero.* We hear nothing in Homer of reading and writing. But as civilization advanced in Greece, we observe a remarkable difference in respect to systematic education between the principal tribes into which its inhabitants were divided.

* *De Oratore* III : 15. μέθων τε πρτῆρ ξμεναι, τρητεηρά τε ξργυν. II. IX : 442, 443, 485.

The Dorians, adhering to the primitive ideas of the object of education, aimed at the development of the bodily powers. The design of Lycurgus was to form and perpetuate in the Spartans a nation of heroes. And he accomplished his object. But his heroes, like the demi-gods of Homer, were rarely able to say their letters. The Ionic race on the other hand, not neglecting physical education, connected with it intellectual culture. The Athenians attempted to develope in due proportion all the powers of the man. Every citizen was to be instructed in the two great branches of education, music and gymnastics. In regard to physical training, the difference between the Spartan and Athenian education consisted in the fact, that in the Spartan system gymnastic exercises, which with them had special reference to war, constituted nearly the whole of education, and were extended through the lives of the citizens ; whereas among the Athenians, gymnastics were used chiefly for purposes of discipline, and when all the bodily powers had been fully developed, were discontinued.* The principal objects aimed at by the Athenians in bodily discipline, were health, strength, and beauty. In securing these ends two classes of means were used.† The first, which may be included under the head dietetics, consisted in a proper care of the organic powers of life by a suitable attention to food, sleep, cleanliness, clothing, and the like. Gymnastics constituted the other set of means. These were designed to act upon the muscular system, and were regarded not only at Athens, but in all Greece, as of so much importance that they gave name if not to education itself, at least to the places where it was acquired. At a certain age, the youth of Athens were sent to the Gymnasia, and committed to teachers, whose business it was to develope their bodily powers by gymnastic exercises. These exercises were such as wrestling, boxing, running, leaping, swimming, riding, driving the chariot, ball-playing, and the like. In all these, the object was the union of swiftness and strength. There were at Athens several famous gymnasia devoted to

* The training of the Athletæ excepted ; also such exercises as were regarded as promotive of health or suitable for amusement. Cramer's *Geschichte der Erziehung* I: 292.

† Wachmuth's *Hellenische Alterthumskunde* II: 19. (§110.)

these exercises. Such were the Ptolemaeum, the Academy, the Odeum, the Cynosarges, and the Lyceum. In these gymnasia, at a later period, when bodily exercises were less valued, lectures were delivered. In the Lyceum the Sophists wrangled, and in the Ptolemaeum Cicero heard Antiochus of Askalon.

Passing from the subject of physical to that of *intellectual education*, we find that the Athenian system consisted of an admirable combination of development with instruction. The distinction between education in the strict sense, and instruction, is obvious. The one draws out and cultivates the faculties, the other communicates knowledge. In every good system education and instruction, like twin sisters, will go hand in hand. This was the case at Athens. Among the Spartans instruction was for the most part passed over. To form the physical powers and to strengthen the judgment, were with them the objects to be accomplished. But the Athenian system, while in the training both of the body and the mind, it aimed at the development of the powers of the man, embraced a great variety of objects of instruction. In their schools were taught reading, writing, pronunciation, grammar, arithmetic, geography, geometry, astronomy, logic, rhetoric, ethics, history, the laws, politics, and in the time of Aristotle, design. As the nation advanced in civilization, refinement, and wealth, the subjects of study, and the ratio of instruction to development constantly increased. The study began by requiring its citizens to read and write, and if in its encouragements to education it aimed at utility, it was not that utility which leaves out of view taste and refinement; for Pericles while at the head of the government carried the fine arts by his patronage to the highest perfection. In early times science in its higher forms was not cultivated. Practical politics constituted the central point of all knowledge. It was not literary productions therefore, or scientific investigations which were then most highly valued, but oratory as the great means of diffusing knowledge. But the universal ability to read and write could not but give an impulse to science. The seed sown by Solon sprang up and brought forth fruit. As the power of Athens was increased and her dominions extended, new sources of knowledge and new subjects of investigation presented themselves. Learned men flocked to Athens, and students resorted thither in great

numbers for the purpose of acquiring or completing an education. The schools of philosophy became so famous that their disciples constituted little commonwealths. Theophrastus had 2000 hearers, and in the days of Cicero there were more strangers at Athens than citizens. In the discipline of the intellectual powers, the Greeks made use of no other language than their own.* Their national pride led them (and not without some reason,) to regard other nations when compared with themselves, as barbarians, and the languages of such nations, if learned at all, were learned not as a means of education, but for practical purposes of life. Nor were the several branches of natural history and natural philosophy in this point of view, of much service. For these sciences were yet in too rude a state to be employed for purposes of discipline.

Of the studies which are in use among the most polished nations of modern times as means of discipline, *mathematics*, which is one of the most important, was cultivated for the same purpose by the Greeks. The excellence of mathematical pursuits as a discipline for the mind was well understood by that intellectual people, and in particular this study was esteemed as a highly useful, if not indispensable preparation for philosophy. That this was the view at least of Plato, is evident from the famous inscription over the door of the Academy where his philosophical lectures were delivered, "Let no one enter who is ignorant of Geometry."† It is no small proof of acuteness and versatility of genius in the Greeks, that they not only saw the relation between two sciences in many respects so unlike as Mathematics and Metaphysics, but reached the highest eminence in each, and made themselves in both for more than two thousand years the instructors of the human race. While on the one hand the philosophical speculations of Plato and Aristotle, after having moulded the mind of nations, still command the attention of the profoundest thinkers, on the other, the Geometry of Euclid remains a text book in the schools.

Among the means of mental discipline, employed by the

* Anacharsis II: 281.

† Οὐδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω. By some this has been attributed to Xenocrates.

Greeks, must be reckoned *Music*. The relation which music bore to education among the ancients was peculiar, and the estimation in which the art was held, may be seen in the different senses in which the word was used, and in the prominence which was given to it in education. According to Plato, education consists of two branches, Music and Gymnastics—music for the mind and gymnastics for the body. In music is included the whole intellectual and moral development, while the cultivation of the physical powers belongs to gymnastics. This use of the word music, however foreign from our notions of the meaning of terms, is not confined to Plato.*

One reason why music was so much cultivated was that eloquence is dependent on language, and language with the Greeks had important relations to music. And if in oratory music was supposed to be useful, in poetry it was regarded as indispensable. Poetry without music, says Plato, is like a face once beautiful, which has lost the bloom of youth. There is no doubt that music, in the strict sense of the word was in far more extensive use in education among the ancients than at the present day. "Music," they said, "is a good leader in war, a good companion in civic duties, and a good means of education." Instruction in music was universal in Greece; or, if it was wanting in any region, it was only in some inland state, and among the roughest tribes. It was not, however, skill in the use of either the native stringed instruments of Greece or of the Asiatic wind instruments, that was chiefly aimed at in this instruction by the Greeks. They believed that music is capable of producing a strong moral impression, and of becoming a powerful instrument in the formation of character. "There is music," they said, "in the earth, and music in the stars, and why should there not be music in the soul of man?" The intellectual part of the Spartan education consisted almost entirely of music without general instruction in reading and writing, and although the Athenian system embraced a much wider range of objects,

* In Crito and other portions of his writings, Plato speaks of Education as comprising two great classes of objects of instruction—music and gymnastics. Elsewhere (as in Clitophon) he makes three, adding *τα γράμματα*.

yet music was regarded as an indispensable element in the education of every citizen.* Even reading as it was taught in the schools was a musical exercise, since music was required to distinguish the long and short syllables, and to regulate the rise and fall of the voice and the emissions of breath, by certain rules which had their origin in the musical feeling of the Greeks. The opinion of the Greeks respecting the moral influence of music is seen in the strictness of the laws, in which their early legislators prohibited or allowed the use of certain instruments, and in the vigilance with which they guarded against innovations in a science of so much importance. The enervating melodies of Asiatic Ionia, however, at length made their way across the Ægean and mingled with the simple harmony of Greece. But although these innovations, after having been at first hissed from the stage even at Athens, succeeded at last in establishing themselves there, they met with no quarter at Lacedæmon. "Strike from your lyre four of its eleven strings," was the decree of the kings and ephori against Timotheus the Ionian, "and corrupt not the youth of Sparta with your soft, effeminate airs." Yet the same warlike people knew how to employ softer measures when such were the most useful. Laying aside the rougher instruments, they commanded their troops to march against the enemy to the sound of flutes, because the fiery courage of the Spartan youth, always urging them beyond the bounds of prudence, needed not the spirit-stirring stimulus of the trumpet and the horn. "The hymns of the first poets," says the Abbe Barthélemy, "inspired piety, their poems the thirst of glory, their elegies patience and firmness under misfortune. Examples as well as precepts were easily imprinted on the memory by simple airs of a noble and expressive character; and the youth, early accustomed to repeat them, imbibed with pleasure the love of every duty, and the true idea of real excellence."†

We turn to another characteristic of the Grecian education

* Der Glaube an die Allgewalt der Musik war in Athen eben so gross, wie in Sparta, und daher wurde auch hier Musikalische Bildung als nothwendig von jedem Freien gefordert. —Cramers Geschichte Erziehung, I: 275.

† Anacharsis, II: 127.

—*its aim at the union of the beautiful and good.* If there is any one feature of the Grecian character which is more strongly marked than all the others, it is the love of the beautiful. The idea of beauty pervaded the national mind, and spread itself through every portion of society. It guided every thought and motion, and gave form and color to every production. The Graces reigned in Greece with undisputed sway, and Jupiter himself inspired his worshippers, not so much with fear by the thunder which he bore, as with love and admiration by the mingled beauty and grandeur of his form, and the serene and awful majesty that sat upon his brow. This characteristic of the Greeks developed itself in a thousand ways, but in none more strikingly than in their conceptions of the gods. In the ideas of their divinities, which were embodied and expressed by painting and sculpture, is grouped together a collection of beauties, physical, intellectual, and moral, which the modern world has labored in vain to equal. In the mythology of the Greeks, in the fables which obtained currency in the heroic age, and even in their early history, we see the most conclusive proofs that the love of beauty was a national characteristic. That a beautiful body is the external form in which a beautiful and noble spirit dwells, was the common belief of the Greeks. On the other hand, between deformity and vice there is, it seemed to them, a natural connection. The bad qualities of Thersites, Homer clothes with a misshapen and ugly body. The fascinations of beauty originated the Trojan war; the goddesses strove for the prize of beauty; if the gods descended from heaven to visit men, it was beauty that brought them down; and when mortals were seized and carried to Olympus, beauty was the quality which secured them this preëminence. If Jupiter in the counsels of the gods, was proud, haughty, and inexorable, the charms of beauty had power to soften his severity, and render him placable and mild. It was not the virtuous only, but the beautiful that were admitted to the favor of the gods. If heaven was in commotion and Olympus was shaken to its centre, it was some beauty either present or absent that produced the tumult.

The Orientals desired children, the Greeks wished not for children simply, but for beautiful children. The barbarous custom of *exposing* infants was intimately connected with this love of beauty. When the child at five days old was

presented to his father, so completely did the love of beauty triumph over natural affection, that a personal deformity subjected the little unfortunate to a cruel death. The ancient philosophers taught, that goodness and beauty, if not absolutely identical, are in their nature inseparable.*

Whatever may have been the origin of this love of beauty in the Greek, their system of education was fitted to foster it, and so far as the education was extended, to make it universal. Homer was the text-book in all the schools, and the absence of the Iliad was considered as so unpardonable, that Alcibiades once gave a school-master who had no Homer, a box on the ear. Other poets also were studied, but Homer moulded the mind of the nation. At Athens the body of the people from their infancy were familiar with his poems, and many in old age could repeat the whole Iliad. If we consider what Homer in the Iliad is ; if we call to mind the dignity of his subject, the harmony of his numbers, the nobleness of his sentiments, the beauty of his descriptions, and the inexpressible fire of genius that pervades the whole and enables him to clothe the immortal gods with human forms and make them mingle in all the affairs of men ; we shall see how admirably fitted as an instrument of education was the study of his works to produce in the minds of the susceptible and imaginative Greeks a love of the beautiful. Various other modes were adopted in their education to cultivate the feeling for the beautiful. Pericles proclaimed, that while Athens opened an asylum to the unfortunate of all nations, *his countrymen should love the beautiful and true.* Had the Greeks possessed a means of forming moral character as efficient as the instrumentalities which concurred in cherishing the feeling for the beautiful, the result would have no doubt approached more really to the realization of that charming theory which is indicated by the term *καλόκαγαθία*. Their system aimed at the beautiful and good, but unhappily produced only the beautiful without the good.

* The relation to each other of the ideas of beauty and goodness has been developed with much originality of thought and felicity of expression, in two lectures on "The Connexion between Taste and Morals," by President Hopkins of Williams College.

While this was the theory of the Greek education, the highest practical object was the production of a perfect orator, and a perfect master of "divine philosophy."* Eloquence, according to Aristotle and Cicero, is the daughter of freedom and of peace. Under a despotism she pines away for want of exercise, and amid the tumult of war her voice is drowned by the clash of arms. Eloquence exists, however, in the rudest periods of society, and is called into action in the stormiest times. Ulysses spoke with skill, and the words of Nestor were sweeter than honey. But it was another age that produced Demosthenes. Cherished by education, and strengthened by the arts of peace, oratory in its noblest form appeared in Greece at a later period. It was intimately connected with politics. The orator was the leader of the people, and therefore every statesman must be an orator. The sciences of Rhetoric and government were regarded as inseparable, and in the brightest days of Greece, success in them was considered as the highest summit of human excellence. But when the sun of Grecian glory was descending towards the west, another science rose into consequence and contended with Rhetoric for the place of honor. *Philosophy* came to be considered as a necessary means of education, and to be universally cultivated by those who wished to elevate themselves above the common mass. The four most distinguished philosophical schools, the Academic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean, each maintained a Professor's chair at Athens, and under the Roman Emperors these schools became state institutions, whose teachers received their salaries from the government.† While rhetoric was taught with distinguished success at Rhodes, the subtle and metaphysical genius of the Greeks found, at

* The arts and sciences belong to musical education, and this ends with the love of the beautiful and good. Philosophy, therefore, which is the love of science and wisdom, which relates to divine things, which elevates man to true freedom, and imparts dignity even to common affairs—is the most perfect music and the highest of all cultures.

† The annual stipend of a Professor of philosophy is stated at ten thousand, and of a Professor of politics at six thousand drachmæ. Cramer's *Geschichte der Erziehung* I: 35.

Athens, in the speculations of philosophy its native element. The age at which the youth sought the philosophical schools is not well defined, but the years devoted to this one study were equal to those of our college course. In general the youth heard lectures in philosophy from the sixteenth to the twentieth year, but the study was often begun as in the case of Epicurus in boyhood. The remark of Cramer,* that the extensive study of philosophy among any people is a sign, if not of decrepitude and decay, at least of a ripe national character, is illustrated by the history of Greece. This study did not decline with the corruption of morals and the overthrow of freedom, but maintained itself in vigor for centuries at the seat of science. The Athenians re-built the gardens of the philosophers as often as the barbarians destroyed them.

In concluding what we have to say of the Grecian education, it is proper to refer to the unfavorable change in the mode of training youth at Athens about the time of Socrates. The influence of the state in education was far more decided and strong in the earlier than in the later periods of the history of Athens. By degrees education broke away from the restraints imposed by the state, and became to a great extent a private matter. This change seems to have been brought about chiefly by the increase of wealth and luxury, and to have originated in a desire, on the part of the rich, to give their children a different education from that which the middle and poorer classes could obtain. Its influence on the public morals was disastrous. Combined with other enervating causes it relaxed the springs of virtue, introduced general licentiousness of manners, and paved the way for the final ruin of the nation. It is not to be supposed, that this corruption was completed without remonstrance or without a struggle on the part of the friends of morality and order. The contest between the rigid severity of the old system of education, and the lax liberality of the new is ingeniously

* Geschichte der Erziehung I: 471. "Nur das Eine werde bemerkt, dass, je älter ein Volk wird, es sich desto mehr zu Philosophie hinneigt und dass, diese selbst gewöhnlich das Zeichen eines gereiften Volksleben ist, welches die Sonnenseite seines Daseins überschritten hat, wenn sie nicht wohl gar den Grabstein desselben bildet."

exhibited by Aristophanes. In his play of *The Clouds*, the teachers of the two methods are represented as contending for the patronage of the youth. The advocate of the more recent style of education decries the ancient discipline as old fashioned, vulgar, and contemptible, while the lover of the good old ways in reply institutes a comparison between the two.

In the same connection the poet describes, in an amusing style, the effects of the new principles of education on the manners of the youth. An anxious father, driven from his

* Mitchell's *Aristophanes II*: 104—117. (Nubes 960 seq.)

bed before the dawn of day by inability to sleep, expresses his impatience at the extravagance of his son

“There's]my young hopeful too, he sleeps it through,
Snug under five fat blankets at the least,
Would I could sleep so sound ! but my poor eyes
Have no sleep in them ; what with debts and duns
And stable keeper's bills, which this fine spark
Heaps on my back, I lie awake the whilst,
And what cares he but to coil up his locks,
Ride, drive his horses, dream of them all night,
Whilst I, poor devil, may go hang.”*

In passing from Greece to Rome, the first difference that we notice between the mode of training youth in the two nations is, that at Rome education was not, as in Greece, the business of the state. In both countries the same general views of the relation of the state to the individual prevailed. If the state was prominent among the Greeks, so was it among the Romans. If the Greek must live and die in the state, so also must the Roman. Nevertheless at Rome the state, except in special cases, interfered very little with the training of the youth, and there was no such thing as public education. In the usual sense of the word education, the common people in the good times of the republic, had none at all.† They had no instruction in reading and writing, and no systematic physical training similar to the Greek gymnastics. Education among the Romans was a domestic matter. The youth remained at home with his parents during all that period, which at Athens was spent at school. The parents

* Mitchell's Aristophanes II: 8. (id. 8—18.)

† It must not, however, from this be inferred that the lower classes among the Romans were destitute of all culture. Rude as at the period referred to they doubtless were, they were, nevertheless, characterized by a high degree of intellectual and moral energy. “Indessen haben auch die Römer in dieser Hinsicht vor den übrigen Völkern einen wesentlichen Vorzug, und diesen Möchten wir namentlich darin finden, dass bei ihnen die plebejische Jugend, schon in der frühersten Zeiten, nicht aller Bildung fremd blieb, wenn diese auch von der patricischen wesentlich verschieden war.” Cramer's Geschichte der Erziehung I: 414.

were regarded as the natural teachers of the child, and on them the education depended. Many distinguished Romans, for instance Cato and Augustus, instructed their children either wholly or in part themselves. There were indeed some schools at Rome, but a system of common schools for the people, such as the Athenians maintained from a very early period, was there unknown. Plutarch finds fault with Numa because he instituted no system of education, and thinks he showed himself in this much inferior to Lycurgus.*

The difference between the Greek and Roman education in respect to *female influence* was very great. Among the Orientals and the Greeks, education was wholly engrossed by the men. The mind of woman (with the singular exception of the Courtesans) was not cultivated, and of course she was not fitted to exert an extensive influence in education. At Rome the prominence of woman was a new development in the history of humanity. Numa, by his institutions, elevated the wife to the esteem and confidence of her husband. She received the keys at marriage, and was expected to share in the work of education. In Greece, maternal responsibility ceased when the boy, at the age of seven, was withdrawn from female supervision and committed to the charge of teachers. From this time the mother was not allowed to inflict a blow upon her son. Even at Athens in the midst of all the cultivation and refinement that prevailed, the women were far from being qualified for the business of instruction. Shut up in the female apartments, and watched with oriental jealousy, they spent their time in decorating their persons or overseeing household affairs. But at Rome, woman moved in a higher sphere, and exerted a far nobler influence. Antiquity has transmitted to us no more beautiful conception than that of a Roman matron training up her children. The lofty virtue which the Roman institutions cherished never appeared more charming than when, softened by the tenderness of maternal affection, and surrounded by the attractions of female beauty, it was occupied in the important work of moulding the youthful mind. The author of the Dialogue De Oratoribus, who ascribes the decline of eloquence and the arts in the later days to the negligence of

* Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus.

parents, the ignorance of teachers, and the indolence of youth, has occasion to describe the influence of mothers in the good days of the Republic. "Each one's son, born of a virtuous wife, was educated not in the hut of a bought nurse, but in the lap and bosom of his mother, whose especial praise it was to manage the family and be devoted to her children. Some elder relative also was selected, to whose approved and excellent management all the offspring of the family might be intrusted, in whose presence it was not permitted to speak an improper word or do a dishonorable action. And she, regulated with integrity and propriety, not only the studies and employments but also the sports and relaxations of the boys. So we have understood that *Cornelia* the mother of *Gracchi*, *Aurelia* the mother of *Cæsar*, and *Atia* of *Augustus*, superintended their education and instructed these young princes. This discipline and strictness aimed at this, that each one's mind ingenuous and pure, and perverted by no evil influences, might heartily embrace honorable employments and whether it inclined to military life, or civil law, or the study of eloquence, might pursue that alone, and thoroughly acquire it."^{*}

Plutarch says that though the *Gracchi* had greater *natural advantages* than any other men in Rome, yet they owed more to their mother than to nature; † and Cicero tells us that *Gracchus* was instructed from his boyhood by his mother *Cornelia*, and by her direction taught the Greek language. ‡ We are not indeed to suppose that all Roman mothers were *Corneliae*, *Aureliae*, or *Atiae*. These were remarkable women. Yet they show us what some Roman mothers were, and they set before us the pattern of maternal character to which thousands of mothers at Rome bore some resemblance. But these were specimens of female character such as Greece never produced. At Sparta, the women by the institutions of *Lycurgus* were removed from their proper sphere and in-

* *De Oratoribus* §28.

† *Plut. Gracch. vit.* §1.

‡ *Fuit Gracchus diligentia Cornelie matris a puerō doctus, et Græcis literis eruditus. Cic. Brut. §27. Legimus epistolas Cornelie, matris Gracchorum; appetet, filios non tam in gremio educatos, quam in sermone matris, ib §58.*

spired with a masculine spirit, which, although it maintained a race of heroes, was nevertheless unnatural and unlovely. Their judgment was sharpened and their views elevated, but all the softer and gentler affections of the sex were crushed by the absorbing spirit of nationality. But at Rome, *feeling* was cherished—the natural and beautiful emotions of the heart were not blighted, and there woman appeared in her native dignity and grace. The Spartan mothers taught their sons how to die, the Roman how to live and die too. If any one would see the difference between the highest specimens of female cultivation at Athens and at Rome, let him observe on the one hand the beautiful but dissolute Aspasia teaching Socrates the art of speaking, and on the other Cornelia presenting to her jeweled visitor her well instructed children with the memorable expression of maternal affection and maternal pride, “These are my jewels!” It is not difficult to see what influence such mothers must have exerted on Roman education. As the youth remained until fifteen always at home, the moulding power of the mother was decisive. And we may see the relation between this mode of education and the character of the Romans. Maternal influence is exerted not so much in the form of law as in a general and more silent way, by the force of affection; and history tells us that the earlier Romans in their public affairs were governed less by law than by feeling and custom.* The dignity of a Roman mother had power to restrain the most impetuous youth, and her sacred image hovering over him, like the vision of a goddess, pointed him to the path of virtue and of honor. It was the glory of Coriolanus to give his mother joy.†

Another feature of the Roman education which distinguished it from that of the Greeks is, that its prevailing character was not intellectual but *moral*. The Athenians cultivated the intellect, the Romans the affections. We have said indeed, that the Athenians aimed in their education at the development of all the powers of the man. And so they did. But the actual result of their system was a high state of intellec-

* “Non pas par crainte, non pas par raison, mais par passion.” Montesquieu.

† Plut. Life of Coriolanus.

trial cultivation, and a taste of the most exquisite refinement, while the moral sense was blunted by vice. The Roman education in this respect approached more to the Spartan than to the Athenian, and in moral effect it far surpassed both. It has been said that the Orientals lived in the future, the Greeks in the present, and the Romans in the past. And it is true that the Romans in their education made great use of history. Reverence for their ancestors may even be regarded as its central point. Their forefathers were deified, the faults of their more immediate predecessors were forgotten, their virtues magnified, and their characters held up as patterns for imitation. Not only distinguished men, but women also were eulogised in funeral orations.* The first Cæsar pronounced over the body of his wife, such an oration, in which he set forth her virtues.† The moral effect of these things was great. The principle of reverence was strongly developed. Deference to superiors was insisted on as the corner-stone of character,‡ and the youth who refused or neglected to rise up in the presence of age was punished with death.§ In the Roman education, everything pointed to decorum.|| Whatever might be the virtues of the Roman youth, modesty was to be the crown and glory of them all. If the want of courage was disgraceful, so also was the want of modesty. When Cato said he wished for youth who should turn red and not white, he expressed the universal feeling of Rome.

Another feature of the Roman education was that *it aimed chiefly at utility*. As in the literature, so in the education of the Romans the practical feeling predominated. With the Greeks, music was so important a branch that it embraced all others, and with them, music led to the development

* Liv. V: 50. Plut. De Virtutibus Mulierum.

† Plut. C. Jul. Caes. Vit. §5.

‡ *Apud antiquissimos Romanorum neque generi neque pecuniae praestantior honos tribui quam aetati solitus; major- esque natu à minoribus colebantur ad deum prope et paren- tum vicem; atque omni in loco, inque omni specie honoris priores patioresque habiti.* A. Gellii Noct. Att. II: 14.

§ Cramer's Geschichte der Erziehung I: 387.

|| Cic. De Officiis I: 35.

of a world of ideas of beauty and taste. But the Romans cultivated chiefly the understanding. In their objects of instruction they aimed more at actual life—at the wants of the citizens, and of the state.

This difference of character may be seen in the objects for which the two nations pursued the same studies. The Greeks, as we have said, regarded Geometry as a stepping-stone to Philosophy. The Romans esteemed it for purposes of measurement. With the Romans, reading, writing, and reckoning were the three chief branches, because they were the most useful. The Greeks thought that all knowledge is desirable, and aimed not at utility only, but at nature and truth. Among the Greeks, development was the prominent idea, among the Romans, instruction. The fine arts were cultivated with ardor by the Greeks, and esteemed above all else. But the Romans asked first what is useful, and afterwards, or not at all, what is beautiful. The whole life of the Greek was a struggle, and a struggle for what? For a branch of olive or a sprig of laurel which might be twined in a graceful wreath around his brow. But the Roman valued the olive or the myrtle not merely for the wreath, but for the fruit which it furnished. This outward and mercenary aim of Roman education was a theme of satire for the poets, as may be seen in Juvenal and Horace.* There was no regard for science and art for their own sake, but they were cultivated only for the use of the state. In physical education the Greeks exercised the body, because it is the veil and instrument of the noble spirit of man; the Romans trained it only as a preparation for war. Hence physical education was much less esteemed by the Romans than by the Greeks. In Greece, none but freemen cultivated gymnastics. But the Romans looked on gymnastics, except in relation to war, as fit for slaves rather than freemen, and considered the prevalence of such exercises as evidence of effeminacy. The Romans were the only nation of antiquity that cultivated foreign languages. This study, however, was prosecuted only in the later ages, and their pursuit of it was owing not to a love of literature, but to the necessity imposed by the extent of their possessions.

* *Juv. Sat. XIV. Hor. Sat. II : 3.*

We have seen that in the Grecian education, rhetoric and philosophy went hand in hand, and that the metaphysical genius of the Greeks at length caused philosophy to stand forth as the highest summit of intellectual culture. But such was not the result at Rome. The idea of Isocrates, that oratory is the pinnacle of human excellence, and that a faultless orator is the most perfect specimen of human nature, was first nationalized in the Roman world. The genius of Rome was not of a philosophical cast. Philosophy, as well as all culture, was introduced into Rome by the Greeks, and in later times it was extensively cultivated there. But it never found a genial soil. Rome produced no great philosopher. The versatile genius of Cicero gave him a taste for philosophical studies, and his writings show that he knew how to prune away the rhetorical amplifications of which he was so fond, and to approach in his style more nearly to the simplicity which philosophy requires. But the orator is ever bursting forth and assuming his native predominance. Even in his treatises on the theory of rhetoric itself the *practical* is always uppermost. In the early ages of Rome, both rhetoric and philosophy were viewed with a jealous eye, and regarded as highly dangerous to the public morals. The old simplicity and sternness struggled long against them, and through the influence of Cato, the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians were at length banished from Rome.* We must no doubt suppose that there was something in the doctrine and characters of the men who then taught philosophy and rhetoric that increased the existing prejudice against such studies. But after the introduction of philosophy into the Latin language by Cicero, and especially after the establishment of an extensive intercourse with Greece through the Roman conquests in the east, it was impossible to repress the study of philosophy and rhetoric. Teachers in both these sciences were eagerly sought by the youth at home and abroad. Rhetoric especially was cultivated with ardor. Cæsar not only wrote commentaries in the camp and a Latin grammar, but also assiduously practised declamations.† In the early days of the republic unconditional obedience prevailed in the armies of Rome, but

* Bucheri *Institutiones Histor. Philos.* 287.

† Cramer's *Geschichte der Erziehung* I : 423.

in later times, and especially under the empire, oratory was resorted to as a means of influencing the troops. Not Cæsar alone but Pompey, Anthony, Augustus, and other Roman commanders were in the constant habit of declamation. While the speculative spirit of the Greeks delighted in philosophy, the practical feeling of the Romans preferred oratory. In the higher schools at Rome, rhetoric became in later times the chief means of intellectual discipline. Law and eloquence were there regarded as the noblest objects of pursuit. The bonds of Grecian philosophy, which for centuries bound the modern world, are broken ; but the jurisprudence of Rome has given permanent laws to Christendom.

Thus have we sketched some of the features of the Greek and Roman education. In doing this we have aimed not at the exhibition of details but at the development of principles ; for there was not time for both, and the root is more essential than the branch. If any one supposes that because the institutions of which we have been speaking passed away two thousand years ago, their characteristics are to us of no practical importance, he errs ; for human nature remains unchanged, and the principles which must govern the right education of man are immutable.

The nature, limits, and application of the power of the state in education ; the extension of the benefits of education to all the children of the state ; the time to be devoted to this purpose ; the necessity, and the mode of physical culture ; the union of development and instruction ; the systematic employment of music as an instrument of education ; the cultivation of the taste in connection with morals ; and the relation of philosophy and oratory to each other and to education as a whole ;—these points in the Grecian system are of equal interest in our own. Nor are those which have been touched upon in the Roman education less practical. The plastic power of domestic education without the interference of the state ; the influence of mothers and of the whole female sex ; the principle of utility in education, and the superior advantages which attend the cultivation of the moral part of our nature, are topics which must command the attention of all who are called to influence the opinions of their countrymen on this important subject.

We boast ourselves the freest and best educated nation the world has ever seen. And doubtless we have many advan-

ges of position, and some excellencies of character. But we make this boast with two little knowledge of ourselves, and a very limited acquaintance with facts. The truth is that as in theoretical education we are mere children, so in practical education we are only unskilful beginners. If the spirit of Plato were restored to this world, and instead of being transported to the classic soil of his native Greece, were set down in one of our villages, and after having been pointed to the place where our youth are prepared for the highest stage of their education, were told, “This is the *Academy!*” what think you he would say? It may not be easy to determine what he would *say*, (for the Greeks were polished men,) but as his mind reverted to the graceful proportions, the fluted columns, and the embowering groves of the original *Academus*, we are sure he must *think* that his eye had lighted on a very imperfect imitation. If a Grecian of the age of Pericles were shown one of our school-houses—standing on or *in* the street, its windows broken, its steps gone, its door creaking, its one chair wrenched out of shape, its desk reeling to its fall,—and were informed that this is the place where our children are educated—where their faculties are developed, their taste formed, their first impressions of science received, and their intellectual character to a great extent fixed,—should he speak out his thoughts, it would be strange if he did not exclaim, “No wonder they are barbarians!” He would undoubtedly suppose himself in Scythia.* There is among us a great

* Since this passage was indited, the writer has met with a description of the school-houses in one of the best counties of a state which, in respect to education, is second to none in the Union. It is by W. R. B. Hubbard, of Northampton, Massachusetts. A few sentences are here extracted: “In many districts, the poorest and most unsightly building that offends the eye of the traveller is the school-house. Is there somewhere near the geographical centre of the district a gore of land unsuitable for cultivation—valueless as a building spot even for a blacksmith’s shop—some sand bank, or some marsh, of which the frogs have held undisputed possession time out of mind, there you may expect to find a temple of science. There the youth of many generations are to congregate, and imbibe principles and acquire habits which will accompany

work yet to be done in education. And the first if not the most important part of the work is to acquire a competent acquaintance with the subject. Theoretical knowledge must precede or accompany practical efforts, or they will be sadly misdirected. The people of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and some other portions of the Union have already taken in this matter important steps. In some of these states Boards of Education have been established, officers created, whose duty it is to spend their time for the improvement of education, and appropriations more or less liberal made to colleges, academies, and common schools. A beginning—imperfect though it is—yet a beginning has been made. But there are still some states even in New England, and a much larger number in other parts of the country, which have hitherto sat by in silence and looked idly on. It is to be hoped, however, that this indifference will not be much longer continued.

It may not be improper, in concluding this article, to bring into view a topic which there is here no room to examine at length, but which seems to us to deserve a more extensive and thorough examination than it has yet received. We refer to the question, "*What in a national view is the legitimate connexion between education and religion?*" Some, while they admit that physical and intellectual education are not sufficient to produce national morality, because this is not their object, nevertheless imagine that the end in view can be attained by the introduction of a code of ethics, and a suitable attention to moral education. If religion exists in the

them through life. Most of the dwelling houses have an air of neatness and comfort; many have shade trees and ornamental shrubbery about them. But if you find a weather-beaten building, with its blinds swinging upon one hinge, or lying upon the ground—with clapboards flapping in the wind—with window panes filled with hats and shawls—with a pile of logs before the door, without a tree or shrub to relieve the eye, and every thing around indicating the march, not of mind, but of the destroyer; depend upon it, that is the place selected for the wooing of the muses. Some may think this an over-drawn picture, but it is from real life. Would that it existed only in imagination."

community, it is, they think, sufficient without an attempt to introduce it into systems of education. Others believe that if national morality is to be secured, religion ought to be and must be a constituent element of national education. Even if they admit with M. Guizot,* that morality in its elements can be distinguished from religion, yet they deny that it can be sustained without religion by education of any kind or of all kinds. To us it appears that on this subject much is to be learned from antiquity. The importance of religion and the insufficiency of education without it to secure morality and give permanence to free institutions, are abundantly illustrated by the history of the two nations of which we have been speaking. Greece was educated, but her columns fell. In the midst of the most splendid developments of Grecian genius, the eloquence of Demosthenes could not save his country, because her morals were destroyed. Respecting the moral impotence of education in Greece we have the testimony of Professor Meiners. "But a sad observation is this, that in the very position in which the number and extent of the acquirements and arts in which the youth were instructed increased, education itself grew worse, and that the more their minds were accomplished with beautiful and rare arts and attainments, the more their morals and hearts were corrupted."† Rome, when she knew but little, was virtuous and free. On the other hand, when she knew much, she was corrupted by vice and oppressed by arbitrary power. At the most enlightened period of Italian history, previous to the despotism of the Cæsars, Cato Uticensis, despairing of the liberties of Rome, bared his bosom to his sword. We have said that the Roman education was in a moral view superior to the Athenian. The cultivation of the principle of reverence, the constant appeal to some rule of right or of decorum, and the elevation of maternal influence gave to the Roman education in this respect an advantage over the Greek. The moral tendencies of the mode of training youth at Rome were not without their salutary influence. But after all it was not these that fixed the moral character of the Romans, for that was formed by the religious institutions of Numa. It must be

* History of Civilization p. 117.

† Geschichte der Wissenschaften II: 63.

remembered that in the best days of both Greece and Rome, education and religion were inseparable. If the Greeks in the midst of all their science were corrupt, the reason was not indeed that they had no religion, but that their religion was corrupt. It is a mistake to suppose that the religions of Greece and of early Rome were the same. For, while the former, aiming at the imagination and not the heart, was sensual in its character and debased by the most revolting fables of the Gods, the latter contained many elements of a sound natural theology. The absence of images, the overseeing providence, if not the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, the accountability of man, and the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, were elements of the early Roman religion which gave it no small amount of moral influence. The first Romans were an eminently pious race, and *therefore* they were moral. But this subject cannot here be pursued.* We therefore close with the expression of the hope that since the agitation of the questions, "Shall religion be incorporated into our systems of education?" "And if so, in what way shall this be done?" has been commenced, this agitation will be continued till the momentous bearings of the subject are fully understood. For on the solution of these difficult problems depend in our country the prevalence of morality, the stability of freedom, the security of right, and the safety of life itself.

* For authority respecting the character of the religion of early Rome, and its superiority over that of Greece, the reader is referred to Plutarch's Life of Numa; August. De Civitate Dei IV: 31, I: 131; Tertull. Apologet § 25; Dion. Hal. II: 18, 19, 75; Polyb VI: 54; Cic. De Harusp. Respons. § 9; Bolingbroke's Works IV: 427; Kreutzers Symbolik II: 992, 993; Hegels Werke (Vorlesungen Ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte) IX: 297. "According to the common idea, the Roman religion, with a change of name only, was the same as the Greek. Upon a closer inspection, however, the most striking difference shows itself." "In all circumstances the Roman was pious," etc. For a contrary view see Meiners De Vero Deo p. 17: Buchholz Philosophische Untersuchungen ueber die Römer I: 35.

ARTICLE III.

EXAMINATION OF PROF. STUART ON HEBREWS, IX: 16-18.

By Rev. Albert Barnes, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia.

16 Οτου γαρ διαθήκη, δύνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου.

17 Διαθήκη γαρ δεὶ τεκροῖς βεβαια. ταῖς μήποτε ἴσχύει ὅτε ζῇ διαθέμενος.

18 Οὖτος οὐδὲ ἡ πρώτη χειρὶς αἴματος ἐγκεκρινότας.

THIS passage is rendered in the common version, " For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. For a testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth. Whereupon neither the first testament was dedicated without blood."

It is rendered by Prof. Stuart (Com. on the Hebrews, p. 607*) " Moreover, where there is a testament, it is necessary that the death of the testator should take place; because a testament is valid in respect to those only who are dead, since it hath no force while the testator is living. Hence, not even the first [covenant] was ratified without blood."

In the explanation of this passage two interpretations have been proposed. The first is that which is found in our common version, and which is defended by Prof. Stuart, by which the word *διαθήκη* is rendered *testament* or *will*; and the other, that which regards the word as meaning *covenant*. Distinguished names may be found defending each of the interpretations proposed, and though the current of authority has been in favor of the interpretation defended by Prof. S., yet it is not so decided as to make it improper to enquire into the validity of this exposition.

As the meaning of the whole passage, as well as of many other important passages in the New Testament, depends on the sense affixed to the word *διαθήκη*, it will be proper to precede the particular examination of the passage, by a brief enquiry into the meaning of this word.

Perhaps there is no single term in the Bible that is more

* Second Edition of the Commentary.

important than this, or the significations attached to which ramifies itself farther, and gives form to more views in theology. I need not say that it lies at the foundation of entire systems of belief in regard to *covenants*; that the views attached to this word modify or control the views which we entertain of the divine dealings with Adam and with all his posterity, and that the conceptions of the nature of the plan of redemption are also moulded very much by the sense attached to this word. It becomes, then, a question of immense moment, whether the usual explanations of this word are true, or whether they do not tend to lead the mind into error. It has been no common calamity, if erroneous views of the meaning of this word have been allowed to lead a mind like that of Prof. S. into error in the interpretation of the Bible.

The word διαθήκη occurs in the New Testament thirty-three times. It is translated *covenant* in the common version, in Luke i: 72, Acts iii: 25; vii: 8, Rom. ix: 4; xi: 27, Gal. iii: 15, 17; iv: 24, Eph. ii: 12, Heb. viii: 6, 8, 9 *bis*, 10, ix: 4 *bis*; x: 16, xii: 24, xiii: 20. In every other instance it is rendered *testament*. In four of those instances, Matt. xxvi: 28, Mark xiv: 24, Luke xxii: 20, and 1 Cor. xi: 25, it is used with reference to the institution or celebration of the Lord's supper. In the Septuagint it is used not far from three hundred times, in considerably more than two hundred of which, it is the translation of the word בְּרִית. In one instance, Zech. xi: 14, it is the translation of the word אֶחָדָה, *brotherhood*; once, Deut. ix: 5, as the translation of בְּרֵךְ, *word*; once, Jer. xxiv: 18, as the translation of בְּרִירָה, *words of the covenant*; once, Lev. xxvi: 11, as the translation of מִשְׁבֵּט, *tabernacle*; once Ex. xxxi: 7, as the translation of תּוֹזֵעַ, *testimony*; it occurs once, Ezek. xxvi: 28, where the reading of the Greek and Hebrew text is doubtful, and three times, 1 Sam. xi: 2, xx: 8, 1 Kings, viii: 9, when the word is not in the Hebrew text. From this use of the word by the translators of the Septuagint, it is evident that they regarded it as the proper translation of the Hebrew בְּרִית, and as conveying the same sense which that word conveys. It cannot be reasonably doubted, that the writers of the New Testament were led to the use of this word, in part at least, by the fact that they found it in the

version which was in common use, but it cannot be doubted also, that they regarded this word as *fairly* conveying the meaning of the Hebrew word *תְּרִיכָה*. On no principle can it be supposed, that inspired and honest men would use a word in referring to transactions in the Old Testament which did not *fairly* convey the idea which the inspired writers of the Old Testament meant to convey. The use being thus regarded as settled, there are some remarkable facts which present themselves to our notice, demanding attention and explanation. These facts are the following.

(1.) The word *διαθήκη* is not the word which properly denotes *compact*, *agreement*, or *covenant*. That word is *συνθήκη*—or in other forms *σύνθεσις*, and *συνθεσία*; or if the word *διαθήκη*, is used in that signification it is only remotely, and as a secondary meaning. See *Passow*, Comp. the Septuagint in Isa. xxviii: 15, xxx: 1, Dan. xi: 6, Wisdom i: 16, 1 Mac. x: 26, 2 Mac. xiii: 25; xiv: 26. It is not the word which a Greek would have naturally used to denote a *compact*, or *covenant*. He would have employed it to denote a disposition, ordering, or arrangement of things, whether of religious rites, civil customs, or property; or if used in reference to a *compact*, it would have been with the idea of an *arrangement*, or *ordering* of matters, not with the primary notion of an agreement with another.

(2.) The word *συνθήκη* is *never* used in the New Testament. In all the allusions to the transactions between God and man, this word is never employed. For some cause, the writers and speakers of the New Testament seem to have supposed that the word would convey an improper idea, or leave an impression which they did not wish to leave. Though it might have been supposed that in speaking of the various transactions between God and man, and especially, if they had the common views which prevail now in theology, they would have selected this word, yet with entire uniformity they have avoided it. No one of them—though the word *διαθήκη* has been used by no less than six of the writers of the New Testament—has been betrayed in a single instance into the use of the word *συνθήκη* or has differed from his brethren in the use of the language employed. This cannot be supposed to have been the result of concert or collusion, but it must have been founded in some reason which operated equally on all their minds.

(3.) In like manner, and with like remarkable uniformity, the word συνθήκη is *never* used in the Septuagint, with reference to any arrangement or “covenant” between God and man. Once, indeed, in the Apocrypha, and but once, the word συνθήκη is used in that sense. “With great circumspection didst thou judge thine own sons, unto whose fathers thou hast sworn, and made covenants of good promises,”—*ὅρκους καὶ συνθήκας ἔδωκας ἀγαθῶν ὑποσχόσεων.* In the three only other instances in which the word συνθήκη is used in the Septuagint, it is with reference to *compacts* between man and man. Isa. xxviii : 15, “and with death we are at agreement”—*καὶ ἐποιήσαμεν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλεὺς συνθήκας*—where it is a translation of *תְּעִדָּה*; Dan. xi : 6, “the king’s daughter of the south shall come to the king of the north to *make an agreement*,”—*τοῦ πονηταί συνθήκας*, where it is a translation of *תְּעִדָּה, rectitudes, or rights*; and Isa. xxx : i, “that cover with a covering but not of my spirit,” where it is a translation of *מִבְּרָכָה, covering*, and refers to *compacts*, according to the translation of the Septuagint, made with other nations. This remarkable fact, that the word συνθήκη is *never* used by the authors of that ancient version to denote any transaction between God and man, shows also that there was some reason for it which acted on *their* minds with entire uniformity. No man can believe that that whole version was made by the same individual, or even nearly at the same time, or by men acting in concert, and the reason, therefore, why they avoided the use of this word, must have been one that would occur to many minds, and must have been so strong and decided as to keep them from varying from one another.

(4.) It is not less remarkable that neither in the Septuagint nor the New Testament, is the word διαθήκη ever used in the sense of *will* or *testament*, unless it be in the case before us, Heb. ix : 16, 17. This is conceded on all hands, and is admitted expressly by Prof. Stuart, (p. 439,) though he still defends this use of the word in this passage. I shall have occasion to advert to this indisputable fact, and to show its importance in regard to the proper interpretation of this passage, in another place. At present it is necessary to remark on it only as *a fact* which no one will call in question.

A very important enquiry at once presents itself here, and which, so far as I know, has never received a solution which has been generally regarded as satisfactory. It is, why was

the word *διαθήκη*, selected by the writers of the New Testament to express the nature of the transaction between God and man in the plan of salvation? It might be said, indeed, that they found this word uniformly used in the Septuagint, and that they employed it as expressing the idea which they designed to convey, with sufficient accuracy. But this is only removing the difficulty one step farther back where it remains in all its force. Why did the LXX. adopt this word? Why did they not rather use the word *συνθήκη*, the common and appropriate Greek word to express the notion of a covenant? And why, if there was no settled plan, or no propriety in the nature of things for the use of the word *διαθήκη*, did they adhere to it with such remarkable uniformity, a uniformity which has probably not a parallel in the use of an important word in the Scriptures?

In regard to this enquiry, it was suggested by the late Rev. James P. Wilson, D.D., of Philadelphia, that the reason might have been that the translators of the Septuagint, who were surrounded by the heathen, and who supposed that their work would be read by them, were unwilling to convey the idea that the Great God had entered into a *compact*, or an *agreement* with his creature man. That idea, he supposed, would have been revolting to them, and to avoid this, they used the word *διαθήκη*—as conveying the thought that God meant merely to express his *will*, or to make a testament in regard to what he required them to do, similar to that which a man makes of his property when he dies. How far considerations like this may have influenced their minds, it is impossible now to determine. It is scarcely, however, to be supposed that a resolution of this kind could have been formed by the translators of the Septuagint, without an express agreement or compact among themselves; and it may fairly be doubted whether there is not more refinement and artifice in the supposition than would have been likely to have occurred in making that translation.

A reason may, however, be suggested for this remarkable fact, which seems to be liable to no objection. It is, that in the apprehension of all the authors of the Septuagint, and of the writers of the New Testament, the word *διαθήκη* in its original and proper signification *fairly* conveyed the sense of the Hebrew word *תְּרִיבָה*, that the word *συνθήκη*, or *compact*, *agreement*, would *not* express that idea; and that they never

meant to be understood as conveying the idea either that God entered into a COMPACT or COVENANT with man, or that he made a WILL. They meant to represent him as making an arrangement, a disposition, an ordering of things, by which his service might be kept up, and by which men might be saved; but they were equally remote from representing him as making a compact, or a will. In support of this supposition, we may allege (1.) the remarkable uniformity in the manner in which the word διαθήκη is used, showing that there was some settled principle from which they never departed; but (2.) and mainly, the meaning of the word itself. In its original and appropriate signification, it is just the word that was needed, and will accord with all the usages of the word διαθήκη. Prof. Stuart has, undoubtedly, given the accurate original sense of the word. "The real, genuine, and original meaning of διαθήκη is, arrangement, disposition, or disposal of any thing," p. 440. The word from which it is derived—διατίθεμι—means, to place apart, or asunder; and then to set, arrange, dispose in a certain order. *Passow*. From this original signification is derived the use which the word has with singular uniformity in the Scriptures. For although in classic Greek, the word remotely has the signification of *will* or *testament* (*Passow*), yet it *never* has that sense in the Bible, unless the passage before us be an instance (Stuart, p. 439); and though in the classic Greek also the word may have the notion of a covenant or compact remotely (*Passow*), yet it cannot be shown to have that meaning in a single instance in the Scriptures. It denotes the arrangement, disposing, or ordering of things which God made in relation to mankind, by which he designed to keep up his worship on the earth, and to save the soul. It means neither covenant nor will; not compact or legacy; not agreement, or testament. It is an arrangement of an entirely different order from either of them; where the sacred writers with singular care, and with an uniformity which could have been secured only by the presiding influence of the One Eternal Spirit that inspired them, have avoided the suggestion that God had made with man either a compact or a will. Unhappily, we have no one word which precisely expresses this idea, and hence our conceptions are constantly floating between the conception of an agreement, or a testament; and the views which we have

are as unsettled as they are unscriptural. The simple idea is, that God has made an *arrangement*, or *disposition* of things by which his worship may be regulated ; by which man may approach him, and by which they may be saved —an arrangement having all the force of law, and which men are not at liberty to neglect or disregard. Under the Jewish economy this arrangement assumed one form ; under the Christian another. In neither was it a compact or covenant between two parties, and where one party would be at liberty to reject the terms proposed ; in neither was it a *testament* or *will*, as if God had died and left a legacy to man.

If these remarks are well founded, they should materially shape the views in the interpretation of the Bible. Whole treatises of divinity have been written on a mistaken view of the words *תְּעֵדָה*, and *διαθήκη*—understood as meaning covenant. Volumes of angry controversy have been published on the nature of the “covenant” with Adam, and on its influence on his posterity ; and in no subject, perhaps, are the views of men more indefinite than in regard to this “covenant” which they are supposed to make with God in the purposes of salvation. The only literal “covenant” which can be supposed to exist in the plan of salvation is that subsisting between the Father and the Son—though even the existence of any such covenant is rather the result of pious and learned imagining than of any distinct statement in the volume of revelation. The simple statement there is, that God has made an *arrangement*, the execution of which he has entrusted to his incarnate Son, and has proposed it to man ; an arrangement which they are not at liberty to disregard, and which being embraced will secure their salvation.

Bearing with us now the remarks which have been made in regard to the meaning of this word *διαθήκη*, we are prepared to examine the meaning of the passage before us, Heb. ix: 16—18. Two interpretations of the passage have been proposed, in one of which the word *διαθήκη* is regarded as meaning *covenant*, and in the other, as meaning *will*, or *testament*. The latter is the interpretation adopted by Professor Stuart. It is the object of this paper to examine the reasons which he suggests for this interpretation, and to state considerations why the former is to be preferred ; or rather, why the word *διαθήκη* should be regarded here as employed in accordance with its uniform usage elsewhere, to denote not

will, but *arrangement* or *disposition*. If the word is used here, as Professor Stuart supposes, in the sense of *testament* or *will*, then the idea is, "that where there is a testament, it is necessary that the death of the testator should take place, because a testament is valid only in respect to those who are dead, and has no force while the testator lives." The reason of this is, that by the very nature of a testament, it relates to the disposal of a man's property after he is dead, and of course cannot be regarded as valid until his death takes place. The force of this remark, according to this interpretation, here would be that the fact that the Lord Jesus made or expressed his *will* to mankind, implied that he would die to confirm it, or rendered his death necessary in order that his "will" might be complete or ratified. The fact of a "will"—*diathēken*—involved the idea of the *death* of him who had made it. Of the truth of this observation about the nature of a "will" there can be no difference of opinion. The only question is, whether such an illustration would be pertinent to the argument of the Apostle here, and whether it is such as he meant to use. In opposition to it, and in defence of the other interpretation, I adduce the following considerations.

(1.) The word *diathēken* is not used in this sense in any other place in the New Testament, nor in any other place in the Bible. This has been already fully shown, and is fully admitted by Professor Stuart himself. "The sense given to *diathēken* here [by Prof. S.], viz., *testament* or *will*, is beyond all doubt consonant with the *usus loquendi* of the Greeks; *although in the Septuagint and New Testament no example of this usage occurs, excepting in the present passage.*" "The Hebrew *בריך*, never has the sense of *Testament*."* pp. 439, 440. Of the twenty-six times in which Paul used the word, and the more than three hundred times in which it is elsewhere used, not a solitary instance confessedly occurs, in which it is employed in this sense, unless it be in the passage before us. That must be a strong necessity which will require us to depart from a usage so uniform in the Bible, and to adopt a meaning which a word *may* have in a classic writer. It is to be presumed, however, that no such necessity exists in the case of any other word in the Bible, and

* The Italics are my own.

that not another instance can be found in which such a rule of interpretation is acted on. It is not denied that the "exigency of the place" may be such as to justify such a usage, but it remains to be asked whether such an exigency exists here.

(2.) The Lord Jesus made no such *will* or *testament* as is supposed by this interpretation to have been made. According to this exposition the argument must be, that since it was a settled principle that a will was valid only when the testator died, it was essential that the Lord Jesus, who designed to make such a "will," should die, or his death was necessary, in order to confirm it. But the Saviour made no such *will* or *testament*; nothing which can in any proper sense be called a "will." He made no arrangements about the disposition of his property after his death, he left no legacies; he did not even direct where his body should be entombed. There was nothing in his instructions, or in any wish which he expressed, which can in any proper sense be called a *will*, and all the argument which is based on such a supposed fact, must, of course, be merely imaginary. Assuredly, the Apostle Paul did not argue on the supposition of any such testamentary disposition of what belonged to the Redeemer.

(3.) Such an illustration would not be pertinent to the design of the Apostle, or in *keeping* with his argument. In ch. ix, as in some of the previous chapters of the epistle, he is comparing the Jewish and Christian systems, and the point of comparison in this chapter relates to the question about the efficacy of sacrifice in the two arrangements. The Apostle shows that the arrangement for shedding blood in sacrifice entered into both systems; that the high priest of both offered blood as an expiation; that the holy place, in the one instance in the tabernacle, and in the other in heaven, was entered with blood, and that consequently the necessity of the death of a victim was supposed in both arrangements or dispensations. The argument is, that the former dispensation or covenant was ratified with blood; and that the shedding of blood was supposed in the whole arrangement. See vs. 19—22. The argument is not at all that Moses made a *will* or *testament* which could be of force only when he died, and that the same thing was necessary in the new arrangement, but it was that the former covenant was ratified with blood, or by the death of a victim, and that it might be expected that

the new arrangement would be confirmed in this manner. Moses made no *will* or *testament* that required his death in order to confirm it. No such occurrence is alluded to in his writings ; nothing of this kind in fact existed. With what pertinency or propriety, therefore, could there be an allusion to a *will* in the new dispensation ? How could such a "will" constitute a parallelism with what occurred in the time of Moses ? How could its necessity be shown, or its nature illustrated, by a reference to the ancient dispensation ?

The difficulty involved in this consideration, on the interpretation adopted by Prof. Stuart, is so great, that it was felt to be necessary to obviate it. The considerations which he suggests in explanation of the difficulty, or in *anticipation* of the difficulty—for the statement occurs in a general summary of the argument in chs. v—x : 18—are conveyed in the following words, "The mention of Christ's *death* here (ch. ix : 15) in connexion with the assurance effected by it of a heavenly *inheritance* for believers, affords occasion for the writer to compare the word διαθήκη ratified by the death of Christ, with the διαθήκαι which are ratified by the death of testators. The Greek word διαθήκη not only answers to בְּרִית, but also means such an arrangement as is made by a man's last *will* or *testament*, and is employed, not unfrequently, in the latter sense. Hence our author, after asserting (ix: 15) that Christ's *death* made sure such an *inheritance* to believers, falls very naturally upon comparing the διαθήκη thus ratified by the death of Jesus, with the διαθήκαι ratified by the death of testators. Such, says he, is the custom among men in regard to *testaments*, that the death of the testators must supervene, in order to give them full effect and confirmation, ix. 16, 17. Even the first διαθήκη (ברית) although it could not be so appropriately called a *testament*, was sanctioned in a manner not unlike that in which the new διαθήκη is sanctioned," that is by blood, p. 358.—The amount of this reasoning, in view of the facts which have been established in regard to the words בְּרִית, and διαθήκη, and of the points admitted respecting these words by Prof. Stuart, seems to me to be this: "Moses made a covenant with the people. It had none of the properties of a *will* or *testament*; had not the design of a *testament*, and was not ratified in that manner. That covenant was confirmed or ratified by blood, that is by the death of a victim. The Apostle Paul in instituting a comparison be-

tween this and the Christian institution, incidentally mentioned the word *inheritance*. *Therefore* he proceeds to show from the transactions recorded by Moses, though they had no relation to a *will* or *testament* ['although it could not be so appropriately called a *testament*'] that the death of a testator was necessary in order to confirm or ratify a *will*, and *therefore* that the death of the Lord Jesus was necessary to confirm the will by which his people obtain the promise of their *inheritance*." If this be the nature of the reasoning of the Apostle here, it is difficult to resist the conviction that it is much less forcible than that which we have been accustomed to regard him as commonly employing.

(4.) The view here taken, that the word *diabήxη* refers not to a *will*, but to an arrangement such as is commonly called a covenant, is confirmed by the use of the word *όθεν* "whereupon," in ver. 18. This word implies a conclusion from the preceding argument or illustration, or supposes that a reason had been stated which showed the propriety and fitness of what was about to follow. What the Apostle proceeds to state was, that the "first covenant was not dedicated without blood." The *reason* for this implied by the use of the word *όθεν* "whence," was the *principle* which he had stated in vs. 16, 17. According to the interpretation adopted by Prof. Stuart, the reasoning would stand thus, "It is an admitted principle, or a universal fact, that when a will is made it is necessary that he who made it should die before it is valid or confirmed. *Whence* (*όθεν*) it was, or it was on this universally admitted fact, that Moses, though engaged in making, not a will but a covenant, ordained that a victim should be slain, and that the blood should be sprinkled on the book and on all the people. The principle that the making of a will implies of necessity the death of him who makes it, is so uniform and settled, that it was indispensable that in making a compact between God and man a sacrificial victim should be slain, and the blood sprinkled on the book and the people." The consecutive-ness of such reasoning cannot be understood now, nor would it be admitted in a court of law. Its force would appear not to be greater than to say, "It is an universally admitted fact that the death of a testator is needed in order to make his will valid, *whence it was* (*όθεν*) that A., in the conveyance of a piece of land was careful that the deed should be confirmed by a seal." But admit that the word *diabήxη* in vs. 16,

17, is employed in the sense in which it is confessedly every where else in the Bible, and the reasoning is clear. It is this, "It is a settled principle, a great truth that is indisputable, that in an arrangement between God and man pertaining to salvation, the death of a victim is necessary in order to ratify and confirm it. *Whence it was* (ὅτι) that, acting on this principle, the first covenant was not ratified without blood. In that great transaction a victim was slain, and to confirm that covenant, the blood was sprinkled on the book, the tabernacle, and the people." In reasoning like this, we see, at least, that the conclusion is connected with the premises.

In regard to this view, however, Prof. Stuart says that there are "difficulties" which are "insuperable." Those "difficulties" he states in the following "summary," p. 442. "(1.) It is yet to be made out, that no covenants were valid except those made by the intervention of sacrifices. Most clearly these were exhibited only in covenants of a peculiarly solemn and important nature. See Ruth iv: 7. Deut. xxv: 7, 9. Gen. xxiii: 16. xxiv: 9, etc. The proposition is too general here (ὅπου διαθήκη) to admit of limitation merely to covenants of a special nature. Even in regard to them, it remains to be shown, that the sacrificial rite, specially in later times, was deemed to be necessary. Where is this seen, in solemn compacts and treaties so often made, as represented in the books of Kings and Chronicles? An *oath* is the general sanction. (2.) Διαθήκη and διαθέσις cannot properly be rendered *mediate* and *mediating sacrifice*. They have no such meaning any where else. Διαθέσις must mean either a *testator*, or else a *contractor*, i. e. one of two covenanting parties. But where is the death of a person covenanting, made necessary in order to confirm the covenant? (3.) Νεκροί means only *dead men*; but men surely were not sacrificed by the Jews, as a mediating sacrifice in order to confirm a covenant. Of course it is impossible to support the exegesis of Pierce and others, in the way of *philological argument*."

These objections and difficulties, which it is but justice to Prof. S. to say, would doubtless have appeared much more forcible, and much less as *dicta ex cathedra*, if they had been expanded in an *Excursus*, or in such an argument as Prof. S. would build on them by expanding them, will be best examined by an exegesis of the passage itself. They

occur in the same order in which the various points are presented by the Apostle.

(1.) The first is, that "it is yet to be made out that no covenants were valid except those made by the intervention of sacrifices." The force of this objection rests on the remark of the Apostle, (ver. 16,) "For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator;" which, according to the view of those who hold the word διαθήκη to mean *covenant* here, and not *testament*, Prof. S. evidently regards as meaning, that every covenant or compact must be ratified by the death of a sacrificial victim. The universality of any such principle or fact, Prof. S. says is yet "to be made out."

In reference to this objection, I would submit the following remarks.

First, That the point which the Apostle proposes to "make out," or which his argument requires should be "made out," was not that such a custom prevailed universally in contracts *between man and man*, but that it was a universal principle in covenants *between God and man*. The argument relates not at all to compacts between one man and another, but to what was the custom, or what was understood to be settled and proper in transactions between God and man. Here, the Apostle says, that this was a settled principle, or a universal fact that there must be a sacrificial victim —so universal as to make it to be expected that the same thing would occur under the *new* arrangement by the Redeemer, or in any arrangement between God and man. There is no evidence, as it seems to me, that he alludes to a compact between God and man. The mistake here has arisen partly from the use of the word "*testament*" by our translators, in the sense of *will*, as if it must relate to some transaction pertaining to men only; and partly from the insertion of the word "men" in verse 17, in the translation of the phrase ἐπὶ νεκρῶν "upon the dead," or "over the dead." But it is scarcely necessary to attempt to show that there is no necessary reference to any transaction between man and man at all, and that the whole force of the illustration will be retained, if we suppose the Apostle to be speaking only of a transaction between man and his Maker. If the principle was sufficiently settled, or if the custom was so far universal that it might be laid down as a general truth, that in a cove-

nant between God and man such a sacrifice was necessary, then this is all that the argument of the Apostle seems to demand. The argument would not be essentially strengthened, if it could be proved also that this was a universal custom in all compacts between man and man; it is not weakened at all if it is shown, as it easily may be, that no such necessity exists, and that such a mode of ratifying a compact in fact seldom occurs. This remark, if well founded, will meet the force of the objection made by Prof. S. in the manner in which he intended it to be understood, that "it is yet to be made out that no covenants were valid except those made by the intervention of sacrifice." It will not be necessary, to prove that the custom of ratifying compacts between man and man by sacrifice prevailed. Whether that is true or not, or can be "made out" or not, the assertion of the Apostle may be true, that in a covenant with God, it was a settled principle that sacrifice was necessary in order to confirm it. The true point of enquiry then is, whether such a settled principle prevailed. I remark, then,

Secondly, That this was regarded as a well understood and established principle among the Hebrews, and is not unfrequently referred to in the Old Testament. We find the principle either implied or distinctly expressed in all the transactions between God and man, that had the nature of a *ברית* or *διαθήκη*. To say nothing of the case of Abel, (Gen. iv: 4,) or of Noah, (Gen. viii: 20, 21,) we find it expressly recognized, and described at length in the important transaction with Abraham. Gen. xv: 9—18. Abraham, on occasion of the "covenant" which God made with him, was directed to take an heifer, and a she-goat, and a ram, and to divide them in the midst, and lay each piece one against another. When this was done, God made a "covenant" (or "cut a covenant" *ברית ברית*) with Abraham, and promised to give him the land, ver. 18. In this transaction, the principle is distinctly recognized, and acted on of making a "covenant" over the victims offered in sacrifice. It was over the dead bodies of the victims; it was of force, or was ratified, only when *they were dead*. In like manner, the covenant which God made with his people in the wilderness, was ratified by the death of victims. See Ex. xxiv: 6, seq. The same principle is distinctly recognized by Jeremiah, and by Zechariah. Jer. xxiv: 18, "And I will give the men that have transgressed

my covenant, which have not performed the words of the covenant which they had made before me, *when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof*,” &c. Zech. ix: 11, “As for thee, also, by the blood of thy covenant (or as it is in the margin, ‘whose covenant is by blood,’) I have sent forth thy prisoners.” Indeed, the whole of the Jewish sacrifices might be referred to as an illustration of this principle. They were all to ratify the covenant; and the Jew had no idea of a בְּרִית or διαθήκη with God, which was not connected with the slaying of a victim.

Thirdly, the same thing is expressed in the usual and established *terms* when a בְּרִית between God and man is referred to. Those terms became settled and technical, and they show what was understood by such a transaction. The term or phrase, used with great uniformity in the Old Testament is בְּרִית בָּרִית, “to cut a covenant, in allusion to the victims cut in pieces on the occasion of entering into such a covenant.” See Gen. xv: 18; xxxi: 54; Jer. xxxiv: 18; Professor Stuart, p. 448. “The meaning,” says Professor Stuart, “of such a transaction seems evidently to be, that the persons who make the engagements by passing through the dissevered parts of the slain animal, virtually say, ‘if we preserve not our engagements faithfully and without violation, then let us be cut in pieces like the animal between whose dissevered parts we now pass.’” But in the Scriptures this phrase refers most commonly to transactions between God and men, rarely comparatively between men and each other. See above, Gen. xv. 18; Jer. xxxiv: 18; also, 2 Chron. xxi: 7; Isa. lv: 3; Jer. xxxii: 40. Similar terms are also used in other languages to express the idea of making a covenant, showing that it was based on the custom of slaying a victim. Compare the common terms in Greek, ὄγκια τέμνειν, τέμνειν σπονδάς, and in Latin, *icere fædus*.

Fourthly, a similar custom was common among heathen nations. Thus Professor Stuart, (p. 448) says, “Ephrem Syrus testifies that the Chaldeans had the same usage; Opp. 1. p. 161; as also Hacourt does, in respect to the Arabians, *Histoire de Madagascar*, p. 98, 360.” Virgil alludes to the same custom, Aen. viii. 641.

et cæsa jungebant fædera porcæ.

So also Suetonius (in Claudio, chap. 25), says, Cum regi

bus foedus in foro icit porcā cæstā, ac veteri facialium præfatione adhibita. So Festus, Porci effigies inter militaria signa quintum locum obtinebat; quia, confecto bello, inter quos pax fierat, cæstā porcā foedus firmari solebat. See Bochart, Hieroz. p. 1. Lib. ii. c. xxxiii.

These facts with numerous others which might be adduced, go to establish the position that it was a settled principle, that in a *בְּרִית* or *διαθήκη* between God and man, there must be the death of the sacrificial victim. It was an indisputable principle. It entered into all the Jewish conceptions of such a *בְּרִית*; it pervaded their language; it was even the common sentiment of the heathen world. If, therefore, the Apostle Paul referred to such a transaction—which is all that his argument requires, the fact that “no [such] covenants were valid except those made by the intervention of sacrifices, is sufficiently *made out*,” and the objection of Professor Stuart, to the interpretation proposed is removed.

2. The second objection is, that “*διατίθημι* and *διαθέμενος* cannot properly be rendered *mediate* and *mediating sacrifice*.” They have no such meaning any where else. *Διαθέμενος* must mean either a *testator*, or else a *contractor*, i. e. one of two covenanting parties.” This objection occurs in reference to the phrase, *θάνατον ἀνάγκην φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθέμενου*, rendered in the common version, “there must of necessity be the death of the testator,” and by Professor Stuart, “it is necessary that the death of the testator should take place.” The objection urged by Professor Stuart is, that it would be improper to render this as meaning, “it is necessary that the death of the covenanter or the victim set apart to be slain, should take place.” In regard to this objection, I would observe,

First, that the word is *never* used in the sense of “testator,” either in the New Testament or the Old, unless it be here. This is impliedly admitted by Professor Stuart himself, when he says that the word *διαθήκη* is never employed in the sense of will or testament except in this place. See above. If this remark is true of *διαθήκη*, it is equally true of *διαθέμενος*, and it may be assumed, therefore, that it is no where else used in the sense of *one who makes a will*. If, therefore, it should be necessary, as it is undoubtedly, to assign a meaning to the word here quite unusual in the Scriptures, why should it be assumed that the meaning must be, “one who makes a will,” or a *testator*? Why may it not be equally proper to suppose

that the unusual meaning may be, one who confirms, or ratifies a covenant ; that is, the victim that was slain to ratify it ?

Secondly, if the Apostle used the word διαθήκη in the sense of a covenant in this passage, in accordance with the uniform usage of that word, and the word בְּרִית every where else, as I have endeavored to prove, then nothing is more natural than to suppose that he used the corresponding word διαθέμανσις in a similar sense. Since an *unusual* signification was to be attached to the word, it is to be presumed that he would give to the word this signification. He wished to express the idea that the covenant between God and man was always ratified by the death of a victim sacrificed on such an occasion, and for such a purpose. Yet there was no single word which would convey that idea. Neither the Greek nor the Hebrew furnished such a word in common use, and there was a necessity for expressing the thought by circumvention, or by using a word in a sense that differed slightly from the usual signification. Professor Stuart is not to learn how the Apostle would meet such an exigency, nor how common in his writings ἀπαρχή λεγομένα occur, nor how often words are used by him in a sense which occurs nowhere else. The instance before us, is at all events, such an instance, *for even on the interpretation proposed by Professor Stuart, it is necessary to suppose just such an usage.*

Thirdly, the usage by the Apostle, in this sense, is not a departure from the fair and proper meaning of the word. The word διαστίθημι properly means to *place apart*, to set in order, to arrange. It is rendered *appoint* in Luke xxii : 29 ; *made*, and *make*, with reference to a covenant. Acts iii : 25 ; Heb. viii : 10 : x : 16. It does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament except in the case before us. The idea of *placing, disposing, arranging*, enters always into the word, as to place wares, merchandize, &c., for sale ; to arrange a contract, &c. *Passow.* The fair meaning of the word here may be, whatever goes to arrange, dispose, or settle the covenant, or to make it secure and firm. If the word relate to a compact, the word cannot refer to one of the contracting parties, because the death of neither is necessary to confirm it. But if it was a well understood fact that a sacrifice was needful to confirm such an arrangement with God, then the word would naturally refer to such a victim as that by which it was confirmed. And though it be admitted that the word

is not elsewhere found in this sense, the only material question is, whether the Apostle would use a word in a single instance in a sense different from the usual signification, where the sense would be easily understood. On either interpretation, this must be admitted, for Professor Stuart admits that the word does not occur in the Scriptures elsewhere in the sense in which *he* uses it here. If these remarks are well founded, then the word may be properly regarded as referring to *the victim that was slain, in order to ratify a covenant with God*. In the old "arrangement," this was the animal offered in sacrifice; in the new, it was the Lamb of God. It may be added here, that the authority of Michaelis, Macknight, Doddridge, Bloomfield, Steudel, and the late Dr. James P. Wilson, all of whom assign this meaning to the word, is a sufficient proof that such an interpretation cannot be a very serious departure from the proper use of a Greek word.

(3.) The third objection of Professor Stuart to this interpretation is this:—"Νεκροί means only *dead men*, but *men* surely were not sacrificed by the Jews, as a mediating sacrifice in order to confirm a covenant." Of the fact here affirmed, that "*men* were not sacrificed by the Jews to confirm a covenant," there will be no difference of opinion. The only question is, whether the other point of the affirmation be equally clear—that "*νεκροί* means only *dead men*." Of this fact, Professor Stuart has adduced no proof, nor has he referred to any sources from which the evidence is derived. It is evident, therefore, that he regarded it as so settled in classical and Scripture usage that *νεκρός* meant only *dead men*, that it was not even a matter of question among the learned. Yet it is not improper to ask what is the evidence that the word *νεκρός* involves of necessity the conclusion that that which is affirmed to be *dead* was a *man*? It cannot be that nothing else *died* so far as the knowledge of the Greeks extended, for it is to be presumed that they were not ignorant of the fact that vegetables and animals were subject to death as well as men. In no other language, so far as known, is the idea *necessarily* incorporated into a word that refers to *death*, that it is the death of a *man*, nor is one word used to denote such a death, and another to express the death of a vegetable or animal. No one can deny that language *might* be so philosophically constructed as to express with entire

accuracy these shades of thought, but in the languages in common use in the world, it has not been deemed necessary to mark this distinction by the use of different words, and what is the evidence that even the subtle and philosophic Greeks did it? What gave rise to the distinction, if it did exist among them? On these points, Professor Stuart has given us no information, and it is not unfair, therefore, to enquire respectfully whether it is an undisputed and unequivocal matter of fact that the Greeks made this distinction, and that the word “*νεκροῖς* means only *dead men*.” There are some considerations, however, which may lead us to doubt whether this remark respecting the meaning of the word *νεκροῖς* is as universally true as is affirmed by Professor Stuart, or whether the word may not be used here in reference to the bodies of victims slain in sacrifice. It is true, that the signification usually given in the Lexicons is one that confines it to the bodies of *dead men*. Thus Passow defines it as meaning *der tote Leib, der Leichnam, die Leiche*, and remarks that it is used by Homer exclusively of the bodies of dead men—*vom menschlichen Leichnam*. The same definition is given substantially by Robinson Lex. N. T. This limitation of meaning is not, however, marked by Bretschneider, or by Schleusner. In regard to its use here, we may remark (1.) that it is scarcely necessary to observe that the word *men* is not in the original, unless it be supposed to be involved of necessity in the word *νεκροῖς*. It is simply “upon” or “over the dead”—*ἐπὶ νεκροῖς*. (2.) It is to be presumed, unless there is positive proof to the contrary, that the Hebrews and Greeks used the word *dead* as it is used by other people, as applicable to any thing when the life was extinct. A sacrifice that had been slain was *dead*; a tree that had fallen was *dead*; an animal that had been slain by other wild animals was *dead*. It would be desirable to be able to express the condition of such objects when life was extinct, and there was doubtless some word that would convey such an idea. It is possible, indeed, as has been suggested, to conceive that a language may be so subtle in its distinctions as to have one term to denote a dead oak, another a dead cypress, another a dead lion, another a dead elephant, another a dead man, and so on through the whole range of objects where there has been organic or animal life. But what is the evidence that the Hebrews or the Greeks had

such separate terms? What term *was* used in Greek besides *νεκρός* to denote that an animal was dead? (3.) What is the meaning of this word *νεκρός* in such passages as the following where it is applied to *works*, if it never refers to any thing but dead men? Heb. vi: 1; ix: 14. And what is its meaning in James ii: 17, 20, 26, where it is applied to *faith*, and in Eph. ii: 1, 5; and Rev. iii: 1, where it is applied to those who are spiritually dead? (4.) In Eccl. ix: 4, an instance occurs where the word cannot be applied to *dead men*—for it is applied expressly to a dead lion—*τὸν λέοντα τὸν νεκρόν*. In Isa. xiv: 19, it is a translation of *τείχι* a *branch*, a broken, rejected, dead limb. These instances show, at least, that there *are* cases where the word is used to denote something else than *dead men*.

To these considerations respecting the use of the word *νεκρός* we may add that the translation of *τείχι νεκρός* by “*after men are dead*,” can be arrived at only by a much forced use of language. Independently of all the difficulties suggested by the connexion, it may be observed that it is impossible to reach this signification without giving to the word *νεκρός* the force of a *participle*, in the sense of “*when men are dead*” or “*they having died*.” This idea is not properly in the Greek. It is that of a *dead body*, a *carcase*, a *corpse*, without special reference to the fact of its *having died*. The attention is confined by the word simply to the fact that it *is* dead, without having the mind turned particularly to the fact that it was once alive, or that the thing to be done or secured depends on that fact. The *dead body* is in the eye; not the fact that it was once living. To this it may be added, also, that the proper use of *τείχι* is not *after*, but *upon*, or *over*, and it may be doubted whether an unequivocal instance can be found in which the word is used in the sense of *after*.

If the suggestion contained, therefore, in this article be well-founded, the following paraphrase will express the true sense of the passage: “*For where an arrangement subsists between God and men, there must of necessity be the death of the victim by which it is ratified and confirmed. For such an arrangement is ratified over dead sacrifices, seeing it is never of force, while the victim set apart for its ratification is still living. Whence it was (οὕτω) that the first covenant was not ratified without blood, for when Moses had spoken all the commandments to the people, according to the law, he*

took the blood of calves, and of goats, with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled the book and all the people, saying, 'This is the blood of the covenant which God hath enjoined unto you.'

ARTICLE IV.

THE TRAINING OF THE PREACHER.

By Rev. Henry N. Day, Prof. of Sac. Rhet. Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

THE ambassador of God occupies the loftiest station of dignity and responsibility on earth. The source of his commission, the nature of his duties, and the infinite consequences connected with his labors, unite to show how exalted are his character and functions, how responsible is his trust. Clothed with the authority of the Sovereign of the universe, representing his divine person and acting in his name; engaged in the prosecution of an enterprise in which God has enlisted his brightest attributes, in which infinite power, and wisdom, and love shine in their divinest forms, in which too, the dearest interests of his boundless kingdom are vitally concerned; sent upon a mission on the success of which are hanging the destinies of immortality to deathless spirits, where on earth can he find a competitor in momentousness of trust or sacredness of function?

Vast as are the responsibilities which attach to every part of the Christian minister's office, however, it is in the attitude of a *preacher* of the gospel of salvation, that he appears transcendently interesting. It is when he is speaking in the name of the majesty of heaven, and proclaiming the messages of infinite authority and grace, that he is peculiarly "a savor of life unto life, or of death unto death." However important and sacred, however engaging and delightful may be the other duties of his ministry, yet "his pulpit is," emphatically, "his joy and his throne." There is the seat of his authority, the place of his power and dignity, and there, if he be true and faithful to his high calling, will he find the

purest joys of his service, the richest fruits of his labors. With his soul awed by the majesty of a present God, whose eye pierces his inmost thoughts and motives, and whose finger he sees writing down the record for the last dread account, with a heart burning with desire for the salvation of the company of immortals before him, and with a message on his tongue, every word of which is fraught with life or death, how must he tremble under the sense of his responsibility; while, at the same time, he rejoices that he may be the instrument of life to some that otherwise must perish! How, too, must he look upon all other departments of his office as entirely subordinate, and unworthy of comparison, when he thus stands breaking the bread of life to the starving and perishing multitude; and, in circumstances most favorable, is urging with all the authority and love of the gospel, the grace of a pardoning God! If there be joy in heaven over the recovery of one sheep, lost from the fold of God, over the conversion of one sinner that repenteth, with what intense interest and solicitude must the cloud of spiritual witnesses that hover over our heads regard the ambassador of Christ persuading congregated sinners to repentance! One shaft of truth successfully hurled, one warning, one entreaty successfully urged, and the courts of heaven ring with new anthems of joy and praise. What a position does he occupy in whose hand balances that shaft, upon whose tongue trembles that word of persuasion!

It is the design of the following essay to set forth *the work and training* assigned to the ambassador of God in his character *as a preacher*.

Confining our view to this one object—the minister of Christ in the attitude of a preacher—we designedly shut out the full consideration of certain points that it might otherwise be deemed essential to discuss. There are, for instance, certain indispensable requisites in the preacher, which not being exclusively or peculiarly his, the design now proposed does not require should be distinctly considered. It is rather for the purpose of preventing misapprehension—that I may not be thought to underrate these high qualifications, essential but not peculiar—than because strictly required by my subject, that I barely refer here to the necessity of a thorough discipline, of extended knowledge, and particularly of a profound and systematic acquaintance with theological science,

biblical literature and Christian history, as well as of a fervent and highly cultivated piety. The inspired historian has well recognized the distinction I have made when, in describing that early Christian orator, Apollos, he not only says he was "eloquent," but adds also "mighty in the Scriptures," and "fervent in spirit;"—eloquence, in his view, being something more than mere learning and piety.

Theology, so justly called "the art of arts and science of sciences," must emphatically be so to the Christian orator. Unless he be thoroughly indoctrinated in the Christian system, unless he fully understand the foundations on which it rests and the evidence by which it is established; unless he knows what are the great truths which it embraces, whether they appear in the form of doctrines, duties or motives, the principles on which they are based, their relations and connexions,—with what face can he stand up as the messenger of Christ to man, to explain, vindicate, and enforce the truths of God? How can he discharge his only peculiar function—wield "the sword of the spirit which is the word of God," when that very instrument itself is out of his grasp? With what confidence or authority, moreover, can he deliver his message unless he be well versed in the study of the Scriptures;—unless he knows that he delivers what God has revealed—knows from his own investigations and not merely from the opinions of fallible men, the grounds of which he neither can see nor understand—knows fully as he may know with all the light of learning reflected on the pages of inspiration, directly from the near lamp of his own well-lighted intellect, and not merely from the distant lamps of other minds, or, rather with all the light of other minds concentrated and directed in one full steady beam from his own? How, again, shall he be able to discover the errors and mistakes, the follies and crimes, into which imperfect men are liable to fall, even under the light of the gospel, and the means of avoidance or rescue? How shall he show clearly, convincingly, and movingly, to others, their dangers, and exhibit to them their encouragements? How shall he be able to illustrate and explain, by the light of experience, unless he can hold up before them, and before his own eyes also, the torch of Christian history?

Still more is a heart of tender sensibilities, a soul that can be swelled with the noblest, purest passions, a soul that is

filled with the love of Christ and of men, consuming every other emotion, and glowing with an ardor that cannot be repressed, indispensable to the Christian preacher. Without this, his learning, his gifts, his accomplishments are vain ; his eloquence is cold and lifeless, and his hearers will freeze and die under the very brilliancy of its icy splendor.

But essential as are these gifts and qualifications to the Christian orator, they are now to be regarded only as the necessary foundations on which he must stand ;—the air which must sustain his speaking breath. We are to view him only as wielding these mighty elements of mind. The question before us is, what is it to use them with energy and effect ? These, the elements to be used, and the skill to use them, are widely to be distinguished. He is not necessarily a musician who has possessed himself of the choicest instrument. That may command an admiration ;—we may wonder at the beauty of the workmanship ;—we may admire the taste and sumptuousness of the purchaser—but it is not till we hear the sweet strains of its melody and the smooth concord of its harmony, brought out by the touch of practised taste, that, ravished and chained, by our very rapture, we acknowledge the musician's skill and power. It is one thing to possess “the sword of the spirit ;” it is quite another thing to be able to wield it with success. There may be mind, furnished with all the stores of knowledge and trained to the highest vigor of discipline, joined to a soul of the warmest passion, and yet the effective preacher, the eloquent Apollos, mighty in convincing, mighty in persuading, be wholly wanting.

There is an art to be superinduced upon this intellectual discipline and furniture ;—a high, noble art,—I know not but I may say the highest, noblest art of which man is capable. For when does man seem more exalted, more godlike, than when, by the power of his eloquence, he sways, at will, the judgments and passions of men ? Go—witness its displays and its energies. Enter the halls of judicature, and notice there the voice of truth and fervor guiding ignorance and doubt into light and knowledge, subjecting prejudice to reason, and confounding all the arts of sophistry and error, while it yields protection to innocence, extends succor and redress to the injured, and restores to right and to law its authority and respect. Go with Demosthenes into the tumultuous

assembly of an alarmed, incensed and factious populace, met to adopt measures that are to decide the destiny of the state. Follow him with your eye, as he ascends, trembling yet decided, the bema. The eye glistens, the lips move, and, as if by the power of Him who "spake and it was done," who turns the hearts of men as the rivers of water are turned, the tumult is hushed; the strife is appeased; the alarm is dispelled; perplexity has fled; confidence returns, and Athens rends the air with its united, determined cry, "to arms! to arms!" and rushes to the conflict. Witness this, and can you conceive of a scene where man can appear more exalted, more godlike? Yes—there is one, and but one. It is that in which the ambassador of God, with the truths of inspiration on his tongue, and the love of Christ burning on his lips, and speaking from his eye, breaks up the lethargy of sin, convinces the unbelieving, enlightens the ignorant, melts the insensible, subdues the perverse and obstinate, comforts and cheers the troubled and desponding, and transfuses all hearts with the power and blessedness of the love of Christ. There is a scene in which man appears super-human, nay, super-angelic; for even Gabriel might aspire to be the mover and actor in a scene like that.

I am well aware that the art whose province it is to fit man for this high function has been decried, resisted and despised. But when I question experience, and hear her declare that the noblest fruits of eloquence are the products of rhetorical art;—that in all ages the orators who have risen to the highest eminence at the bar, in the forum or the pulpit, are the men who have subjected themselves most entirely to its forming hand: when she tells me of Demosthenes devoting years, and thousands of gold, upon a single branch, and that almost the least, that of vocal expression; of Cicero, applying himself under the direction of the most eminent masters of the art, year after year, with untiring assiduity; of Chatham, contending, like those ancient orators, with the difficulties of an infirm bodily constitution, and consenting to the most puerile tricks of the art, as they have been sneeringly called, practising, hour after hour, before a mirror, that he might acquire a free, graceful and forcible action:—when she takes me into the church of God, and points me to a Chrysostom—him of the golden mouth, so styled, from the surpassing richness of his eloquence,—the devoted pupil of

the art; and, in modern times to a Reinhard, the untiring student of the ancient rhetoric, as well as of the ancient orators; to a Robert Hall, remarkable in early life, as much for his attention to the culture of oratory, as for his philosophical investigations, I am content to pass by, unnoticed, the sneers of ignorance and the detractions of envious sloth and weakness.

But rhetoric has received her deepest wound from her own votaries. She has been conceived of, even by professed teachers of the art, only as a stern, morose, capricious, critic, with chisel and mallet in hand, hewing off this angle, or chipping out that excrescence, but as incapable of adding a beauty as of infusing original life. The rhetorician, it is said, necessarily succeeds the orator. He can, therefore, only analyze, classify, enumerate. He may detect deformities, and smoothe an outline, but with that terminates his power.

The logic is false; and the conception low and unworthy. Rhetoric, in the true notion of its office, is developing and formative, as well as corrective. It cannot, indeed, give original life; but it can do something more than prune off an unproductive or injurious limb. Its province is to take the plant living, indeed, but undeveloped, unformed, and weak, and by the judicious and assiduous application of water, light, and air, by the timely direction of every shoot, and the removal of every needless stem and stalk, develope its infant energies, its generous juices, and its beauteous foliage, and thus make that the noble, majestic tree or vine yielding its rich and beautiful and plenteous fruits in their season, which otherwise had been choked with weeds, withered in the drought, or wasting all its life in a rank luxuriance of leaves, alike shapeless, cumbersome, and destitute of fruit.

It has here a great, a noble task to perform, worthy of the most gifted and most richly furnished intellect. Receiving the mind, thoroughly disciplined in all its intellectual faculties, and stored with the richest fruits of knowledge, with its sensibilities and capabilities of feeling, also, expanded, trained, and pliant, taking in short intellect and soul in the highest degrees of their cultivation, it has, first, to set forth a standard of eloquence and fix it firmly in the mind, by the judicious and forcible exhibition of the finest models. It has, next, to inspire a generous enthusiasm for its attainment, which will

mock difficulties, and turn toil to pleasure, by opening the eye upon the peculiar charms and delights of the study, and by presenting the rich rewards that attend success. It has, then, to direct and superintend the severe course of training, which shall elevate the enthusiastic aspirant to the standard and aim he desires ;—a course of training which shall bring into perfect control all the attainments of learning, and make all subsidiary to the designs of eloquence ; which shall also give him command over all the powers of feeling, and enable him to transfuse the life and energy of passion into the coldest, driest, most lifeless forms of thought ; which shall make easy a ready arrangement, rendering every process of reasoning clear and convincing ; every description and narrative simple, consecutive, and symmetrical ; and every passionate appeal timely, unerring and effective : which shall, moreover, put at service all the powers of expression, so that thought can be made to appear, not in cold and inanimate forms of language, but in its own living body, in distinct and graceful outlines, plump, fresh, and vigorous : and which shall, still more, superadd a graceful, appropriate and energetic action, that will seem but the outward covering, the skin, if you please, of the verbal body of the thought, partaking its life and picturing, in its changing hues, the stirrings of the soul within.

I need not say that here is no slight task to be performed, both by him who superintends and by him who undergoes this process of training. I need not say that it is by no means strange, so few have been willing to take the requisite pains, and submit to the necessary toil—that so few, therefore, have attained the enviable power of swaying, by the force of truth enlivened by feeling, the minds and hearts of men.

Indeed, it is a most rare occurrence that we find any one ready to admit, that eloquence is an attainment at all ; that it is any thing else than a gift conferred. Into such neglect has the art fallen in modern times, that the maxim once so current, *orator fit*, is now received with almost universal skepticism. Men witness the prodigies of oratory,—they are themselves the victims of its power, and suppose it wholly a boon of heaven. They have no idea of the midnight study and the toil by day ; the severe discipline, the long and patient training which the fruits of eloquence have cost in their production : and were they told of a Chatham coming into par-

liament to awe a virulent faction into silence, and speechless dread, by the force of a word or a gesture, in which the whole energy of his giant mind went out, from a dressing room—from practising before a mirror; of a Brougham, to catch a proper power of expression, first locking himself up for three weeks to the study, night and day, of the single oration “on the crown,” and then writing over fifteen different times his peroration before bringing it to its final shape, they would stare with wonder and incredulity.

In the church, particularly, all such labor of preparation is but too generally regarded as trifling puerility, vain and criminal sacrifice to the love of applause, or at least, sad and unjustifiable waste of time. The Christian minister who should study the art of expression, who should spend every week some hours in the culture of his taste, the acquisition of words, the discipline of his voice, and the improvement of his manner, would be charged with criminally squandering that time on trifles, which should be devoted directly to the care of souls. They, who would think no pains too great, no expense too heavy, which should secure in time of religious interest, the instrumentality of a man of God who can speak with a resistless force of truth and overwhelming vehemence of holy passion, yet, in the inconsistency of their ignorance and thoughtlessness, will blame the man who employs the innocent means that are made necessary by God himself to the attainment of this power. Even the lawful culture of God’s noblest gifts, the acquisition of a power to which he has chiefly confided the great work of spreading his gospel on earth, is with them sin and folly. If they meet with a modern Apollos, “an eloquent man,” mighty in handling the truth of God, capable of moving, and with the aid of God’s grace, of subduing the hearts of men, they esteem him a man directly gifted of heaven, receiving from lavish but capricious nature, his whole powers of persuasion, and never imagine that he must have gone through the low drudgery of a rhetorician’s mill.

Perhaps such stolid simplicity might be passed by with only a smile of pity, did not such views infect, also, the expectant ministers of religion. But they too, to a lamentable extent, are carried away by the same delusion. They think of nothing more nor higher than storing their minds with all theological lore, and are content with the old adage, “a good

textuary is a good divine." Especially if an elevated piety be added to extensive knowledge, they deem themselves thoroughly furnished to their work; and taste at last the sad fruits of their folly when too late to retrieve it. Insensible of the importance of skill in the use of their armor, they wonder that at the very appearance of it, the enemies of truth do not fall prostrate. Utterly ignorant of the power of expressing thought and feeling, the most moving truths of the gospel fall powerless from their lips. Sabbath after Sabbath, they enter the pulpit and deliver from lips that at least express no feeling, discourses as destitute of force and passion to hearers that are equally motionless and dead. Years gradually wear away the little enthusiasm that the ardor of youth forced, insensibly to themselves, into their preaching, and then all is cold and repulsive. The house of God, of consequence, is neglected. The congregation are wearied and disgusted. They demand more effective preachers. And those men of God, who might have become able ministers of the word, sought out and esteemed by all, are dispirited and sad, leave the field which they find they cannot till successfully; and the church of God mourns over the loss of their piety, talents, and acquirements—all rendered ineffective by their neglect to cultivate one important gift. Oh! would that the children of this world were not here so much wiser in their generation than the children of light. Surely, his six months diligent culture of his voice, with half-shorn head in a cave, was not misjudged policy, wasted time and sacrifice, for the Grecian orator, by which he was to attain the empire of factious Athens, the sway of all their furious passions by a word, to procure for himself an immortality of glory, such as no other mortal ever attained. Is it unwise, is it wrong for the servant of God to devote time and labor to acquire a similar power over the minds and hearts of men—not that he may gain glory to himself—not that he may preserve to them their rights and civil liberties, but that he may save their souls and bring additional glory to the God of their salvation?

I repeat, then, here is a great, a most important duty laid before him who aspires to the elevation of a successful Christian minister. It is not enough to possess the power of thinking,—to be thoroughly imbued with all theological lore,—to have a heart of warm Christian sensibilities, of strong, fervent zeal and passion. These are essential—entirely indispensable. But they are not all. The power of expressing

truth known, passion felt, must be added. This it is which constitutes the peculiar function of the preacher.

We have all seen the man of known intellect and acquirement, of devoted spirit, too, rise and address a waiting congregation, and through the obscurity of his method, the want of command over thought and feeling, the clumsiness of his style, and the dullness of his manner, but still more to stupefy and chill his hearers. And we have seen, also, another of inferior parts, of lower piety, perhaps, whose first word or look fixed the eye, whose clear and distinct method carried the attention, whose style and manner, so true, so natural, so easy, impressed every thought and implanted every feeling. The difference is as much the fruit of art as is the superiority of the thoroughly trained musician, or the long experienced artizan over mere genius undrilled, undisciplined. Natural genius will indeed make here, as every where else, a difference in the comparative degree of attainment made under the tuition of art; but it will not supply the place of principles and rules, into which observation has rendered the true elements of power in every eminent speaker, nor of systematic practice founded on those principles.

No—the ancients were right. They judged from experience. The poet—the eminent in any other line may be the product of nature alone; the orator is formed—is made so by art and training. It is no more absurd to expect that a man will be eloquent in a foreign tongue in which he cannot speak a sentence without faltering, than that he will be so in his own native dialect of which he has not acquired a mastery;—no more absurd to expect that a man who has never opened his lips in song will sing with the sweetness of Orpheus, than that he who has never fitly trained his voice will speak with the force of a Chatham or a Whitefield. “There is no native eloquence, more than there is native running races or fighting battles.”

It has been justly observed by one to whom his own experience probably verified the remark, “the most successful preachers are those who, in their discourses, observe most the laws according to which power in public speaking universally displays itself.” And certainly it is not difficult to decide which of the two has fairest promise of success, he who devotes himself to the practice of an art ignorant of all its laws, or he who has closely and thoroughly studied and

comprehended it so closely and thoroughly that they have become the secret principles and guides of all his efforts.

It is not the object of the rhetorician to teach the arts of display ;—how to round a period, to hang artificial flowers on lifeless statues of thought, to string together epithets of high sound but of scanty sense ; how to balance gracefully to this side and that, with all the regularity of a pendulum, and to show how prettily the voice can glide up and down through the whole range of the musical scale ; in other words to teach bombast and rant. Nor does his art seek merely to prune speech of all such false ornaments and disgusting trickery. Its great province is to develope and cultivate that highest, noblest attribute of man—the faculty of discourse in its outward working ; to furnish it a suitable body, and feed and educate that body. The connexion is not closer or more vital between body and spirit than between thought and expression. This all experience proves ; for who attempts to think but in words, as who conceives a spirit but in body. This intimate connexion, too, the phenomena of language demonstrate ; since in different tongues,—in languages originating in different ages and countries we find, from the vital intimacy of the two, both reason or discourse and speech expressed by the self-same word. Hence, too, speech has well been called “the incarnation of thought.” This body it is the high duty of him who aims to sway the minds of men at will, diligently and lawfully to train and educate. And, surely, it is no small, no despicable task to make the vital fluid circulate through every limb, diffusing life, vigor and beauty through every part. It is no mean task to acquire the power to present truth in a perfect, a symmetrical, vigorous, healthful body of speech. It is a work, in truth, in the accomplishment of which man comes nearest to Him who gave expression to his own infinite attributes in the perfect forms of creation.

The process of training, already summarily indicated, no part of which can be dispensed with, at once manifests the greatness of the work.

The *idea* of what eloquence is—of what it is in its constituent nature—in its form and outward appearance—in its prerogative and power is to be awakened and developed. Not only must there be a conception of what it is, but the idea must be reduced to a practical idea in the mind, im-

pressed on all the faculties of the intellect and all the susceptibilities of the soul; made a practical standard or model guiding insensibly, as does the idea of harmony the fingers of the organist, all the powers of the mind,—a standard of attainment to which the aim shall ever be directed till perfection be reached; a standard, too, of criticism that shall indicate at once to the orator, as the smooth concord of sounds to the harmonist, that the end is reached, and persuasion, in perfect figure, sits on his lips. This is to be accomplished as in the case of the artist by the long and familiar communion with the most finished models of eloquence in ancient and in modern times. What an attainment is this to the preacher—to possess a distinct idea of what eloquence in its perfectness is—of what it was in Jesus Christ!

Our *enthusiasm* must be inspired and fed in the endeavor to realize this idea. The ravishing beauties of discourse compact and solid with thought, animated with passion, and invested with a rich, graceful drapery of words must be pointed out and contemplated; the glorious achievements of a finished oratory, the pure and exalted pleasures which line the path of progress as more and more perfect forms come forth from the forming mind like the successive stages of perfection in original creation, all good but the better ever last;—these must be pressed home to the heart till it warms and glows into a quenchless ardor of passion.

With the idea and the enthusiasm well developed, the training in its stricter sense is to be pursued. A ready *command of thought* is to be acquired. Knowledge is so to be stored as that its various depositaries shall be known; and the thoughts laid up can be as promptly furnished to use as his various wares by the accomplished tradesman. The powers of invention, trained under other hands, must here be subjected to the speaker's will, to be sent forth at once into any field of thought and bring back any assigned fruit or flower of intellect. The treasures of knowledge must not only be possessed, but each casket must be known, its position, its contents. Spirited eloquence awaits not the slow process of a tardy association that must grope around the whole chamber of thought, before it can bring forth to light its appointed truth. Practice must make its motions true at the first effort, and quick as the minstrel's touch, whom long exercise has taught to strike each note, with the preci-

sion and suddenness of thought; which, at first, could be reached only by long and tedious reflection on the structure of the scale, the relations of pitch, and all the details of the musical art. "It is not the dilatory precision of thought and words, stored up in memory, which qualifies mind for its high action in victorious elocution; but the electric flash of thought, and the broad circumference of illuminated vision, filled with words for perspicuity, precision, strength or beauty, and familiar by use, offering every where and constantly their willing aid—a body-guard clustering by affinity and affection unseen around the orator, as guardian spirits attend the saints."

The *command of feeling* is to be acquired. Not only must the various passions of the soul be known, be cultivated and expanded in the symmetry of virtue, but the different chords of emotion must, like the strings of the harper, be under command, so that any can be touched at pleasure. Here is a higher advance of art. For the will has access to the feelings only over the domain of the understanding; and its power must be established over both. It is the prerogative only of the highly accomplished orator to hold thus all the voices of passion and to make any speak as he may desire. He only can do this who has learned how to present at once the objects of feeling and has trained his sensibilities to the most ready obedience. Especially is much training requisite here to enable the orator to force the ardor of passion into the forms of thought; to keep up both the fires of intellect and soul together and in due proportion.

Next, *method* requires distinct attention—long, severe, patient study. Of the very first importance is this branch of the preacher's training. It is, perhaps, more by his accurate method than by any other quality that his intellectual rank will be determined by men of discernment. It was to his method more than to any thing else that the celebrated Reinhard of the modern German pulpit attributes his success and renown as a preacher. No common discipline will suffice to give this power of expression. It is no slight task achieved, even, to develope fully the idea of method, although an essential element of mind;—to get out distinct and complete the notion of what method is—that "progressive transition" which implies a beginning and an end; which presupposes unity, which neither admits of the am-

putation of essential parts, nor of the forcible insertion of foreign heterogeneal matter to maim or enfeeble the one, complete, living principle of the thought; which, with undeviating aim, is ever pressing forward towards its end; and which is naturally so pleasing and is so essential in the great work of convincing, instructing and persuading. How rarely, indeed, is this important element to be found in the common oratory of the day, whether of the forum, the senate, or the pulpit? How little is there of this exhausting, orderly, symmetrical method—either of that *gradatory* kind, if I may so term it, where, by the power of the mind's keen gaze and forcible impulse or firm pressure, the subject is cleft and laid open and its natural parts as of an orange are spread out, are complete, proportionate, and in place, following each other by regular intervals or steps; or of that other *continuous* kind which seizing with almost instinctive promptness and sagacity the ends of the fibres, skilfully unwinds, as in the throwster's art, the entire ball of the thought unbroken, and untangled? The method that we commonly discover, if it be worthy of the name, is that of the careless breaker of stone for macadamizing, who chips off a piece here and a piece there from the rocky mass, but can neither tell why he began here, or stopped there, or why he passed round this way rather than that, only that, perhaps, it so happened, and he ceased when his cart was full. How little is there of that keen penetration and discriminating study which pierces to the heart of the subject and then follows out the various arteries or veins to the extremities; which is the fruit only of much training and discipline?*

A body of language, moreover, is to be furnished to methodized thought and passion; and, here, lies another rich and extensive province to be entered, explored and subjected by the orator. But on this point it is unnecessary to dwell, as it is both trite and has already received, perhaps, sufficient notice. The general means of training are the same here as elsewhere. It is by much practice under the direction of ex-

* Cicero's observation on this point deserves to be engraved on the memory of every student of oratory. *Omnes enim, sive artis sunt loci, sive ingenii cuiusdam atque prudentiae, qui modo insunt in ea re, de qua scribimus.*

perienced taste and exercised judgment; by frequent and careful labor in putting thought into language. This is the process adopted and most faithfully applied by all who have gathered laurels in the field of eloquence. This is the great leading direction given by the most philosophical of orators and the most eloquent of philosophers. *Caput antem est, quod (ut vere dicam) minime facimus, (est enim magni laboris, quem anquicentibus nobis, omniq[ue] acie ingenii contemplantibus ostendunt se et occurunt, plerique fugimus,) quam plurimum scribere;* STILUS OPTIMUS ET PRAESTANTISSIMUS DICENDI EFFECTOR AC MAGISTER. It is here we discover the secret of Edwards' power as a preacher; who, although he professedly despised the whole art of expression and was extremely careless and almost slovenly in his style, yet was so effective a speaker. He owed that power to his constant practice from boyhood, of thinking with his pen. He thus acquired that copiousness of language and power of expression which redeemed his productions from their other faults.

One thing more demands the preacher's careful attention before he can be deemed thoroughly furnished for his great work of teaching and persuading. It is the command of a *pleasing and energetic delivery.* He must acquaint himself with all the various functions of speech; he must understand the kind and degree of expression belonging to each; he must, moreover, have those functions of speech so perfectly familiarized by practice and subjected to his control, that he can employ them at pleasure. Here is an art; an important, a most interesting art by itself. As he cannot justly claim the name of an accomplished artist who does not know all the implements of his art with their respective uses, and can handle them with skill and effect, so neither can he be called an accomplished speaker who does not know all the movements of the voice; who does not understand precisely what is their office in the expression of the various degrees or kinds of thought and passion; and who cannot, whatever may be the circumstances in which he is placed, whatever even may be his own feelings, command just that vocal movement which nature has appropriated to the sentiment he desires to utter. This, in the present advanced state of the art of elocution now established on the basis of a science, the principles of which are clearly ascertained and set forth, he

may do ; and he who enters the responsible office of a preacher of the gospel without this preparation, may well consider whether he has not seized a sword for the battle, on which he has put no edge. It was in infinite wisdom that the spread of the gospel was confided to the persuasive accents of human speech. There is a resistless charm and power in utterance that sits closely and elegantly upon the thought and feeling, or rather into which, as into their own native body, intellect and soul send their own life and fire. And the truth of God surely deserves the most finished body of expression which human art and skill can give.

Such is the training which the ambassador of God must go through to become an effective preacher. To the point of making the power of expression his own which this course of training will give him, he cannot be indifferent, if he rightly appreciate his own peculiar office work, if he realize at all its importance to his success.

The expression of thought and feeling is his sole peculiar work as a preacher ; and necessarily just so far as he is deficient in the power of expression, just so far is he lacking in fitness for his work.

Just in proportion too, as he possesses this power, will be his success. The possession of it indeed, has a most important bearing on his success remotely and indirectly, as well as immediately and directly.

It will affect seriously his reputation, to which no servant of Christ can wisely be indifferent. The exhibition of this power, as the exhibition of talents, of learning, of piety, will command even from the men of the world a respect for the sacred profession. It will draw them under the influence of the gospel. It will render the minister of God a man to be sought and desired ; and will open him a way more effectually to address the truths of the gospel to multitudes ; as the throngs which the name of a Whitefield drew together most fully attest.

It will favorably and mightily influence the preacher himself. It is the fruit and effect of art that it turns every thing to its own account. The painter sees every where forms of beauty. He looks on every tree in the landscape, every cloud in the heavens, every feature in the countenance as containing an element of beauty ; and he is perpetually striving to conceive that object as delineated on canvass. Thus

his taste and his skill are ever forming and developing, while many an hour is redeemed from listlessness and sloth, and all places, and all objects are converted into sources of pleasure and profit. It is the aim of the preacher to persuade men. If he has acquired any high degree of the art, he will ever be studying the means of persuasion. Fired with his object ever in view, he will pursue the investigations of science with a more eager zeal; his study will be lighted more by the midnight lamp; he will be a more profound and thorough theologian and scholar. He will seek to know more of that mind and heart which he is to address; and will with greater interest and delight, study in familiar intercourse, the minds, the habits of thought and feeling of his congregation, and will then furnish himself with the weapons of persuasion. He will be more diligent and thorough in his preparations for the pulpit; and adapt them more directly to his great end—persuasion. Entering the sanctuary with his object steadily in view, he will address himself to his high office with greater skill, and will speak with a greater confidence in the power of divine truth. More than all things else, he will feel the need of a fervent piety; of a soul that can sympathize with all the sorrows, all the compassions of the Saviour of sinners, and can be swelled with his holy passion. He will drink deeper of his love. He will study with more eager desire to copy Him who spake as never man spake. In every way, thus, the acquisition of this power must exert a favorable influence on the Christian preacher himself.

And will God be insensible to the careful and lawful culture of one of his noblest gifts? Will the Spirit, without whose power, the eloquence of an angel were vain and impotent to convert souls, despise the attainments of him who has qualified himself for the duties of an office like this? No:—the success of a Summerfield, a Payson and a Griffin attests that the Holy Ghost loves to second the vivid and forcible presentation of his own truth.

But it is in its immediate effects and fruits that the importance of this power of expression is conspicuously seen. Men are not converted and saved by the truth simply—by truth unexpressed. “The words,” says our Saviour, “The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life.” The quickening, saving power of divine truth can be secured only on condition

of its being communicated ; of its being manifested and commended to the conscience. Now we may not only conceive of truth as entirely without body, undivested of language, which of course, is entirely impotent, since it is aloof from the mind and can only be brought nigh by language ; but we may also conceive of truth as more or less perfectly furnished with a body of speech. The whole truth may be there, but it may only in part appear ; and then it not only lacks its total power of impression, but even the part distinctly presented has not even its appropriate effect, since it is out of place, dismembered, mutilated. And here is the secret of the difficulty with many a sound and pious theologian, whose preaching is without its anticipated effect. All the necessary truth is in his discourse, but it is not seen, it is not felt, because not furnished with an adequate body. It is not rash to say that the ministers of the gospel for the most part lose one half of the fruit of their labors merely from the want of a suitable expression of the truth which they have actually searched out and prepared for exhibition. If there be any disposition to doubt here, go back and look in upon the crowded assemblies that attended the preaching of Edwards. See every eye fixed on the man of God, as with scarcely a sign of outward action he speaks of the dread justice of Jehovah. Watch the rising emotion in those glistening eyes ; listen, as that first sigh draws after it another, and still another, as quicker and quicker, and deeper and deeper it breaks on every side around you ;—as groans succeed and thicken, till the whole vast assembly seems in an agony of distress, and the voice of the preacher is drowned in the sobs, and cries, and groans of his hearers ; is there not power there ? power in expression ? It is not vehemence of bodily action ; it is not overwhelming power of vocal utterance. For in these Edwards was deficient. It is not truth more weighty, more powerful than the gospel contains ;—than is contained in many a discourse, the fruits of which never appear, in this world at least, to human view. It is not holiness higher, purer than it is competent for man to attain ; than the servant of God, perhaps not very unfrequently does attain. It is truth and christian love *expressed* ;—truth and holiness expressed in the accuracy of method, the clearness and energy of style, and aptness of words which Edwards attained by his assiduous use of the pen almost insensibly to himself, and certainly undesignedly. Take an-

other case illustrative of the remark I have made in respect to another element of expression ; the delivery of thought and passion, arranged and clothed with language, by a suitable action and management of voice. Put the most successful of Whitefield's sermons into the mouth of a less accomplished speaker, and will the thousands, as under the sound of his voice, weep and wring their hands and shriek out in the irrepressible anguish of their souls ? It is not then truth alone which instrumentally saves even. It is truth expressed, expressed in its own appropriate manner.

Nor let the opposite error be countenanced, that christian feeling alone will savingly influence men ; that holiness and devoted zeal will suffice. There is a zeal without knowledge, which is fruitless except in evil, as the history of our own times and of our own land sadly teaches us. Even that judicious feeling must be expressed, expressed suitably, or it will utterly fail of good effect. Every emotion has its own appropriate expression in language and in voice, prescribed by the God who formed us ; and he only who has learned what that is, and attained, by careful training, the ready control of it, can even by his holiness produce the effect he might. Passion as well as truth must be expressed suitably, or the famous dagger scene of Burke will be re-acted in the pulpit, and the ridicule and disgust of all be the only and merited result.

It is as essential to success that the preacher be able to express truth as to know it ; to express Christian emotion as to feel it. Something more than a meek and a learned Moses was needed to achieve God's design of redemption for enslaved Israel. An Aaron must be called in to be a mouth to the people. Something more was needed than the thorough instruction given by our Saviour to his Apostles in his long intercourse with them ; something more too, than a Peter's devotedness and zeal. The Holy Ghost must be sent down with tongues of fire.

With this learning and holy fervor let the power of expression be joined, and the man of God becomes what he should be—"apt to teach." He will not enter the sanctuary and lift up his voice in vain. Truth glowing with love, and directed with skill, will tell of its power. Attention will be aroused. The truth will be understood. Its force will be felt. The heart will be stirred. Sympathy will work. The

feelings will glow ; and fed with the oil of truth the flame will continue till the will be reached, and by the grace of God, the man renewed. The pious soul also will be fed with the nourishment of truth which it apprehends, and be refreshed by the living waters of pious feeling not wasted in channels of language which it cannot reach.

Thus preached he who spake as never man spake. His discourses were not dry, obscure logic ; nor fervid rant of words. Truth and feeling, light and love, were duly combined, and spoke out in his clear and perfect method, his rich imagery and illustration, his tender moving accents. Thus preached his devoted and successful Apostle Paul, who was well nigh adored as the god of eloquence, by the superstitious Lycaonians. Thus preached those in all ages of the church whose labors God has greatly blessed in the conversion of many to himself. Let those who would reap similar fruits imitate their example. Let them count no labor lost, no sacrifice dear which shall enable them to speak forth the truths of God with effect.

It is matter of congratulation that attention has been of late more decidedly drawn to the culture of this important art in our own country. It is a matter of especial thankfulness to God, that the eloquence of the pulpit has taken the lead, as it should, of all the departments of oratory. The religious press is speaking out with a more frequent and a louder voice on the importance and means of promoting a higher degree of eloquence in the pulpit of our land. The patrons and conductors of our public institutions, our colleges and theological seminaries, are evincing their zeal and sagacious judgment in the more munificent provision of means of instruction, and the establishment of professorships of oratory. The Christian public are demanding higher qualifications in the preaching art. These signs of the times are hailed with peculiar delight and thankfulness. They augur well for the advance of truth and religion. May the friends of the effective advocacy of truth and holiness, hold on in their laudable course. Especially, may they remember to follow up their charities and their endeavors with their prayers.

ARTICLE V.

THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY AS INDICATED BY THE CONDITION OF WOMEN.

By E. D. Sanborn, Prof. of Latin Language and Literature, Dartmouth College, N. H.

"If women are by barbarians reduced to the level of slaves," says Aristotle, "it is because barbarians themselves have never yet risen to the rank of men, that is, of men fit to govern. Nothing proves more ruinous to a state than the defective education of women; since wherever the institutions respecting one half of the community are faulty, the corruption of that half will gradually taint the whole."

The practical good sense of the philosopher, exhibited in these quotations, shows him to have been, not only in advance of his age, but *superior even to himself*: for the sentiments here advanced are more liberal and just than his ordinary speculations upon the relations and rights of females. The wisest of the ancients did not duly appreciate the influence of woman. Her authority was rarely acknowledged in the domestic circle, and her *political existence* was scarcely recognized. Previous to the introduction of Christianity, even by philosophers, woman was regarded rather as the servant of man, the minister of his wants and pleasures, than his friend, companion and equal.

From Christianity woman has derived her moral and social influence. To it she owes her very existence as a social being. The mind of woman, which the legislators and sages of antiquity had doomed to eternal inferiority and imbecility, Christianity has developed. The gospel of Christ, in the person of its great Founder, has descended into this neglected mine, which wise men regarded as not worth the working, and brought up a priceless gem, flashing with the light of intelligence, and glowing with the lively hues of Christian graces.

Christianity has been the restorer of woman's plundered rights. It has furnished the brightest jewels in her present crown of honor. Her previous degradation accounts, in part at least, for the instability of early civilization. It is impos-

sible for society to be permanently elevated, where woman is debased and servile. Wherever females are regarded as inferior beings, society contains, within itself, the elements of its own dissolution. It is impossible that institutions and usages, which trample upon the very instincts of our nature, and violate the revealed law of God, should be crowned with ultimate success.

The family is a divine institution. The duties and rights of its respective members are plainly indicated by the laws of our physical constitution. They are more fully prescribed by the word of God. In the infancy of the world, the family and the state were intimately associated. Both society and government naturally grew out of the divinely constituted relations of the family. The first human pair were not "isolated savages," as they have been termed by groveling infidels, nor was the natural state of mankind a state of warfare, as the philosopher of Malmesbury would have us believe. Admitting what revelation clearly teaches, that the first human pair were intelligent, civilized beings, united by God, "in the bands of holy wedlock," we have then a foundation sufficiently broad for the whole social fabric to rest upon. We need not resort to "a state of nature," (technically so called,) nor to a "social compact," for the origin of government, nor to "necessity" for the origin of society. The family contained the elements of both. An enlarged family is a society. The regulations adopted by a father, for the management of his household, constitutes a government. Upon this natural foundation "*the state*" is based. From these simple relations, an endless variety of political institutions has arisen.

Though the family and "*the state*" are so closely united in their origin, still we must not confound their relations. The rights and the duties of the father and the magistrate, the son and the subject are, by no means, identical. "*The state* and the family differ, not only in size, but in the essentials of their constitution. At the same time, however, it is undeniable that there have been stages, in the history of humanity, when the ideas of state and family were closely interwoven and almost blended together. They were mixed in the patriarch; they were continued when the family grew into a tribe; they were not always formally separated when the tribe became a nation." A more enlightened philosophy

has distinguished these analogous relations, and defined the duties and rights of the father and the magistrate. The government of the family is based upon mutual affection and sympathy ; the government of the state upon mutual justice and political equality. Still the family is the nursery of all those virtues which adorn the state. "Patriotism, as all languages testify, springs from the hearth." The good father makes the good magistrate. The son, who has "borne the yoke in his youth," makes the exemplary citizen ; while the enlightened and cultivated mother and sister give to society its highest dignity, and to home its fondest endearments. Whatever interrupts the harmony of domestic life or disturbs its divinely-appointed relations, poisons the very well-springs of society, and introduces disease into its political organization. The tyrannical father is not a safe depository of delegated power. The disobedient son early learns to contemn the wholesome restraints of law ; and before his maturity, often becomes a hardened culprit. The uneducated, undisciplined daughter is often the disgrace of her family and the reproach of her sex. In a word, *the condition of the family is the true index of the condition of society.* Where domestic happiness is most fully enjoyed, there society is most matured and civilization most advanced.

The family, therefore, obtains a higher importance as society improves and woman assumes the true position for which she is so admirably adapted by the laws of her physiological and mental constitution. Among savage nations the condition of woman is always degraded and servile. This is one of the most odious features of barbarism, and one of the most difficult to eradicate. No system of religion recognizes woman as the companion and equal of man, except Christianity, and under no other system can she enjoy her inalienable rights. Society may change in its external aspect, may exhibit the glitter of wealth, the refinements of taste, the embellishments of art, or the more valuable attainments of science and literature, and yet the mind of woman remain undeveloped, her taste uncultivated, and her person enslaved. But wherever Christianity enters, woman is free. The gospel, like a kind angel, opens her prison doors, and bids her walk abroad and enjoy the sunlight of reason and breathe the invigorating air of intellectual freedom.

Among the nations of antiquity, woman enjoyed the

highest consideration where *the private virtues* were most cultivated. With the Egyptians and Romans, the pleasures of home were better appreciated than in Greece. Though the intellectual culture of Greece was superior to that of Egypt, there is little doubt that the Greeks were less domestic, and consequently less virtuous, than the Egyptians. The researches of antiquarians, among the ruins of Egypt, have recently thrown a flood of light upon the character of that interesting people, and rendered their history almost as familiar to us as the events of the last century. The paintings and sculptures formed upon existing monuments reveal all the processes of the arts and of domestic life, with a definiteness and accuracy surpassing the most lucid narrative. Besides the sculptures, and pictorial representations of ancient usages, the cabinets of European kings and antiquaries are full of the remains of art. In these magnificent collections, may be found specimens of almost every article of furniture, tool and ornament, used by the Egyptians. It is probable that a work-shop; or a kitchen might be fitted up with its appropriate apparatus, from the tombs of Egypt. The paintings upon the walls of the tombs show us *how they used* the furniture and tools. The whole public and private life of the Egyptians, from the bloody arena of mailed warriors, to the puppet show; from the dignified employments of the monarch, to the nursery-sports of children, are engraved and painted upon their enduring monuments. You may there, in imagination, mount the car of the victorious warrior, and ride with him over the bodies of his slaughtered foes, or accompany the priest to the very penetralia of his awful deity, without hearing the "procul este profani" from his shriveled lips; or you may step into the carriage of an Egyptian gentleman, and drive with him to a party in high life, seat yourself upon a divan, ottoman or splendid chair, rivaling modern art in its curious carvings and decorations, and witness the arrival and entertainment of guests, *of both sexes*, and discover no jealousy in the countenances of those antiquated belles. You may visit, if you please, the shops of the mechanics, the fields of the agriculturists, the pleasure grounds of the nobles, the kitchen of the housewife, the parlor of the lady; you will find the owners all at home, each with his stone countenance fixed and changeless as eternity. These pictorial illustrations of the private life and

manners of this early age surpass, in accuracy and minuteness of detail, the most graphic description. Language may be equivocal ; historians may be prejudiced, or misinformed ; travellers may exaggerate, but these monuments cannot deceive—these pictures cannot lie.

These discoveries give unequivocal testimony in favor of the general accuracy and fidelity of Herodotus. They show that he was sometimes deceived, or perhaps imposed upon, but, in a great majority of instances, they confirm his statements. For freedom from prejudice, accuracy of description and fidelity to truth, “the father of history” stands unrivalled, even among modern travellers. The united testimony of the historian and the paintings leave it beyond a doubt, that females in Egypt were treated with more respect than in any other nation of antiquity. Though frequently engaged in domestic employments, they were not confined and secluded, as in Greece, nor tasked and oppressed as among the Asiatics. They enjoyed that respect and consideration, which are the growth only of a high state of civilization and comparative moral purity. Of the mode of contracting marriage among the Egyptians very little is known. The marriage ceremony is nowhere represented in the paintings of their tombs.

Diodorus* informs us that, on account of the great benefits conferred on mankind by Isis, not only did the queen obtain greater authority and honor than the king, but the wife of the citizen governed her husband, and that he was bound by the marriage contract, to yield an unhesitating obedience to her commands. If such a custom ever obtained, it can hardly be supposed that the supremacy of the wife extended beyond the management of domestic affairs. It is certain, however, that royal authority was entrusted, without reserve, to women. They succeeded to the throne, by hereditary right, as in many of the states of modern Europe. They also assumed the office of regent at the death of their husbands. Herodotus† asserts, that the office of the priesthood was, in every instance, confined to men ; that there were no priestesses in Egypt, in the service of gods or goddesses. In this statement the historian is evidently mistaken, and he furnishes

* Diodorus 1 : 27.

† Herodotus 2 : 85.

himself the proof of his error in a subsequent passage,* where he ascribes the origin of the oracles of Greece and Libya to two *Theban priestesses*, who were violently carried away by the Phoenicians and sold, the one into Africa, and the other into Greece. There is abundant evidence, from the monuments, that females were employed in the service of the gods, and that those of the highest rank esteemed it an honor to officiate as priestesses of the various deities. Egyptian women, in the reign of the Pharaohs, were not veiled in public, nor secluded, at home, as among the modern Asiatics. They enjoyed as much liberty as the ladies of modern Europe. After the conquest of Egypt by the Persians, Eastern customs were introduced, and thenceforward the Egyptian ladies were condemned to concealment and seclusion.

We learn, from the history of Abraham, not only that ladies were unveiled in public, but that a fair complexion was esteemed a great attraction by the nobles of Egypt. If the face of Sarai had been concealed, the princes of Pharaoh could not have seen her, nor would the patriarch's alarm have been aggravated by the reflection, that she was a "fair woman." "The Egyptians were a swarthy race; on the monuments, the men are usually painted red, and the women yellow." Ladies of high rank are represented in lighter tints than their attendants. This, with other circumstances, makes it evident, that a fair complexion was highly esteemed by the Egyptians. That the ladies of Egypt were of a browner tinge than those of Syria and Arabia, we learn from the history of Sarai. It is evident that that style of beauty was highly esteemed in Egypt, because Pharaoh took her to his house, and, afterwards, "entreated Abram well for her sake." The Egyptian princess, in Solomon's song, alludes to her complexion, as being darker than that of the ladies of Palestine: "I am black, but comely, O ye daughters of Jerusalem, as the tents of Kedar, as the curtains of Solomon. Look not upon me because I am black, because the sun hath looked upon me."

The social intercourse of males and females in Egypt was free and unrestrained. "At some of the public festivals,"

* B. 2 : 54.

says Wilkinson, " women were expected to attend, not alone, like Moslem women at a mosque, but in company with their husbands and relations. At private parties, they were frequently entertained separately, in a different part of the same room, at the upper end of which the master and mistress of the house sat close together, on two chairs, or on a large fauteuil ; each guest, as he arrived, presented himself to receive their congratulatory welcome. In some instances, we find men and women sitting together, both strangers as well as members of the same family ; a privilege not conceded to females among the Greeks, except their relatives."

Women were not forbidden the use of wine, as in the early ages of Rome. Indeed there seems to have been a perfect equality between the sexes, in the pleasures of social life. Even children were introduced into company, and permitted to sit by the mother's side, or upon the father's knee. Children were also furnished with abundant means of amusement. Many of their toys and sports resemble those of modern civilized life. At their private entertainments they spared no expense in providing for guests. Music was the recreation and employment of both sexes. Hired minstrels were employed on festive occasions. Monarchs set no limits to their extravagance in feasting. Lucan's description of the entertainment given by Cleopatra to Cæsar, though of a comparatively modern date, will give us some idea of a royal feast in Egypt :

" Now by a train of slaves, the various feast
In massy gold magnificent was placed ;
Whatever earth, or air, or seas afford,
In vast profusion crowns the laboring board.
For dainties Egypt every land explores,
Nor spares those very gods her zeal adores.
The Nile's sweet wave capacious crystals pour,
And gems of price the grape delicious store ;
No growth of Mareotis' marshy fields,
But such as Meröe maturer yields ;
Where the warm sun the racy juice refines,
And mellows into age the infant wines.
With wreaths of nard the guests their temples bind,
And blooming roses of immortal kind ;
Their drooping locks with oily odors flow,
Recent from near Arabia, where they grow ;
The vigorous spices breathe their strong perfume,
And the rich vapor fills the spacious room."*

* *Pharsalia* 10 : 155.

Such luxuries were shared by both sexes in common. In some instances the artists represent the ladies as indulging too freely in the pleasures of the table, being entirely overcome with wine, and "unable to carry their liquor discreetly." In their fondness for dress and ornaments, they were not peculiar, for in this respect, the wife of the Indian hunter and the European princes are alike. They both love to adorn their persons. Egyptian ladies are frequently represented as comparing their ornaments and discussing the value, beauty, and fashion of their various articles of dress, *with great apparent eagerness and rivalship.*

The occupations of females were generally such as are deemed appropriate to women of the same rank, in modern times. Needlework and embroidery, probably, occupied much of the time of the more wealthy and elevated class. We have positive evidence, from the sculptures, that females were employed in weaving, and the use of the distaff. They also ground corn, and prepared food for the household, as among the Jews. Although polygamy was tolerated *by law*, it was probably confined to kings and nobles. Herodotus* says, expressly: "Like the Greeks, they confine themselves to one wife." That odious custom, which has long cursed the Eastern world, could not, therefore, have been extensively injurious in Egypt. The influence of caste was perhaps the most effectual barrier to general improvement.

The "wisdom of the Egyptians," mentioned in the Bible, must have been principally the inheritance of the priesthood and nobility. Isaiah† in his denunciation of divine wrath against Egypt, mentions the learned men as a separate and distinct class. The great mass of the people must have been comparatively degraded and ignorant. Although woman's sphere of observation was greatly enlarged, and her means of improvement greatly multiplied, by the unrestrained intercourse of Egyptian society, still her general intelligence must have been very limited, and far below the station she occupied. With all these disadvantages, Egypt was far superior to Greece in the habits of social life. Though inferior in literature, in arts, and in arms, she excelled in those domestic virtues which give value to civilization, dignity to life, and permanency to government.

* Herodotus 2: 92.

† Isaiah 19: 11.

When we reflect that the Egyptians were of Asiatic origin, that their architecture, philosophy and religion, are very similar to, if not identical with those of India, their social usages, and their just appreciation of the family relations appear truly astonishing. Among the Oriental nations, the rights of woman have never been acknowledged, her social and political existence has never been recognized, and she has rarely risen above the condition of a mere animal, or what is worse —that of *a slave*. The systematic degradation of one-half the population of those Eastern nations, accounts for their uniform corruption and profligacy. All true greatness must draw its nutriment from the domestic virtues. Where these are wanting, patriotism, philanthropy and benevolence, are but the disguises of intriguing selfishness. Neither domestic virtues nor domestic happiness can co-exist with polygamy. No nation, practising polygamy, has ever advanced beyond the iron barriers of despotism. Political freedom is inconsistent with domestic tyranny. "A plurality of wives," says Heeren, "as it diminishes conjugal tenderness, saps the foundations of parental attachment; and thereby impairs the interest which every member of the state should feel, in its preservation and prosperity. Attachment to the family produces devotion to the state." The ideas of home and country are always united in the mind of the true patriot. Among the Asiatics they are always separated, therefore we look to them in vain for examples of heroic daring, noble enterprise, and disinterested patriotism. Where polygamy prevails, society wears the aspect of moral death. There is no change, no progress. Human affections are degraded to animal instincts; human bones and muscles are converted into mechanical powers, and the human will is made a mere link in the iron chain of custom. Thousands of years make no alteration in the usages of society, or the processes of art. The Chinaman of to-day is but the petrified Mongul of the age of Confucius. The modern Persian differs in nothing but his religion from the soldier of Xerxes. The courts of Susa and Persepolis, two thousand five hundred years ago, presented the same scenes of royal pomp and magnificence without, and of jealousy and intrigue within, as the courts of Ispahan and Constantinople of the present age.

We know but little of the private life of the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians, but from incidental notices, which

occur in ancient historians, of the condition of females, we infer that it was very similar to that of the women of the present day in the East. The ancient Babylonians are represented as exceedingly corrupt and licentious. The principal cause of this profligacy of manners was wealth and luxury, consequent upon extended commerce and conquest. "This total degeneracy of morals," says Heeren, "was above all conspicuous in the other sex, among whom were no traces of that reserve which usually prevails in an eastern harem. The prophet,* therefore, when he denounces the fall of Babylon, describes it under the image of a luxurious and lascivious woman, who is cast headlong into slavery, from the seat where she sits so effeminately." The shameless profligacy of the Babylonian women, their extravagance in dress, and their attendance at public festivals † lead us to suppose, that they were more influential, (especially for evil,) and less secluded, than is common among Asiatics. The state of morals in the community, would render the existence of genuine affection and domestic happiness impossible. The common mode of contracting marriage among them, proves that women were regarded as mere slaves. Herodotus‡ informs us, that their marriageable virgins were yearly exposed to sale, in the several districts. The most beautiful were sold first. The purchase money paid for these by the wealthy, furnished a dowry for the most ugly and deformed. These were delivered to the poor citizens who would take them for the least sum. By superior personal charms, or by force of native ingenuity and strength of intellect, women frequently succeeded in gaining a powerful influence over their husbands. A favorite wife would thus control the affairs of the nation, or even assume the sole direction of the government. Such were Semiramis and Nitocris, mentioned by Herodotus, in the history of Assyria and Babylon. In ancient Persia, women were more strictly secluded, and of course, more reserved in their manners. The book of Esther gives us an accurate view of the Persian seraglio, while the account of the court intrigue, in the reign of Xerxes, recorded by Herodotus § throws additional light upon their history. The hatred and jealousy of rival queens grew more intense and

* Isaiah 13. † Dan. 5:3. ‡ Herod. 1:196. § Herod. 9:110

violent, as their sphere of action was more limited. The victorious competitor for royal favor set no bounds to her vengeance. The Eastern harem has ever been the abode of the most malignant passions, and consequently of misery and crime.

The history of a despotic court in one age will apply with little alteration to despotic courts in all ages. There is no variety, only in degrees of guilt and misery. Chardin has painted in lively colors the horrors of the royal harem of modern Persia. "The seraglio of the king," says he, "is most commonly a perpetual prison, from whence scarce one female in six or seven, ever has the good luck to escape; for women who have once become mothers of living children, are provided with a small establishment within the walls, and are never suffered to leave them. But privation of liberty is by no means the worst evil that exists in these melancholy abodes. Except to that wife who is so fortunate as to produce the first-born son, to become a mother is the most dreaded event that can happen to the wretched favorites of the king. When this occurs, not only do the mothers see the last chance of liberty and marriage cut off from them, but they live in the dreadful anticipation of seeing their children deprived of life, or of sight, when the death of their lord shall call a new tyrant, in the person of his son, the brother of their offspring, to the throne. Even new-born innocents are murdered, either by actual violence, or the denial of that nourishment which it is the mother's duty, and should be her delight, to give." Such are the consequences of this iniquitous violation of the laws of nature; and the number of tragedies is increased by the reluctance with which the royal favor is received. Abbas II., ordered a beautiful girl to be burnt alive, by having her tied in the chimney and lighting a fire of wood beneath, while he looked deliberately on, because he had detected her in an artifice to avoid his attentions.

The court usually gives tone to the manners and morals of a nation. Where such examples are set in high life, it cannot be expected that any just views of the dignity of woman, and of the family relations, will prevail in society at large. Nothing but the restraints of poverty prevents every petty tyrant from converting his house into a prison, and inflicting the torments of hell upon those whom we ought to love and honor. Chinese civilization (if a system which admits of

such unnatural cruelty deserves the name,) has always been characterized by the same contempt and oppression of woman. From their fantastic cosmogony, they adduce proofs of her inferior nature. "As the *Yang*, which composes the highest heaven, is *masculine*, while the *Yin*, of which the earth chiefly consists, is *feminine*, they infer that man is as much above woman as the heaven is above the earth."

This contempt for females is not of recent origin. It is certainly as old as Confucius; for he speaks of women and slaves as on a level, and complains of a similar difficulty in managing both. This sentiment originates from their religion, and is confirmed by inveterate custom. Even "*the celebrated female writer*" in China, (for such an anomaly in their history once occurred,) inculcates on her sex their own inferiority, observing, "that they hold the lowest rank in the human species, and that the least exalted functions ought to be and are in fact assigned to them." Females, from their birth, are treated with less attention than males. They are also selected for infanticide. Dr. Morrison has translated a passage from a native writer, which reveals the treatment of the two sexes :

"When a son is born,
He sleeps on a bed,
He is clothed in robes,
He plays with gems,
His cry is princely loud—
But when a daughter is born,
She sleeps on the ground,
She is clothed with a wrapper,
She plays with a tile,
She is incapable either of evil or good ;
It is her's only to think of preparing wine and food,
And not giving any occasion of grief to her parents."

Females are so completely secluded, that the parties to a marriage contract never see each other, till the day that unites them. After marriage the bondage of the wife is increased. She is obliged not only to be subject to the tyranny of her husband, but to the insolent abuse of her mother-in-law, who is her legal mistress. She not only labors like the meanest slave, but like a beast of burden, being frequently yoked to the plough, which is steered by her surly spouse. Beauty and talent, in females, so highly prized in Christian communities, are regarded with peculiar dread by the Chinese

The following lines quoted by Dr. Morrison, may be adduced in proof :

“ A beautiful and clever woman should be regarded
As a hoarse and hateful bird :
Women with long tongues
Are stepping stones to misery.
State commotions come not from heaven ;
They are born by, and come forth from *woman*.”

The only alleviation of this unmitigated misery, is the affection of children for their own mothers. The prevalence of polygamy weakens the *paternal* connexion, and renders the *maternal* bond peculiarly strong. Aged mothers are treated with great respect by their sons, and after death, their memory is cherished with the fondest affection. This circumstance alone, mitigates the horrors of matrimonial slavery, and prevents the general prevalence of suicide among females.

This systematic oppression of the weaker sex has prevailed in Asia, from time immémorial. It is the legitimate fruit of those corrupt systems of religion, which have prevailed in the various countries of that continent. There is no hope of a change, for the better, until these systems are abolished, and Christianity introduced. With a religious creed which teaches the inferiority of woman, and sanctions polygamy, society cannot advance. The despotism of the court is based upon the despotism of the harem. The political and religious systems must stand or fall together. Hence the hostility of the governments of Asia to European manners and institutions. The people are not opposed to improvements. It is chiefly the influence of the court that prevents the progress of civilization. Despotism, civil, religious and domestic despotism, like its infernal prototype at the entrance of Hades, guards every avenue to the palace, the temple, and the seraglio, and whoever may disturb its grim repose, extends its triple jaws with dismal howling. Hence, society is stationary. Its usages are almost as fixed as the laws of gravitation. From the days of the Patriarchs until now, domestic oppression has cursed the fairest portions of this mighty continent.

The civilization of Europe has ever been of a different type. Its earliest inhabitants were restless adventurers, excited to leave the primitive abodes of the race, by a love of

enterprise and personal independence. These qualities give *life* to society, and *progress* to civilization. They learned their own strength from the perils they had successfully encountered, and the victories they had won. Hence accidental civilization has ever been marked by a *love of liberty* and a *spirit of enterprise*. It is worthy of remark also, that the restless habits and poverty of these early adventurers prevented the introduction of polygamy. Monogamy was introduced by the earliest lawgivers of Europe. Still the dignity and importance of the marriage relation was not understood nor appreciated, till the introduction of Christianity. In the first settlement of Europe, the very circumstances which led these adventurers to their new abode, and the dangers to which they were constantly exposed, led them to place an undue estimate upon mere physical prowess, and, at the same time, to undervalue the modest virtues of the weaker sex. This was true of the heroic age of Greece. When war was the chief business, and glory the end of life, it is not strange that female weakness was despised, and the power of female charms comparatively inefficient. The soul of the hero was absorbed in other contemplations, and the delights of home were rather regarded with *indifference* than *contempt*. Females were, therefore, less strictly observed and less secluded, than in later times, in Greece. The social intercourse of the sexes, though comparatively unrestrained and artless, was nevertheless marked by condescension, on the part of the lord, and by timidity and dependence, on the part of the lady. In the heroic ages, the occupations of females were similar to those of patriarchal times, having their origin in a primitive age. They drew water, kept sheep, fed cows and horses, even loosed and watered as did Andromache, the horses from their husbands' chariots, conducted the men to bed, and to the baths, dressed and undressed them, and performed almost all the laborious offices of the house. In such an age, we look in vain for that chivalrous devotion which has so deeply tinged the manners of our own times. Refined love was then scarcely known. Still there are some noble exceptions. That affecting scene of Homer, which describes the parting of Hector and Andromache, is, of itself, almost sufficient to wipe away the reproach of brutality from the age. The affectionate Andromache, while contemplating the probable fate of her husband, after re-

minding him of the loss of her dearest relations in war, exclaims :

" Yet while my Hector still survives, I see
My father, mother, brothers, all in thee.
Alas my parents, brothers, kindred all
Once more will perish, if my Hector fall.
Thy wife, thy infant in thy danger share,
Oh prove a husband's and a father's care."

The heart of the hero was touched. Yet his country, (ever the idol of the hero,) was in danger. After expressing his anguish for her fate, contemplating the prospective captivity of his wife and child, he cried :

" May I lie cold before that dreadful day,
Pressed with a load of monumental clay.
Thy Hector, wrapped in everlasting sleep,
Shall neither hear thee sigh nor see thee weep."

Such exhibitions of elevated affection are not common in the best days of Greece. So gross were the prevailing sentiments, on the marriage relation, that some have denied the existence of refined love among them. " Certain prostitutes," says Madam de Stael, " lost to every sense of shame ; slaves rendered contemptible by their abject state ; and women secluded from the rest of the world, confined within their own houses, entire strangers to the interests of their husbands, educated in such a manner as to render them unfit for comprehending any idea or sentiment, these were the only ties of affection with which the Greeks were acquainted. Love, as depicted by the ancients, was a distemper, a spell thrown over them, by the gods ; it was a kind of delirium, which sought for no moral perfection in the object beloved. The Greeks did not know that women were beings capable of equaling them in sense and understanding ; nor did they believe that, under the influence of sincere affection, they could become faithful companions for life ; nor that it would constitute their own supreme felicity to devote their time and talents towards rendering the object of their attachment happy."

The Greeks generally regarded marriage as a *mere political relation*. Lycurgus absolutely abolished domestic affection, by converting the whole community into one great political family, and constituting the state the legal step-mother of every new-born child. The ideas of Plato upon

this subject are still more revolting. He proposed, for his ideal republic, *a community of wives*. How could common citizens be presumed to understand the dignity and importance of the marriage tie, when philosophers and lawgivers so egregiously misapprehended its true import? It is but just, however, to add, that many of the ancient philosophers entertained more just and liberal views. Aristotle, in his *Politics*, freely censures this proposition of Plato, as well as the laws of Lycurgus. Socrates is represented by Xenophon as saying: "By many things, O men, is it evident that the female nature is, in nothing, inferior to that of men; they need only the required knowledge and power. If, therefore, one of you has a wife, let him only teach her, with full confidence, whatever he may wish her to understand." Plutarch also, in his "Advice to married persons," has drawn a picture of married life, which even Christianity would not blush to own.

Whatever may have been the theory of wise men among the Greeks, upon this matter, it is evident that their practice was far below what their rank, in the history of civilization, would lead us to expect; and what constitutes a strange anomaly in the history of the world, as society advanced among them, the social intercourse of the sexes was more restricted, and women were more secluded. In the refined age of Greece, women were allowed less freedom of action and opinion, and were treated with less apparent consideration, than in the heroic age. Wives shared the bed, but not the table, of their husbands. They were confined to their own apartments, and maidens were not permitted to pass from one part of the house to another, without leave. This change of customs may have resulted from an imitation of the Asiatics, or, what is more probable, from jealousy of the influence of females, resulting from an increased conviction of their power to control the destinies of the state. In the palmy days of Grecian arts and arms, a few women were distinguished for accomplishments and intelligence. But these were generally females of doubtful reputation, and were admired rather as prodigies, or remarkable exceptions to a general rule, than as models for imitation. Such was the celebrated Aspasia, who was the companion of philosophers and the counsellor of statesmen. Although females were present at family parties, (composed generally of relatives,) .

and at the religious festivals in which they took part, and occasionally at the theatres, yet society, in the modern acceptation of that term, could hardly be said to exist. What they understood by friendship existed only between men. The different sexes were not presumed to be at all interested in each other's occupations. Aristotle deems it unbecoming for a man even to know what was done within doors. The men lived almost constantly in the open air. The delightful climate of the country, with all its blandishments, invited them abroad. The forum, the circus, the pnyx, and the theatre, became their home ; literature, gymnastics and politics, their business. The honor of the state was their strongest bond of union ; the glory of the nation their idol ; to it they sacrificed all the more delicate sympathies of nature, and many of the endearments of home. They rejoiced that they were members of a powerful confederacy ; citizens of an illustrious city, defenders of a glorious state. The charms of home could exert but a feeble influence upon hearts so captivated with glory. They admired their wives, rather as the mothers of brave men, than as friends and companions. The mother was honored, not so much for her private virtues, as for her heroic sons. These were her jewels. As Greece grew more wealthy and luxurious, the restraints imposed on females by law and custom were relaxed, and social intercourse was less formal and reserved. Females, however, did not, except in a very few extraordinary cases, frequent the schools of the philosophers or sophists. Distinction in learning was the privilege of the rougher sex. A few females, in poetry, equalled the most distinguished bards. Such were Sappho and Corinna, the latter of whom took the prize, repeatedly, from the immortal Pindar.

It is true of all ages and nations, that superior intellect will gain the ascendancy. So in Greece, when females were endowed with uncommon genius, they surmounted all those obstacles which law and public opinion had thrown in their way. But the true estimate of female virtues may be learned from the language which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, when addressing the widows of those who died in the first campaign of the Peloponnesian war. "If," says the orator, "it be expected from me, to say any thing to you, who are now reduced to a state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall express it all in one short admonition ;—it is

your greatest glory not to be deficient in the virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men as little occasion as possible to talk of your behaviour, *whether well or ill.*

Among the Romans, females enjoyed a greater freedom, commanded a higher respect, and exerted a more extensive and salutary influence, than among the Greeks. They were accustomed to mix freely in society, and to occupy the most frequented part of the house. Roman notions upon these points, are contrasted by Cornelius Nepos, with the scruples of the Greeks, as follows:—"Which of us Romans is ashamed to bring his wife to an entertainment? And what mistress of a family can be shown, who does not inhabit the chief and most public part of the house? Whereas, in Greece, she never appears at any entertainments, except those to which relations alone are invited, and constantly lives in the uppermost part of the house, called *gynæconitis*, into which no man has admission, unless he be a near relation." This diversity of treatment resulted from the peculiar characteristics of the two nations. The Romans were sober and practical; the Greeks volatile and imaginative; by consequence the former were faithful and cordial in their attachments; the latter fickle and treacherous. The Romans worshiped at the domestic altar; the Greeks at the public shrine. The Roman revered his household gods; the Greek the guardian divinities of the state. The Roman was roused to action by appealing to his domestic sympathies; the Greek by kindling his love of fame. This may be detected upon almost every page of the two great orators of antiquity. Demosthenes rouses the fears of his countrymen, by showing that their great idol, the state, is in danger; enkindles their rage by pointing to the insults which the foe has offered to their country's honor; fires their ambition by showing the glory that will accrue to the state from their victories, and animates their courage by pointing to the spoils that have been gathered by a nation's prowess. Cicero strikes the chord of domestic affection. He calls on his countrymen to protect their domestic altars and household gods; to save their wives from hostile pollution, their children from butchery, and guard their fane and temples from profanation. Neither orator plead in vain. Both understood the instruments they played upon, and both accomplished their objects. Perhaps it may be said, that this difference of appeal results from a

difference of circumstances in the two auditories. This is true in part. Still these different susceptibilities existed in the respective nations, else these appeals would not have been made, nor the results have followed.

During the first five hundred years of Roman history, it is said that there did not occur a single instance of divorce. These were the best days of Rome. Roman virtues were then most conspicuous. The most distinguished generals cultivated their own farms. The luxury and corruptions of a later age were unknown. Industry and frugality were held in high esteem. When our ancestors, said Cato, wished highly to praise a good man, they called him *a good farmer*. The same Cato ranks an *honest husband* higher than *a great senator*. The women of early Rome are as highly commended for their industry and economy as the men. "Roman husbands," says Columella, "having completed the labors of the day, entered their houses, free from all care, and there enjoyed perfect repose. There reigned union and concord and industry, supported by mutual affection. The most beautiful woman depended for distinction only on her economy and endeavors to assist in crowning her husband's diligence with prosperity. All was in common between them. Nothing was thought to belong more to one than another. The wife, by her assiduity within doors, equalled and seconded the industry and labor of her husband." We need no stronger evidence of the exalted estimate of female chastity among the Romans, than the histories of Lucretia and Virginia, where an insult, in the one case, offered to a Roman matron and in the other an attempt to ensnare a Roman virgin, produced a radical revolution of the government. The whole nation rose to avenge insulted purity. These instances alone suffice to show the high estimate that was placed upon female virtue. There is good evidence also that a portion, at least, of the Roman women were educated for the duties of their appropriate sphere. The unfortunate Virginia was *going to school*, when her beauty attracted the attention of the libertine Appius. Roman matrons also educated their own children. Cicero attributes the purity of language, copiousness of diction, and polished elocution of some of the most eminent Roman orators, to the early instructions of their mothers. Tacitus ascribes the vicious manners of his own age, the decline of liberal studies, and the corruption of the Latin

tongue, to the disuse of this good old custom, and the inexcusable negligence of Roman matrons, in educating their children. "Anciently," says he, "the infant as soon as born was not consigned to the mean dwelling of a hireling nurse, but was reared and cherished in the bosom of a tender parent. To regulate all household affairs, to attend to her infant race was then the glory of the female character." Speaking of his own age, he says, "now the infant is committed to a Greek chambermaid, and a slave or two, chosen for the purpose, generally the most abandoned of the whole household, all utter strangers to every liberal notion. In this way the vulgarisms of the servants are adopted, their vices copied, and not only the language of the child is corrupted, but his morals are vitiated." When the mother thus abandoned her children to slaves and hireling nurses, and sought entertainment at the public spectacles, home lost its attractions, the domestic ties were weakened, and the very life-blood of civilization was tainted.

When female virtue became venal, and marriage was no longer respected, Roman integrity was gone forever. When the fire ceased to burn upon the domestic altar, the light of true civilization went out—but not for ever. It was destined to revive again, and shine, with meridian splendor, under a northern sky. Many of the elements of modern civilization may be traced to the woods of Germany. The Gothic tribes, whose hardy virtues were engrafted upon the decayed stock of a degenerate race, entertained a peculiar respect for the female character. The old Germans believed that woman possessed something sacred and prophetic. They sought her advice in times of peril. She girded the warrior for battle, and followed him to the scene of conflict. Her presence inspired his fainting courage; her cries of terror at the prospect of captivity, nerved his arm to deeds of desperate valor. She took off the harness of the weary soldier, and numbered and dressed his bleeding wounds. She even required the exhibition of blood as the condition of her favor. To her the warrior looked for approbation. Her praise was his highest honor.

This peculiar reverence for woman, among the Teutonic tribes, co-operated with Christianity in giving to her that high station which she holds in modern society. Chivalry, that strange compound of religion and gallantry, growing out of

the natural respect for woman entertained by the Goths, and their superstitious worship of the holy virgin, for a time, exerted a salutary influence upon society, and contributed to soften the manners of a barbarous age. But chivalry, like almost every other institution of the dark ages, was the monstrous offspring of religious faith and superstition. Instead of adopting the true standard, which the gospel prescribes, for the estimation of woman, it surrounded her with an atmosphere of angelic sacredness, and converted love into adoration, respect into religion. The influence of this affected devotion is seen in the history of that age of frivolous gallantry, which succeeded the introduction of chivalry. Still even this worship of woman was not without utility in that dark age. It was based upon genuine affection, and though greatly abused to frivolity and superstition, yet it gave birth to many of the amenities and courtesies of refined society. "This feeling," says an eminent writer, "exaggerated as it seems to us, did, unquestionably, influence in a high degree, the opinions of the age, their tastes and their modes of expression. Its effect upon modern literature has been most remarkable. It has rendered the principle of romantic love the main spring of modern poetry and of imaginative composition in general." The immediate influence of chivalry upon the females of that age, who possessed but little mental cultivation, was injurious. It filled their minds with extravagant notions of their own charms; created a thirst for unmeaning compliments, and gave them a fondness for splendid dress and equipage. The effect of this undue exaltation was scarcely less pernicious to them than oppression. But a more rational Christianity has relieved us of the evils of both. "It is," says Lieber, "by observing a proper medium between servitude and deification, by treating the sex as women, and not as slaves, or goddesses, by cultivating their minds and hearts, as well as by adorning them with the graceful accomplishments, that our own times have, in some measure, restored this part of our race to their rights and duties.

From the brief survey we have taken of the different epochs that mark the history of the world, we have seen that the elevation of the female sex is intimately associated with the elevation of our race; *that the condition of women, in any age, is a true index of the condition of society*, and

that the progress of human civilization has only kept pace with the progress of female education. If this be true, we can scarcely estimate too highly the advantages that would result to our own country, from a more thorough system of female education. Much has been done, within the last fifty years, to elevate the standard of female education. If the list of studies, taught in our female academies now, be compared with the requisitions of that period, they will be found to be vastly superior. President Dwight, in remarking upon this subject, in his day, says: "It is owing to the innate good sense of the women of this country, that they are not absolute idiots. I would not give a farthing to have a daughter of mine go to many of the schools of our country. Observe the state of our schools for females, and compare them with the colleges for males. The end kept in view, in the education of males, is to make them *useful*; in that of females, to make them *admired*. Men will pay any sum to have their daughters taught to manage their feet in dancing, to daub over a few pictures, to play a few tunes upon the piano, to be admired by a few silly young men." "I cannot speak of this subject," adds the venerable President, "*without indignation.*" Though many institutions have been established, within the last half century, for the education of girls, and great efforts have been made to elevate the standard of scholarship, still not a tithe of what ought to be done, and what the best good of society requires to be done, has yet been accomplished. The romantic ideas of the dark ages have not wholly disappeared. The chivalrous notion still prevails, in refined society, that men need *knowledge*, but women, *accomplishments*, for success in life. Consequently, boys, in a course of education, are confined to the severe discipline of the languages and mathematics, while girls, after obtaining a superficial knowledge of the elementary branches of an English education, are confined to music, drawing, and other similar accomplishments, accompanied, perhaps, with a slight smattering of French. I would, by no means object to the cultivation of those elegant branches of female education, but I would not have them substituted for that intellectual training, without which even these are worthless.

The question here occurs: What is the best course of discipline for female minds? I answer, *precisely* that which

is best for the development of *any* mind. Females have the same mental powers as the males, and these require the same discipline in order to their complete, symmetrical development. To meet the difficulties of life, the female needs the same acumen of intellect, the same maturity of judgment and refinement of taste, as the male, and whatever is valuable as a mental discipline for the one, is equally so for the other. There is no way to acquire intellectual strength, but by vigorous intellectual exercise. The mind can be matured only by hard study, patient and protracted study, discriminating study, incessant study. Mind expands only by *patient thought*. This cannot be secured by attention to mere accomplishments. A severer discipline is needed, if women would have *strong* minds, *cultivated* minds, *mature* minds; if they would acquire an intellectual strength and soundness of judgment, which will enable them to meet with fortitude the stern realities of life. If females are confined to the merely *ornamental* branches of education, they are, by that very process, doomed to everlasting mediocrity, if not to inferiority. Whatever is essential to the education of the male mind, is equally essential to the development of the female mind. But, says an objector, would you fit females for the pulpit, the bar, and the halls of legislation? By no means. I would only prepare them for the faithful and intelligent discharge of those duties which the God of nature has assigned to them. In their own appropriate sphere they will find abundant use for all the acumen, all the sound judgment and cultivated taste, which the most thorough mental discipline can give. It does not follow, because profound learning in the dark ages, and to a considerable extent, even in the present era of light, has been the exclusive possession of professional men, that none but professional men ought to be educated. It is time that "the benefit of the clergy" should be extended even to women, and that distinction in learning should no longer be the peculiar privilege of "learned clerks."

A well cultivated, well stored mind, is an inestimable treasure in *any station of life*. It is as useful, and as necessary in the domestic circle as in the public walks of life. The only right which I would claim for woman in our country, is the right to be *thoroughly educated*. That doctrine which teaches the *identity* of the duties and rights of the

sexes, seems to me subversive of the first principles of human society, violating the express laws of nature and revelation. Rights and duties are relative terms. Our rights and duties in a great measure, grow out of the relations in which God has placed us. The duties of the mother can never become the duties of the father; nor the duties of the sister those of the brother. Neither can the rights of the mother become those of the father. The father and mother sustain unchangeable and inalienable relations to their children. The duties and rights resulting from these relations are peculiar and immutable, *not interchangeable* and reciprocal. It is impossible, from the very constitution of the sexes, that it should be otherwise. It is evident that the same God who ordained that woman should be "the mother of all living," ordained that she should be the nurse, the teacher and guide of her infant offspring. Her most important duties, therefore, must be *domestic*, connected with the home of her children. She cannot engage in those public duties which require long absence from home, much less in those long, protracted investigations, which belong to the secluded scholar.

It is our duty "to glorify God in our bodies and spirits which are his." It is woman's duty to honor God *according to the laws of her being*. Her appropriate duties are plainly indicated by her organization. The remarks of Mr. Lieber on this point are pertinent:—"She is framed and constituted more delicately, and in consequence of this marked difference of organization, has advantages and disadvantages, compared with the male sex, differences which are of elementary and last importance for the obtaining of those ends for which man and mankind are planted on this globe, and from which, likewise, different positions, callings, duties and spheres of activity result. The woman is fitter for all those actions, which must be impelled chiefly by affection; hence, she is more fit to foster and educate the young, and to nurture in turn their hearts with affection; she is more disposed to cling to a protector, and far readier to bring sacrifices; she graces society, and—sentiment, being one of the spheres in which she is most active, and chastity, her first

* Lieber's Pol. Ethics 2 : 250.

virtue and honor—she is the chief agent in infusing delicacy, gentleness, taste, decorum and correctness of morals, so far as they depend upon contingency, into society at large."

The sphere of duties and influence here presented is sufficiently enlarged and important for the exercise of the mightiest intellect. If, however, ladies are qualified by native talent and education to control the public mind, *let them employ the pen.* I think facts will warrant the assertion, that no individual in Great Britain, during the reign of George III., exerted so extensive, and so salutary a moral influence upon all classes of citizens, from the king to the meanest beggar in the realm, as Hannah More. She is a lady of whom her sex may justly be proud. The world has produced very few of the other sex, who might not bow with respectful deference before her splendid genius. I close my remarks with a quotation from her pen. "But *they* little understand the true interests of woman, who would lift her from the appointed duties of her allotted station, to fill, with fantastic dignity, a loftier, but less appropriate niche. Nor do they understand her true happiness, who seek to annihilate distinctions, from which she derives advantage, and to attempt innovations, which would deprecate her real value. The most elaborate definition of ideal rights, and the most hardy measures for attaining them, are of less value in the eyes of a truly amiable woman, than that meek and quiet spirit, which is, in the sight of God, of great price." *

* H. More's Works, vol. 6, p. 104.

ARTICLE VI.

AZAZEL, OR THE LEVITICAL SCAPE-GOAT;

A Critical Exposition of Leviticus 16: 5—10.

By George Bush, Professor of Hebrew in the New York City University.

If there be any thing calculated to diminish the pleasure or damp the ardor of the Biblical expositor in his researches, it is the stern necessity under which he sometimes finds himself placed, of putting new interpretations upon familiar texts. The deeper he penetrates into the mine of Scriptural wealth, and the wider the excavation which he makes on either hand, the greater is the probability of his here and there undermining the adjacent surface and causing it occasionally to fall in. But this will be little to be regretted if the chasms thus made only open new avenues to treasures below vastly more precious than any which had lain above. Still it is always more or less painful to an ingenuous mind to disturb, in any degree, a "throned opinion," even though that opinion be founded in error, and he be able to substitute in place of it an irrefragable truth. Knowing with what fond tenacity men cling to their ancient and accredited forms of belief, he does not like rudely to assail them, and it is only a very rampant spirit of innovation that can take delight in breaking up the time-hallowed associations with which certain phrases and sentences of holy writ uniformly come before the mind. Yet it is certain that this result is in many cases absolutely inevitable. It is the invariable law of human progress, whether in the department of nature or revelation, that as the light breaks forth upon our previous darkness, new modifications should come over established ideas. It would therefore be the height of injustice to ascribe, in all cases, to a rage of novelty in those who suggest them the new interpretations which an advanced state of science or philology, or a more extended and critical inter-collation of passages, may force upon their convictions. It is to be remembered that they too have known what it is to be wedded to favorite interpretations, and can tell of the struggle which it cost them to give them up. But they yielded to the force of evidence,

and embraced the views which, it may be, they at first strenuously withheld. If then they become the patrons of these views, and with all the requisite array of learning and logic, endeavor to make good their access to other minds, let it be presumed it is not owing merely to a prurient prompting to obtrude a novel exposition upon the mind of the Christian community, but to the stern behests of the spirit of homage to truth, which will not let them forbear to utter what they sincerely and solemnly believe to be the sense of revelation.

These remarks will no doubt be perceived to have a direct and prominent bearing upon the task which we have imposed upon ourselves, in the somewhat elaborate investigation of the passage quoted at the head of this article. The typical institution of the Scape-goat is one of the most striking features of the Levitical system, and its import as a symbol has been so long rested in as shadowing forth the grand doctrine of the economical transfer of sin and guilt from believers to Christ, that one would almost as soon think of doubting the *fact* of such a ceremony, as of calling in question the established sense which common theological consent has attached to it. Indeed, it has been remarked that while other types receive light from their accomplishment in Christ, this is intrinsically so apt, so felicitous, so obvious, that it reflects light upon the Gospel itself. The imposition of hands and the confession of sins on the head of the emissary goat, and his subsequent discharge and escape into the wilderness, seem to afford so fit an emblem of the bearing and carrying away of the sins of believers by the substituted divine victim, that it would appear to be no less a violence done to the pious sentiments, than to the pondering reason, of the Christian, to attempt to divert the spiritual application of the symbol to any other subject. But fealty to truth must predominate over every other sentiment in the bosom of the humble disciple of revelation. Under its guidance we are to shrink from no results to which we are legitimately brought. And in this spirit of supreme deference to the dictates of truth, we would enter upon the critical exposition of the passage before us. We first give it in the English version.

Lev. 16: 5—10. “And he shall take of the congregation of the children of Israel two kids of the goats for a sin-offering, and one ram for a burnt-offering.

“And Aaron shall offer his bullock of the sin-offering, which is for himself, and make an atonement for himself, and for his house.

“And he shall take the two goats, and present them before the Lord at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation.

“And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the Lord (לְהָיוָה *laihovah*, for Jehovah) and the other lot for the scape-goat, (לְאַזָּזֵל *la-azazel*, for Azazel.)

“And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord’s lot fell, and offer him for a sin-offering.

“But the goat on which the lot fell to be the scape-goat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scape-goat into the wilderness.”

In order that the particular point which we now propose to consider may stand out in its full relief before the mind of the reader, we will briefly advert to the leading ceremonies of that solemn festival in which the rite before us held such a conspicuous place. It was the day of Annual Expiation of the sins of the people. The high priest on this day, having first carefully bathed in water, and arrayed himself in his linen vestments, was to draw near to the altar with a young bullock for a sin-offering, and with a ram for a burnt-offering. These were the customary victims, but on the present occasion he was to take, in addition, of the congregation two kids of the goats for a sin-offering, and present them before the Lord at the door of the tabernacle. After the presentation, he was to cast lots upon them, one lot being for Jehovah (לְהָיוָה), and the other for what in the original is termed Azazel (לְאַזָּזֵל). The goat on which the lot of Jehovah fell was to be brought and offered up for a sin-offering, but the goat on which the lot of Azazel fell was to be “presented alive before Jehovah to make an atonement with him (or, upon or over him—עַלְיוֹן), to let it go for Azazel into the wilderness.” Of the former, the blood was to be carried within the veil, and to be sprinkled upon the mercy seat, and before the mercy-seat, in order that atonement might be made for the holy place because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel. When on the other hand the live goat was brought, the High Priest was to lay both his hands upon its head and to confess over it all the iniquities of the

children of Israel, putting them upon the head of the goat; after which he was to send it by the hand of a "fit man" (יש עיטה ish itti) that it might bear upon it all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited.

Such was the ceremony, and we are now to endeavor to ascertain its typical or symbolical scope, and especially what is to be understood by the different treatment of the two goats. But in order to this, we must in the outset institute a careful enquiry into the meaning of the remarkable term "Azazel," which occurs in this connexion for the first and last time, and on the true sense of which it is evident that every thing depends.

Etymology and Meaning of the term אַזָּזֵל Azazel.

To the eye of the Hebrew scholar, this word presents itself at once as a compound, but its constituent elements, and consequently its true signification, have long been the theme of learned debate. Nearly every critical commentator opens his peculiar scholium upon the text, with a kind of preliminary groan of "locus vexatissimus!" and some are disposed to give it up in despair. Bochart, whose stupendous erudition is seldom baffled by the most formidable difficulties, is here forced to the humble confession—"Me de hac voce אַזָּזֵל Azazel nihil habere satis certum;" and moreover that—"prudentiores vocem Hebræam relinquunt ἀνεγενέσθον," *the more prudent leave the Hebrew word uninterpreted.* Under these circumstances it can be little discredit for one to fail of entire success in his attempts to illustrate the genuine import of the term. The failure of our predecessors affords us a kind of *testudinal* panoply against the shame of a defeat in a field where so many men of prowess have been worsted.

We shall first state the principal explanations which have been given of the term.

I. Several of the Rabbinical writers, including the Targumists, understand by אַזָּזֵל Azazel, the name of *the place* to which the scape-goat was conducted. Thus Jonathan, in his Targum on v. 10 of this chapter, renders the last clause—"to send him away to death in a rough and rocky place in the desert of Tsük." Here it was supposed by the Talmudists, that the goat was thrown down a steep precipice of the

mountain called *Azazel*, and dashed to pieces.* This is favored by the Arabic versions which have for the Hebrew *הַרְאָזָזֶל* to *Azazel* every where *هَرَبَنْ بَرْبَلْ legebel al-azaz*, to the Mount Azaz, or to the rough mountain, as *azaz* properly signifies. And to give still more color to this interpretation, R. Saadia Gaon supposes the word to be compounded of *הַר* and *רָב*, so that the mountain *הַרְאָזָזֶל* is by transposition equivalent to *הַרְבָּאָזָזֶל*, i. e. rough mountain of God, just as David, Ps. 36: 7, speaks of lofty mountains, as "mountains of God." But to say nothing of the license of alteration which appears in these readings, we find no intimation of any mountain thus denominated, either in Palestine or out of it, to which the scape-goat was led. We are simply informed that the animal was to be conveyed into the wilderness, without any specification of the place. Besides, had Moses intended to have designated a particular mountain, he would doubtless have employed the common adjection "Mount," and we should have had "Mount Azazel" just as we now have "Mount Horeb," "Mount Ebal," "Mount Gerizim," &c. Rejecting this interpretation therefore as untenable, we come upon another which unites the suffrages of a large class of the more modern commentators.

II. This supposes that the term *אָזָזֶל* is the name, not of a mountain or place, but of the scape-goat itself. This, it is contended, is obvious from the structure of the word, taken in connexion with the structure of the sentence:—"Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats, one lot for the Lord," i. e. for the goat which was to be sacrificed to the Lord; "and the other lot for Azazel," i. e. for the goat which was to be sent away into the wilderness. The word itself, it is maintained, is easily and legitimately resolved into *אָזָז*, a goat, and *אָזָל*, to go away, to depart, which gives us the exact idea of the ceremonial use of the scape-goat, viz., that of being formally sent away into the wilderness. The rendering of several of the ancient versions gives, it is said, not a little confirmation to this sense of the term. Symmachus has for "Azazel," *τραγος ἀπεγχάμενος*, the departing goat; Aquila *τραγος ἀπολελυμένος*, the goat set free or let

* Lightfoot Temp. Ser. p. 177 vol. IX. Pitman's Ed.

loose ; and the Sept. ὁ ἀποσμίθεος, which Theodoret and some other of the Greek fathers interpret as equivalent to ἀποσμίθεος, *sent away*. But as we shall show in the sequel that there is great reason to question the correctness of this interpretation, the rendering of the LXX must be taken here as important rather for the sense which has been put upon it, than for its own direct and positive testimony to the meaning of the Hebrew original.

The terms, however, above quoted, are freely used by the ancient Greek writers, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, and others, in reference to the same subject, and the Latin vulgate accords with them by adopting the rendering, "hircus emissarius," *the emissary goat*. Guided by the same authorities, our translators have rendered the original by "scape-goat." But to this view of the origin and import of the Hebrew term, it must be admitted that there are serious objections, among which are the following.

(1.) It does not appear why such a singular and anomalous term should have been employed to express an idea so simple as that of *a goat sent away*. The Hebrew has an appropriate word for the subject, viz., יֵזֶב *ez* or שָׁלָאֵת *shala'et*, *goat*, and another, מְשֻׁלָּחַ *meshulla'ch*, from שָׁלַחַ *shala'ch*, *to dismiss or send away*, for the predicate. Why then should such a strange compound word be introduced in this connexion, especially when it is well known that although, in Hebrew, proper names are often compounded, yet appellatives very seldom are ? The presumption from the genius of the language is most unquestionably in favor of "Azazel's" being a proper name. The force of this objection is greatly enhanced by the fact that neither Onkelos, Jonathan, nor the Samaritan, have attempted to translate or paraphrase the term, which they undoubtedly would have done, had they considered it merely as an appellative.

(2.) It is objected to this explication by Bochart, that it involves a grammatical anomaly. Each of the goats was obviously required to be *a male* ; but יֵזֶב, in the sense of *goat*, more appropriately signifies *a female* ; and yet it is here represented as compounded with the masculine יְאָזָל *azal*. We do not indeed consider this objection as insuperable, as there is some reason to rank יֵזֶב among the epicene or hermaphrodite nouns ; but we may still say that we should more natural-

ly have expected, that for the purpose intended, the unambiguous סֵירָזֵל Seirazel would have been employed, especially as סֵירִים Seirim, is used in speaking of the two goats in the words immediately preceding.

(3.) But a far more serious difficulty incumbers the proposed interpretation from the structure of the sentence. The direction in the text is thus worded:—"One lot shall be נַדְרֵךְ for Jehovah, and the other lot נַדְרֵךְ for Azazel." Now the obvious impression on reading this would be, that a personal antithesis was intended. Jehovah certainly, the first party, is a person; and as precisely the same formula of expression occurs in regard to the other, why should we not consider that also as a person? But according to the present rendering, the preposition 'for, in the two successive clauses, is made to bear two entirely different significations. In the former it denotes *to* in the sense of *appropriation*—in the latter, it denotes *for* in the sense of *designation to a particular purpose*. Is this probable? Indeed, we see not why, if "Azazel" is to be understood as the name of one goat, "Jehovah" is not as properly to be understood as the name of the other. But from this alternative the mind instinctively shrinks back.

As then the objection to this theory of the derivation and meaning of the word appears to be sufficiently valid to warrant its rejection; and as we seem forced, at the same time, to adopt only such an exposition as shall assume the *personality* of the "Azazel" of the text, the question at once arises, what *person* can we suppose to be intended by the appellation? This is indeed a question of very grave import, and we feel a strong necessity laid upon us of making peace with the pre-possessions of our readers, when we announce our firm conviction, that not only a *personal being*, but an *evil demon*, real or imaginary, is signified by this unique and anomalous term.

In presenting our purposed array of authorities in support of this opinion, we begin with the translation of the Seventy. The words of our English version,—"One lot for the Lord and the other lot for the scape-goat"—they have thus rendered;—κλῆρον ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ κλῆρον ἐν τῷ ἀπομεπαῖῳ, *one lot to the Lord, and one lot to the Apopompeus, or sender-away.* The Greek word ἀπομεπαῖος, though rendered *passively* in

our translation, and so understood and interpreted by several of the early fathers, yet according to the analogy of the language, and doubtless according to the intention of the versionists, is properly a term of *active* signification. The reader has only to turn to the learned pages of Bochart to see this point established beyond a doubt.* In this sense it is held by many critics of distinguished name to import one of that class of demons or deities who were called by the Latins *Dii Averunci*, or *the deities who send away or avert evils from their votaries*, which was done through the propitiating agency of prayers, sacrifices, and other offerings. This is confirmed by Gesenius, from whose Hebrew Lexicon we extract, in this connexion, what he says on the word **אַזָּזֵל** ; “I render it without hesitation *the averter, expiator, averuncus, ἀλεξίαχος*, i. e. for **אַזָּזֵל** Azazel, from the root **אָזָל**, *to remove, to separate*. By this name I suppose is to be understood originally some idol that was appeased with sacrifices, as Saturn and Mars ; but afterwards as the names of idols were often transferred to demons, it seems to denote an evil demon dwelling in the desert, and to be placated with victims, in accordance with this very ancient and also Gentile rite.” The name Azazel is also used by the Arabs for an evil demon. (See Reland de Relig. Mohammed. p. 189. Meninski h. v.) The etymology which we have above proposed, was expressed of old by the Sept. translator, although neglected or misunderstood by most interpreters. Thus he renders it v. τῷ Ἀποφράτῳ, i. e. Ἀποφράτῳ, ἀλεξίαχῳ, *averuncῳ* ; v. 10, σἰς τῇ ἀποφράτῃ *ad averuncundum* ; v. 16, σἰς αφεσιν. The ecclesiastical fathers have referred this Ἀποφράτος to the *goat* itself, q. d. *scape-goat*, although obviously in v. 8 the antithesis lies between **אַזָּזֵל** and **אַרְנֵת**.† That ἀποφράτος is indeed of the active instead of passive signification not only has Bochart clearly proved by a long list of classic citations, but the words of Josephus in reference to this rite throw a strong light on this sense of the Sept. rendering : “The goat is sent away into a remote desert *as an averter of ills* (*αποφρασμός*), and a satisfaction for the sins of the people.”†

* Hieroz. P. I. L. II. c. 54. T. I. p. 745—7.

† Antiq. Jud. L. III. c. 10.

It is clear then, we think, both that the LXX esteemed the “Azazel” a person, and that they supposed that person to be a demon, or deity of the order of “Averunci,” or *averters*. That the same opinion was held by the early Christians, we seem to have clear proof from the words of Origen, who, in attempting to show that the devil was known in the times of Moses, says among other things, “He who is called in Leviticus ἀταραχαῖος, and whom the Hebrew Scriptures call Azazel, was no other than the devil.” The same conclusion was drawn from this language by the apostate emperor Julian, who maintained that since Moses speaks of the devotion of a goat to a deity called ἀταραχαῖος in contradistinction from Jehovah, he in effect taught the very same doctrine as that inculcated by the heathen theologists respecting the *Dii Averunci*. He was answered at length by Cyril of Alexandria, but we are not concerned with the arguments of either, any farther than as they serve as testimonies to the fact of an early belief in the Christian church that “Azazel” in the Pentateuch was the name of an evil demon. That this belief is to be traced to the demonology of the Jews, we think there can be no doubt. Rabbi Menahem in his commentary on Leviticus, says that Azazel was one of the four principal demons whose names he writes together as follows: Sammael, Azazel, Azael, and Mahazael. In like manner the apocryphal book of Enoch makes mention of Azalel, or as it was afterwards written, Azael, among the fallen angels. The same is affirmed in the Rabbinical work entitled *Zohar*. Mercer in his commentary on Genesis relates as a traditional dogma of the Cabalists, that demons and all kinds of malignant spirits were prone to dwell in burial places and solitudes, and that Azazel was the name of one of this class of beings. Nor are we to forget that the New Testament allusions make it evident, that in the popular belief of the Jews the desert and desolate places were the chosen haunts of these foul fiends. Our Lord underwent his temptation from the devil in the wilderness, and it was hither that the legion of evil demons is said to have driven the possessed man ere they were ejected from him by the word of Christ. It is, moreover, through dry and desert places that the unclean spirit is represented by the Saviour as walking after he had quitted the body of the demoniac. It goes also strikingly to confirm this view of the subject, that these desert-deities were generally conceived of as having

the semblance of *goats*, or rough, hairy, shaggy creatures, corresponding with the Satyrs of the Greek and Roman mythology, which were sylvan deities or demigods, represented as monsters, half man and half goat, having horns on their heads, hairy bodies, with the feet and tail of the goat. Thus the prophet Isaiah in predicting the ruin of Babylon, says, chapter 13: 21, "Wild beasts of the desert shall lie there, and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures, and owls shall dwell there, and *satyrs* (סְעִירִים Seirim, goats) shall dance there;" where the Gr. has δαιμόνια *demons*: the Vulg. "Pilosí," shaggy, or hairy animals; and the Chal. "Demons." The popular ideas of the external form and appearance of the devil among the rude and ignorant of nearly all nations, both ancient and modern, easily connect themselves with these early traditions, and the language of holy writ in the following passages goes clearly to evince the origin of the vulgar associations. Lev. 17: 7, "And they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devils (פָּעִירִים lit. goats) after whom," &c. 2 Chron. 11: 15, "And he ordained him priests for the high places, and for the devils (פָּעִירִים goats) and for the calves which he had made." On the peculiar usage of the original term, Kimchi in his Lexicon (voc. פָּעִירִים) remarks, "They (demons) are called goats, because they appear in the shape of goats to their votaries." It would seem then that there are good grounds for recognizing in this term a designed allusion to some kind of desert-demon to whom the second goat was in a manner dedicated, devoted, or consigned, but not sacrificed, as this would be a direct contravention of the precept just quoted from Lev. 17: 7, "They shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devils."

Still the grand question remains to be solved, why the goat was consigned or devoted *at all* to Azazel? The Rabbins, who for the most part understand Azazel to mean the evil spirit, have advanced some singular notions on this subject. Substituting the name Sammael for Azazel, R. Eliezer scruples not to say, that they offer a gift to Sammael or Satan on the day of atonement, lest he should make their oblations fruitless. Indeed, we are told that it became a current proverb among the Hebrews, "A gift to Sammael on the day of atonement." The idolatrous character of this offering, Moses Gerundinensis endeavors, indeed, to explain

away, but still in such terms as assure us of the fact;—“ Our intention when we let loose the goat, is not to present him as an oblation to Sammael. God forbid!—but our desire is to do the will of our Creator, who has delivered to us such a commandment.” What is yet stranger, some of the more ancient Christians, who used the Greek translation of the Seventy, were thence led to imagine that “ of the two goats, one was sacrificed to God, and the other was sent into the desert to propitiate an evil and impure demon, thus venerated as an *apopompean* spirit.” For this impiety they are deservedly censured by Cyril and Procopius; and it is well remarked by Abulensis, that “ the goat was not sacrificed to the demon Azazel, for it is only said that it was *conveyed into the desert*; for it were a great disgrace to the God of the Hebrews, if he could not deliver his worshippers from demons, and if they were compelled to propitiate the devil lest he should hurt them.” And in this connexion we may advert to the opinion of Spencer,* who takes the name “Azazel,” as compounded of *az*, *strong*, and *azal*, to *depart*, implying the *strong receder*, or *powerful apostate*, an appropriate denomination, he supposes, of the devil as the *arch rebel and revolter*; to which may be added, that he and other beings of his class were prone, according to popular estimation, to *withdraw* themselves from all frequented places, and hover about dreary solitudes, tombs, ruins, and deserts. The reasons which he assigns for the extraordinary rite of the consignment of the goat to Azazel, are the three following: (1) That the animal thus laden with the sins of the people and delivered up to the demon, might denote the wretched lot of all sinners. (2) That the dedication of this goat thus circumstanced to an evil demon might serve to show the Israelites the impurity of apostate spirits, and so divert and take them off, and others also, from all proneness to hold intercourse with such beings. (3) That since their sins were sufficiently expiated by the piacular goat sent out to Azazel, they might more willingly abstain from all application to the *apopompean* gods of the Gentiles.

These reasons, though free from the absurd impiety of the

* *De Legib. Heb. L. iii. Dissert. viii. p. 1040.*

Rabbinical superstition, strike the sober mind as at once far-fetched and fanciful, and we are shut up to the necessity of seeking for a more satisfactory solution of the problem. In attempting this, let us recur again to the incidents mentioned in the text as connected with this singular transaction. V. 9, 10, "And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a sin-offering. But the goat on which the lot fell for Azazel, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him (לְקַרְבָּן צְבָאָוֹן, *lekap-pér alauv*, *to expiate or atone over or upon him*,) to let him go for Azazel into the wilderness." And then again after describing the ceremonies of the slain-goat, he adds, v. 21, 22, "He shall bring the live goat, and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness: and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited: and he shall let go the goat into the wilderness."

Typical Import of the Scape-Goat.

The common interpretation given by divines of this typical rite,—an interpretation built for the most part on the presumption that "Azazel" was the name of the scape-goat, is substantially this:—The two goats constituted in fact but one offering, having a direct typical reference to Christ, who laid down his life for us in the character of a sacrificial victim, and to whom the load of our iniquities was transferred by imputation. But Christ is contemplated in this type in a two-fold aspect, one as *dying* for our sins, the other as *rising again* for our justification. But to this two-fold phasis of the mediatorial work of Christ, no *single* offering could suitably correspond. A *double* oblation, it is supposed, was made necessary by the very nature of the case. One goat slain could only show us a sacrificed Saviour; it could not show us a living Saviour. One could not exhibit him "who liveth and was dead, and is alive forevermore." There must be two to convey the great truth, that Christ was "put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit; that "he was delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justifica-

tion;" that "he was crucified through weakness, and yet liveth by the power of God." All this, it is held, is significantly taught by the two-fold symbol of the slain and the emissary goat, the one designed as a *vicarious sacrifice for sin*, the other as a *living memorial of its benign effects*. In the latter we see the sins of believers *carried away*, and *removed* from them as far as the east is from the west; in a word, as lost, blotted out, extinguished forever from the divine remembrance.

This view of the typical purport of the rite before us is very ancient, having been held by Theodoret, Cyril, Augustin, and Procopius, and while ingenious and plausible in itself, it does not, that we are aware, go counter to the general genius of the Mosaic economy, distinguished, as it was, by a vast and unspeakable richness of symbolical imagery. At the same time, we cannot but suggest, that this explanation labors under a liability to two objections of considerable weight. (1.) The sins of Israel, in the typical ceremony, were laid upon the head of the live goat, which was then, as a figure of the risen, justified, and justifying Saviour, to be sent away into the wilderness. But how does this correspond with the facts in regard to the Antitype. Christ bore the sins of men, not as *rising*, but as *dying*. He rose from the dead, and entered into glory "without sin;" nor do we any where learn that he continues *after* his death to sustain the same *expiatory* office that he did *at* his death. On the contrary, we are assured that he was "once offered to bear the sins of many;" and that "by this *one* offering he hath forever perfected them that believe." (2) We learn from v. 26, that "he that let go the goat for Azazel was to wash his clothes and bathe his flesh in water, and afterwards come into the camp." From this it appears, that contact with the goat made the person who handled him, even for the purpose of sending him away, unclean. This was in consequence of the sins with which the scape-goat was putatively charged and loaded previous to his dismission. But as no uncleanness can be supposed to attach to Christ *subsequent to his resurrection*, it is difficult to conceive how any ceremonial taint should cleave to his representing symbol.

Influenced by these and other considerations, and dissenting moreover, from the opinion that "Azazel" was the name of the goat, Faber, following the footsteps of Witsius, has

propounded the following solution of the spiritual purport of the rite.* "Christ," he remarks, "laid down his life for us that we might go free; and this sacrifice of himself upon the cross, was typified by every bloody sacrifice under the Law, and therefore, among others, by the piacular devotement of that goat, which fell by lot to Jehovah. Here we have the great mystery of the gospel, so well described by the Apostle, as that which could alone exhibit God both just and yet the justifier of them that believe in Christ Jesus. But this is not the whole of our Lord's character. At the very commencement of the Bible, it was foretold that, although the promised seed of the woman shall finally bruise the head of the serpent, yet the serpent should first bruise his heel or mortal part. If then the serpent was to bruise his mortal part, that mortal part must needs be delivered over to the power of the serpent; for of himself, he could possess no such superiority, even during a single moment. Hence it will follow, that Satan, bent only on satiating his own malice, and unconscious that he was actually subserving the divine purposes of mercy, was the agent who, through his earthly tools, effected the death of the Messiah. Such being the Scriptural character of our Lord, it is evident that no *single* type can perfectly exhibit it in both its parts. The various bloody sacrifices of the Law pre-figured it in *one* part, viz., *that which respected the atonement made with God for the sins of man*; but they spoke nothing concerning its *other* part, viz., *that which respected the delivering up of the Messiah to the infernal serpent, with the permissive power of bruising his mortal frame*. On this second part they were silent; and if it were at all to be shadowed out under the ceremonial law, such a purpose could only be effected by the introduction of a new type, connected indeed with the usual sacrificial type, but kept nevertheless studiously distinct from it. A *double* type, in short, must be employed, if the character of Christ under its *two-fold* aspect was to be completely pre-figured.

Now the two goats, which are jointly denominated a *sin-offering* (Lev. 16: 5.) constitute a type of this identical de-

* Hor. Mos. vol. ii. p. 259, Comp. Witsius on the Covenants, vol. ii. p. 230.

scription. The two together present us with a perfect symbolical delineation of our Lord's official character, while he was accomplishing the great work of our redemption. The goat which fell to the lot of Jehovah was devoted as a sin-offering, after the manner of any other sin-offering, by its being piacularly slain. This type represented the Messiah in the act of satisfying the strict justice of God, by consenting to lay down his life sacrificially in our stead, and on our behalf. But the goat which fell to the lot of Azazel was first imputatively loaded with the sins of the whole people, and was then symbolically given up to the rage of the evil spirit, by being turned loose into the wilderness, which was deemed his favorite terrestrial haunt. This second type represented the Messiah burdened with the transgressions of all mankind, deserted for a season by his heavenly Father, and delivered into the hand of the prince of darkness with a full permission granted to the apostate angel, of mortally bruising his heel or human nature. Such I conceive to be the plain and obvious interpretation of the ceremonial which was observed in the great day of atonement. Yet from a part of the ordinance respecting the live goat, I think it not improbable that a special visionary regard may have been mysteriously had to a very remarkable part of our Saviour's history. When the goat was delivered up to the malice of Satan, it was turned loose *into the wilderness*. In a similar manner, "Jesus was led up of the Spirit into the wilderness, to be tempted of the devil," (Matt. 4: 1;) and here, when he had fasted forty days, and was afterwards an hungered, the fiend commenced upon him that series of attacks which terminated only with his death upon the cross. Thus perfect throughout is the similitude between the type and the antitype."

This view we submit to the reader for what he may deem it worth. If we had not what we esteem a still better solution to propose, we should be inclined to adopt it, at least in preference to the common and accredited mode of explication. But we think we can point out "a more excellent way" of solving the mystery of the scape-goat, and to this we now invite attention, simply premising that a hint contained in a quotation from the old commentator, Conrad Pellican, whose own work we have never seen, contains the germ of the exposition which we have expanded to much fuller dimensions, and sustained by a new array of evidence, in the remarks that follow.

It is evident that in making out the proof, that "Azazel" signifies something else than the scape-goat itself, a new complexion is given at once to the whole passage. If the falling of the lot to Azazel indicated the consignment of the emissary goat to some real or imaginary spirit of evil, then it is palpable that a typical or symbolical scope entirely different from the common one must be recognized in the ceremony. We do not perceive in what sense, or with what propriety, an animal could be dedicated to Satan, and still be considered as a type of Christ. "Satan cometh, and hath nothing in me," said the Saviour himself when on earth, and we cannot but ask, on what ground a typical rite is to be referred to Him, the direct and prominent import of which expressed a *peculiar appropriation* to Satan, as of something to which he had an acknowledged and paramount right. Surely no one can be insensible to the incongruity which reigns throughout the whole transaction viewed in this light. However plausible the arguments in favor of such an interpretation, we shrink instinctively from it as derogatory to the pure and sinless nature, and the holy designation, of Jesus. Whatever else might have been shadowed forth by this institute of the Jewish law, we are sure that we are not to look for a prefiguration of Him, who was dedicated as a divine *Deodand* to God, in a goat set apart by mystic ceremonies to the devil.

What, then, are we to understand by this significant item in the ordinances of the great day of atonement? Something of a symbolical character all will admit in the dismissal of the goat, loaded with sin, into the wilderness. Whatever the implication may be, the ceremony itself cannot, we think, imply that the animal, considered in its emblematic character, was regarded by God as *acceptable*, or looked upon with a complacent eye, but rather the reverse. It was something which was *put away* as from a feeling of aversion, while on the contrary, the other goat was retained, and, when turned into a sacrificial offering, came up before the Lord as a sweet-scented savor. This utterly diverse treatment and disposal of the two animals compels us to recognize in each an antitypical substance which was to meet with corresponding entertainment at the hands of Jehovah. The one victim pointed to a substance which was to be pre-eminently well pleasing to him; the other, one from which he would turn away with dismancy and loathing. The former plainly received its reali-

zation in Christ, the beloved Son, in whom his soul delighted ; the latter must be accomplished in something which, in comparison, he abhors. In looking around for an object which shall answer these conditions, we know of none that so fully and so fairly meets the demand as *the Jewish people themselves*. It is here, if we mistake not, in the apostate, derelict, and reprobate race of Israel, rejected (not irrevocably) for their rejection of the Messiah, that we behold the substantiated truth of the shadow before us.

Certain it is that this signal event of the judicial rejection of the covenant people, was in the prescience of Jehovah ages before it occurred, and we see nothing incongruous in the idea, that it might have been mystically fore-shown by some appropriate rite in the ancient economy. And if this be granted, what *occasion* more suitable for the exhibition of this rite, than that of the great national festival of expiation, in which the atoning death of the divine substitute for sinners was most significantly set forth ? This day was replete with solemn prognostics of that still more momentous day when Christ, the true victim, should make his soul an offering for sin, and we well know that it was in putting the Messiah to death on that occasion, that that wicked nation were so to concentrate and consummate their guilt as to necessitate, to the divine counsels, their exclusion from the pale of the covenant, at least for a long lapse of centuries. We may indeed admit that such a typical intimation would be very apt to be in its own nature obscure. It would be one of peculiarly latent meaning for the time then being, for the people would be slow to read the sentence of their own rejection in any of the national rites, and in order that it might not be read, it was doubtless designedly shrouded in a veil not easily penetrated, and couched in an action so closely connected with another of different import, that it was in itself easily susceptible of a construction apparently sound, yet really fallacious and false.

We are well aware that it may be objected to this mode of viewing the transaction, that the sins of the congregation were, by putative transfer, laid upon the head of the emissary goat, as their appointed substitute, in whose *dismissal* they were to find remission. The language, moreover, would seem to be peculiarly express to this effect, when it is said that the scapegoat should be “presented alive before the Lord, to make an

atonement with him, to let him go for Azazel into the wilderness." How then does this comport with the idea of the Jewish people being the substance of the type in question? Does it not follow that they were themselves the victim of expiation for their own sins, instead of their sins being laid upon Christ, the grand propitiation for the sins of the world? We answer, undoubtedly it does. This, in fact, we conceive to be the very aim and drift of the ceremony before us, viz., to intimate that the guilty race were to "bear their iniquity," that they were, upon their rejection of the Messiah, to be sent forth into the wilderness of the world, scattered over the broad surface of the earth, and after being loaded with the guilt of that blood which they imprecated upon their own and the heads of their children, to be delivered over to the dominion of darkness, of which Satan, under the mystic denomination of Azazel, was the reputed prince and potentate. This we are certain was the *fact* in regard to the great body of the outcast nation of Israel according to the flesh, and as before remarked, we see no grounds to question that an event of so much moment should have been darkly, yet significantly, shadowed forth in the typical ordinances of that solemn day which celebrated prospectively the events of the atonement. Nor do we read any insuperable objection to this in the language of the institute itself; "to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scape-goat (to or for Azazel) into the wilderness." We have already intimated that the original קָרְבָּן *lekhapper alauv*, properly imports, to *make an atonement over, upon, or for him*, instead of *with* or *by him*, instrumentally, as rendered in our translation. The goat in this act was plainly considered as the *subject*, and not the *medium*, of atonement or reconciliation. The interposition of the particle עַל is extremely common after the verb קָרַב *kaphar*, to denote the *object* of expiation or pacification, expressed by that Hebrew term. Thus, Lev. 4: 20, "And the priest shall *make an atonement for them* (kipper *aléhem*), and it shall be forgiven them," i. e. the congregation. So also in v. 18 of this chapter:—"And he shall go out unto the altar that is before the Lord, and *make an atonement for it*, (kipper *alauv*). So again, v. 30—"For on that day shall the priest *make an atonement for you* (yekapper *alekhem*). In v. 33, the same usage

repeatedly occurs :—“ And he shall make an atonement *for* (בְּ) the priests, and *for* (בְּ) all the people of the congregation.” From these instances of the *usus loquendi*, which might be indefinitely multiplied, it would seem to be indisputable that the goat was not viewed in this connexion as the *instrument*, but as the *object* of the expiation, and a reference to the Concordance we believe will show that the preposition בְּ is never used in a similar connection with בָּאֵל but as denoting the *person* or *thing* which is the *object* of the atonement. Our English translation therefore is unquestionably wrong in rendering it in this place “ with him,” instead of “ over, or for him.”

But still it may be asked *how* an atonement or reconciliation was made *for*, *over*, or on *account of*, the scape-goat, seeing that all the action mentioned was confined to the animal itself? We refer for answer to the passage under consideration, and beg that its phraseology may be carefully scanned; “ to make an atonement for him, to let him go to Azazel into the wilderness.” Our translators have here gratuitously inserted the word “ and ” before “ to let him go,” which is wanting in the original, and the absence of which affords, we believe, the true clue to the interpretation. The latter clause is exegetical of the former. *The atonement was made by the letting go of the goat to Azazel.* He was consigned over, by way of judgment and punishment, to the jurisdiction of Satan, as the type of a similar allotment towards the recreant and rejected Jews. It was thus, and thus only, that the Most High was to be *propitiated* for their offences, and we have only to appeal to the truth of history to learn how accurately the fact has corresponded with the typical prediction.

But this is to be shown more fully by reference to the evangelical narrative, where, in the details of the crucifixion-scene, we may expect to recognize the fulfilment of the Old Testament earnest. There we behold the elect and accepted victim meekly submitting to the fearful death which the body of the nation clamorously demanded, and by demanding which they sealed their own doom of dereliction. And as if on purpose to make the coincidences more remarkable, the controlling providence of God so orders it that almost by the decision of a lot Barabbas is released and

Jesus retained for execution. In this incident we are furnished with a striking counterpart to the ceremonies of the expiation-day. In the release of the robber Barabbas we see the lot coming up with the inscription "for Azazel," while in the condemnation of Christ, we read the opposite allotment, "for Jehovah." We cannot refrain from regarding Barabbas in this transaction as an impersonation, a representative type, of the whole people to whom he belonged, and in the words of Peter on the day of Pentecost, we more than imagine that we see described the very process of *selection* and *rejection* which stands forth before us in the prescribed ceremonies of the Jewish Law ; Acts 3 : 13—15. "The God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God of our father has glorified his Son Jesus, whom ye delivered up, and denied him in the presence of Pilate, when he was determined to let him go. But ye denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you ; and killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised from the dead." Here we have the typical scene of the wilderness vividly enacted before us in its substantiated realities of a far different place and a far distant age. In Barabbas released, with all his crimes upon his head, in accordance with the emission of the goat loaded with the sins of the congregation, we see a lively, and we doubt not, a designed, emblematic presentation of the fact of the judicial thrusting forth of that covenant race, with the weight of the imprecated curse of God abiding upon them from one generation to another. Nay, so precise is the accordance between the items of the adumbration and of the accomplishment, that we behold in Pilate the fore-shadowed "fit man" by whom the discharged goat was led forth into the wilderness. "He shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness." The original is peculiar ; *בְּיַד אִישׁ שָׁׁבֵר beyad ish itti, by the hand of a man timely, opportune, seasonable.* The proper Greek rendering, as Bochart remarks, is *καιρίω* or *suxaligw* *well-timed* ; and the evangelist in his account of Pilate's *time-serving* agency in the events of the crucifixion, presents us with the *very man for the nonce*, who is so significantly designated by the epithet before us. Matt. 27 : 20—26 : "But the chief priests and elders persuaded the multitude that they should ask Barabbas and destroy Jesus. The governor answered and said unto them : Whether of the twain will

ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas. Pilate saith unto them, What shall I do then with Jesus, which is called Christ? They all say unto him, Let him be crucified. And the governor said, Why? what evil hath he done? But they cried out the more, saying, Let him be crucified. When Pilate saw that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water, and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just person; see ye to it. Then answered all the people, and said, His blood be on us, and our children. Then released he Barabbas unto them: and when he had scourged Jesus, he delivered him to be crucified."

We here leave the subject, commended to the calm consideration of our readers, to whom we say, in the language of Spencer, proposing his views of the same subject,—"Si quis lumine perspicaciore donatus, hujus instituti rationes solidiores assignaverit, me minime pertinacem experietur."

ARTICLE VII.

EXPLANATION OF Ζαχαρίου υἱοῦ Ζαχαρίου, MATT. 23: 35.

By Christ. Wilhelm Müller, Preacher at Recknitz Mecklenburg.

Translated by the Junior Editor from the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*.

Dr. Winer—*Bibl. Realwörterbuche* 2. Aufl. Th. II. p. 822,—declares himself, with the latest expositors of the above passage, for the opinion, that Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada, of whose being stoned, we have an account in 2 Chr. 24: 21, is unquestionably here meant. Even Olshausen, the faithful student of the Scriptures, finds nothing objectionable in the opinion, that Matthew confounded the name of the father of the murdered, perhaps with the father of Zechariah, one of the prophets of the Old Testament, and rather adopts it, than favor an opinion at all forced.—*Bibl. Commentar* I. p. 854. 3. Aufl. But, notwithstanding this agreement of the latest expositors, it seems to us that there are objections of no little weight to this interpretation. The opinion, that the

evangelist has here been guilty of a failure of memory is ever to be received with caution, and is liable to the charge of arbitrariness. Then, too, the place and time given in Chronicles seem not to suit the passage in our Evangelist. In Chronicles as above, it is said, that Zechariah was stoned in the court of the temple—*חַדְשָׁה יְרֵחָה*, according to the LXX., *την αἰλῆν οἴκου κυρίου*. And although we should concede, that the place as indicated by Matthew, *μεσαράν τοῦ ναοῦ καὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου*—compare the parallel in Luke 11: 51,—is consonant with the representation in the Chronicles, yet we ask: if the Lord in his discourse alluded to that passage in Chronicles, wherefore the extended and more exact specification of the place in the gospel? It seems not to have originated from Jewish tradition; for in the Talmud, to the question: *ubinam loci interfecerunt Zacharium*, the answer is the following: *nec in atrio Israëlis, nec in atrio mulierum, sed in atrio sacerdotum*—cf. Lightfoot Hor. Heb. ad Matt. 23: 25. The circumstantial pointing out of the locality in the gospels, itself renders the allusion to the Chronicles improbable in our estimation.

In respect to the chronological agreement also, we might find, in our most recent expositors, more subtlety than truth. Zechariah, son of Jehoiada, was put to death under king Joash about 840 B. C.; and Jesus is supposed to have meant this murder in the passage before us, forsooth, because it is the last recorded murder of a prophet in the Old Testament. But if the Lord says to his contemporaries, that all the innocent blood shed on the earth must come on them, why should he exclude from the recompense the whole period from Joash to his own day? Is it not much more natural and probable to suppose, that he took the murder of Abel as the *terminus a quo*, the murder of a pious (*δίκαιος*) man of that generation as the *terminus ad quem*, and so comprehended all innocent blood shed from the creation of the world—*ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου* in Luke—to his own day? This view is supported by the fact, that the *ἴποιστας—ye have murdered*—points precisely to a deed of those then living, especially as a nice distinction between the fathers and the contemporaries of our Lord runs through the whole discourse. To remove these difficulties, De Wette remarks—*exeget. Handbuch I. I*, p. 194—“*ἴποιστας* is spoken according to the idea of community of guilt; properly speaking, the fathers had done it

—compare Gen. 46: 4. Ps. 66: 6. Hos. 12: 5.” This opinion, however, seems inadmissible, as the same personal designation, in πλησιαστες v. 32, as in ἀποτελεστες και σταυρωστες v. 34., manifestly applies only to those addressed, and ἐφ' ὑμᾶς v. 35, points precisely to the same persons. The idea of communitative guilt certainly lies in the whole tenor of the discourse, but not in the word ἐπονεισθαι, which, if what was said referred to the murder of Zechariah, son of Jehoiada, must much rather denote a community of action.

Although, on account of these objections we cannot agree with the latest interpreters of this passage, yet we must accord with them in this, that they set aside the other explanations considered by them, as arbitrary and groundless. We wonder the more, however, that they have altogether overlooked the oldest of all interpretations which finds in Zacharias the father of John the Baptist. Even Winer, who mentions it, enters into no examination of it. The learned Lightfoot, as above quoted, certainly gives his judgment there: *quæ de Zacharia, Baptista patre, hic dicuntur, somnia sunt*; but this cannot prevent us from making the attempt to justify again this earliest interpretation.

Origen, the father of Exegesis, says, in Tract. xxvi, *in Matt.*, that Zacharias, the father of John, was murdered by the Jews, who was enraged because he had allowed Mary, after the birth of the Saviour, to stand in a part of the temple appropriated exclusively to virgins: and in another place —*Tom. xi. in Matt. p. 225, ed Huet.*—he says expressly that Jesus, by the language in Matt. 23: 35, confirms a writing considered as apocryphal, ἐν ἀκοχήφοις φερομένην—Basiliæ, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and others, agree with Origen—comp. Thilo, *cod. apocr. N. T. I. Proleg.* lxiv. n. There is a different tradition of the murder of this Zacharias found in the *Protevangelium Jacobi*, capp. xxii.—xxiv.—Thilo. I. 1, p. 262 sq. Zacharias is here represented as having been put to death by Herod the Great, at the time of the murder of the children of Bethlehem, because he would or could not give him information of the abode of his son John. Of this opinion was the Patriarch Peter of Alexandria, expressed in his pastoral letter a. 306—*Routhii Reliq. sacr.* Vol. iii. p. 341 sq., and the Nestorian Bishop Solomon of Bassora *sac.* 13.—*Assemanni Biblioth. Orient.* T. III. P. I., p. 315 sq.—who represents as the common

opinion of Syrian Christians, that Zacharias, on account of his concealment of his son, was, by Herod's order, slain between the temple and altar.

These testimonies are sufficient to establish the fact of a constant tradition, during the first centuries of the Christian era, that the father of the Baptist had been murdered, although the tradition varies as to the occasion and manner of his murder. This variation, however, cannot make us suspicious as to the matter of the tradition itself, as it is universally characteristic of it, that it conjectures the occasion and attendant circumstances of any fact committed to it, and reports them in connection with the fact itself. For the truth of the fact, we have two witnesses of weight in Origen and the Protevangelium Jacobi. For no one will deny critical tact to Origen, nor accuse him of a blind credulity in tradition. If then he applies the account of the murder of Zacharias to the explanation of our passage of the Scriptures, it must have seemed to him to rest on good grounds. Of the Protevangelium Jacobi, however, the learned editor—Thilo, I.I. p. xlv.—judges, that this very ancient writing, of which already Origen, Epiphanius, Gregory of Nyssa, indeed, perhaps Justin Martyr and Clemens Alexandrinus, make mention, might contribute very much to the criticism and grammatico-historical interpretation of the New Testament. Comp. in the same, p. lxii., the favorable opinion of Combeffisius. Would it not, then, betray an excessive protestant abhorrence of all tradition, if we should place in the land of dreams, an account in itself not improbable, merely because it is found in a writer of traditions? We appeal frequently and with justice to the testimony of tradition, on other points of controversy, e. g. as to the authenticity of our gospels. The only inquiry therefore is, whether the father of the Baptist suits the context of our passage; then we have in the words of Jesus, as Origen correctly remarks, a confirmation of the traditional account of the murder of Zacharias.

That the time, in which this murder falls, agrees very well with the language of Jesus, indeed appears exclusively admissible, has been already determined above. When Jesus spake these words, about thirty years had passed away since the murdering of our Zacharias: he could, therefore, adduce the same as an act of his contemporaries—*ἴποντας*. And what case lay nearer to him than the murdering, in the sanc-

tuary, of the father of the Baptist, certainly highly respected by him? It was connected with his own earliest history, and was still in the lively remembrance of his contemporaries.

The striking designation of place in the gospels, above noticed, finds also its satisfactory explanation, when compared with the account in the Protevangelium Jacobi. In chapter 24 of this work, it is stated, that the priests had found the blood of Zacharias παρὰ τὸ θυσιαστήριον κυρίου. We might be in doubt, whether the altar of incense or the altar of burnt-offering is here meant, as however in chapter 23, we read : αἷμα ἐκχύνεις παρὰ (sic) τὰ πρόθυμα τοῦ ναοῦ κυρίου, the altar of burnt-offering must be understood, which is known to have been in the court of the priests: so that the designation of place in the Protevangelium agrees exactly with that in the gospels.*

As all the difficulties which stand in the way of the other expositions of this passage, disappear before the interpretation here recommended, so also there would be no reason to doubt the entire correctness of the account of Matthew. For although neither in the canonical nor apocryphal gospels is it mentioned, that the father of the Baptist was a son of Barachias, it certainly cannot be concluded, from this circumstance, that Matthew's account is not according to truth. On the contrary, it is rather inferable, even from our passage, that the father of this Zacharias was called Barachias.

It only remains for us to consider more particularly the

* The reading in the Protevangelium: περὶ τὸ διάφραγμα ἐφενεύθη Ζαχαρίας, found in the text, as given by Thilo, seems to be a corruption from the reading of other codices: περὶ τὰ διάφραμα, which is confirmed by Eustathius—compare *Thilo as above quoted*, p. 267. n.; for τὸ διάφραγμα is, according to Zonaras, of like signification with τὸ μεσόστοιχον, which separates the court of the Gentiles from the court of the Israelites, and immediately after passing over the latter, one came into the court of the priests, at the θυσιαστήριον—comp. Winer, *bibl. Realw.* II. p. 675.—Moreover περὶ τὸ διάφραγμα does not accord with the other designations of place above quoted. On the other hand, the reading περὶ τὰ διάφραμα contains a very suitable designation of time, and seems to be a corruption only because the unusual word διάφραμα was not understood.

parallel passage in Luke 11: 50, 51, which seems, at first view, to be opposed to our exposition, but in fact contains a confirmation of it. Luke has not given the name of Zacharias' father, and hence many interpreters have concluded that the words *νινοῦ βαραχίου* in Matthew are an interpolation. But the state of the case differs in respect to Luke and Matthew. Luke, for instance, in the beginning of his gospel, had particularly spoken of Zacharias as the father of John the Baptist; he must therefore presume that his readers, on the mention of Zacharias again in chapter 11: 51, would think of no other person than the Zacharias already known to them, and consequently he subjoins no more exact designation of him. Whether the Lord himself, in his discourse, added or expressed the father's name, whether therefore Matthew or Luke is the more correct, it will be difficult ever to determine. It must suffice us to have pointed out, in the gospels themselves, the ground of this difference; and even from this source there seems to arise an argument of some weight for the justness of our view about Zacharias.

Another objection which might be raised against our view, out of the passage in Luke, is likewise shown to be unsupported. From the words *τὸ αἷμα πάντων τῶν προφητῶν* v. 50, it is concluded that the Zacharias here mentioned must also have been a prophet. This is certainly true, but does not militate against our interpretation. For just as Abel, in a large sense, is enumerated among the prophets—compare Olshausen and De Wette—so can our Zacharias be also reckoned, of whom Luke, 1: 67, expressly says: *καὶ Ζαχαρίας ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπλήσθη πνεύματος ἀγίου καὶ ἐπεφήτεσσεν*. In Luke 1: 6, also, he is called a *δίκαιος*, which exactly corresponds with the *αἷμα δίκαιον* of Matthew. But that the discourse here relates only, as De Wette thinks, to the occurrence recorded in the Old Testament, is an affirmation intended to favor his own interpretation. Indeed, the father of the Baptist was himself also a pious man under the Old Testament.

If, finally, it be asserted against our exposition, that those apocryphal accounts of the murder of Zacharias are adduced merely to illustrate the passage in Matthew, and especially the difficult words *νινοῦ βαραχίου*, the assertion is altogether devoid of proof. In opposition to it, there is the authority of Origen, who would scarcely have given credit to a mere fable, and the antiquity of the Protevangelium Jacobi, which existed

at a time when such inventions to favor the canonical gospels were perhaps scarcely thought of. Besides, the inventor, if his design had been to solve that difficulty, would scarcely have omitted to designate the Zacharias mentioned by him, as a son of Barachias.

With this view of the matter, we cannot, with modern interpreters, attribute a slip of the memory to the evangelist, as long as a way is open for his justification, which presents so few difficulties.

ARTICLE VIII.

REVIEW OF SCHMUCKER'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. C. P. Krauth, D. D., President of Pennsylvania College, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Science, Gettysburg, Pa.

Psychology, or Elements of a new System of Mental Philosophy, on the basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies. By S. S. Schmucker, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg. New York : Harper and Brothers, 1842. pp. 227.

IT may be regarded as interesting to all who believe knowledge to be progressive, and that it is the duty of every generation to make some contribution to its increase, that there have appeared in this country recently, several works on the philosophy of *mind*. Ignorance and prejudice have manifested great distrust of this species of investigation. The opinion has been hastily assumed, either that the mind is too far removed from our reach to admit of examination, or that, after the researches which have been made, it can hardly be expected to yield any valuable additional results. Sympathy with such an opinion could not justify itself by any thing like adequate views of the phenomena of mind, or of the means in our possession, of inspecting and describing them. The more extensive our acquaintance with the results of the labor of eminent metaphysicians throughout the world in ancient times and in modern, the deeper will be our conviction

that their praiseworthy and toilsome studies, though they have conferred rich benefits upon all succeeding ages, have not accomplished every thing, but have left a *terra incognita* which makes ample room for the investigations of others. The translation of Cousin in this country and the metaphysical treatises of Professor Upham, the Psychology of the lamented President of Marshall College, Dr. Rauch, and now, the *Mental Philosophy* of Dr. Schmucker, may be regarded as convincing evidence both that the science of mind admits of additional elucidation, and that there is a demand for it. It is creditable to our country, and its literature, that so much has been done in this department, and done so well.

Much was anticipated, when, in the forthcoming *Psychology* of Dr. Rauch, a promise was given, that the metaphysics of the English Language should be incorporated with the German. Many, who had received but vague rumors concerning the metaphysical principles adopted in that land of profound learning, and deep research—Germany—who desired, to be initiated through the medium of our vernacular idiom, and by one who had rendered himself familiar with our modes of thinking and speaking on these subjects, into the explanation of the human mind, as given by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Heinroth, Schubert, and others, hailed with joy the appearance of that work, a year or two since. How much was accomplished towards gratifying these desires, and what position the author will take amongst our metaphysicians, it is not our province now to determine. It may not be improper, however, to express the opinion, that neither they who have been lavish in their praises, nor they who have been heated in their condemnation of the work, have hit upon the proper medium. The *Psychology* of Dr. Schmucker comes before us, too, with peculiar pretensions, and raises in consequence of them, peculiar expectations. It may be asserted, that a system of metaphysics could appear under no more auspicious banner than that which is hung out by this. It professes to be the product not of the study of the patriarchs of the science, but of original examination of the mind, or, to express it in the wonted phraseology of the craft, the exercise of consciousness in regard to the author's mental operations. The propriety and the value of this method all the initiated will concede. Its difficulty has deterred many from undertaking it, and but few comparatively have

pushed it to any great extent. But notwithstanding the magnitude of the undertaking, our author has, during years of patient study, ventured independently to analyze his own mental processes. The history of his procedure, and the classification of our mental actions are here given us. Such a contribution, from such a mind, ought to be regarded as a present of no inconsiderable value.

The matter is viewed by us in this light. There are yet, after ages of study, dark places in the human mind. These are to be illuminated, not by compiling systems from Locke, and Reid, and Stewart, and Brown; not by new arrangements of old matter; not by additional beautiful illustrations of known truths, but by repairing to the mind itself, catching up and detaining its fleeting operations, and making them the subjects of thorough investigation. The author of this book, in the true spirit of the Baconian philosophy, discards for the time, the labors of others, and engages in proper efforts of induction, to obtain firmer footing. In pursuing this course he has not failed. Those who read his book, and we venture to predict that it will be extensively read, will not fail to perceive that he has planted his standard in advance of his predecessors. He takes his place among original and independent thinkers, and deserves to be enrolled—an honor which we would not allow to the mere compiler, or teacher of mental philosophy—among metaphysicians; with such men as Kant, Heinroth, Schubert in Germany, Locke, Reid, Stewart and Brown, in Great Britain.

His position may be ascertained by the following extracts from his preface. "About sixteen years ago, having been called to take charge of a Theological Seminary, he felt it a duty to devote particular attention to his instructions in this department, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless had some influence on this system. He had considerable acquaintance with the patriarchs of British Metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, as well as some few German authors; but neither of them seemed to present an entirely natural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively his own mind, and for ten years, he read no book on this subject. During this period, he spent much of his time in the examination of his own mental phenomena; and having travelled over the whole ground, and employed the leisure of several

additional years to review and mature his views, he now presents to the public the following outline of a system, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic induction." Dr. Schmucker adds, that the publication appears "after frequent solicitations from those who heard the author's lectures, and from other gentlemen of high literary and scientific rank, who examined the manuscript, and that the work is at length submitted to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may subserve the cause of truth and human happiness. The author does not flatter himself that his views on all the topics discussed, have reached entire accuracy; he will thankfully receive and carefully weigh any suggestion which may be made, especially if presented in the spirit of benevolence, or of literary comity." In the above remarks, we have an expose of the nature of the work, and it every where bears marks of such an origin. The names of celebrated writers on mental philosophy, do not present themselves on every page to endorse opinions or illustrate facts. The writer speaks for himself. He presents his own mental movements. His prompter is the microcosm within him, in the various phases that it presents under the influence of the material world. In a rapid, but very interesting sketch, there is given an outline of the various systems of classification which have been adopted by metaphysicians. No one is sufficiently comprehensive and clear. The nearest approximations to the author's own views are found in German writers. Their arrangement, as we have frequently met with it in different authors, coincides more nearly with that of our author than he appears to have seen. Our understanding of the three leading powers, Vorstellungs vermögen or Erkentniss vermögen, Gefiehls vermögen, and Begehrens vermögen, as given by them, coincides in the main with the knowledge, feeling, and action of Prof. Schmucker, though the materials embraced in them are somewhat different. Our attention was first directed to it in the *Moral*, a system of Ethics of the celebrated Dr. Reinhard, the first edition of which, was published before the end of the last century. Professor Fischhaber, with whom we have no acquaintance, has not done justice to the logical character of the German mind, in the order in which he arranges the powers, as cited in this work. The general arrangement is, in other German writers, presented precisely in the order of succession in which our author's is given. Of

its correctness, no one can doubt. Professor Upham, in his interesting work, on mental science, has at last, fairly arrived at an adjustment of the mental states, which is substantially the same. No other classification will hereafter be used. Whatever terms may be employed to designate these classes of mental operations, they will appear to be equivalent to intellectual sentiment, and active, or as the author expresses it,

1. Cognitive ideas,
2. Sentient ideas,
3. Active operations.

Without discussing the subject, it is taken for granted, that there are no innate ideas. The origin of our knowledge is first explained. The material world in its various aspects, through the medium of the organic senses, is regarded as its source. The whole discussion on this subject is entirely in the spirit of Locke, and indeed throughout the work, we perceive a mode of thinking, and a class of results which harmonize more nearly with those of that celebrated metaphysician than with those of any other.

The remarks on the cognitive class of ideas are admirable. The detail of their extent is very accurately given. The observations on consciousness are deserving of notice, though we do not understand the author to differ from the views of Dr. Brown, endorsed subsequently by Payne. In the account of conscience, we object to our author's position. It belongs rather to the sentient part of our nature, and is closely connected with active operations. Its materials are doubtless furnished by intellec[t]tions, and it is modified by them; but its essence is the feeling of approbation, or disapprobation, followed by feelings of obligation. Our author, indeed, does make it both cognitive and active, but we wish he had been more explicit on the sentient part, both on account of the importance of the subject, and the apparent rejection, with which he may be charged, of a moral sense.

Unusual pains have been taken in this work to classify the various objects of our knowledge, and a terminology has been introduced, which we confess, we should have preferred not to see. It gives a pedantic air to the work, which ill accords with the manly, lucid, and we will say, *metaphysical style* of the book. If the ordinary mode of speaking of

external objects had been selected, it would better have suited our taste, and perhaps attracted some who have a great horror of books treating familiar subjects in an unusual manner. We have not much to say about this classification, except that the author has taken new ground, or revived old, in regard to what he calls absolute entities. Here he is a thorough realist, and gives not only name, but a "local habitation" to those fleeting entities, time and space, and number.

To accord the praise of ingenuity to these speculations is easy. It may be admitted that there is some plausibility in what is said of space. It is less difficult to consider it as something existing without, and to give it a place amongst material existences, but when the same is asked for time and number, it produces a pause and a balancing of thought. After all, we must consent to remain, we suppose, where our recent metaphysicians have agreed to place us in this matter, incapable of giving any other account of these ideas, than that they are under certain circumstances suggested to the mind. They have an internal origin. For them, we are indebted to the pure reason as a Kantian would say,—to reflection as a disciple of Locke would express himself, or to original suggestion as would be said by our later writers on metaphysics.

We prefer to occupy the position in which we are placed, by those who tell us—answering the views of those who coincide with our author, and expressing their own,—“if it were of external origin, (the notion of space,) as asserted by Locke, if it could properly be said to come into the mind by the way of sensation, we should be able to make such a reference of it. But let us enquire. It will evidently not be pretended, that the notion of space is to be ascribed to the senses of taste, of smell, or of hearing. And can it be ascribed to the sense of touch? Is it a matter of feeling? A single consideration will suggest a satisfactory answer. It will certainly be acknowledged, that we can have no knowledge, by the sense of touch,—with the single exception, perhaps, of the ideas of heat and cold, which are sometimes ascribed to it,—of any thing which does not present some resistance. The degree of resistance may greatly vary, but there will be always some. But no one will undertake to say that resistance is a quality of space, or enters any way

into his notice of it." Tested by the sense of sight, it bears no analogy to its notices, and we suppose no satisfactory account can be given but that which refers it to the mind in the exercise of original suggestion.

The same mode of reasoning is applicable to duration and number, and it may be thought by many with reduplicated force. We commend to the careful examination of metaphysicians the author's speculations on these points. They have been elaborated with much care; though they do not remove the difficulties which have heretofore existed on this subject.

We may notice with high approbation the practical aspects of the work. In this point of view, there is much that is deserving of notice. In connection with cognitive ideas, we have a statement of the sources of error, the careful study of which cannot but be of great use to every one, who would have clear mental representatives of external things, or an accurate acquaintance with truth.

In the science of education, and in the processes of self-improvement much may be learned from the summary of the sources of error given. We pass on to the chapter (the 3d,) in which the organic process, by which we obtain our ideas, is handled. The chapter is short, and offers nothing new. A clear and satisfactory account is given of the action of the senses, and their relation to mental operations. We could have desired in a book intended for students, and academic use—a more copious development of the operation of the senses. The materials are at hand, and it will be easy, in a future edition, to supply this defect, if it should be deemed advisable. If we ask ourselves the question, before we leave this first and fundamental part of the treatise, whether the independent investigations of our author have made any additions to our knowledge, we feel constrained to answer that they have not; but they have sustained the previous discoveries of others, and set forth with unusual clearness and force, the intercourse between matter and the mind, and the dependence of the latter on the former, for the furniture with which it is fitted up. We proceed to the second grand division of this picture of the human mind, and we feel disposed to permit the author to speak occasionally for himself, as our design is mainly, to enable those unacquainted with the work to form a correct opinion of what they may expect from the perusal of it.

The term ideas, in connection with the sentient states of the mind, appears somewhat incongruous. It has been so exclusively appropriated to the intellectual part of our nature, that it is not easy to naturalize it in this new region. We know not that any probation which may be assigned, will remove the difficulty—but we will let this pass. We are not disposed to indulge in minute criticism. We feel the less disposed to do it, because we think the subject of feeling has in the brief space of twenty, not very extended pages, been placed in a clear and comprehensive light. These pages cannot be read without the conviction that the author was not moving in the beaten track, that he has studied carefully the evolution of feeling, and has exhibited it in such a manner as to render his labors worthy of high praise. We have thought our best writers on mental philosophy exceedingly deficient in their exhibition of this part of the mind. There is no agreement in classification, no uniformity of definition. The points of agreement and diversity in our feelings, are set forth so obscurely, that the mind is rather bewildered than guided and instructed. A slight comparison of the systems of our metaphysicians will establish the truth of our remarks, and render it evident that a reforming hand was needed in this part of mental science. We see it, or think we see it here, and without claiming for this part of the work perfection—without believing that it cannot be improved,—we give it our decided approbation. The classification of feelings is into individual and relative. By the first is meant such as have a reference exclusively to ourselves. By the other is meant such as have a relation to some other sentient being, or object. The latter are subdivided into benevolent feelings, malevolent feelings, sympathetic feelings, and antipathetic feelings. We know not that a better arrangement has been given than this. In common with others, we do not like the term malevolent as applied to any original part of our constitution, but know not what to substitute, unless it be defensive feelings. The laws of feeling are laid down very fully, and in a very instructive manner. There is much in this part of the work calculated to render important aid in the æsthetical and moral training of the mind—much to assist in the education of the heart.

Let us hear the author on a point of great moment, which has been the subject of remark in some of the discussions in recent numbers of the *Biblical Repository*. From the pre-

ceding laws, and considerations, it is evident that the state of our feelings is, to a certain extent, under our own control. It is indeed true, that no man can instantly change his feelings by a mere volition to do so. But the end can be accomplished eventually, by his habitually directing his attention to those entities and truths, calculated to produce the desired feelings. We are, therefore, justly held responsible by our moral governor for the character of our feelings. Nor is the case different with what is often termed the habitual state of our feelings and affections. As every feeling is individual and transient, as it continues only as long as our minds dwell on the entity or idea which excited it, and as it must, in every instance, be excited anew by the appropriate entity, or our knowledge of it, it follows that by the state of our feelings or affections, must be meant our susceptibility for feelings from any particular entities. This susceptibility is permanent, being a part of our original constitution, and is either increased or diminished according as it is more or less frequently and designedly exercised towards any given object. It would have enhanced the value of the work, and rendered it still better adapted for the purpose of instruction in colleges, if the author had introduced separate notices of the more prominent feelings, and illustrated them by such facts as are copiously at hand. He seems to have thought it sufficient to sketch the prominent outlines—the filling up and coloring he has left to the *viva voce* instructor, or perhaps he may intend to employ his leisure in performing it, and give the results in future editions.

The third and last part yet claims our attention. We take it up with the feeling that it would require much space to do it justice. Had the author done nothing else, his account of the active operations would entitle him to the praise which we have accorded and give, to his contributions to metaphysics, the claim of originality and depth. We challenge, for this part of the work, no ordinary interest. It is interesting to the man of letters, to the metaphysician, to the orator, to the theologian, and to the expounder, in the sacred desk, of the Gospel of the Son of God.

The difference between active operations and other mental states is described in such a manner as to render it perfectly clear. They are, indeed, sufficiently discriminated by the single feature, that "knowledge and feeling are inward ef-

fects produced from without ; the active operations are outward effects caused from within." It would, perhaps, have been better,—it certainly appears to us that it would better have covered the ground occupied by active operations as described by him,—if the author, whose language we have quoted, had said, active operations are effects originated within. The views of the author do not require that the effects should be external, unless he consider ideas external, and in a former part of the work, he does express the opinion, which is perhaps not better than the old notion of ideas being images of objects, that they are something different from the mind.

The active operations are in number five—inspection, arrangement, modification, mental direction of our physical action, and the process of communicating our ideas to others.

Attention is not considered "entitled to the rank of a distinct active process, but is defined the energy of the soul exerted in some active operation." The process of inspection embraces what has in former systems been attributed to the faculties of perception, consciousness, conception, judgment in moral as well intellectual and physical cases, voluntary recollection, analytic reasoning and conscience. Arrangement is defined "that active operation of the soul by which we select some from the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representatives of them, and place them, as wholes or units, in a particular order, with a view to a specific purpose."

This is the operation by which induction is made, classes, orders, genera and species are formed—by which we arrange in logical order our ideas on the various subjects of discussion, and form syllogisms. We are pleased with the various items presented under this head. They may admit of some improvement, but, on the whole, will, we think, be found satisfactory. Modification is the third active operation of the mind and is defined, "that active operation of the soul, by which we take some from among our mental representatives of real entities, and bring them into such forms, or combinations as do not correspond to realities ; that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them." The definition sufficiently explains the propriety of such a classification, and the precise function which it subserves.

The remarks under this head, on *a priori* knowledge, are deserving of attention, a knowledge which is not the result

of external influence, but intuitively presented to the mind. Admitting the ingenuity of our author's reasoning, we incline to the opinion that no better account can be given of these ideas than that they do, under certain given circumstances, suggest themselves to the mind. The speculations of philosophers may have gone to an extreme in the reference of ideas to an internal source,—but we cannot yet give in our adhesion to the prominence which is given in this work to the maxim, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu." We believe that the sensuous metaphysics have led to extravagant and dangerous theories. Have they not produced the idealism of Hume and Berkeley on the one hand, and the materialism and atheism of the French philosophers on the other? Did not the critical philosophy in Germany, and its various modifications, as they appear in the Scotch metaphysicians, in Cousin in France, and in Upham, of our own country, arrest the downward tendency of the sensuous system, and rescue morality and religion from threatened ruin? While we make these remarks, we cannot refrain from an expression of the opinion, that if Professor Schmucker had, during the sixteen years in which he has been laboring on this work, paid some attention to the productions of others, his views would have been more comprehensive. By looking at the advances made by metaphysics in other hands,—and we believe that real, substantial advances have been made—he would have been enabled to rectify his own views and given additional value to his system. We are not Kantians, we do not profess to have studied his works. We are not certain that we should be able to comprehend them; but if we have at all appreciated his views, as they have been presented to us by others, they contain a considerable amount of valuable matter, and have particularly, in this, been of eminent service, that they have directed the attention to the fact, that there is knowledge in man that is not derived from the senses. This seems to have been entirely lost sight of by the followers of Locke—although we may not charge him directly with a similar omission, and the consequences have been frightful, and have been arrested solely, humanly speaking, by a sounder philosophy.

To avoid extending our reflections too far, it will be necessary for us to pass over several instructive sections, and to touch slightly upon what remains. The occurrence of active oper-

ations is ascribed to the nature of the soul, which, by its constitution is active. To the question, Why does the soul, at any given time, engage in one of the active operations rather than another, it is said, "Every individual will unhesitatingly reply, that these operations are engaged in, in one of two ways: either from deliberate choice, or from habit." The mode of occurrence in the active operations is then said to be two-fold:—1. Voluntary; 2. Spontaneous. The whole subject of the freedom of the will is discussed in a very satisfactory manner, and the account of the constitutional inclinations by which we are influenced, presents the whole matter in a novel light, and renders this part of the work particularly instructive. It enables us to solve the manifestations of man's moral structure, and *shows clearly the source of the light and shade of human character*. We do not know that we are prepared to adopt the author's philosophy in regard to habitual actions. The facility of performance, does not appear to us to exclude the precursive agency. Does not the author's view, though contrary to his expressed opinion, in regard to spontaneous actions, place them beyond the region of responsibility—at least to a considerable extent?

If, in any action of conformity, or non-conformity to the law of God, the self-determining power of the will is wanting, does it not cease to be praise or blame-worthy? How much better are spontaneous actions of the mind than necessary actions? In all cases, in which the will determines the action, we must suppose renewed effort to be necessary, however slight may be our consciousness of it.

The style of this work, as we have incidentally mentioned, is chaste, perspicuous, and adapted to the subject. It cannot be said of the metaphysics of Dr. Schmucker, as was said of Dr. Brown's, that they are too poetical. The language is precise, and as before stated metaphysical, that is, suited to discussions of this nature. We may mention with most decided approbation the religious aspects of the work. It is Christian metaphysics, and in this respect will take its place by the side of the admirable treatises of Professor Upham. It is the work of a theologian, and in looking at the human mind, he could hardly fail to perceive the theological bearings of his discoveries, and perceiving, to make them known. If we have given high praise to this system of mental philosophy, it has not been indiscriminate. We have endeavored to

give our impressions honestly. We have no sympathy with that criticism which praises, or blames, without reference to truth. Truth should be our guide always, and to this every thing should be sacrificed.

We leave this work with sincere respect for the abilities of the author, gratitude for his labors, which have been brought to so successful an issue, with the sincere wish that he may secure such a reward as a Christian man should desire, and with the determination to make use of his labors, in our future efforts to teach ingenuous youth the philosophy of the noblest part of God's creation,—the immortal mind of immortal man.

ARTICLE IX.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON PANTHEISM.

Translated from the *Revue Théologique*, by the Junior Editor.

WE have heard incessantly, for some years, that Pantheism threatens to become the dominant system of philosophy, and we are pointed to all the evils, as already pressing on us, which are accumulated on those enervated persons, who have fallen asleep in that base and dangerous doctrine. The apprehensions on this subject seem to us exaggerated. That system may be adopted happily, by some solitary thoughtful, secluded from the noise and bustle of the world, and conversant rather with books than with men, it may even, if you please, gather around it some adepts, and become the banner of a whole sect, as has sometimes happened ; but do you suppose that it can effect anything in the world, in the midst of real life, in a moment, and among the people, where everything turns to a frightful positivism, to a disgusting utilitarianism. It is deplorable, indeed, not to be preserved from excess and from an ultra error, and one that is fatal ; but the sad spectacle which society presents, ought to make us fear less the ingress of pantheistic doctrines, than the scepticism and egoism which menace the foundations of society.

Pantheism is, from its very nature, little suited to become popular ; moreover, a system requiring a considerable amount of exaltation, stands little chance of success in an age when everything seems to be a matter of calculation ; and in fine, of all philosophical opinions it is the one most repugnant to French character, of which the two principal traits, activity and the feeling of personality, are incompatible with a mode of perception, which compels man to abdicate his individuality in order to repose in the bosom of the absolute.

Besides, a mere momentary interest is not enough to call our attention to pantheism ; an interest purely scientific and philosophical, as it seems to us, is alone sufficient to engage the mind in an examination of a theory, which, like all the grand systems, is reproduced in every philosophical movement, which has played, and still plays an important part in the history of human thought, and which, more than once, has exercised some influence on theological doctrines. We do not pretend to make a complete work on the subject ; our intention is only to offer some considerations for the purpose of exhibiting, in general, what pantheism is, and appreciating it at its proper value. Two things are included in this intention. In the first place we shall endeavor to give an idea of pantheism as complete and exact as we possibly can, and in the second place, point out the causes from which it arises, and at the same time the errors connected with it, and the dangers it presents, either in the field of thought, or in that of practical life.

I. *General exposition of Pantheism.*—Of all the questions presented to the human mind, none is more capable of exciting its curiosity than that of the relation of the world to God. It is evident that, on this subject, we can only express some hypotheses, more or less dependent on some induction and some analogies ; but each system furnishes one in harmony always with its own point of view. We are not here to be occupied about those different suppositions, we wish to speak only of that proposed by pantheists, and which constitutes the essence of their system. It may be said that pantheism consists entirely in the hypothesis on which it pretends to explain the relation which God sustains to the universe. It is that which constitutes and characterizes it. To unfold the manner in which it understands and undertakes to explain that relation, is to say what pantheism is : all the rest of the system is but a logical consequence of that opinion.

And first, pantheism differs in its notion of that relation from theism. Whilst the latter regards God as the author, and the world as his work, the former looks upon God as a principle, of which the world is a necessary and logical consequence. Hence, there is an essential difference in the ideas which those systems present of the world and of God. According to theism, God and the world differ in their natures; according to pantheism, the world is but an external manifestation of the same essence with the Deity. The former represents God as a conscious and free agent, who created the world by an act of his own will; the latter, as a power living and active, necessarily producing the world as the result of its unceasing activity.

We are now able to form an idea of the whole theory on that important question. The basis is the same in all the systems arising from that point of view; the developments, the proofs, the mode of presentation, are the only things that differ in any of them. In all, God is a *natura naturans* and the world a *natura naturata*.* The former is the immanent principle of the latter, as our spirit is the immanent principle of our thoughts, of our intellectual productions. Our thoughts are but our spirit manifested; so, says pantheism, the *natura naturata*, the world, is but the external manifestation of the *natura naturans*, of God.

After these general considerations, let us take a glance at the different systems which have successively formed from that point of view. This examination will give us a more precise and more complete idea of the hypothesis which lies at the foundation of all pantheistic systems.

1. The first form under which pantheism is presented in history,† is derived, on the one hand, from a view of the analogy

* Expressions consecrated by usage, anterior to Spinoza, and frequently used by him.

† We pass by the pantheistic systems of India, which seem like the classic ground of pantheism. But as our object is not so much an exposition and history of all such systems, as an appreciation of the general value of their foundation, we can, without much inconvenience, allow ourselves this omission; the more so as, excepting some differences, the tendency and psychological source of the pantheism of India are the same as those of neoplatonism, of which we shall speak farther on.

supposed to be discovered between the universe and man, and on the other, from ignorance of the laws of nature. Struck with the regularity of the phenomena of the world, it inquires what is the principle on which it depends. It is believed that the principle must possess something reasonable, since a being without reason would not be able to create and maintain order so perfect as that which presides over the celestial movements and all natural phenomena. The world, therefore, is represented as having a rational principle, directing its operations, just as there is in man a spirit which directs his movements.

Consequently, pantheism admits a soul of the world, and, without determining precisely what that general soul is, it contents itself with considering it as the principle of whatever is; and in order to account for the particularity and diversity of the individual beings, it represents the world as its body, and particular souls as its effusions, its emanations.

It is easy to perceive how that hypothesis flows especially from ignorance of the laws of nature. Not being able to explain the regularity, harmony and constancy of the motions and of the life, which manifest themselves in all the kingdoms of nature, by mathematical laws which they did not understand, and which they could not even suspect, the ancients were led to think them the result of a rational principle, possessing consciousness, or at least a certain degree of knowledge. Thence, they were obliged to find some analogy between man, a being material as to his exterior, but having a spirit within directing all his movements, and that immense universe which also appeared only as a material mass, but whose very regular phenomena betrayed a species of intelligence. That analogy confirmed them in their opinion, and led them to consider it as one living whole, composed of two parts, a soul and a body, which, although distinct, sustain to each other a relation as intimate as that existing between the body and spirit of man.

That species of pantheism, which, among the ancients, was able to rest on an appearance of reason, can evidently have no chance of success in the present actual state of the physical and mathematical sciences. Accordingly, the hypothesis of a soul of the world is no longer met with in modern systems, and if the word is found in some, it is employed in a sense altogether different from that assigned to it by the ancients.

2. Pantheism appeared even under that form only in the first periods of the Grecian philosophy. The Eleatæ soon transferred it to its veritable ground, and placed it on reason for its pedestal. They said they felt that the hypothesis of a soul of the world would still approach too near to Dualism, and that they wished to avoid the consequence by changing the principle. With the Eleatæ there is, in effect, no more question about a soul of the world distinct from it, penetrating and governing it. They have already considered the material world as a phenomenon, to which they seem not to assign a veritable reality.

It is no more on a simple analogy that they found their system, but on dialectic reasoning. Nothing, they say, comes from nothing—something cannot spring out of nothing, for if otherwise, why and how will it come from it? Now, that being which has not had a beginning will not have an end,—for we cannot admit a succession of beings. The being produced must, in effect, be either identical with that which has produced it, or must differ from it in something. If it were identical with it, the two beings would be really but one and the same being; if different from it, that in which it differed from the first, that which was new in it, would be without a cause, would proceed from no principle, would come out of nothing, which cannot be admitted. All that is, is therefore eternal. From the eternity of being, the Eleatæ deduced its infinity, from its infinity its unity, from its unity its indivisibility, its unchanging and constant uniformity, and finally, from its indivisibility its incorporeity.

That which conducted the Eleatæ to the opinion of the unity, immutability, and eternity of matter, was the feeling of the numberless contradictions and oppositions which meet us in our acquisitions of knowledge from experience, through the medium of the senses. Those oppositions seemed to them irreconcilable. They saw that it is impossible for man to ascend from phenomenon to phenomenon, from fact to fact, up to the point where they cease; that he can no better dispose harmoniously all the judgments acquired by experience in a single and unique focus, in a theory one and complete—and not being willing, in questions surpassing the capacity of the human understanding, to rest on mere presumptions, they appealed to another source of knowledge, regarding that alone as legitimate, and considering the testimony of the senses as a pure illusion, or, if you prefer, as

something subjective, and having no general and universal value. The senses apprise us of a multiplicity of things with which they put us in connection; but according to the Eleatæ, there is there an illusion, an illusion which makes to us objective the purely subjective impressions of the senses.* In correcting that error of the sensible organs, in rising above the illusions of the senses, there remains no more than the being, the veritable and sole being, besides which there is nothing.

The contempt with which the Eleatæ looked upon experience and the knowledge derived from the senses, is a characteristic of all pantheistic systems, which are essentially enemies of observation, and pretend that the reason is the sole source of true knowledge. We remark, in passing, this fact, which belongs to the very nature of pantheism, and to which we shall be obliged to return again. As to the rest, although in consequence of the small number of the memorials of that school now in existence, it is impossible to pursue its doctrines in their details, we can recognize in it whatever there has been specially remarkable, even down to modern times.

3. A third form of pantheism appears in Neoplatonism. An immense field would here be opened before us, if, in a rapid sketch, we were not under the necessity of confining ourselves to general considerations. The doctrines of Neoplatonism, the great historical importance of which cannot be denied, are derived neither from logic or dialectics, as that of the Eleatæ, nor from imperfect observation, like the cosmogonies of the first Greek philosophers; they have their origin in the febrile over-excitation of a spirit still active in the midst of an epoch of decay, but without force sufficient to stay the general ruin. Neoplatonism is the genius of Greece grown old and decrepid, and returning with pleasure to the first emotions of its infancy.

What is most important to us here, is to point out the mystic source of their doctrines. The union of the soul with God—that is the highest aim they propose to themselves,

* The Eleatæ attributed to the senses what Kant does to the speculative reason. He accuses them, too, of objectivating ideas, which are subjective, in his opinion.

and the means they employ to effect that union, become more and more ascetic and theurgic in proportion as the sect approaches its end, and loses the little vitality that animated it at its commencement. The aim, the means, and the explanations which they indicate, have the greatest analogy with the design, means and theories of the pantheistic systems of the East. The tendency is the same in both ; and saving some differences owing to the Grecian spirit, the Neoplatonists resemble much the Yogi of India.

The core of their system is the theory of emanation. We think it unnecessary to explain what is so well known. It is sufficient for us to be reminded that it represents the divinity as the source from which emanate the most exalted beings, these again as the source of those less elevated, and so on successively down to that which is too low and weak to emit from it any thing inferior to itself.

Whatever there is of mysticism in pantheism, the Neoplatonists admitted into Christian theology. A writer, who probably lived in the sixth century, published, under the title of Denys the Arcopagite, some works in which Christianity and Neoplatonism were amalgamated, whether because he thought he could again give currency to those doctrines by presenting them, so to speak, in a Christian dress, or that being a Neoplatonic convert, he himself had embraced Christianity through his first philosophical opinions. In the ninth century, Scotus Erigena translated these books into Latin, and from that time they became the text of a multitude of commentaries, and the manual of the mystics of the middle ages, amongst whom it is rare not to find some taint of pantheism.

4. Hitherto pantheism is exhibited to us as a system narrow in its expositions and exclusive in its source. Amongst the ancient Greeks, a superficial observation is its only basis—in the sect of the Eleatæ, it offers us dialectic considerations on being, and unable to explain nature, is compelled to deny its existence ; with the Neoplatonists it revolves round some ideas, and becomes inconsistent whenever it will descend into details. We proceed now to contemplate it scientifically, and we shall find it more complete, if not more veritable. God is here again all in all, substance eternal, alone, existing only by itself ; but it is not denied that the world may have a certain contingent reality. Thus. The divine

substance has two attributes, two modes of being, which are thought and extension. By the attribute of thought, God manifests his life, and that manifestation is the spiritual world. Life is no less manifested by the attribute of extension, and that manifestation is the material world. That is the common foundation, which all the modern systems of pantheism develope, each in its own way, and with more or less of ability.

Spinoza may be regarded as the father of modern pantheism, although preceded in that way by Giordano Bruno, who assiduously studied the Eleatæ and Neoplatonics, in order to form a system differing little, as well in its basis as in its structure, from that of Schelling. The system of Spinoza has its origin in Cartesianism. Leibnitz has said with much reason : Spinozism is an extravagant (*outré*) Cartesianism. Spinoza sets out from the idea of Descartes, that there is but one only substance, which becomes spirit or matter accordingly as it receives the attribute of thought or that of extension ; but instead of regarding extension and thought as two attributes of one and the same subject, he considers them as two modes of being of that sole substance. Here it is that he departs from pure Cartesianism, but that difference entails pantheism as its immediate consequence. If thought and extension are the two modes of being of that substance, there is no need of an exterior cause to give it thought and extension ; it possesses both by its own proper nature. The thought which that sole substance thinks, is but a thought of that substance, and the extension which the thought conceives is still but that same substance, considered in a certain manner by itself.

Here it is no more necessary to suppose a God different from the world, in order to explain the existence of the world. That unique and living substance is God, and its determinations, its modes of being are the world. The particular thoughts are the modes which express, each in a determinate manner, the nature of God, as also particular things are but the affections of the attributes of God. In that system every thing goes out from God, every thing comes to him, or rather, every thing resides in him.

The system of Spinoza, one of the most remarkable monuments erected on the pantheistic point of view, has exercised a great influence on the systems which have succeeded it.

It is very evident that Schelling is in general under the impression of Spinozism. Saving the developments of that doctrine, under the influence of German philosophy, and the applications to it of the advancements in knowledge, the point of view is the same, and the results are not very different. The chief difference consists in the mode of exposition. Spinoza thought himself obliged to proceed in a mathematical way; Schelling, on the contrary, has taken a dialectic march, which is much better for a philosophical exposition. But at bottom, the system of Schelling is pantheism a little transformed and dressed up under a new title.*

The system of absolute identity is composed of two parts, a philosophy of nature, and a philosophy of spirit; the latter being denominated by Schelling transcendental idealism. In transcendental idealism the spirit studies itself; in the philosophy of nature it contemplates an object without itself. But that object and that subject, however different they may seem to us at first view, really differ less than might be supposed. The same laws govern both; the laws of thought are those of nature, and the laws of nature those of thought. But farther; there is, according to Schelling, a point where the subject and object, spirit and nature cease to be different things—that point is the one from which they both go out equally, and in his own language somewhat singular but lucid, he calls that point *the indifference of the different*, that is to say, the place where the different things cease to be so. There, there is absolute identity between spirit and nature, and it is owing to that idea that the system has been called a system of absolute identity.

It is in the absolute that the different things cease to be so;

* It is true that, in his work on human liberty, the author of the system of absolute identity pretends and endeavors to show, that there is an essential difference between his doctrine and pantheism; but it seems to us that he has only shown that his system is not an undigested and gross pantheism, such as we sometimes find it exhibited by those who would refute that point of view. But this is not the place to enter upon these considerations, which would carry us too far; the rapid exposition of that system, which we offer, will present it, we hope, in its true light.

the absolute is even, if we may say so, constituted by that identity, which is of the most positive character. The subject and object, the ideal and real, thought and matter are in it essentially one ; they differ only in the view of those beings which perceive by means of the senses and reflection.

After having ascended thus from the different to the indifferent, from the forms of the absolute to the absolute itself, we may descend from the absolute to its minor manifestations, to give, so to speak, a history of its life, of its development, to follow it in all its phases, in all its modes of being. In that way there is rebuilt the primitive construction of the absolute ;* there is presented the tableau not only of the whole creation, but even of the inner life of God. That labor, the boldness of which certainly cannot be denied, has been undertaken by Schelling, whose philosophy is nothing else than a re-construction of the absolute.

This will suffice, we think, to characterize that system, which cannot be made known in its entireness without entering on a prolix consideration of details. It is perceived that it does not depart much from Spinoza's point of view. It is of the same spirit and tendency.

Yet, notwithstanding those dialectic forms of exposition, Schelling constructed his system rather as a poet than as a philosopher. It gushes out from his imagination, was not formed step by step on reasoning. But there appeared, on the side of Schelling, a powerful logician, who seized upon that primary conception and labored with inconceivable zeal to lay its foundation on logic. That was Hegel. Fundamentally, Hegel's system is nothing else than the system of Schelling logically exhibited, pushed to its extreme consequences, clearly determined, scientifically constructed, and rigidly systematized.

Hegel calls that, idea, which Schelling designated under the name of absolute. Idea is the source of all that exists, or rather, that which continues perpetually under all the different forms which it is able to assume. Idea is living sub-

* We apprehend it best as a romance, of which the hero is absolute ; yet that mode of proceeding has been adorned with the name of the *constructive method*.

stance—whatever is. It possesses the power of determining itself in an infinity of different modes, of also giving birth to the multiplicity of beings, and by changing its diverse determinations, of forming a succession of external manifestations.

Hegel considers, first, idea in itself ; this is the first part of his philosophy, called by him logic. It is evident that his logic is not what is ordinarily understood by that term, that is to say, the theory of reasoning, the science which teaches how to proceed legitimately from particulars to generals, and from generals to particulars.* The logic of Hegel is the science of being, such as it is in itself, prior to its external manifestations, or without regard to its manifestations—of being virtually (*en virtualité*), but possessing capabilities of action. If it be asked why Hegel calls that logic, which in other systems is denominated ontology and metaphysics, we reply, that it is because with him the laws of thought are the

* The following passage from M. Michelet's history of modern German philosophy, it seems to us, will give a sufficient idea of what Hegel understands by logic.

"The science of logic, considering thought in its pure element, exposes to our view gradually, all the oppositions of thought, oppositions which, accomplishing the course of their development, rest at last in the supreme thought. But as the exercise of thought is not only a subjective activity of man, but contains in itself all being and all truth, logic has to do not only with the form of science, and is not, like common logic, a theory of ideas, of judgments and of reasoning, Aristotle has separated the pure form of thought from its contents, and that was called by him exclusively logic which was concerned with that form, whilst Plato calls the objective movement of the substantial contents of thought, logic. Here—in Hegel's system—logic holds the same place as the Platonic logic. Our logic is, therefore, a theory of the categories of things or of the most general predicates of all being, that which restores the objectivity of Aristotle's categories, who placed a higher value on them than on formal logic. Logic develops scientifically what Pythagoras, Kant and Aristotle, and even, if you please, Raymond Lully, and Giordano Bruno, wished to establish in their tables of categories. It is then ontology, the theory of primitive being in as far as it is, and it includes what Aristotle and Wolf regard as the business of metaphysics."

laws of action, and to describe idea is to describe being. This is a characteristic trait of that system, a trait on which we have remarked in the system of absolute identity, and to which we shall have to revert subsequently, when we shall see what is the fundamental defect of modern pantheism.

The two other parts of the philosophy of Hegel discuss idea or being in its manifestations, in its external life, in its developments, or, as Hegel calls it, in its goings-out (*processus*). And here that philosophy departs a little from Schelling, and above all, from Spinoza. The latter supposes that the two modes of being of the infinite, extension and thought, are simultaneously manifested. Hegel, doubtless prompted by the discoveries of geology, which show us that the successive creations have followed a growing gradation in their organic forms—Hegel, prompted by these discoveries, although he affects to borrow nothing from experience, is of opinion that being is first manifested as nature. Proceeding from a state so vague, so indeterminate that it resembles nothing in existence, idea, before arriving at its perfect development, before having a conscious knowledge of itself, was under the necessity of passing through a series of different degrees, and by a progressive education, to become capable of assuming a form more suitable to its dignity, and to appear as spirit.* As the material form is less perfect than the spiritual, idea manifested itself first under the form of the world. The description of its progress in that direction, forms the second part of his system, that is, a philosophy of nature.

Then follows a third part, which is the philosophy of spirit. Here we have presented before us the spectacle of the most beautiful developments of idea. It disengages itself, so to speak, from the bonds of matter; it becomes free; it has a consciousness of itself. In that new state, being passes through three degrees of development; it manifests itself first as individual spirit in man, and in that inferior form it is yet in connection with nature which it does not entirely con-

* Does not this remind us somewhat of the, at least singular idea of Robinet, who in the last century regarded the petrifications which geology had not yet explained, as the unsuccessful efforts of nature in seeking to form man?

tro. Then, creating for itself a proper world, a world wholly spiritual, having nothing common with nature, it manifests itself as that general spirit which animates an entire mass of mankind ; that is properly, the national spirit, which, with Hegel, is not an abstraction. Finally, it elevates itself to the summit of that superior state, in order to pass into the ideal sphere. Then idea apprehends itself ; sees itself ; contemplates itself ; studies itself ; knows itself ; it feels itself God, God perfect, God infinite, God eternal.

As it seems, each of the systems is the definition, the description of the absolute in a different degree of its developments, and the entire system is but the tableau of the life of being.

Such, in its latest impression, is the system of Hegel. Doubtless this dry and meagre sketch is very far from exhibiting it as it ought to be, in order to make an impression, that is to say, by rising gradually on an unbroken chain of the most concise reasoning. As little partisan as we may be of that system, we cannot help admiring its beautiful structure, and proclaiming it the boldest, philosophy has produced. But one must study it in Hegel's own writings in order to gain a complete idea of it. Here, we repeat it again, because unwilling to be accused of not representing strongly and truly, the theories we design to combat ; here, we have only to inquire into the general traits of the spirit of the system, and we think we have said enough on the subject to give our readers an exact idea of it.

We have just cast a rapid glance at the three most celebrated pantheistic systems which the history of philosophy has offered us, and it is to those we must, above all, have regard, the pantheism of the first Grecian philosophers, that of the Eleatæ and that of the Neoplatonists, which are transfused into the modern systems. We may remark that, notwithstanding some differences in their details, they all three revert to this as their basis, to know God, the absolute, the idea,—the name is of no account—as the sole and only being, and the universe with all it contains, whether matter or spirit, as nothing else than a manifestation of that being, a moment of its life, its mode or modes of existence.

II. *Appreciation of Pantheism.*—Pantheism cannot be considered as the hap-hazard product of certain minds totally imbued with error. Although an enormous error, it must

find in the human soul some causes ever ready to act, when no longer counterbalanced by other forces of the mind necessary to maintain the equilibrium. We are led to this opinion by observing the constancy with which it has persevered from the most ancient times to the present, and the universal power with which it has operated, at different periods, on the human mind. Already in most remote antiquity, it appears at the foundation of all the systems of India. Scarcely has mind waked up in the west, before it appears in the sect of the Eleatee: it leaves some traces in Platonism, reigns among the Neoplatonists, penetrates into Christian theology, which it essays to invade at several different periods, and at length is developed in all its vigor in the modern systems of Germany.

This continuance is no evidence indeed of its truth, but it is proper for us to understand that, like all other philosophical points of view, pantheism is always produced under the influence of certain causes present in the human mind, and active whenever a favorable occasion offers.* We shall first proceed to inquire into those causes and to expose that which may be regarded as giving birth to pantheism. Then we shall essay to show what is the fundamental error of all the systems of that sort. And finally we shall point out some of the dangers of pantheism both in the field of thought and in that of practical life. These three points will form, it seems to us, a refutation of this view, if not complete, at least sufficiently satisfactory.

1. *The Psychological causes of Pantheism.*—From our very nature, composed of two parts, one spiritual, the other material, we find ourselves connected with two very different

* All the philosophical systems can be disposed into certain classes; and each class has its own particular way of considering things. Does any one take such a point of view, he is necessarily drawn towards such a species of system? But as each of those modes of view has its logical reason in the human spirit, it follows that all the systems have their source in the human spirit itself. Every system is worth as much as the source in the human mind from which it proceeds. In order therefore to give a just idea of each system, it will be advantageous to go into an examination of its psychological causes.

worlds, and as we possess two sorts of instruments for acquiring knowledge, the senses and reason, we attain two kinds of ideas, those of experience and those of reflection. Hence we are ready to believe that our nature imposes on us a dualism from which we cannot escape, and which it is impossible for us to reduce to unity.

Yet the human mind is unwilling to remain in that dualistic state; it feels a need of finding a principle in which all contradictions will disappear, and which will be of itself competent to explain all. The numberless contradictions we perceive between the ideas obtained through the senses and those of the reason, the no less numerous oppositions we encounter between the ideas coming from the same source, puzzle and embarrass us. The history of philosophy is nothing else than the history of the efforts made by the human mind to reconcile them. Within us and without us we always find two principles, spirit and matter, continually present, in action and reaction, often in conflict. Are these two principles hostile only on their surface, so to speak, only in that in which they are apprehensible by us, whilst in their nature itself, in their substance, they are one, branches of a common stock, diverse manifestations of the same principle? Or is their opposition rather in their very nature, and is there no common point, from which they both emanate?

A sage and prudent philosophy knows well that it cannot answer those questions, and a multitude of others of a similar nature; it is, in effect, impossible for the human spirit to penetrate into the substance of things. But there is a number of systems less cautious, which regard dualism as an inferior view, and imagine themselves to have found the point where opposition ceases, and whence it proceeds.* The authors of these systems are evidently impelled by the necessity which the human mind feels of reducing everything to unity. We pretend not that here is the single cause of those systems, nor the principal; but we think it contributes its proportion towards their formation.

These systems establish their unity in two ways. Some

* We shall call these systems *monistic*, in distinction from the dualistic. The monistic systems are materialism, idealism, and pantheism.

of them deny the reality of one of the two terms, and seek to explain the phenomena appertaining to it, by the action of the single term which they affirm. Thus materialism arrives at unity by denying all qualitative difference between spirit and matter, regarding spirit as subtle matter, and representing intellectual phenomena as produced by matter endowed with an organization infinitely delicate. Idealism establishes unity by a similar process ; it denies the reality of the sensible and considers the phenomena attributed to it, as the result of the action of spirit. These systems, by setting aside one half of all that is, simplify the problem and render its solution indeed much more easy ; but their disregard or their negation of one of the terms necessarily condemns them to error.

Pantheism, the other form of these systems, recognizes the existence of two factors, but treats them as two branches of a single trunk. It admits, in this way, duality, and reduces it to a unique principle. But this unique principle is but a supposition proposed to satisfy our need and our desire to get rid of the contradictions which are every where present. In fact, the point at which they suppose all contradictions cease, and which they hold to be the common source of spirit and matter, is not known to us either by the senses or by the reason. Were it a reality, did it verily exist, it would be to us as if it were not, since we have no means of knowing its existence. Schelling, indeed, says much of a superior faculty, by which we perceive that substance which manifests itself here as spirit, there as matter, and which is nevertheless neither matter nor spirit. But psychology has never discovered in the human spirit anything resembling that intellectual intuition, which this philosophy assumes. Hegel, feeling the impossibility of building on so fragile a basis, the system of absolute identity, considered himself more lucky in supposing that pure thought gives us the knowledge of that primary substance. But there again is a psychological fiction ; the faculty of thought is able to operate only on a subject provided for it ; it is neither intuitive nor creative. That being, in which spirit and matter are identical, and which is their common substratum, has not been proved to exist ; it is assumed ; it is decreed. But that will not suffice in philosophy.

We should not disown the influence exercised on the formation of these systems by the need of unity felt by our

spirits. In obedience to its impulse, the pantheists think to ascend higher in the explanation of things than those philosophers who are content to admit two principles, and who acknowledge the impossibility of sinking them in one higher unity, which, nevertheless, they do not deny, but which they do not affirm. All that the pantheists do besides, is a hypothesis which does not appear to us to have procured any benefit to philosophy. It is true that their systems are often less constrained than the dualistic, that they seem less defective, and that they explain some questions which a more circumspect philosophy leaves unresolved. But science derives no great advantages from solutions which are but hypotheses.

Nearly related to the cause, which we have just pointed out, we may mention two others, each of which is manifested in a different species of pantheism. This view is presented under two principal forms, which sometimes commingle in one and the same system, but which are, however, distinct, and one of which prevails even there, where the two are amalgamated. Pantheism appears in history, sometimes as a system essentially religious, sometimes as essentially speculative and dialectic. As a religious system we find it in India, amongst the three sects of the Brahmins, the Buddhists, and the Jains; in China, in the doctrine of Fohi; in Persia, in Sufism. The pantheism of the Cabbala, that of the Neoplatonists, and that of most of the mystics of the middle ages, bear in general the same character. As an exclusively speculative system, it is met with in the sect of the Eleatæ, in Giordano Bruno, in Spinoza and in the modern German schools. Each of these two forms has a different source. Religious pantheism is produced by an exaltation of the religious sentiment abandoned to the imagination and without the guidance of reason. Speculative pantheism is the result of an exclusive speculation, badly directed, badly developed; of a purely logical exercise of the judgment.

We say, in the first place, that religious pantheism is generated by a religious sentiment, borne away by the imagination, and freed from the control of reason. A few considerations will suffice to make this apparent.

The profoundly religious man possesses an unceasing desire for communion with God. Nothing more laudable, nothing better. But if he give no heed to the voice of reason,

which tells him that that union can only be a moral one, that it consists only, in sensible beings, such as we are, of the sentiments of the heart; if he allow himself to be carried away by his imagination; if he seek, instead of that moral union, a substantial union with God, he will find himself inevitably drawn into pantheism. Every mystic doctrine which proposes the identification of the soul with God, which aims at the absorption of my individual self into the bosom of Deity, must necessarily consider God as the sole real being, the world as an illusion which must be dissipated in the eternal light, and the soul of man as a part of the sole being.*

History, on this point, presents us numerous examples, and we apprehend that, in all places and in all times, mysticism, when freed entirely from the empire of reason, has ended in pantheism.

Amongst pagan nations, it shows us in the East a multitude of mystic sects, all preaching pantheism, and proposing to themselves, as the ultimate aim, the absorption of the soul in the Deity, besides whom there is nothing real.†

In the West, it gives us an example of that union of mysticism and pantheism, in Neoplatonism. The Deity with whom Plotinus had the felicity of being so often united, is also the sole real existence, manifesting his being in the infinite variety of things.

It presents before us in Mohammedism, which, notwithstanding its materialism and the precautions of its founder to exclude mysticism,‡ has not been able to escape from it, a

* “The key to the release of the soul is in these words, which those false philosophers must repeat over and over without cessation, with a pride beyond that of Lucifer: I am the supreme being, aham ava param Brahma.” Lettres édifiantes, xxvi, 247. Similar language sometimes occurs amongst the pantheists of the West, and of modern times.

† See Colebrook’s essays on the systems of India, also the Bhagavad-Ghita, of which there is an indifferent French translation.

‡ Mohammed, considering monachism as the source of mysticism, excluded it from his religious institutions. *That there cannot be monks in Mohammedism*, is a common saying, even a proverb with every good Mussulman.

pretty large mystic sect, known under the name of *Sufism*,* proposing as its supreme end, a union with God, the only real being, besides whom all is smoke.†

In the bosom of Christianism, whose spirit, nevertheless, is so opposite to pantheism, it has often followed in the wake of mysticism. All the mystic sects of the middle ages are, at the same time, pantheists. It is sufficient to mention the Beghards, the Brothers of the free spirit, the Friends of God, the Brothers of the common life, etc. If we may believe that the greater part of those who composed those sects were carried away by a blind zeal, excited by the evils of the times, and urged on by some fanatical preachers, the same excuse cannot be made for those who, more enlightened, have been impelled into pantheism merely by the high excitement of their religious sentiment, which exposes itself clearly as the cause and source of their pantheistic notions. We can cite, for example, some men like Eckart, Tauler, Suzo, Ruysbrock.‡ Finally, it might be proved that the mystics, who have not avowed pantheism, were not so far removed from it as they thought, and that they were preserved from those fatal excesses only by their practical judgment. This remark applies particularly to those mystics of the middle ages, who, attaching much greater importance to the practical life than to the gloomy speculation of the schools, were thus saved from the ordinary consequences of their manner of thinking. In this number must be ranged the Victorists, Bonaventure, and some others whose religious sentiment took a practical direction.

Speculative pantheism proceeds from another source. It has its origin in an exclusive employment of the faculty of reflection, depending on it alone, and discarding the aid of

* Tholuck has written in Latin a remarkable work on this philosophical religious sect.

† Tholuck, *Sufismus*, p. 247, 219, 142, 153, etc.

‡ Tauler teaches positively, that God alone exists; that besides him all is nonentity, and that in the abyss of his divinity, from which the soul has emanated, and into which it must be absorbed again, all temporal contradictions will one day be dissolved in a perfect identity. Ch. Schmidt, *Essay on the mystics of the fourteenth century*, p. 77.

all the other faculties. It is easy to see, when we examine systems of this sort, that they rely not at all on observation, for which they profess a profound contempt, and which they regard at best as the means of acquiring some ideas of an inferior order, and useless as to philosophy. They launch out, at once, towards regions inaccessible to human ken, and which it seems to common sense not possible to attain but by slow and timid inductions, built on observations well made and long studied. The point from which these systems would start, is precisely that at which a philosophy more reserved arrives at length, with difficulty and after much toiling labor. But, posting itself on ground concealed from human view, and disdaining to take for a point of departure what can be known by us, how can speculative pantheism establish any system? Some pantheists, it is true, have pretended that the invisible world is concealed only from profane and gross minds. The Neoplatonists talk of a possibility of seeing God, and we have already said that Schelling admits in man a faculty, which he calls *intellectual intuition*, by which we can have a view of hyperphysical things. But, besides that this is proved to be a psychological error, and that the understanding is not an intuitive faculty, the more logical pantheists, as Hegel, for instance, reject this opinion. How, then, can they know any thing of the intellectual world, since they cannot have any intuition of it, and do not attain to it by reasoning through induction on the things which we know? The only method remaining to them is that of reasoning a priori on the intellectual world. And, reasoning a priori is at once the method and the origin of speculative pantheism. It is to the judgment alone it addresses itself; on it alone it stakes all; it rejects totally our other means of knowledge.

The judgment is a discerning faculty; its proper office is, to be exercised on what we acquire by observation, in order to deduce conclusions by different species of reasoning. But here it is not employed in exerting its powers on matters of experience, on a basis furnished by the senses. Pantheism must create its own proper subject: how will it set about it? It can only be done by forming to itself some notions a priori of what seems to it necessary, and as it cannot be bound by ideas derived from experience, and often very difficult to arrange in order, it determines its notions according to the laws of logic. Thus the *ensemble* of the ideas so formed is eminent-

ly logical ; nor is this astonishing, since logic alone has been concerned in their production ; and the systems constructed after this fashion possess a unity and attractiveness which are very seductive ; but they resemble Roland's horse, which would have been perfect, but for one single fault, that he was without life.

These systems, in fact, do not represent what is ; but what, according to their authors, may logically be. They are indeed very beautiful romance, but are they the history of actual being ? What would be thought of a man who, proposing to unfold the causes which have operated in producing human events, would not consult every testimony, every chronicle, every work—and who, proceeding on an a priori conception of man and society, should construct a history of the human race with the logical deductions he might make from that ideal notion ? But this is nevertheless just what the pantheists do. True, they pretend that the mutual relations of being are the same as the relations of our ideas among themselves ; so that logic is sufficient to supply us with metaphysical ideas. But on what does such an opinion rest, which nothing seems to authorize ? On an idea true in itself, we confess, but abused in this case and wrested from its proper signification. It is certain that we only know things by the ideas we have of them. A parallelism may therefore be struck between what actually is, and our idea of that which is. But between this and the identity of being and idea, as pantheism assumes, the distance is very great. That identity could, at most, be established by means of ideas derived from experience, and things which fall within the field of observation ; and yet it has been denied under these restricted limits. But nothing could warrant us to extend it in all cases to ideas which we form a priori, and to beings inaccessible to us ; nothing could authorize us to believe that theological relations of our ideas are identical with the real relations of being.

Here, however, is the foundation of speculative pantheism. It describes the relations of beings according to the logical relations of our thoughts, and it considers logic a branch of metaphysics. We come now to show this system to be nothing less than a confusion of the laws of thought with those of matter. We shall confine ourselves to some principal traits.

Speculative pantheism wishes to represent what is the first being, and what are its relations to other beings. It asks of logic to teach it what that being is. That being must necessarily be the condition of all other beings, and as it is the property of a condition to contain in itself all of which it is the condition, that primary being must contain in itself all other beings. That is not all. The being containing all being in itself, must be of such a nature as to be able to become this and that, good and evil, the whole and a part; in a word, capable of assuming every species of determination, even the most opposite. All pantheistic systems agree in describing that first existence as something vague, indefinite, indeterminate, soft wax, susceptible of taking all forms. Schelling calls it *the indifference of the different*; Hegel considers it so very indeterminate, that he represents it almost as the nihility of existence; Plotinus regards it as so simple, that, properly speaking, it is nothing at all. This indeterminate, this simplicity, is so much the essential character of every pantheistic system, that it alone renders possible the existence of other beings. It is clear that, were the first being something well defined, it would not be able to become another thing, and, a fortiori, a thing the opposite of itself.

The fundamental error of speculative pantheism reveals itself already here. It consists in confounding perpetually the logical relations of ideas with the actual relations of things. What they say of being is true of thought. The highest thought, that which is the logical condition of all others, is also the most general, abstract, and indeterminate; that thought contains all others, that is to say, that thought in receiving this or that determination, becomes this or that particular thought. And here is the source of the error of pantheists, who have confounded thought with matter, and built their system on this confusion. This confusion, in its turn, comes from their contempt for observation, and their hope of constructing a rational system from the resources of the reason alone, which they avert from its legitimate office.

In summing up, we are able to affirm that this species of pantheism arises from a confusion of the logical forms of thought with the laws of matter. After the model of the most general thought, as the logical condition of all other thoughts, it represents the first being as the real condition of

all other beings. In the logical order of the judgment, that which is at the head of the system is thought the highest and most general, that which comprehends all others, and on which, consequently, all others depend ; that thought is that of the unconditional. That logical form, speculative pantheism transfers to nature, and places at the head of all existence the universal being, in which are contained all particular beings. It thus confounds the logical order of the thoughts with the real order of things, and depicts the supreme condition of all existence under the traits of the highest condition of all thought.* Thus the God of speculative pantheists is but a visionary abstraction, to which they arbitrarily attribute a real existence ; and as in the most general thought are embraced all other thoughts, and none exist logically without it, they suppose that every particular thing is contained in God. The real immanence of things in God is taken from the immanence of thought in the universal thought.

An examination of the speculative systems of pantheists easily convinces us, that they all form their first principles on the image of the most general notion of being we are capable of conceiving. The $\delta\upsilon\; \chi\alpha\;\pi\bar{\alpha}\nu$ of the Eleatoe is nothing else than logical universality. The ideas of Plato are nothing but personifications of general notions. What is the absolute substance of Spinoza, that substance in which, as he himself expresses it, all possible attributes coexist, other than a general idea of being, embracing in itself all the thoughts of particular beings ; for how would a real substance be able to unite in itself all attributes, even those the most contradictory ? In fine, Schelling's identity of the real and ideal is still but a logical abstraction. More consecutive than those who before him have constructed systems of that kind, Hegel considers the most general notion of pure being as the absolute, and the logical development of that idea as the development of being, and lays down as the basis of his doctrine the identity of matter and thought.

* Schmid. *Leçons sur la nature de la philosophie*, 9 Leçon.

ARTICLE X.

PARK'S LIFE AND WRITINGS OF WILLIAM BRADFORD HOMER, REVIEWED.

By Rev. Edwin Holt, Pastor of the Carmine Street Presbyterian Church, New York.

Writings of Rev. William Bradford Homer, late Pastor of the Congregational Church, in South Berwick, Me., with a Memoir By Edwards A. Park, Bartlet Prof. in Andover Theol. Seminary. In one volume. Andover: Allen, Morell, & Wardwell. New York: Dayton & Newman, 1842. pp. 420.

THE 24th day of March, 1841, will be long remembered in the village of South Berwick. It was the day when a congregation crowded the sanctuary, not to listen to their pastor's voice, but to gaze for the last time on his lifeless remains. Four months had scarcely elapsed since they had met to form with him the connection that binds together the pastor and the flock. The day of his ordination was a time of joyful congratulations. The youthful minister had then reached a goal to which, from his earliest years, he had looked forward. The child of many prayers, he had enjoyed and diligently improved ample opportunities for mental and spiritual culture. With qualifications of a high order, and with a heart panting after usefulness in his Master's service, he was ordained to the work of the ministry, under auspices singularly favorable. The field of his labors was sufficiently difficult to task all his resources, and he was cheered with smiles of encouragement and prayers for his success, from every quarter. He seemed to stand, buoyant with hope and flushed with holy ardor, at the starting-point of a career that stretched onward and upward—radiant with the light of heaven. The attachment and admiration of the people centered upon him. They were happy in the thought that he was to perform among them in future years the duties of a pastor—to consecrate the nuptial tie—to dedicate their children to God in baptism—to bury their dead—to console the afflicted—to lead their worship, and to impart the instructions of the sanctuary.

But the bright scenes of the ordination are soon followed by the gloom of funeral obsequies. Never will the writer forget the mournful events of the burial. The sanctuary was filled with a sorrowing people. The sable drapery of the pulpit, the plaintive dirge and the funeral service were not needed to call out emotions of sadness. The pensive look, the moistened eye, and the heaving bosom, every where told of overpowering sorrow. The seats that were appropriated to the circle of mourning relatives, presented an affecting spectacle. There was one whose bridal attire, so recently put on, had been exchanged for the weeds of widowhood: brothers, who could yet scarcely realize the fact that the brightest and best of their number was cut down in the freshness of his youth, were there: and there was a bereaved parent who bowed his venerable head in submission, although the unconscious groan denoted that nature was tasked to the utmost in the effort.

One object was the centre of interest to all—it was the pastor's coffin. The well known voice was silent in death, but the scene spake with indescribable power. All felt the eloquence of the appeal that came from those remains. Solemn and touching was the interview between the living and the dead.

The book, whose title stands at the head of this article is designed to preserve the productions and the biography of the young pastor to whom the preceding remarks refer. The editor has been induced to devote his well known abilities to a subject not unworthy of their efforts. Mr. Homer was no ordinary man. His ministry, though brief, was singularly effective. He was attaining fast a wide-spread influence. It was not the tinsel reputation of the shallow pretender, who can practice the arts of the obsequious demagogue, and the tricks of the rhetorical charlatan. It was the substantial result of the consecration of sanctified intellect to the sacred ministry.

The biography of Mr. Homer is executed with great fidelity. If the author have committed any error, it is one that is not often found in those who write the memoirs of a well known friend—it is that of giving less prominence than they, perhaps, deserve, to the good qualities of the subject, from a praiseworthy fear of coloring the sketch too highly. The uneventful incidents of Mr. Homer's life are invested

with attractive interest by the skill of the biographer; his character is analyzed with searching discrimination, and the memoir is enriched with valuable suggestions which no minister can read without benefit. The following extracts may serve to show in what manner Prof. Park has executed his trust.

“The subject of this memoir had not the deep self-abhorrence of him who cried out in view of his sins, ‘Infinite upon infinite— infinite upon infinite:’ nor had he the sombre and gloomy piety which made him walk over the ground like David Brainerd, fearing that the earth was just ready to open itself and swallow him up; nor had he the bruised and morbid spirit of Cowper, nor the imposing and awe-inspiring virtues of Payson, nor the spirited and impetuous piety of Baxter, pressed on by an irritated nerve, and looking for no peace till he reached the Saint’s Everlasting Rest. There was the calm and philosophical devotion of Bishop Butler,—there was the mild and equable and philanthropic temper of Blair and of Tillotson; but it was neither of these that Mr. Homer held up as his exclusive model. He had not attained a perfect symmetry of Christian virtue, but he was aiming after it, and striving to blend the graces of the gospel into one luminous yet mild, rich yet simple expression.”—p. 77.

“He was not one of those perfect men who live in biographies but nowhere else, and who never utter a word which dying they would wish to recall. All that we care to say in his praise is, that the charms of his conversation were greater and the foibles of it less, than those of most men, even good men. His excellences were positive rather than negative, and he must have been more than human if they were never combined with a fault. His was a mind of vivacity and ardor, and it was a well regulated mind; but these properties are less favorable than hebetude and coldness to the reputation of a perfectly faultless man. It was common indeed to speak of him as faultless, he was so free from the usual foibles of sedentary persons, from all the malignant feelings, from bigotry and its kindred vices. But he well knew that one who offendeth not in word is a perfect man, and he was quick to confess that he had never attained this perfection.”—p. 82.

In a valuable chapter on the character of Mr. Homer as a preacher, occurs the following sketch.

"It is not claimed that Mr. Homer's discourses present a model to which all ministers should conform, but they meet one demand of our natures which is too seldom gratified. He was not a rude preacher, but he was plain-spoken when he thought it desirable to be so; he was not distinctively a metaphysical preacher, but he did not always avoid severity of argument. He had more depth of thought than men of his physical conformation are often supposed to have. He was not large of stature, he walked with sprightliness, his voice though masculine was not deep-toned, and he was not clumsy in his attitudes. Now a man who is thus formed will be regarded by some as less profound, than those who have a heavy movement and a very deep enunciation. So much are men affected, consciously or unconsciously, by the outward appearance, in judging of the inward character. The nodosities of the oak are deemed essential to its strength. But if the subject of this memoir had been inferior to the majority of students in mental vigor or acumen, he would not have been so enthusiastic and persevering in his study of the Greek orators and critics, nor would he have selected Bishop Butler as the companion of his leisure hours. But he was sensitive rather than profound, and literary rather than scientific. His superiority lay in his quick sympathies with the beautiful and the good, in his ardent and varied emotion, and in the versatile energies of his mind."—pp. 93, 94.

At the close of the volume will be found critical notes on Greek orators and poets, partly original, and partly translated from Latin and German authors, and also an outline of a course of lectures on Homer and Demosthenes. These unfinished remains show with what care Mr. Homer had studied his favorite Greek authors.

In looking over the sermons in this volume, we are struck with the variety of their subjects and their structure.

Evangelical truth is presented more or less distinctly in all, yet in almost as many varied forms as there are discourses. Mr. Homer did not run his sermons into the same mould. He did not derive from every text a proposition and proceed to prove it, and then deduce inferences. His mode of discussion varied with his subjects. Whether he describes "the character of Pilate," or of Enoch, or of "the almost Christian," or of "the Judge of the world," or whether he discusses "the influence of familiarity with truth upon the

sinner," or the "responsibility of a man for his influence over others," or "the extent and broadness of the divine law," or "the connection between Christianity and the social affections;" or whether he urges "the duty of immediate obedience to the divine commands," he adopts a method well suited to the subject. Had he preached for many years, no wag would have been able to exercise his wits, at the announcement of the text, by anticipating the preacher's outline, and by fitting a set of stereotype phrases as the "hooks and eyes" to a well known series of remarks appended to that particular verse.

One variety only is wanting in these sermons—it is that which has no plan. Mr. Homer's sermons always have method and point. He is not confined to the textual, topical, or expository method, but uses all of these modes on appropriate occasions. The following is the outline of a discourse on Matthew xi: 29. If we are correctly informed, this sermon was projected and finished in a single day—but this fact would not have been conjectured by the reader. The outline, we think singularly neat and striking. "The passage invites us to look upon Christ in four several aspects: I. As a master, in the services he enjoins: 'Take my yoke upon you.' II. As a teacher: 'Learn of me.' III. As an example: 'I am meek and lowly in heart.' IV. As a refuge from sorrow and sin: 'Ye shall find rest unto your souls.'" An ambitious preacher might have despised this textual arrangement as an insufficient framework for the exhibition of profound remarks, and of fine-spun speculations, but Mr. Homer was free from this affection of greatness. On other occasions, as in the sermon on the extent of the divine law, for example, he shows that he can form a plan of great compactness and strength, every part of which is subservient to the single point in view, in which nothing is superfluous, and nothing omitted that is necessary for his purpose.

Mr. Homer did not deem it his duty to gratify those "who would like no more variety than depravity and election to-day, election and depravity to-morrow." His range of topics he believed to be as wide as that of the Great Teacher. A considerable space in these sermons, is allotted to the social affections. Their insufficiency as a substitute for holiness is faithfully pointed out, and the importance of their due culti-

vation is urged upon the religious professor. The author would have his hearers embellish their piety with all the charms of a sanctified social influence. He was no advocate for that sort of religion which can leave men unamiable, rough, and repulsive in their character. Still less could he endure "flagrant instances of criminality in the church and the ministry, which seem to indicate that one can be a good Christian and a very bad man." The orthodoxy that did not make men even moral, could never receive his sanction. His sense of honor was delicate, and it was excited to shuddering by any instance of meanness, of indelicacy, of ingratitude, of what often passes among religious persons for the most trivial misdemeanor. Scorning as he did whatever was dishonorable, trained as he had been from early childhood to avoid every stain of immorality—he could not believe that Christians might soil their profession with open improprieties. His sermons urge the careful cultivation of whatever "is lovely and of good report." The requisitions of elevated morality as well as "the doctrines of grace," were the subject of his ministrations. Purity of life as well as accuracy of belief was enforced in his sermons.

These sermons show that their author had formed a method of preaching, peculiarly his own.

It is not difficult to see that he had studied some of the best models. One might conjecture that he had read with admiration the pages of Jeremy Taylor, and that he was not ignorant of the peculiarities of Prof. Tholuck's sermons, and that he had learned from Demosthenes to proceed with directness and strength to the point before him. Yet he was no copyist. If he examined the best models, it was to select from them the traits which were to be embodied in the formation of his own model. He would only have been trammelled by the help of a pattern for imitation. His own active and full conceptions would have overflowed the channel thus provided for them. Whatever ground there may be in the remarks of Mr. Knox* of the preaching of his day—"There is no spirit in it. It is the result of a kind of intellectual pumping: there is no gushing from the spring," this cannot be said of the sermons of Mr. Homer. They are as

* Correspondence with Bp. Jebb. vol. i. p. 18.

far as possible from bearing this negative character. The gush of thought and feeling is one of their prominent features. They are the fresh and racy productions of a vigorous and independent mind.

These sermons are characterized by superior chasteness and elegance of style.

We hail with pleasure sermons that inculcate the doctrines of the cross in language of classic purity. If these doctrines need not the dress of a polished diction to set off their powers, is this a reason why they should not be invested in the best dress which the store-house of our language furnishes ? We have read sermons in which the attractions of style were employed with too great success, to exhibit a system of faith not based on the sacrifice of a redeeming Saviour. When we have turned over the pages of Mr. Buckminster, or Dr. Channing, the pleasure imparted by the elegance of their style has been greatly diminished by the absence of what we regard as the fundamental truth of Christianity. We feel not this difficulty in reading the sermons of Mr. Homer. A few out of many selections that might have been made, may enable the reader to judge for himself of the beauty of Mr. Homer's style.

"Contrast the humblest saint, who comes from his earthly pilgrimage to heaven with the highest archangel, who ministers before the eternal throne. He glorious in holiness, splendid in beauty, terrible in power ! We would not diminish the height of his elevation, or impair the lustre of his crown. But who is this that comes toil-worn and timid from terrestrial strugglings, and upon whose unprepared vision the glories of the upper world are bursting in their full effulgence. That song of angels which ceases neither day nor night—we would not detract from its harmony or its significance. 'Holy, holy, holy Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come. Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honor, and power, for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.' Verily the majesty of the invisible is deserving of such homage ; and the wonders of creation, even of old, waked into melody the sons of God, when with the morning stars they shouted and sang together for joy. Yet there is a song more rapturous and elevated, such as breaks from the lips of the new inmate, and is echoed by the sympathetic choir of the saints, until all heaven rings

with the gladsome acclamation, ‘Worthy the Lamb that was slain, for he has redeemed *me* by his blood.’”—pp. 198, 199.

This extract is taken from a sermon in which “the superiority of the saints to angels” is advocated. We thought that Payson had exalted our nature to a lofty rank, when he contended for “the equality of men with angels.” Mr. Homer advances redeemed man to a still higher grade.

A sermon on the connexion between Christianity and the social affections, contains the following contrast :

“ Go back to the remote ages of antiquity, before the light of our religion had dawned upon the world. Many a bright spot shall you find in the moral waste. Many a city where art has lavished her most gorgeous treasures, and learning has reared her proudest seats. You shall find there the taste of the architect in marble columns, gracefully carved cornices and majestic temples that rear themselves towering and queen-like. You shall find there the skill of the sculptor in the accurately chiseled proportions of that chief earthly beauty, the human form. You shall enter suburban groves, and listen to philosophy in her most inspired lessons, and poetry in her most winning strains. You shall be surrounded by every thing outward that speaks of elevation and refinement. But when you penetrate the secrets of domestic life, when you look for the happiness of a pure and holy fireside, the light that is in them has become darkness, and how great is that darkness.”

“ Follow the influence of Christianity during the ages since its origin, and you will find the nature of the case materially changed, yet leading to the same result. Now religion and refinement seem to go hand in hand. All that is splendid in art becomes consecrated to, or is consecrated by the spirit of the gospel. Painting and sculpture expend their choicest workmanship on the subjects of the bible, and the mosaic pavement and the arched galleries and the frescoed ceiling become vocal with the praises of God. And it seems as if the social refinement of Christianity attracted to its own service the genius and taste of man as eminently harmonious with its spirit.”—pp. 305, and 306.

The discourse from which this is taken, abounds with strains equally beautiful. A minister who heard this sermon speaks thus of the impression it made. “ The whole effect

was most delightful. Strangers pronounced it an exquisite specimen of sermonizing. I think that the service, taken as a whole, was one of the most beautifully impressive which I ever attended. In contrasting it with my own performances, I felt strongly inclined to give up the clerical profession." p. 315.

Here we find the distinctive truths of the Christian system, embellished with a dress, that need not shrink from a comparison with some of the best habiliments of an erroneous belief. Had the author lived to develope his powers more fully, we cannot but think that he would have ranked among the best writers of the age. The fourteen sermons in this volume were the productions of a youthful ministry. We know not where to look for as many sermons, all from the same source and all presenting better specimens of correct, chaste, classical, elegant English, than have been produced by Mr. Homer, at the age of twenty-four. Perhaps the sermons of Mr. Melville ought to be excepted in this remark, but we are not sure that even they should' be made an exception.

The sermons in this volume are remarkable also for the skill with which the author illustrates religious 'truth. He was far from being satisfied with a languid and bare utterance of Christian doctrines. Nothing short of a vivid and impressive exhibition could satisfy him. His active mind brought illustrations from every quarter. Unlike those who are shocked at every allusion in a sermon, not drawn from the scriptures, he felt at liberty to obtain illustrations from any respectable source. He recognized no narrow *tabooed* ground to which the preacher must be restricted. Sometimes classic lore is made to subserve his purpose. Historical facts are pressed into his service. Passing events of local dr of general importance he seized, as the Great Teacher oid, for the purpose of investing his appeals with fresh interest. The lamented loss of his early friend, Mr. Brown, in the ill-fated Lexington, furnishes two different illustrations well suited to give force to the subjects on which he treats. The stores of his own fancy contributed their share to the elucidation of truth; and the facts of scripture history were brought forward in a striking manner. While he employs freely the aid of diversified illustrations, he does not use them in the unhewn shapes in which he may happen to find them. They are first fashioned into forms of beauty in which you

do not recognize the rough original without some difficulty. They are made ornamental gems before they are inserted in the structure. "*Nihil tetigit, quid non ornavit.*"

Mr. Homer seems to have believed what all preachers do not understand—that, if the instructions of the pulpit are to be of any avail, they must secure a hearing. Accordingly, he made his sermons attractive by the aid of graphic illustrations. To the want of this trait in the French pulpit, Dr. Wiseman attributes some of the most deplorable results. "The reason why infidelity proved so mischievous in France during the last century, was, that its emissaries presented it to the acceptance of the people, tricked out with all the tinsel ornaments of a mock science; because they dealt in illustration and in specious proofs drawn from every branch of literature; because they sweetened the edge of the poisoned cup, with all the charms of an elegant style and lively composition; while, unfortunately, they who undertook to confute them, with the exception of Guenée, and perhaps a few others, dealt in abstract reasoning, and mere didactic demonstration."* A complaint like this cannot be brought against Mr. Homer's preaching.

These sermons contain sketches of remarkable power. From a discourse in which "the extent of the divine law" is described in a mode that would have been creditable to a far more experienced preacher—the following passage may be taken as a specimen

"Time is one of the chief limits to the operation of a human code. The reaper, in his flight, cuts down the tares as well as the wheat, and the vices of men with their virtues are lost in the lapse of years. Human law too, cannot reach beyond the present life. The capital offender may anticipate the sword of justice, by laying violent hands upon himself, and his lifeless frame hanging suspended from the grate of his cell, or dashed against its granite walls, becomes a ghastly mockery of the court, and seems to proclaim in sepulchral tones, 'I am beyond your power now.' The waiting executioner cannot call back the suspended animation, and the sheriff must knock in vain at the door of the dead.

* Lect. on Science and Rev. Religion, p. 393.

"But not so the divine law. It is not subject to the mutations of time. Co-existent with the Deity who is its great administrator, its broad sweep is from eternity, into eternity, through eternity. The same yesterday, to-day, and forever, it brings up the crime of a century's growth, as if it were but a moment old. Its action, like the being of God, is an eternal now; and upon the guilty it has its eye, ever with the same fixed gaze. He may hurry into forgetfulness of himself and all around him, but the eye is there still. Sometimes in this life it will begin the work of retribution, and kindle the flames of conscience with all the terrors of a present and living hell, but its grand sphere is in eternity, where the spirit is left bare to its searching gaze, to the recollection of past and the consciousness of present guilt, compelled to hear the constant mandate to do right; yet as often, of its own free, evil nature, drawing back to do wrong, and withering under that same eye which blazes on forever and ever and ever."—pp. 327, and 328.

A sermon on the character of Pilate evinces careful research and great skill in moral dissection. The vacillation of the Roman Procurator is sketched with a master's hand. The following passage, while it evinces the author's fondness for the rich style of Jeremy Taylor, shows that he might himself have well-nigh risen to the splendid imagery and elegant diction of this modern Chrysostom.

"So have we seen one upon a rock, with the sea circling his tabernacle and crossing his pathway, and even calling to him as with a mother's voice; and the tide and the waves ever gain upon him, and already presume to touch with their damp breath, the lower fringes of his garment, and it is only by one desperate exertion that he can clear the flood, and rest himself above and beyond its gaping mouth—but still he hesitates, and calculates, and edges along his little island, and looks over his shoulder at the advancing billows, as if ashamed to turn his back on danger, and all the while the surges boil more furiously, and the ground grows slimy beneath his feet, and by and by, the wet spray touches his forehead; but still he pauses, and doubts, and edges along, till the irritated sea pours over him, and he goes to be seen no more. How strikingly did this weakness and irresolution, this dallying with duty, this shuffling of responsibility, this edging along upon the rock, instead of leaping to the shore, seal the ruin of the Roman governor. Oh! had he but boldly responded to

that look which the Saviour gave him, had the majesty of the old Roman looked out at his eye as he proclaimed the innocence of the victim, had he that moment laid down unhesitatingly the parley with conscience, all would have been well." pp. 269, 270.

One more specimen of powerful description is taken from a sermon which treats of Christ as the judge of the world. The author loved to dwell on the fraternal relation of the Saviour to man. Though he had no sympathy with "an effeminate theology, which leaves no room for the inflexible justice of God," he felt at liberty to insist much upon the point that Christ is our brother. In showing that the Judge of the world will sustain to us this relation, he introduces the following sketch.

" My hearers, have you ever been in court when sentence of death was pronounced against a criminal ? As you fixed your eye on the cold, rugged visage of the condemned, and marked his unmoved posture and his iron mien, you doubted if a human heart could be beating there. Perhaps a quick flush passed over his features as the word of death reached his ear, and then all was calm and cold again. But when you gazed on the streaming eyes of the judge, and saw his venerable frame agitated and quivering under the awful responsibility of his mission ; when you heard the choaked ejaculation, ' May God Almighty have mercy on your soul,' you felt that there was new power in the law, shining through the tears of a man, and speaking in his tremulous voice. Just so will it be with our final judge. The sympathies of humanity shall be conspicuous even in his severest maledictions. The joy of a man swells in his bosom at each act of faith and penitence he reads in the record of his chosen, and his voice sings for gladness at each new welcome to the right hand of his Father. And those who go away forever from his presence, shall remember the paternal tones with which he pronounced their doom ; and amid the dark, lonely caverns of their exile, no sound is sadder than that which follows the soul from the judgment scene,—' He that did eat bread with me, has lifted up his heel against me.' "—p. 225.

The sermons of Mr. Homer are not faultless. Critical severity might expose the imperfect structure of two or three of his sentences—or the frequency of exclamations—or the

occasional straining of a metaphor—or the diluting diffuseness of some passages; but these blemishes are easily overlooked amid the blaze of great and varied merits. They would have been removed, doubtless, by his own hand, had he revised the sermons for the press.

We may add that it was the good fortune of these sermons to be delivered in a style of impressive elocution. It was our privilege to be present when one of them was preached, and we can bear testimony to the author's power in the pulpit. The effect of this passage was peculiarly great: "But, Oh! thou correct and exemplary citizen, thou who hast kept every law in the statute book from thy youth up, thou who boasted thyself that thou hast never stood at the criminal's bar, or turned pale at the sheriff's mittimus, or shivered in the damp walls of a jail, think not, most perfect man, think not that it shall be so with thee at the divine assize. Terrible must be the reckoning when the weak whom thy slanderous or angry tongue has wounded, when the ruined whom thy secret dishonesty has wronged, when the destitute whose wants thou hast slighted, all rise up as witnesses that thou hast violated the great law of love, that thou hast wronged thy neighbor, that thou hast hated thine own mother's son." He spake as one having authority, and the hearers showed that they felt the power of eloquence, by breathless awe and solemn stillness. What he has well said of the dramatic element in pulpit oratory, in a valuable essay, may be applied to his own rhetorical power.

"The dramatic spirit in all its dealings with men will turn away from the stiff specimen picture hung up in the garret, and in the open air will draw from the breathing figures of nature. And not content with re-creating the men that had been turned to stones, the dramatic preacher will invade the very domain of this granite Circe, to transform its stones into men. Under his Ithuriel touch, abstraction becomes being. The words dealed out to the people are truths passed through the fire of life. Ideas stand forth with the breathing force of objective realities. The lines of his own experience blaze around his thoughts, and he speaks with the energy of one who reads his doctrine in the clear pages of history, or the burning revelations of prophecy—with a cloud of witnesses from the past and the future gathering near to confirm with trumpet tone the sentence."—p. 150.

If we have not overrated Mr. Homer's attainments as a preacher, they were truly eminent. And yet they are not beyond the reach of those who possess respectable abilities. We should explain the mystery of his success by referring to industrious exertion as the secret. At the early age of seven, he received private lessons in elocution, and thus acquired skill in the management of his voice. Through a long preparatory course he was a diligent student, and obtained successively the highest badges of distinction, at the academy, the college, and the theological seminary. His productions evince the marks of indefatigable study. He had from an early period devoted himself to the sacred office. Industrious toil, under the influence of Christian principle, was the secret of his usefulness, "the hiding of his power."

Mr. Homer was not one of those deformed prodigies who are remarkable for the great and precocious development of some single faculty. It was rather to a symmetrical expansion of all the powers requisite in the ministry, that he owed his growing reputation. It was seen that his mind could think ; his imagination, soar ; his heart, feel. Over all his efforts taste of exquisite delicacy spread its happy influence, and devotion to the Redeemer's service, its hallowed charm. Rhetorical power contributed its share to his success. From the labors of one, thus happily qualified for his work, great results were, not without good reason, expected.

Mr. Homer was well fitted to discharge the functions of the sacred office in places replete with difficulties. He could disarm prejudice by a candid admission of facts and principles, which an advocate of Christian truth may well afford to concede. He could win the favorable regards of men by kindness and courtesy. He could secure for the most pungent appeals a respectful hearing by the skill, the forcible reasoning and the felicitous illustrations with which they were presented. His polished style and ample scholarship, while they were not ambitiously displayed, secured for his sermons in some quarters a degree of attention which they would not have received had they lacked these qualities. The fastidious hearer could not complain that his discourses bristled with rough excrescences and violations of taste, of logic, and of truth ; or that they were only bare and bald statements of useful common-places. It is remarkable that while they were as well received by the erudite, as if they

were prepared only for a select few, they were prized and felt by those who made no pretensions to literary attainments. They contained so much that was true to nature ; his sketches and illustrations were so vivid and life-like ; his appeals were urged with so much directness upon all his hearers, and came home so evidently to their bosoms and business, that the less favored as well as the more enlightened of his hearers could not but listen to him with interest.

The advocates of "another gospel" have probably gained not a few proselytes from the more refined circles by the attention which they have paid to elegance of style. Literary taste has been claimed as a distinguishing trait of the sect. We are far from admitting the justness of this claim, and if we could admit it, we might question the wisdom of those who make the literary polish of the pulpit a *sine qua non*, while the character of its instructions is not closely scrutinized—who would rather receive from the highly-finished goblet a draught of poison, than the water of life from a plain cup. If the Gospel must be preached to all classes, and if ministers must, to some extent, "become all things to all men," it is desirable that the wishes of the tasteful and erudite should be somewhat consulted. It is well that some who preach the doctrines of the cross should not fall below the highest range of scholarship, that may be found among the teachers of self-styled "rational Christians." Had Mr. Homer's life been spared, his ministry might have been successful even among the most fastidious hearers. Those who recoiled from evangelical truth in its plainer dress, might have listened to his attractive exhibitions of the sentiments that have incurred their dislike. We are disposed to think, that among the more refined classes of New England, there are not a few who sigh after the true repose which can be found only at the foot of the cross. Their spiritual wants are not relieved by the cold abstractions, the vague theories, the frothy sentimentalism, and the clashing varieties of "another gospel." And yet they remain under the influence of unhappy prejudices against evangelical religion—the only balm for the wounded spirit. We cannot but think that if those who are in this interesting state, could view the plan of salvation under a favorable light, they would embrace it as the long-sought relief of their burdened minds. Mr. Homer was one of that class of evangelical preachers who are qualified to

win a hearing for the Gospel from the prejudiced, and to guide them to the Lamb of God. It was our hope that he was raised up to prove a son of consolation to many who have been entangled in the mazes of error—to lead the bewildered and unhappy into the light of the Gospel. But God has transferred him to a still nobler sphere of usefulness.

The untimely removal of one whose qualifications for usefulness in the ministry were of a high order, is an evil on which the mind will speculate, and for which it will seek an explanation. In the biography, some of the reasons that may be alleged for this dispensation are canvassed, and we are pointed to the consoling thought that "a new ornament for some niche in the temple above" may have been required. We wish that the writer had embraced this opportunity to inveigh, with all his power, against what, we fear, has been one of the explanatory causes of the loss sustained by the church in this, and in other instances—the development of the intellectual to the neglect of the physical powers. This insidious evil has been allowed too long to make havoc of some of the best sons of the church. Is it not time that the voice of earnest remonstrance were raised? Must corporeal vigor be lost in the acquisition of mental power, and thus the supporting frame-work of the indwelling spirit be left in a shattered condition, incapable of sustaining the action of the mind? Can the intellect not take its finest polish till the muscular energies are worn out? And shall its brilliant finish be made thus the sure token of an early dissolution—of imbecility or derangement? Shall its richest lustre be only "a gilded halo hovering round decay?"

We cannot believe that theological study is to be successfully prosecuted only at the expense of health. Mr. Homer was not, avowedly, an invalid during his preparatory course. Indeed he seemed to be a stranger to the pangs of sickness. Yet we know not but that the comparative neglect of physical culture had been long preparing the way for the lamented result. The intellect was matured, but the bodily powers were not invigorated in proportion. The faculties of the mind were urged on to more intense and powerful action, while the material fabric which was the seat of action, was left to undergo weakness and decay. The scabbard was allowed to rust away, while the blade acquired a keener edge. The result of sedentary habits, unrelieved by sufficient mus-

cular exertion, came at last in accumulated measure. The laws of nature had not been obeyed. The penalty was inflicted with unsparing severity. No allowance was made for purity of motives, for useful station, or for brilliant prospecta. Nature enforced her laws with unpitying sternness. Indeed the result could scarcely have been otherwise without a miracle. Mr. Homer assumed the laborious toils of professional life at a time when his physical powers needed rest and renovation after the confinement of several years to a student's room. Neither himself nor his friends knew how unprepared was his debilitated frame to endure the labors of the ministry.

It is easy to censure past proceedings when the result shows that they were not wisely adopted, and it requires no stretch of sagacity to show, when it is too late, how preferable a different course would have been. Guided by the sad results of the experiment made when Mr. Homer was ordained to the pastoral office, we can now see that his physical energies were not adequate to the task. His mind could work with intense energy, but this fervid action only brought on the approaching crisis more rapidly. His last efforts were not made without a degree of exhaustion and mental suffering which are well remembered by those who knew his more private history. There is, we fear, in the causes of Mr. Homer's death, some resemblance to those which cut off a kindred spirit in the early bloom of his life—we refer to Henry Kirk White. What Southey has not disclosed on this subject, is made known by an anonymous author, who claims to know the circumstances, and who writes as follows. "The academical life of Kirk White, even when viewed through the affectionate narrative of his biographer, was only a prolonged preparation for a sacrifice. The Death's Head is always visible under the mask. . . . We read of dreadful palpitations, of nights of sleeplessness, so that he went from one acquaintance to another, imploring society, even as a starving beggar entreats for food." . . . In another letter he says, "While I am here, I am wretched; the slightest application makes me faint." And again—"I am not an invalid: *my mind preys upon itself.*" But throughout this season of mental torture, the mistaken kindness of friends was urging him forward; the worn-out energies were stimulated into a mo-

mentary and unnatural brightness ; the fire was blown into a vivid but quickly dying flame."

" Melancholy, alas ! as was the issue of his unhappy career, it would have been incalculably more wretched, if he had survived. The intellect was perfectly exhausted, the very waters of mental life were dried up, and this creature of lofty impulses, of rare and poetical genius, of the tenderest sensibilities, of the most disinterested piety, would have dragged out an existence of dreary barrenness—a tree in its early May, *dead at the top!*"*

Let the student beware how he neglects the laws of his nature. The system of grace does not extend its remedial functions to the wrongs sustained by our physical organization. It matters not whether the evil come as the result of design or of neglect, the result is the same. Even devotion to the Redeemer's service will be no shield against the penalty.

We lay down the volume with many thanks to the biographer for the service he has conferred on the public, by giving a permanent form to productions that would otherwise have been preserved only in the memories of those who were Mr. Homer's hearers. And we cannot omit to mention that the publishers have contributed their share to the usefulness of the book by the aid of handsome type and good paper.

* *Conversations at Cambridge, Lond. 1836.* pp. 48, 49.

ARTICLE XI.

TRANSCENDENTALISM.

By the Rev. Noah Porter, Jr., Pastor of the Cong. Church, New Milford, Conn.

What is Transcendentalism? This question is often asked by intelligent men, and sometimes with great earnestness. As the movement indicated by the word is without doubt extensively to prevail, the question is constantly becoming a question of greater interest, and will force itself upon the attention of thinking men throughout our country.

We make no apology, therefore, for attempting to answer the question—which we shall aim to do with all possible honesty and truth, and in a direct and business-like manner.

The word Transcendentalism, as used at the present day, has two applications, one of which is popular and indefinite, the other, philosophical and precise. In the former sense it describes men, rather than opinions, since it is freely extended to those who hold opinions, not only diverse from each other, but directly opposed, not only in their statements, but in their bearings upon the most important interests of man. In its precise and strictly appropriate application, it denotes a class of philosophical opinions, concerning the principles of human knowledge, or the grounds of our faith in the world of sense, and also in those higher truths which make us capable of science and of religion, those truths which impart to our being, as men, all its dignity, and to our hopes and fears for the future, their interest. Our first concern will be with the term in its looser and more general sense, or rather with the men, who, in current phrase, are called Transcendentalists. And here it will doubtless be asked, how can such a term be applied to them at all, and especially with what propriety can it be used in respect to those who differ so widely in their intellectual and moral position and influence? To this we answer, that while we cannot feel ourselves bound to defend, or even to explain the popular use of every epithet, which may originate only in ignorance or confusion of thought, it is yet more frequently true, that such use is owing to a sufficient reason, which it is not difficult to detect and state. In the

present instance this reason is obvious. Those called transcendentalists, while on the one hand they are Pantheists or social Reformers, receivers or rejectors of Christianity, unitarian or evangelical in their views of Christian truth, and in these respects, strangely unlike, are yet, in other points, as strikingly similar. These points are their intellectual and moral predispositions, their favorite philosophical and literary authors, and of consequence, their general cultivation and literary sympathies, with a strong family likeness in their modes of thought and expression. These striking and strong affinities make them of one school, and secure to it its peculiar name, while within that school, are heard the voices of many discordant and contending teachers.

Among these we mention the Pantheistic variety, with whom the name of Mr. Emerson is too intimately connected, to require that it should be concealed. This school, though not claiming to be learnedly or profoundly metaphysical, and apparently despising the logical processes, the acute criticism, and the scientific research of a Kant or Cousin, and in many respects, not to say in most, very unlike to Plato, do yet follow in their train and call themselves by their name. Seizing upon a fragment of the Platonic or Transcendental formula, that the ideas which the reason reveals to man are objectively the laws by which the universe subsists and proceeds, they boldly and dogmatically affirm that these forces constitute the supreme Reason, that besides these there is no Deity; that the Deity is no living person, no Eternal Jehovah. These eternal and unchanging laws, both physical and moral, thus revealing themselves to man and regulating his happiness here and deciding his destiny hereafter, are the only God whom their philosophy acknowledges or their religion adores. This doctrine they propound, rather than prove. They utter it forth with the sage solemnity, the authoritative wisdom, and the affected phrase of the mysterious oracle or the inspired prophet. When ridiculed, they will not descend to retort, for it would be inconsistent with their dignity as prophets. When questioned, they will not give a reason, but emit other mysterious utterances, which, according to the mood of the listener, are received either as the voice of divinest wisdom, or the ravings of men inspired by no other afflatus than that of their own self-complacency.

Other peculiarities they have which are innocent, or rather

which almost makes them innocent, in the ancient sense of the word. They remove themselves from the stirring enterprises and the active benevolence of a bustling age, and can find in its science, its literature, and its religion, but little that suits their taste, or is worthy their notice. The transcendentalist, says their master and oracle, is content to wait in silence and seclusion for an age which shall be worthy of himself. From the past, also, he severs himself, by rejecting the record of its facts, when these facts contradict his philosophy, especially by denying the historic truth of the Christian revelation, by accounting for its miracles, by transmuting them into myth, arising out of occurrences not in the least supernatural, and by making Christianity itself but the highest of all symbols of the higher and purer Pantheistic Truth. Indeed, all past ages and all by-gone enterprises, all the prayers and praises, the high aspirations, the deeds of overcoming faith and daring heroism which had distinguished the great men of other times—all these are worthy of consideration only as they faintly shadow forth the age which is to come, the times of "the restitution of all things," on the true foundations of Pantheism in Theology, of mysterious enigmas in science, and of unnatural energy and affected phrase in literature. With all these vagaries, there are intermingled, in their writings, many just and many striking sayings concerning man, many most worthy and noble principles in relation to the aims of life and follies of artificial society, expressed oftentimes with a delightful freshness of language. These give to their writings a high interest to ardent and youthful minds, and to the writers an influence that has no connection with the truth or error of their opinions. When this is termed the Pantheistic variety of the Transcendental school, it would be unjust, were the impression to be conveyed to our readers, that the dogma concerning the Deity, holds a conspicuous place in their writings. It is not properly a school in philosophy, as it is a school in literature. Its inspiring genius is rather Carlyle in his criticism on books and men, than Straus in his mythical exegesis, or Hegel in his philosophical chaotics. And yet Carlyle has a system in science, theology and exegesis, which, even if he has not dared to utter it to his own thoughts, or to propound it to his readers, does yet exist in its elements and principles, and which gives to his writings their spirit, their meaning, and,

we fear, much of their attraction. We care not to call his writings infidel writings, or their author a Pantheist or an unbeliever. In a certain sense he deserves neither of these appellations, while yet the influence of his writings and of the man pleases and fosters that current of feeling which is even now pressing on, with a silent, yet deep and powerful tide, which we call the practically infidel feeling of the literary men of the age. This infidelity is not metaphysical ; it does not preach atheism with D'Holbach, nor Pantheism with Spinoza, nor man's irresponsibility with Hume ; for metaphysics is not to its taste. It does not concern itself with the infidel exegesis of the German students of the Scriptures, for this is a study which it despises. Nor does it dishonor the moral effects of Christian truth or the record of its religious experience, as many an infidel churchman has done, for even Carlyle discourses of the regeneration of Cromwell, and with so much earnestness in *his* interpretation of the event, that many a Christian might not see the sneer behind. What, then, is it ? How can it be infidelity ? We reply ; It is natural theology without a personal God. It is moral philosophy without a responsible agent. It is Christianity without the belief of its historic truths, acknowledging some of its effects, even those called spiritual, yet without connecting them with its facts, the government of a Holy God, and the redemption of a revealed Redeemer, and the cleansing of a Holy Spirit. It is rather unbelief than disbelief. Subtle, refining, symbolizing all living truths and real facts into inert and powerless mythi, and yet exerting its influence unconsciously to the man himself. Let the dreamers of Oxford, on both sides the Atlantic, understand it and ask themselves, whether Christianity has no work for them to do, except to make her more offensive to such men, by hanging about her neck other mill-stones than those which have well nigh sunk her already ; and whether the Church has no demand for them, except to fill her courts with grotesque and chattering priests, and to busy their brains with inquiring what are the dimensions of that surplice which makes the wearer most devout, and what the size of the cross upon the back of the priest, that leads the spectator most effectually to put on Christ. Let hair-splitting and angry theologians ask themselves, whether Christianity and the Church had nothing for them to do, but to contract their influence, and narrow

their minds, and exhaust their energies. Amateur divines also, and *petit maîtres* in the pulpit, may inquire with profit, whether, as they have to do with men, they had not best act the part of men, and arm themselves for manly contests.

As next in order, we name the Transcendentalists in the Unitarian communion, of the different sorts of which class. Mr. Ripley and Mr. Parker may be taken as specimens. They are not Pantheists, and hence, deserve not to be classed with Mr. Emerson; while they are too decidedly theologians to be named with Carlyle. They take their character as a school, and perhaps their name, from the fact that while in the Unitarian connection they have gone widely aside from that exclusive reliance on the historical evidences of Christianity, which has been so characteristic of those divines, and have planted themselves on the moral evidence, not only as superior, but as supreme and decisive. The truth of its doctrines and its facts, they ground upon their fitness to the reason of man, and only so far as the reason sees and feels them to be true, so far are they to be received. So also they prove the being of God, from the wants and aspirations of our nature, rather than the fact of his existence from the visible universe, and the principles of his moral administration and his own moral attributes, from the course of his own actual providence with man. From the fact that they have rejected and labored to deprecate the only species of proof for the Christian system, which Unitarians have been accustomed to acknowledge, they have seemed to many Unitarians of the older stamp to be no less than rejectors of the system, and their principles have been called "The latest form of Infidelity."

In the writings and general course of thought of some of them, there is certainly much to approve, and we cannot but hail that distinct recognition which they allow to the facts of Christian experience, and to its authority and importance in interpreting the word of God, as well as the honor which they give to man's moral nature,—the greatness of its wants, and the greatness also of the change within which it must experience—to be the omen of a purer theology and a more spiritual religion. As far as they constitute reason, the voucher for all truth, both in Natural and Revealed Theology, so that of truths that are within her province, none

are to be received to which she does not consent—and of truths but partially revealed, nothing is to be believed which plainly contradicts her voice, and as far also, as they give the highest place and the most convincing energy to those truths, which make themselves manifest to the conscience, so far are they to be commended, as holding truth, and important truth. But when they exalt reason to the seat of judgment, and flatter her vanity till she forgets the limits within which she is competent to judge, and yields herself to the perverting influences of an evil heart, then do they dishonor the truth which suffers by their perversion, and send out the words of God's revelation, a poor, tattered thing of shreds and patches, stripped of its venerable authority, and robbed of its aspect of benignant love. Surely religion was never more dishonored, under the garb of philosophy, than in that noted discourse "On the Transient and Permanent in Christianity," by Mr. Parker, a disciple of this school. All that is characteristic of the Christian system, or that could be deemed such, has he taken away, under the name of the Transient, except the name of "the Galilean Youth," to whom he renders no higher honor than more than one of the English Deists have done. Under the name of "the Permanent," has he left a poor *caput mortuum*, which is spiritless, impotent and contemptible. In his own words, "Christianity is a simple thing; very simple. It is absolute, pure morality; absolute, pure religion; the love of man; the love of God, acting without let or hindrance. The only creed it lays down, is the great truth which springs up spontaneous in the holy heart—there is a God. Its watch-word is, be perfect as your Father in Heaven. The only form it demands is a divine life, doing the best thing, in the best way, from the highest motives; perfect obedience to the great law of God. Its sanction is the voice of God in your heart; the perpetual presence of Him who made us, and the stars over our head; Christ and the Father abiding within us." Did not Tindal say as much as this in his "Christianity as old as the Creation." Surely if the name of a Christian, in its most superficial meaning, and its largest extension, signifies anything, on the ground of past or present usage, he whose creed is nothing more than this, ought not to claim it to himself. This is but a more distinct and decided avowal of the infidelity of the age. An infidelity that admits "the moral" of the Chris-

tian system, but denies its facts on earth, and the facts which it reveals from heaven ; which honors the regenerate man, but honors not those truths, by the belief of which, and those influences by whose power and aid his regeneration is secured.

Mr. O. A. Brownson might here be naturally named, as being himself a variety altogether peculiar. But we shall not attempt to describe him. A preacher and a politician—a critic and theologian—a determined reformer of all the present forms of society, and a stern defender of the powers that be—a vulgar demagogue and a teacher of æsthetics—a philosopher of the spiritual and of the experimental school—he is beyond the powers of any one who would seek to portray him. As he is manifestly and avowedly in a state of continued transition,—in a condition of perpetually *becoming*, but of never *being*—of unquestioned vigor of intellect, of no inferior capacity for investigation in the moral and intellectual sciences—possessed of surpassing facility and force in stating and defending his opinions,—we can barely give his name as one of those who bear the name of Transcendentalists, without giving a history of his past transformations, or venturing upon a prophecy of what he is yet to be.

We come now to speak more at length of those Transcendentalists, who are known and acknowledged as men, strenuous for evangelical and spiritual Christianity. In remarking upon the opinions which they hold, and the influence which they exert, we shall present certain suggestions which apply with equal force to all who call themselves *par eminence*, spiritual philosophers, and others which are appropriate to the common position which we hold as believers in the same system of Christian faith. It will not be forgotten that they are Transcendentalists rather in popular phraseology and by common usage, than in the strict and scientific sense. They do not profess to be deeply and learnedly metaphysical. Many would say of themselves, that they are mere disciples and beginners in the school, which yet they are satisfied in the school where truth is most purely taught. Others would tell you that they neither wish nor expect to master all the heights and depths of the spiritual philosophy, while yet they know that it is the only philosophy that is the friend of poetry, and of noble sentiment, and of true and spiritual religion ; the fount of manly principles, of self-sacrificing benevolence, and of pure and reverential worship. They point you with

confidence to the opposing classes of opinions which have ever divided the scientific world, which are represented by the two great masters of Grecian philosophy, and called after their names ; and affirm that according to the structure of their minds and the divinity or earthliness of their original genius, and perhaps according to their moral dispositions, all men have, and all men must be the followers, either of the shrewd, severe, and unbelieving Aristotle, or of the divine and believing Plato. The systems are contradictory, and tend to opposite directions. The one is earth-born, and has its sphere and its limits in the understanding, while it tends to sensuality, selfishness and unbelief ;—the other is from heaven, and carries the soul upward, and in its direct and remoter influences, elevates the spirit above the world of sense, purifies benevolence, and blends in delightful harmony with the faith and love of the believer.

Of the prevailing English philosophy, and of the system of Locke in particular, they express their hearty dislike, not merely on account of individual opinions which Locke, or certain of his disciples have held, but because of the inevitable tendency of its spirit, and its master principles. They trace its fatal consequences, in the struggle which philosophy has been maintaining with Christian truth ever since its prevalence, in the enfeebling and corrupting influences which the sensual philosophy has ever imparted to scientific theology. They find its appropriate results in the Socinianism of Priestly, the Pyrrhonism of Hume, and the Atheism of the French Revolution. They regard with no friendly eye the metaphysical theology of New England, based as it is on the sensual philosophy, and would substitute in its stead the more spiritual Platonism of Germany and of a better age in the past. Our description we acknowledge to be incomplete, but it will answer its design if it indicates with sufficient precision the class of men of whom it affirms, and with whose spirit and opinions many of our readers are familiar.

Others there are, who are Transcendentalists, as the result of close investigation and scientific research ; and who, while they would consent to all that is affirmed by their brethren, do yet rest with firm conviction on their opinions, because, as *philosophers*, they have proved them true. With them, at present we have no concern. The arena of strictly scientific discussion, is the only arena on which we would

wish to meet them, and the examination of their principles of science and faith, on scientific grounds, the only one on which we would rest the question of their truth or error. We trust, however, that the considerations which we shall urge, will not be deemed impertinent, even by them, in their general bearings upon the subject.

Much is made by the spiritualists of all classes, and most of all by those who are now before us, of the inevitable necessity by which all those who attempt to philosophize, become either Platonists or Aristotelians, whether the cause is found in their intellectual tendencies, their moral disposition, or the influence of favorite authors. The distinction between the schools is represented as so great, that the one employs certain faculties, and appeals to their decision, which the other neither recognizes nor believes to exist, that in consequence, the two cannot confer together, nor can they comprehend each other,—that the one is the school of science, and the other of empiricism,—the one, a sanctuary of faith, and a temple of worship,—the other, a dwelling place of unbelief, and a nursery of irreligion. It is easy to see that if these claims be admitted as true, they carry with them the most sweeping conclusions, and give to the spiritualists, not only the field in argument, but occasion for earnest and devout attachment to their own philosophy, and for serious alarm at the prevalence of the opposite. Nor ought it to be a matter of wonder, that much importance should be attached by them to this general fact, and that it should be often used in the argument.

It cannot be intended by this doctrine, merely, that there was a wide dissimilarity in the intellectual structure of these great philosophers, nor that their modes of announcing and defending their doctrines were so unlike, that if they held precisely the same opinions, one would express them in the Aristotelian fashion, and the other in the Platonic way; but that the school of the one is a school of scepticism and of unbelief—while the other is a nursery of faith and devotion; that the one invests the mind with the mists of error, and perplexes it in the intricate labyrinth of doubt, while the other causes it to breathe the pure ether, where forgotten truths of heavenly origin are brought back to the delighted memory, and the soul holds communion with her divine original.

The former of these opinions—the one *not* held by our

spiritualists, we regard as correct;—the latter which they hold and propagate, we think is defective and false. It is defective and untrue in its judgment of the two philosophers, who are made the representatives of the opposing systems. Who then, was Aristotle, and who was Plato? Aristotle was a man who thought severely, and expressed his thoughts in language, condensed, precise and purely philosophical. Plato also thought severely, but in giving expression to his thoughts, presents processes rather than results,—hence, in contrast to Aristotle, he is diffuse rather than concise, suggestive rather than precise, rambling rather than condensed, useful rather in setting the mind upon a course of thinking, than satisfying it at the conclusion by a result briefly expressed and skilfully elaborated. Above all, while Aristotle is naked and abstract in his diction, Plato is illustrative, warm, and poetical, while that of the one is rough, often obscure and always repulsive, aiming to present the thought alone, that of the other is wrought into the finest harmonies of a most delightful style, which is as clear as amber, and musical as the lute of Apollo. The one marches you right on to his conclusion; and often by strides so tremendous that you must follow, *haut passibus aquis*, the other takes you by the hand, and leads you in a devious way, now along a still stream, then beneath a cool and balmy shade, not forgetting now and then to try you with a tangled thicket, and to perplex you with the intricacy of nice distinctions in the way—till at length, having carried you as far as he thinks well to do, he leaves you to review the way you have gone, and to guess out the remainder alone—being satisfied with the exercise which you have received, and apparently having aimed at this as his only object. The one seeks to grasp and understand all the things that are, or which have sprung from the mind of man—the laws of nature, the principles of government, society, and education, the elements of logic, rhetoric, and poetry, and subjects them alike to an analysis marvellously subtle, and a process that is wonderfully exhausting, till he arrives at conclusions which are admirable for the justness of their good sense. He seeks alike to collect the facts which were known in natural history, then a science in its embryo, and discourses also in the same calm and unpretending way of the mysteries of the Deity and of the human soul. He would penetrate all nature by the searching eye of his analy-

sis, or cause her to reveal herself in her primeval elements, by the powerful solvent of his own scientific method. The favorite field of the other is the moral, the religious, and metaphysical—into the darker recesses of which departments he loves to penetrate ; and having gone with you to a certain depth, he prefers then to worship, rather than farther to explore, to pause in mute wonder, or to relieve himself of the mystery under which he labors, by some splendid and lofty mythus, or ornate and finished description. Hence, his doctrine of truths forgotten in a former state, but recalled in this, of men confined in a cave to the view of their own shadow, as cast by the light above upon the farthest wall, of the chariot drawn by unequal steeds, etc., which are sometimes taken by his more devout, not to say, credulous disciples, in a sense somewhat more scientific than the master designed.

Such are some of the contrasts between these venerable masters of Grecian science. Opposite in many intellectual characteristics, and fitted by their modes of instruction, and the intellectual training which they impart, to produce philosophers who will differ, and that most widely, but still in no sense deserving to be set over against each other, the one as constituting the school of empiricism and of unbelief, and the other, that of science and of faith.

Rather should we style them, the one, the imaginative and mythical school, the other, the analytic, and we will not yet say, the more purely philosophical. We grant also, that each have their peculiar exposures to error,—that while that of the Aristotelian is to deny that to exist which does, in fact—that of the Platonist is to bring into being that which is not ; in a word, the besetting sin of the one is unbelief, that of the other, is idolatry and superstition. Which is the more hostile to science we do not hesitate to affirm. Which is the more a foe to true religion, it would be hard to decide. The spirit of both is equally a spirit of science and of faith. Yet the Aristotelian, often, when he has arrived at a great first truth,—principium et fons cognoscendi,—deems it important to survey it with a more careful exactness, and to test the certainty of its being one of the truths, for which faith alone, or rather intuition, must vouch, or whether it is susceptible of a still nicer division. As the naturalist, when the nucleus of the crystal has been uncovered, and presents its brilliant surfaces to his view, still must search for a new

cleavage, till he sometimes batters its fair face with his chisel, or it breaks in pieces under his hammer, so does the analytical philosopher, with the primal elements of knowledge—either refining them till they cease to be objects of faith, or denying that any can be attained on which the mind may fasten. So did Hume; and others besides him have thus destroyed the elements which make possible either science or faith. Hume was altogether an Aristotelian, it is true, but the results to which he arrived are in no sense the legitimate consequences of the Aristotelian philosophy, but only their possible perversion.

The Platonist on the other hand, has his exposures. From his disposition to believe rather than to question, to wonder or worship rather than to analyze, he receives as general laws, and primal elements, those facts which a closer examination would lead him to refer to a law still more general. He imposes upon himself, as facts, the merest figments of words. He multiplies first truths, and thus destroys the simplicity of science, and does dishonor to the simplicity of nature. So also, through his fondness for certain mysterious entities, which he calls ideas, is he tempted to render them a vague and almost idolatrous worship, to substitute them as objects of love and honor, in the stead of his brother-man, and his sovereign God. Not unfrequently does he thus fall into a demon-worship of the powers of nature, or referring them back to one grand idea, to bow before it, as $\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau$, an entity, not personal nor yet material, not living nor yet unconscious; the supreme reason,—the great idea,—the vital force,—the fount of being,—or whatever be the name under which he chooses to veil his pantheistic divinity.

The different methods in which the opposite schools use language, has been adverted to in passing; there are in it consequences, which it is much to our purpose to notice. The Aristotelian employs the language of abstraction, which, though clear and precise, and not without interest to the reflecting mind, is yet the most remote from the looser language of common life, and not less unlike the diction of the excited orator, or the rapt poet. He employs images indeed, but they are briefly presented, and instead of withdrawing the mind from the scientific truth, reflect a stronger light upon the argument, and set it forth in a finer relief. He presents, from common life, facts and illustrations, but such only as carry the mind back again, with a freshened interest to the

truths which they illustrate. The Platonist adopts with freedom, the poetical and figurative diction, and is solicitous to avoid the lifeless and naked style of the follower of Aristotle. Nay, often when the severest simplicity of scientific statement is required, and all the powers of a strictly philosophical expression should be tasked, he is content darkly to show forth what he deems the truth by an allegory or an image, and thinks that he has given a triumphant solution, when he has only hit upon a happy illustration, and covered the knot of the problem by a veil of graceful diction. Even if the two should possess the same scientific truth, and should see with a metaphysical exactness equally nice, they would adopt a method so different, and forms of language so entirely unlike, that the truths propounded might seem scarcely the same. Then, too, the associations which they awaken, the emotions which they kindle, the allusions in which they are at home, and the nomenclature with which they are familiar, are all so different, that they often seem to be combatants, even when they are fellow-soldiers, for the same great truths. We are quite certain that truths have been propounded by Locke and Reid, on which Kant and Coleridge have prided themselves as peculiar to their own system, and as giving it an indisputable advantage over the opposite school. More than one determined partizan of Coleridge has been unable to see such a truth in a plainer style and under a different form of expression, through the merest trickery of language, and the splendid fascinations of a portico-philosophical diction.

Indeed, to the spiritualist of our day, the naked and abstract language of mental and moral science, is most offensive, contrasted with the gorgeous coloring of his own favorite authors and their warmer and more moving style. He counts it reason enough, for his rejection of any writer, that his speculations are dead; that they have not that living force which of itself wakes up the intellect and warms the heart. His language of them all is, "Let the dead bury their dead," while he directs you to his own adopted teachers, and asks no other reason for the excellence of their philosophy than its influence on the minds of those who study it.

We are not insensible to the fascinations and the power of that style which delights to invest some grand truth, concerning God or man, in the splendid drapery of a creating imagi-

nation, and to awaken a new and startled interest in facts, over which man is ever prone to slumber.

We do not object that any truth which deeply concerns man should be presented by the philosopher in such a way as to take the strongest hold of his faith and his feelings. But it should be remembered that the attitude of the philosopher, in investigating truth and announcing to others the results, is essentially different from that of the meditative believer, or the devout worshipper. When, then, it is insisted that he shall be both at once, that he shall use the language both of worship and of science, the attempt is made to combine elements more unlike than oil and water. Let the philosopher use the language of the schools, when he is in the schools; when he is a poet, let him chant the language which the muses shall teach him; when he worships let him pray; when he summons his fellow-man from his sleep of death and sin, let him startle him with the awakening tones of the prophet. But let every thing be done in its place, and let the language of the place be adhered to. True it is, that much philosophical truth can be, and doubtless is, conveyed in a style thus fascinating to the imagination. It would be bigotted folly to deny that many profound observations, on intellectual, moral and theological science, on the history of opinions and of man are thus presented. It is even granted that the entire circle of principles that are received in metaphysical science, may be announced in such language, and there be no important error. We certainly do not value the truth the less, nor do we deny that it is philosophical truth, because it is presented in a poetical garb. We deem works thus written to be of the highest interest and importance, at certain stages of mental progress, and would recommend them as of the highest use, in awakening a philosophical spirit, and in calling into action the reflecting faculty. But we must contend, the while, that it shows a most limited acquaintance with the nature of real science and the kind of language it demands, to suppose that such a diction can be employed in its more refined and attenuated investigations, or can express and make permanent the results of its more refined analyses; that because it can convey certain general facts, concerning the soul, in its wants, and aspirations, and immortality, that it can name all its powers, and allot their functions, and distinguish between false and sound logic, and

make new investigations, and leave the results graven on the page of science, in distinct and legible characters, for coming generations. It is more bigotted still to demand that no other than a style so unnatural shall be employed, and to be incapable of discerning in the homely phraseology of a Locke or Reid, the truth that sparkles and entrances as uttered by Coleridge or Cousin. And, yet, if all this were understood as it should be, what an end it would bring to a vast deal of fine writing about vital metaphysics, and the necessity of a spiritual philosophy, and the blight which the common philosophy breathes upon the life of faith.

We are far from defending the homely diffuseness, and the loose inconsistencies of Locke and certain of his English followers, and farther still from expressing any complacency in that hardest of all metaphysical styles, the ungraceful and untutored diction of the New England metaphysicians. A perfect philosophical style is not unsusceptible of sparkling vivacity or of graceful ease. Nor does it entirely forbid the rising from the even progression of its ordinary course into the excited ardor of lofty emotion. Still it should ever be remembered that the mien of science is chastened and **severe**, that her distinctions are many, and to all but her devotees, they seem excessively minute and over-refined; that the language which she employs is not that of ordinary life, and must be a naked and lifeless thing to him, who has not himself known the thoughts which the words describe. When, then, the spiritualist will have no other than what he terms vital metaphysics, i. e., a philosophy which employs a diction, which will waken the intellect by its electric impulses, and stir the emotions, and is in no way contrasted with a style that is concerned with the realities of nature, rather than the names of science, he demands an impossibility. He even seeks an element, the very presence of which proves the metaphysics to be, at best, but very general, and, perhaps, very superficial philosophizing. Science in all her departments, and, most of all, mental science, begins with abstraction. Her very first effort is to give generic names—names which must be divested of that interest which pertains to the picture language of the senses. As she prosecutes her work, one of her highest attainments is to keep to her terminology with a **severe** precision, and to guard it with a determined caution;

and on this depends, in a great degree, her continued progress and her successful achievements.

Were we in a word to speak of our spiritualists as philosophers, we should say that they are in danger, while declaiming against the superficial and sensual philosophy which prevails, of becoming themselves more superficial, by adopting the dicta of their favorite authors, with too little severity of thinking of their own. While they claim independence of thought, they may find themselves hanging with a servile dependence on the writings of their own inspiring genius, or looking back with an awful reverence on something admirably profound in the past which yet is in nothing admirable except for its obscurity. While they propose to themselves a course of scientific pursuit which shall be continually progressive, they need to see to it, lest they are revolving in the same charmed circle of sounding words, and incomprehensible yet lofty phraseology, and making progress only as they drive on in greater familiarity with the same recurring round. There is a danger, lest interpretation should usurp the place of reasoning, and the admiration with which they dwell upon the mythi of Plato, or the effort with which they labor to put some comprehensible meaning into the sayings "hard to be understood" of Coleridge or Schelling, should be mistaken for the clear yet penetrating gaze by which true science sees into the life of things, and wrests from Nature the secret of her mystery. To our view, many of these professed spiritualists appear to be an earnest group of disciples lingering in the vestibule of the temple of science, who are ever pointing with a fervent admiration to the mysterious recesses within, and shuddering with a holy reverence at her consecrated shrines that disclose themselves in the distance; ever seeming to be just about to enter, but never crossing the threshold.

We have contemplated the spiritualists of the day, so far, as philosophers. But they present themselves in another attitude. As Theologians, they claim unquestioned merits, and an undisputed superiority. "Our mode of studying truth," they tell us, "is not to contemplate her in the lifeless abstractions, or the dim and dead conceptions through which alone she reveals herself to the understanding, but in the living ideas, with which she ever stands before the Reason in her native beauty and commanding majesty. The arguments by which we commend her to others, are not those which argue

with the intellect, but those which command the soul. We wait not for the slow and sceptical induction of the doubting understanding, but we possess at once the citadel of the heart. We degrade not truth to the attitude of a suppliant entreating for admission, but we gird her with the armor of a conqueror. As we believe that there are mysteries in science, so we are not offended at mysteries in Theology, and they do not awaken within us a perpetual struggle between our philosophy and our faith. While the prevailing philosophy leads the mind away from faith, ours carries us to its very borders, and easily blends with it, so that we can scarcely discern the line where Science terminates and Faith begins."

Natural Theology, as an independent science, with its own principles, its laws of evidence, its cautious admissions, in short, in all its researches concerning the being of God, its deductions as to the nature of man and his hopes and fears, under the light of nature, is pronounced a useless and almost an unchristian science, as though it cast implied dishonor on the truth of the Scriptures to meet the question of their falsehood or truth. So also the effort to reconcile the records of science with the page of revelation, is scouted as of evil tendency, as having no other effect than to place Christianity in a false position, as reduced to straits in her defences, rather than as demanding to be obeyed. All this apparatus of logic, and this cautious nicety of investigation, is useless, and worse than useless. The ideas of the soul, of immortality, and of God, are made known to the Reason, and the Reason commands the man to receive them as true. So also Christian Truth shines by its own light, and needs only to be seen by a spirit rightly attuned to be believed.

There is a sense in which all this is true. There is a sense in which it is not only false, but fraught with evil, not only to the progress of the intellect, but also to the moral feelings and character. If nothing more were intended by it than that the moral nature in man is to be recognized in all our reasonings concerning God and his government over man, and that it should ever be regarded as of the highest dignity and worth, and from it should be drawn the most convincing arguments, in speculations as to the light of nature, it would not only be true, but truth of the highest moment. For the lack of this respect to conscience in man, and to the will of

God as it there reveals itself, and the demands of God as he thus makes himself heard in the fears of conscience unenlightened, Natural Theology has too often, not to say more usually, been a barren and unconvincing speculation, and the defences of Christianity which rest upon it have been tame and powerless in their reasonings, and often impotent in their appeals. Speculators concerning the material works of God, and collators of evidences from profane history, have seemed to reason as if theirs were the arena on which the contest was to be decided, rather than by reasonings concerning the soul in its moral constitution and wants, and the government of God as likely to meet its capacities and needs, and as tending to perfect this his noblest work. But we must protest against the conclusion, that because our reasonings in Natural Theology and in the defence of Christianity, ought to take another direction, and to employ the most effective arguments, that therefore we are to cease to reason ; or that because the mind of man will respond to these truths when made to see them, that therefore there is no need that they be set before the mind by a process of severe deduction, and driven home by an irresistible logic.

But when, asks one, " Oh, when shall Christianity be regarded as proved ? After eighteen hundred years, is it still a question to be debated ? Must it again and again be brought into the lists by every combatant, who in this way aspires to a literary reputation—who takes upon himself to affect a spurious candor, and to make unauthorized concessions, as though the whole defence of revealed truth had been by the church universal committed to his keeping ? How long are our young men to be taught that nothing has yet been settled—that all established opinions are fetters upon the human mind, or that a standing miracle of eighteen centuries is to be called in question in each succeeding generation ? Oh, when shall that truly believing age fully come, when we shall have again a *teaching*, and not merely a *reasoning* church—cultivating a believing spirit, and laying so deep the foundations of faith, that the after structure of human science shall not disturb them, without wrenching away all that imparts vigor to the intellect, or life to the affections ? "

To the *truth* involved in these inquiries we heartily respond—in its quackery and confusion of error with truth we have not so entire a sympathy. Never will the necessity cease

for a reasoning church. The laws of God's providence, the conditions of man's probation, both forbid that it should. So long as new minds shall come into being, and must go through the same struggle with doubt and unbelief, which is a part of the discipline and trial allotted to man's depravity and weakness, so long will their teachers need to meet them with convincing logic—so long will their sluggish torpor need to be awakened by giving life to the intellect, so long will it be required to tear them from their refuges of lies, that the truth be armed with convincing light and irresistible energy. As long as each successive generation shall grow up from ignorance to knowledge, and grope its way from darkness to light, and shake off the envelopments of its unexpanded, blinded energies, into the clearness of well established convictions, and the firmness of undoubting faith, so long must the truth be sustained by argument, and that argument be set home to the intellect, and through the intellect to the conscience of man. Error, too, will be ever awake; and if, through a pious dread of calling in question the claims of religion, or the vague pretensions of a confident philosophy, the believer ceases to reason, error will not. The aspects and arguments of Error will change with each changing age. From each advancing science, from the fickle and capricious phases of a morbid literary taste, she will derive new arguments, and cast up new defences; and if Truth will only let her defences alone, and proclaim herself of the celestial empire, she will be as well satisfied as the English are with each new issue of contemptuous bravado from Pekin.

Nor is it desirable that this necessity for a reasoning church should terminate. When its teachers imagine that that time has come, then will they sink into sluggish and animalized torpor, or bask in the luxurious sunshine of spiritual quietism, or amuse themselves in literary trifling, or forge and hurl anathemas for those who dare to knock about their ears any of the mistaken and defenceless outworks of their Faith. Then, too, will their disciples yield a supine and tame submission to church authority, or a lifeless faith to the dogmas of an orthodoxy out-worn and dead, instead of resorting for themselves to the living word, to learn the will of God from his own mouth, not only awed but quickened by the responsibility under which they reason, as they know it is for their lives. The moment that the church ceases to be a reason-

ing church, that moment does she cast forth the element which marks the character of Protestantism. For Protestantism has been what she is, by her logical and instructive ministry, and by the quickening energies of the Word of God, as they have reasoned out of it to the aroused understandings of their flocks. Thus only have they made the people what they are, possessed of a manly growth and an independent life—men able to give a reason for the hope that is within them, and in their turn instructors of their own households, and holders forth of the word of life unto all. The instant that this is to cease, and the intellect of the teacher and the taught is no longer tasked and aroused that faith and hope may also live, then let him who was appointed a teacher turn a priest, and as the intellect is stupified, let him dazzle and amuse the senses ; and in token of the change which is to come upon his flock, let him turn his back upon them in the ministration of the sanctuary: Let those, also, who find it easier to believe, than to know why they believe, and to give a reason for their faith to others, rather by bold and vague generalities than by clear and progressive reasonings, understand where their affinities connect them. If they want a believing church, there is one at Rome, with a branch at Oxford, which, the last especially, grieved at the unbelieving spirit of the age, and with the progress of reasoning without, urges itself to more daring heroics in faith, as the rude and glaring light drives into remotest darkness the birds of night, disturbed in their dim retreat. Nothing should be less surprising than the tendency of this undefined and morbid spiritualism, to those churches in which authority is the prevailing element, in which faith is nourished rather by the impressive solemnity of sensible rites, than by that animated and convincing reasoning which sways the man. It is natural that the confusion of thought with which it is often accompanied, with its morbid aspirations after the high and holy, and its desire to rest upon fixed belief, without that expense of thought which the nature of things requires, has led some of its disciples who had been nurtured in a communion more purely Protestant, to seek a rest and refuge under the authority of prelacy, where the thinking has been done up in past generations, and faith may occupy all the energies of the man.

“ But the moral and religious tendency of spiritualism is still most happy, and especially needed in an age of prevalent

unbelief." We are aware that it commends itself to the favor of many men of refined sensibilities and high moral feeling, as springing from a devout and believing spirit in those who originate it, and as suited to exert a healthful influence on the character of those who adopt it. To it, therefore, they give their adhesion and their sympathy, as men of taste and of piety, rather than as philosophers. We have naught to affirm against the moral elevation and amiable feelings of many who are ardently enlisted in its favor, nor do we care to offend the enthusiasm for good, of any right-hearted man. But our convictions, and our observation, too, compel us to say, that this indiscriminate admiration of whatever tends to *faith*, this seeking to believe without the clear and rigid insight into the grounds of what we believe, is far from tending wholly to moral or religious good. Nor is it, as a token of good in character, worth so much as it often passes for. Often, very often, the very zeal for faith signifies simply this—that there is less of calm conviction and of firm reliance, than there is of a perturbed desire after more, which calls upon the will to supply what is lacking in the intellect and heart. So, instead of the soul which is fixed and at peace because it has proved and understands its foundations, there is the pretension and cant of a school, and the being certain merely for the comfort of certainty. This is bigotry—it is not faith—no matter with what literary accomplishments it is associated, or with what intellectual grace, or with what words or songs of pious fervor. It is *wilful*—defending its position to itself, because it has taken it, and repelling others that it may be let alone to enjoy it. True, while it is cloistered in the schools, or buoyed up by the consenting sympathies of an admiring clique of like-minded spirits, or nursed in the artificial air of affected sentiment, it will be confident to itself, and scornful and repellent to the last degree, to those who differ. But let it be summoned to endure the severer struggles of life, or to grapple with its sterner duties, or to bring out its own faith into collision with the opposing faith of another,—let it measure itself with the brawny strength of some coarse but intellectual assailant, or face the sneer of some rude scoffer or some discerning sceptic, and the trial will not only detect intellectual incapacity, but uncover a moral weakness; and as doubt and despair rush thickly in upon

the soul, it will see that pretension to faith in excess, is not faith, and the cant about believing, is not believing. By such a trial is it shown that Truth is the only food of faith; and the more clearly Truth is seen, and the more distinctly is it held in the method of its proof, the deeper downward does Faith strike its roots, and the fairer, and richer, and more abundant are the fruits which she yields in profit to man, and in honor to God. So, too, is the weakness of this affected Faith made manifest, as she sinks for a time in despondency, because her cherished arguments, and high pretensions, and accustomed plaudits, are gone, and she finds herself compelled to meet argument with dogmatism, and to bestow her spleenetic contempt upon the adversary whom she cannot face. Happy if the consequence be not a misanthropic and moody anger with the vulgar herd, and a hasty abandonment of the defence of truth, because they are too obtuse to be moved by the high and spiritual arguments of a transcendentalizing theology. "He who begins by loving Christianity better than the truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all."

Not such has been the faith of the real martyrs to principle, in church and state. They who have faced danger with that high minded peace, which was too calm to scoff or dogmatize, they who have bled upon the scaffold of martyred patriotism, or have been burned in the fires of Christian piety, have been made of other stuff than this. They have acted no heroics in sentiment or profession, but have been truly heroes. They saw the truth in her deep and strong foundations, upon them rested their souls, with all the energy of men convinced, and for the truth they cared not if they were called to die. We would not then cultivate faith for the sake of faith, for then do we turn spiritual mountebanks, and actors, and are in danger of doing mockery to the holiest thing, but we would that she should be nurtured by the truth, her vital element and her appropriate life.

Of the influence of spiritualism upon scientific theology, and upon students in theology, we shall offer a word. When it proposes to relieve metaphysical theology of the standing objection, which is sometimes so eloquently urged; that it is unfavorable to spiritual culture, we reply with all due respect to those who bring the charge, that it is the merest humbug.

For it is plain, that every theologian must have his metaphysics, and cannot advance an inch without them. He who urges the objection, therefore, can only mean by it, that those who go more deeply into metaphysics than himself, incur this danger. To allow the objection, then, would be to give license to every theologian to speak ill of the piety of his neighbor, who is blessed with a higher capacity than himself, or who has more diligence to use it faithfully.

But did the charge lie against the common metaphysics, it would equally hold against those called transcendental. As far as they are scientific, so far are they metaphysical, and of course, will harden the heart and dry up the soul. As far as they are meditations, and poetry, and praise, so far are they an ill-assorted mixture to the man who would desire with Baxter, that his intellect should "abhor confusion." However splendid and elevating they may be in their place, that place is not upon the page of science.

But they are friendly to theology, as they see mysteries in nature, and of course are not offended at mysteries in religion. And what philosophy does not see mysteries in nature? What science that is true to the reality of things, does not acknowledge truths behind which she cannot go—first truths, which, as they explain other truths, cannot themselves be explained, but must be received? Surely there are mysteries enough in nature without creating new ones to try the faith of the philosopher upon, so that when he comes to theology he may swallow not only mysteries but absurdities. Better at once adopt the sage conclusion of Sir Thomas Brown: "Methinks there be not impossibilities enough in religion for an active faith; the deepest mysteries ours contains, have not only been illustrated, but maintained by syllogism and the rule of reason. I love to lose myself in a mystery, to pursue my reason to an 'O Altitudo!' 'Tis my solitary recreation to pose my apprehension with those involved enigmas and riddles of the trinity, with incarnation and resurrection. I can answer all the objections of Satan and my rebellious reason, with that odd resolution I learned of Tertullian: 'Certum est quia impossibile est.'"

As far as this spiritualism raises expectations which it is sure to disappoint, and carries the mind away from the humbler course of severe and cautious thinking, and intoxicates it with expectations, that some potent mystery is wrapt in its pe

cular terminology, which is altogether unlike the truths which the English tongue has ever been able to grasp or to utter, or which the English mind has ever brought within the field of its view,—so far is it certain to prepare the way for a mortifying disappointment, when it has wandered its perplexed rounds—and finished the last of the splendid series of the mysteries of initiation, and as the result finds itself, with time misapplied, with an intellect undisciplined, with principles of philosophizing unhinged, and a scheme of philosophy which promised every thing, either as yet half compassed, or when gained, no other and no better than what might have been had, without these weary years of confused and vexing toil. To all, over whom we have influence, we would say, read, study, and ponder these writers as much as you will;—used aright, they will reward you well. But let them not lead you captive as partisans, you know not why, blinded and wilful.

As far as this spiritualism prepares the way by its figments and words, which pass for things, for the reveries of pantheism, and either by its modes of reasoning or the factitious influence of its splendid names, imparts a spirit equally foreign to science, to piety and to sense—the desire to astonish the vulgar by dragging from the rotting heap of ancient heresies some transcendental or quietistic vagary—so far will it curse the church, and cause sadly to err and more sadly to suffer its deluded victims. Let those who would put themselves to school to all that passes under the name of spiritualism, even in the evangelical church, mere tyros in science and theology, look well to the spirit which they raise, and see that they forget not the incantation by which he is to be laid.

But it is time we had concluded. Our readers will remember that we proposed to consider the scientific grounds of this philosophy. That promise we hope to redeem at some future opportunity. We dare not now longer trespass on their patience.

ARTICLE XII.

BIBLICAL RESEARCHES IN PALESTINE.

FIRST SUPPLEMENT.

By Edward Robinson, D. D., Prof. of Bib. Lit. Union Theol. Seminary, New York.

In the Preface to the Biblical Researches in Palestine, it was stated, that the Rev. Eli Smith was about to return to his station at Beirût, taking with him instruments of the best kind in order to verify our former observations, and prosecute further researches in parts of the country not visited by us; and that I hoped to be the medium of communicating his subsequent observations to the public. Mr. Smith's return took place in April, 1841; but the state of confusion and anarchy and war since existing in Mount Lebanon and the adjacent regions, by which the mission has of course been greatly affected, has also hitherto cut off all opportunity for travelling and personal observation on his part. The scenes of desolation and bloodshed which have passed in the interval before the eyes of the missionaries, have been graphically described by Mr. Smith and others in their letters, published from time to time in the *Missionary Herald*, particularly in the numbers for May and June, 1842.

In the mean time, others have been doing the work of surveying the Holy Land much more extensively, and perhaps more effectually, than could in any case have been done by a single individual. It may be recollected, that on the withdrawal of the British fleet from the coast of Syria late in 1840, a corps of engineers, all picked men, were left behind, in order to make a military survey of the country throughout its whole extent. Three officers, Majors Robe, Scott, and Wilbraham, were constantly occupied in making surveys in all quarters; and in the southern part, Lieut. Symonds carried a series of triangles over the greater portion of Judea and the country around the plain of Esdraelon, including lines of altitudes from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea and Lake of Tiberias. Some of these gentlemen are members of the Royal Geographical Society of London; and when the Eng-

lish government shall have made the use it chooses of the results of their labors, it is understood that they will be given to the world.

The intercourse subsisting between the English officers and the American missionaries was of the most friendly character; and the former often communicated to Mr. Smith so much of their observations as was compatible with their confidential duty to their own government. From one of them, Major Robe, he received a written communication respecting the country around Merj 'Ayûn and the sources of the Jordan, accompanied by a sketch-map; and another of them, Lieut. Symonds, gave him the exact result of his measurements to determine the depression of the Dead Sea. These documents are now in my hands. Besides these, Mr. Smith has also transmitted several letters directed to him from the Rev. Samuel Wolcott, one of the American missionaries, who spent the last winter at Jerusalem, and while there took the opportunity of carrying out several inquiries, which Mr. Smith and myself could only begin. The results of his investigations, as well as the communications of the English engineers, are of sufficient importance, as it seems to me, to be laid in detail before the public.

The prospect in respect to future observations, is at present gloomy. The corps of engineers was withdrawn near the close of the last year, 1841; and what is yet to be learned, must be gathered up by individual enterprise and opportunity. To this the confusion and anarchy and insecurity, which now prevail among the people, present a formidable obstacle. In February last, Mr. Smith wrote as follows; and the state of things has not yet changed for the better:

“ Palestine is now in too disturbed a state to allow of much travelling; and I have no hope of its being much better while this [Turkish] government remains. It is a most wretched system of fanaticism, corruption, oppression and anarchy. I fear we must wait till another revolution, before doing much more towards biblical research in the country.”

BASIN OF EL-HULEH AND ITS VICINITY.

It may be recollected, that we were prevented by an insurrection of the Druzes from prosecuting our intended journey by the Lake el-Hûleh and the sources of the Jordan to Da-

mascus; and obtained a view of the lake and region round about only from el-Benit, a high point a short distance north of Safed.* Our subsequent route from Safed to Tyre left also the country upon the Litâny, from the Bûkâ'a to the vicinity of Tibnîn, still unexplored. It is just these districts, including the intervening tract of Merj 'Ayûn, which are covered by the sketch-map of Major Robe. The route of that officer from Beirût was nearly the same as that of M. Berrou, in 1838; by way of Deir el-Kamr, el-Mûkhtâra, Jezzîn and the Jîsr Bûrghûz, or bridge over the Litâny, to Hâsbeiya and Bâniâs; thence across the Merj el-Hûleh (Meadow of the Hûleh) to Kedes, the ancient Kedesh of Naphtali, on the western hills; and so to Safed. After visiting the high range of mountains between Safed and the plain of 'Akka, he examined the country along our route from Safed by Bint Jebeil to Tibnîn and the Jîsr Kakhiéh; proceeded thence to the great castle esh-Shûkîf; and, returning part of the way, followed the usual track by Nûsâra and Bablieh to Sidon. On his map the positions of the principal places are laid down according to their proper relative bearings with each other and with the magnetic north; but, in regard to the distances, he had no other criterion to judge by, than the time accurately noted.

Form of the Lake el-Hûleh.—As we saw this lake from the high ground at el-Benit, the intervening tract of lower table land hid from our view its south-western shores, and caused it to appear almost as a triangle; the northern part being far the broadest.† It turns out that this is nearly its true form; or rather, the map of Maj. Robe gives to it in some degree the shape of a pear; the largest projection, however, being on the north-western part.

Sources of the Jordan.—These are treated of, according to the accounts of ancient writers and modern travellers, in the Biblical Researches, Vol. III. pp. 347—354. Two separate streams of considerable magnitude are there said to enter the lake el-Hûleh from the north, each of which is formed by the junction of two others. The easternmost of these two streams, with its two sources, one at Bâniâs, and the other at

* See Bibl. Res. in Palest. III. p. 339 sq.

† Ibid. p. 339.

Tell el-Kâdy, is the Jordan of ancient and modern times. The westernmost stream, which is longer and larger, is represented as formed by the union of the river of Hâsbeïa, issuing from the Wady et-Teim, and another stream from Merj 'Ayûn.*

The statement thus ventured, that the two main streams enter the lake, or at least its marshes, separately, was not regarded as being fully ascertained; it was made on the strength of various circumstances; for there was then no better positive authority for it than Buckingham, who, at the same time speaks of another imaginary lake, north of the Hûleh. It is highly gratifying, therefore, to find that the map of Maj. Robe fully sustains the position there taken. It exhibits the two main streams as flowing separately, and parallel to each other, quite through the marshes into the lake itself.

The stream from Merj 'Ayûn was inserted on our map in accordance with Seetzen's map, and the testimony of Mr. Smith, who travelled through that district in May, 1835. Mr. S. speaks of it expressly as draining the district of Merj 'Ayûn.† But the stream does not appear on the map of Maj. Robe, nor on that of Bertou. This, at first view is singular; and the more so, because the district of Merj 'Ayûn was often described to me by my fellow-traveller, as a beautiful, fertile, and well-watered plain. But he and Seetzen were there early in the season, when the surplus waters flowed off to join the river of Hâsbeïa; while Maj. Robe and Bertou saw it only in August, when the heats of summer had dried up the waters, leaving probably only the gravelly bed of a winter brook. Instead of this, Maj. Robe's map has a small stream not mentioned by any traveller, lying half way between the branch from Tell el-Kâdy and the river of Hâsbeïa, and flowing into the latter.

The two large fountains, 'Ain el-Mellâhah, and 'Ain Belât, on the western side of the basin of the Hûleh,‡ are given by Maj. Robe; and also four smaller fountains and brooks farther north.

* Bibl. Res. III. p. 353.

† Ibid. App. p. 135.

‡ Ibid. p. 341, App. 135.

Course of the Litâny.—The course of this river from the Jisr Bürghüz to the vicinity of Tibnîn, has not before been explored, and is marked as uncertain on our map, and on that of Berghaus. It was only known, that the stream winds through a gorge among the mountains, often between precipices, which are sometimes of great height. Maj. Robe was able to overlook the whole of the portion thus unknown, and has represented it on his map. Only one bridge over the Litâny, the Jisr Bürghüz, was known to us in the mountains; but the map exhibits three, viz. Jisr Bürghüz, on the north of Merj 'Ayûn; Jisr el-Hardely, west by north of Merj 'Ayûn on the direct route from Bâniâs to Sidon; and Jisr Kakhieh, north of Tibnîn. The district of Merj 'Ayûn itself, on Maj. Robe's map, assumes an oval shape, the longest diameter being from N. to S.

Position of the Castle esh-Shûkîf.—Here, unfortunately, both the map and the text of the Researches require an important correction. We saw this castle at a distance, on our route from Safed to Tyre, when near Haddâta, in the region of Tibnîn. It there bore N. 40° E., at the distance of several hours.* This of course gave us no clue to its precise position, which had to be made out from other sources. Mr. Smith had mentioned, that he had formerly seen the castle, when crossing the Litâny by the Jisr Bürghüz; and I had then received the wrong impression, that it was situated near that bridge. Mr. Buckingham also, in passing from Bâniâs to Sidon, crossed a bridge over the Litâny, *near* which, he says, on the hill above, was the castle esh-Shûkîf.† As we then knew of only the bridge Jisr Bürghüz in this region, it was a matter of course to suppose that Mr. B. referred to this latter; and the position of the castle was laid down accordingly.‡ But it now turns out, that the fortress is situated

* Ibid. III. p. 376.

† Travels among the Arab Tribes, p. 407.

‡ I am not sure, after all, which bridge it was that Buckingham crossed. One would naturally suppose it to be the Jisr el-Hardely, which is on the more direct route from Bâniâs to Sidon; and then his remark as to the *nearness* of the castle would be correct. But he says, that in one hour after crossing the bridge, he passed another stream, the Jerma, and then, in half an hour, he came to the village Jerma. Now, on Maj

just below the bridge el-Hardely, on the west of Merj 'Ayûn, some twelve or fifteen miles more south-westerly than its position on our map.

I must therefore do Burckhardt the justice, to take back a remark made in correcting an error in his bearing of the castle, as seen from the mountain north of Bâniâs ; its true bearing from that point would probably be about W. by N. as he doubtless intended to write it.*

DEPRESSION OF THE DEAD SEA, ETC.

The depression of the great valley of the Jordan, which now turns out to be so immense, has been noticed only within the last five years. Lying parallel to the coast of the Mediterranean, at the distance of less than fifty miles, there appears not to have been the slightest suspicion in by-gone centuries, that its bed was not higher than the level of the adjacent seas ; although from several points, both the valley and the Mediterranean were alike visible, and the Egyptian climate of the Ghâr might easily have led to the suggestion of some unusual cause.

Nor does the first notice of this depression appear to have resulted from any previous suspicion of it. In March, 1837, Messrs. Moore and Beke, in attempting a survey of the Dead Sea, were led to make observations to ascertain its level, by means of the boiling point of water ; and were greatly astonished at the result, which gave a depression of about 500 English feet. A month or two later, Schubert's barometrical measurement gave it at 598.5 Paris feet. In 1838, Russegger, and also Bertou, made it out by the barometer to be more than 1300 Paris feet.†

The measurements of the Lake of Tiberias by Schubert

Robe's map, the stream Jerma is marked about an hour from Jisr Bûrghûz, but enters the Lîtâny *above* the Jisr el-Hardely ; while the village Jerma lies on the route from Jisr Bûrghûz to Sidon, but not on that from Jisr el-Hardely. This seems to show, that, after all, Mr Buckingham must have crossed the upper bridge at Bûrghûz.

* Bibl. Res. III. p. 351, note.

† Ibid. II. p. 222.

and Bertou, were still more diverse and inconsistent in their results. The former made the depression of that lake to be 535 Paris feet, only 65 feet less than that of the Dead Sea; while he made the Jordan at the bridge just south of the Huleh to be 350 Paris feet above the Mediterranean; a difference of 880 feet in the distance of about five miles! Bertou gave the depression of the Lake of Tiberias at about 700 feet; and that of the Huleh itself at about 18 feet.*

All these different results were utterly inconsistent with each other; and in some respects appeared to us to be equally so with the nature of the country. I therefore ventured, in 1840, to suggest, that "so great is the uncertainty in all such partial measurements and observations, (as evinced in the like case of the Caspian Sea,) that the question can never be decided with exactness, until the intervening country shall have been surveyed, and the relative level of the two seas trigonometrically ascertained."†

The fulfilment of this wish was nearer at hand than I could then anticipate. It was accomplished by Lieut. Symonds, in 1841; and a slight notice of his results was laid before the Royal Geographical Society of London, at their meeting January 24th, 1842; from which an erroneous statement found its way into the newspapers. A full report of his measurements and calculations was afterwards laid before the society by Lieut. Symonds himself; but no further publication appears yet to have been made respecting them. I therefore subjoin the following account, transmitted to me by Mr. Smith under date of Feb. 7th, 1842.

"I am happy to inform you, that the altitude [depression] of the Dead Sea has been ascertained by exact trigonometrical measurement. Lieut. Symonds, of the British Royal Engineers, surveyed the greater part of Judea, and the region around the plain of Esdraelon by triangulation; and while doing it, carried a double line of altitudes from the sea at Yafa to Neby Samwil, and thence another double line to the Dead Sea. He found the latter to be 1337 feet below the Mediterranean! By similar observations he ascertained the Lake of Tiberias to be 84 feet below the Mediterranean.

* Bibl. Res. II. p. 595.

† Ib. p. 222.

These numbers he gave me himself; and at the same time showed me his calculations."

JERUSALEM.

The Rev. Samuel Wolcott was among the missionaries sent out to Syria in 1839. He remained at Beirût; and during the bombardment of that place in September, 1840, withdrew with the Rev. W. Thomson to Cyprus; whence, however, they returned immediately afterwards. During the following year, (1841,) he was employed at Beirût and in the mountains; where he has shown himself to be an active and keen observer of men and things. On the first of December last, he arrived in the Holy City, where he spent the winter, occupying himself with missionary labor, and at the same time exploring the environs and antiquities of the place. The two letters now in my hands, from him to Mr. Smith, are dated Jan. 10th and 25th, 1842; and serve to show, at least, that the first six weeks of his sojourn in Jerusalem, were not passed in idleness.

Ancient Subterranean Gateway under the Mosk el-Aksa.—The first information as to the existence of this gateway, as also the first definite account of the adjacent vaults under the area of the Haram, were given to the public in the Biblical Researches, from the statements and drawings of Mr. Catherwood.* The vaults, indeed, are mentioned by Breidenbach and Fabri in 1483, and Baumgarten in 1507; and Maundrell in 1697 relates, that he saw them from without, and describes them as consisting of two aisles extending one hundred feet or more under Mount Moriah, etc.† But how he could thus have seen them was to us inexplicable; unless at that time there might have been a breach in the wall. The following extracts from Mr. Wolcott's letters, go to clear up the whole difficulty. Under date of Jan. 10th, he writes as follows:

"On reading of the ancient vaults under the temple-area, (or the present Haram,) seen by Maundrell and other early travellers from a garden within the city-wall on the south, I

* Bib. Res. I. pp. 446—452.

† Ib. p. 446. Maundrell's Journey, Lond. 1810, p. 135.

felt at once the difficulty suggested by Prof. Robinson, from having just observed the extreme solidity and antiquity of all the lower part of the southern wall of the Haram enclosed within the city. I visited the spot again soon after, for the purpose of examining this point. It is obvious that the wall lies in its massive original strength, unmoved and immovable. At the point where the city wall meets it, or, rather, connecting this with that of the Haram, you will recollect, is a large irregular building, now unoccupied.* Its lower rooms adjoining the garden or field within the city, are accessible from it. I entered the one adjacent to the Haram, whose wall forms one of its sides, and exhibits the same appearance as without; excluding up to this point the supposition of any breach in it, since its foundation.

"My attention was now arrested by another object. The arch which forms the ceiling of the room, as it rises from its eastern wall, twelve or fifteen feet above the floor, cuts off the square corner of a sculptured stone, projecting several inches from the solid wall of the Haram, with its side and front profusely ornamented, though now blackened. It struck me at once, that this was a portion of the ancient gateway discovered by Mr. Catherwood, and described in the Researches.[†]

"I now went round by St. Stephen's gate to examine the spot without the wall; remarking, as I passed the Golden Gate, that the architecture which I had just seen was of the same florid character. I found a room in the exterior building, east of the one in which I had been, the entrances to which were closed. But it evidently did not embrace the whole width of the ancient gateway, the eastern part of whose ornamented arch with other relics, still remained in the wall outside. In the summit of this arch is a window, which the accumulation of rubbish here has left not more than ten feet above the ground. I climbed up to this window, on the

* Described in the Bib. Res. as a low, square tower, forming a gateway or entrance to the city, now closed. Vol. I. p. 387.

† I have a distinct recollection of having in like manner noticed this sculptured stone; but as we then had no suspicion of the existence of the gateway, this led to no further results.—R.

wall, and looked through the iron grating. I found myself directly over the gate, (or over the eastern part, for it was double,) and the broad passage [aisle] leading down to it, extending, with a row of columns in the middle, as far as I could see. I observed a door near the bottom of the passage opening to the east.

"I found here, unexpectedly, a solution of the difficulty which I had felt. Here were the 'vaults' which Maundrell saw. They could have been no other; and the 'two aisles' of these and their general appearance accord with his description. The same may, perhaps, be said of the other travellers referred to. In their day, the outer building probably did not exist; and the passage-way was visible from an opening in the city."

The very next day, Jan. 11th, Mr. Wolcott again visited, with Mr. Tipping, an English artist, the western room first above described, in which he had noticed a portion of the gateway; and while pursuing their examination, they were enabled, by the aid of a Mussulman boy, to obtain access to the eastern room already mentioned. Here they very unexpectedly found themselves before the entrance of the western half of the double gateway, which opens into the said room. They entered the avenue under the Mosk, and traversed its aisles, taking then but a cursory view. Under date of Jan. 25th, Mr. W. writes as follows:

"I have again visited the passage and gateway under the Haram for a more particular examination. The evidences of its antiquity are unquestionable. Connected with each gate are two marble Corinthian columns, indicating, as Dr. R. has observed, a Roman origin; and there are also works of Saracenic work of a still later date. But the foundations are Jewish; and both walls of the passage are composed in part of smooth, bevelled stones. The arches are of hewn stone, and are the noblest that I have seen in the country. As I walked through the broad aisles, in a stillness broken only by the sound of my footsteps, it was a thrilling thought, that I was treading one of the avenues through which the tribes had pressed to the temple. I seemed to see the throng of worshippers, and to hear their chant: 'I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the Lord. I will pay my vows now in the presence of all his people, in the court of the Lord's house, in the midst of thee, O Jerusalem. Praise ye the Lord.'

"I subsequently visited the place with Mr. Tipping, who has taken an accurate drawing of it. We took a few measurements. The bottom of the passage is now lower than the ground without; but as rubbish has collected here, it must once have been higher.* Its width is forty-two feet; leaving, exclusive of the columns in the middle, about nineteen feet for each aisle. Between the gates is a partition extending ten or twelve feet within, composed of stones of that length and of great thickness; that of one which we measured was four and a half feet. The two longest stones which I saw, were in one of the side walls, each thirteen feet in length and bevelled. The first column is twenty feet high, and fifteen and a half feet in circumference, and is a single block; its capital being a part of it. Beyond the second column, the floor of the passage is raised several feet, and in the western aisle is mounted by steps. In the eastern aisle, in place of steps is a layer of immense stones with their ends bevelled; and upon it, eight or ten feet back, is a wall of mason-work, a little higher than the upper floor of the passage. Of the columns on the elevated portion, only the first is round, and of a single stone, like the lower ones; the rest are square and built with masonry. The upper end of the western aisle is parted off into a small room. At the head of the eastern is the entrance from above, by a common picket gate, to which a few steps lead down, and through which we could see the green grass of the Haram.† A *Mihrab* [niche of prayer] has been erected here, and another at the foot of the aisle. They have also been placed in the recesses of two door-ways near the bottom, on each side of the gateway, which have been walled up. We have ascertained that the place is still visited for Muslim devotion. We were fortunate in finding it vacant. An owl perched on the capital of one of the columns, and a bat which flitted across the aisles, were the only living things we saw,—representatives of the mournful decay of the glory of the place."

* Mr. Catherwood supposed the bottom of the gateway to be fifteen or twenty feet above the ground outside; Bib. Res. I. p. 451. He would seem not to have passed out into the exterior building; and probably judged merely from the window and the external traces as seen outside.—R.

† See Bib. Res. I. p. 450.

In another part of the same letter Mr. Wolcott speaks of the square exterior building above mentioned, in the following manner :

" Mr. Tipping and myself are fully persuaded, that this was never a gate. The stones with which the arch (forming the supposed entrance) is walled up, appear to be of the same age with the others; and this, you know, is the common mode of building. The *outer* layer appears indeed to have been laid up subsequently; but the inner fits in with the walls of the apartment, and would seem to have been built at the same time. There might possibly have been an open court here. But a gate would be supposing a thoroughfare, where every appearance is against it; and would require passers in and out to mount ten or twelve feet into a large building, pass through it, and descend; which their animals certainly could not do.* We cannot discover the faintest trace of a gate or passage way; nor in such proximity to the Dung-gate, so called, could there have been occasion for any. There are two or three similar, but smaller arches walled up in the adjoining eastern room; and three or four more further east, in the southern wall of the Haram. The wonder is, to what use the building could ever have been applied; and that such an excrescence on the Haram should have been permitted."

This building both Mr. Smith and the writer were led to regard as a gate walled up, from its general resemblance to the walled-up portals of the gate of Herod and the Dung-gate so called.† We noticed it first from the outside, and had no doubt of its being such a gate, leading apparently up into the Haram. But as we then had no suspicion of the existence of the ancient subterranean gateway; and as, on examining it from the inside of the city, we found it apparently leading into the city, in the same way as the Yâfa gate and others, we rested in this supposition, without giving the walls so close an examination as Mr. W. appears to have done.

* This account I do not fully understand. So far as my recollection goes, the floor of the western room which we entered, was nearly, or quite, on the same level as the ground farther west. At any rate, the room had then recently been used as a stable for horses or mules.—R.

† See Bib. Res. I. p. 387.

Knowing what we now do, we can more easily understand what the older travellers say of the "vaults," and may also perhaps account for the external building. In Felix Fabri's time, A. D. 1483, the city wall had not yet been rebuilt; and he speaks here of "many great hewn stones lying in the open street; over which stones he climbed up to the wall, and entering through a hole [probably the portal of the ancient gateway] came into high, long, beautiful, arched vaults, under the area of the temple."* Here was then no city wall; but there would seem to have been a thoroughfare. The wall was built in 1542;† and in 1697 Maundrell goes and visits the entrance of the vaults at a point *within* the city. From all this it seems to me possible, and perhaps not improbable, that, when the city wall was rebuilt, this external building was erected as a gateway to accommodate a former thoroughfare here leading out of the city, and also to cover the portal of the ancient subterranean gateway, which was then still used *as an entrance to the Haram*; that the external opening in this building towards the South, was early walled up and the thoroughfare cut off, still leaving open the portal leading up under the Mosk; that it was in this state when Maundrell saw it, he having entered from the west; and that, since his day, this portal has been further closed by the partition wall dividing the building into two parts, or at least by walling up any passage through it which might formerly have existed. At any rate, I could wish the building might be examined in connexion with some such mode of explanation; and if this conjecture should turn out to be without foundation, some other better hypothesis might then be suggested.

Fountain under the Grand Mosk.—The information we were able to collect respecting this fountain; our attempts to obtain permission to descend into the well; and the reasons which compelled us to leave the enterprise unfinished; are all detailed in the Biblical Researches, Vol. I. p. 508 sq. The well is more than eighty feet deep; the mouth of it is on a platform, or rather the flat roof of a low building, eighteen or twenty feet above the level of the adjacent street. We ascended to it, in all our visits, by a flight of steps from the street leading to the southernmost entrance of the Haram.

* Reissb. ins h. Land p. 279.

† Bib. Res. I. p. 384.

Mr. Wolcott was led to undertake anew the enterprise, thus abandoned by us ; and in carrying it out he displayed a spirit of perseverance and resolute intrepidity, worthy of all praise. The story is best told in his own words, under date of January 19th :

“ My interest was much excited by the notice in the Researches of the unexplored fountain under the Haram. On inquiring of our friends here, if there was any hope of getting permission to descend into the well described, they observed justly, that Muslim prejudice was now more violent than when you were here, and that it was out of the question. I felt a desire, nevertheless, to see the well, and called on the bath-keeper, who conducted me to it. A little conversation with him satisfied me, that he would never facilitate any attempt to explore it.

“ I visited the well again the next day, and found two men drawing water for the bath, which they poured into an adjacent cistern. They were Fellâhs from Kefr Selwân, and told me that they worked here by day, and returned to their village at evening. They were very civil, and offered me some of the water to drink, remarking that it was like that in the fountain of Siloam ; which was evident to the taste.”

After several visits to the well, Mr. W. succeeded in making a private arrangement to descend into it ; though he was not able to prevail on any one to descend with him. Accordingly, on the 5th of January, he repaired to the place, with only a servant boy, taking with him a rope and pulley, and found there persons ready to let him down. “ To one end of my rope they attached one of their large leathern buckets, which they let down and filled, to serve in part as a counterpoise. Having prepared myself and adjusted the rope, I lighted one of my candles, and commenced the descent. The entrance is not quite two feet square, and so continues for a few feet, when it suddenly expands, and the remainder of the passage I should judge to be twelve feet square. I was letdown too rapidly to scrutinize closely ; but all that I could distinguish appeared to be solid rock, and the faces were hewn square. On meeting the bucket, I found it streaming at a dozen apertures, and for the rest of the way was under a cold shower-bath, and could with difficulty keep my light without the circle of it. Several feet above the water, I observed four arched recesses in the rock, opposite one another, each about two feet

deep, six high, and four wide. A little lower, six feet above the water, I noticed a doorway in the rock. On reaching the surface of the water, by the vibrations of the rope before I could gain a footing, my light was extinguished, and I was left in total darkness. I had previously remarked beneath the doorway a shelving shallow side of the well, which I reached before disengaging myself. My matches were yet dry, and I now lighted other candles, which I had brought.

"I first mounted to the doorway, which was small and led to an arched chamber excavated in the rock, about fifteen feet in length and ten in breadth. Its height was but three or four feet; and its floor was uneven and covered with loose fragments of rock. The ceiling or curvilinear arch, running lengthwise, was very regular and overlaid with stucco. As I turned to descend, I noticed that the excavation below, forming the water-basin, was more irregular than above. There were no steps leading down; and the chamber did not seem to be constructed with any reference to the water.

"On the other side, directly opposite, was the passage or channel for the water. These were the only two openings from the well. I wished to ascertain their directions, and had brought a delicate pocket-compass, which was unfortunately injured in the descent, and I now found it to be useless. I regret this accident, as I could myself form no conjecture on the point; and I think that any data which the natives can have, must be very uncertain.

"I now descended into the water, the temperature of which was much milder than I expected to find it at this season. The bottom of the well was uneven and gravelly. The average depth of the water was four and a half feet, and it was about the same in the passage. The entrance of the passage was more than ten feet high. I had just passed into it, when I came to an irregular opening, twenty feet high, and perhaps as long and broad. It had once been covered, in the direction of the passage, with an arch of hewn stone; the lower parts of which remained, though their base was higher than the top of the present water-channel. I climbed up on the right, and looked over the portion of the wall remaining there; but saw here, as above, nothing but the natural rock, within which the wall had been laid. Beyond this opening, the passage, which was two or three feet wide, was covered with stones laid transversely, leaving it about five feet

high. It was not straight, though its general course was direct. The bottom was not flat, but terminated in a groove. The cutting was so uneven as to suggest the thought, that advantage might have been taken of a natural seam or fissure in the rock. The covering of the passage was laid without order, with occasional breaches running up three or four feet; and was evidently composed of the ruins of some other structure. There were ordinary hewn stones; and then there was a section of polished marble shafts, half a foot in diameter, some of them square and fluted. In one place, the end of a granite column, a foot or more in diameter, had sunk obliquely into the passage; and at that stage of the water could with difficulty be passed. I came at length to a well or basin in the passage, and could proceed no further.

“There had been all the way but a few inches from the surface of the water to the top of the passage, barely enough to keep my head and carry my light between them. I had taken an India-rubber life-preserved, which I found serviceable; without it, indeed, especially as I was alone, I should hardly have ventured so far. The opposite wall of the basin, which was apparently square and of the same width as the passage, now shut down before me; and there was not here space enough above the water to allow me to reach and explore it thoroughly. Above, I could see only the face of the rock, and below, could only reach with my foot the rim of the basin, on a level with the bottom of the passage. One would naturally have inferred, that this was the fountain-head. If it be a mere descent to a lower gallery extending further, it can evidently be traversed only when the water is very low. I now measured with a rule the distance back to the well, and found it to be eighty feet. I may add, that this is the only actual measurement I took. I was prepared to make careful observations, but situated as I was, it was impossible.

“I had taken five or six candles with me, anticipating a longer exploration. Reserving one of them, I now illuminated the passage with the others; and having taken my last view of it, leaving them burning there, I emerged into the well and prepared for the last stage,—to be hauled up eighty-one feet by these Arabs. I gave the signal, and was started; and had just reached the recesses above mentioned, when my light was again extinguished. My descent had been uniform, but I was necessarily drawn up at intervals, which

caused a greater vibration. I spun around the dark vault, striking against one side and another, but so gently as to receive no injury. The excursion was soon finished ; and though I had not penetrated so far as I had hoped, yet a sense of safety more than counterbalanced my feeling of disappointment ; and I was happy to find myself again above ground, beneath the open heaven.

“ The impression which I have brought from the visit is, that this excavation was not originally a well. What connexion with a mere well have artificial recesses and chambers in the rock ?* It has a more general resemblance to some of the spacious sepulchral excavations without the city. The wall, whose remains I noticed in the larger opening, I supposed at the time had been only a covering for the passage ; but I am now inclined to the belief, that here was formerly a chamber arched and stuccoed like the one opposite ; that its floor and doorway have been cut down to make a passage for the water, and perhaps a portion of its arch with its pillars used to form the present irregular covering of the channel ; and that the area between the chambers has been hollowed into a basin for the water. This thought did not occur to me during the examination ; and I do not submit the opinion with confidence. And if the passage extends further, it must be fully explored before any just conclusion can be come at.

“ I am sorry thus to increase doubt, where I had hoped to throw light. The principal thing that I conceive I have done, is to demonstrate the impossibility of a satisfactory examination, except when the water is at the lowest point, near the close of the dry season.”

Thus far Mr. Wolcott. It is indeed greatly to be regretted, that an enterprise so intrepidly undertaken, should not have been crowned with more success. The result is, unquestionably, to increase our doubt and perplexity. If the excavation were originally a well, how are we to account for the chambers and the later walls of masonry and the ceiling of columns,

* Yet the well of Job, far down in the valley below, has traces of ornamental arches in its masonry ; and an Arabian writer describes it as having in its lower part a grotto or chamber walled up, from which the water strictly issues. See Bibl. Res. I. pp. 491, 492.—R.

which certainly could not have been laid when there was water in the passage? Or if it were *not* originally a well, whence comes the present copious volume of water? Future researches may perhaps decide the question, if made in the month of September or October.

The distance of the well from the adjacent entrance of the Haram, Mr. W. found, by measurement, to be 124 feet; instead of 135 feet, as given in the Researches, Vol. I. p. 509. This error was mine; and probably arose from the fact, that the distance was measured only by paces; which ought indeed to have been mentioned.

Aqueduct from Solomon's Pools. The account of this aqueduct, so far as we saw it, is given in the Bibl. Researches, Vol. I. pp. 514 sq. Unfortunately, under the pressure of such a multiplicity of objects, and not then being fully aware of its antiquity and former importance to the city, we neglected to inquire out its course after entering the city, or its point of termination in the Haram. When afterwards the subject came up, in preparing the work in Berlin, I keenly felt this deficiency; which, of course, could there be supplied only by the conjecture, that the aqueduct was carried along within the city under the eastern side of Zion, and that it probably passed into the Haram over the mound which we noticed at the north-east corner of the same hill. It is gratifying to find this point rendered certain by the examination of Mr. Wolcott, writing under date of Jan. 25th.

"We were one day examining the remains of the arch in the western wall of the Haram, when we passed to the opposite side of the valley, near where the bridge may be supposed to have terminated. A few feet north of this spot, we observed a passage, eight or ten feet high at its entrance, though soon contracting, cut in the solid rock, which here forms the [perpendicular] western side of the Tyropoeon and the eastern brow of Zion. On approaching and entering it, we perceived occasional cavities in the bottom, broken through the earthen pipes of an ancient aqueduct, which we recognized as the one that connected the Pools in Bethlehem with the Temple. Supposing that a passage, thus opening into the valley, and visible to every passer by, was already well

* Bibl. Res. I. p. 514, comp. p. 393.

understood, we examined it no further at this time.* But on turning to the Researches, I perceived that the course of the aqueduct within the city was apparently unknown to any traveller ; and found, on enquiry, that it was also unknown to the Frank residents. I observed, moreover, that in the published Plans of the city, the directions assigned to it were conjectural and mistaken. We then decided to explore it thoroughly ; and first traced it without the walls. Its course is marked not only by the stones with which it is built, but also by occasional openings into the pipes. Both of these indicate the very spot where it passes under the city wall, about one hundred feet west of the point designated on Catherwood's Plan (which takes it into the valley), and perhaps three hundred feet east of that marked in the Plan which accompanies the Researches. It is directly south of the passage which we had seen cut in the rock ; to which we traced it at intervals within the city. The section in the rock extends fifty feet or more, which I passed through ; and the aqueduct is then supported for an equal distance by a wall of masonry fifteen feet high against the face of the rock, when it again passes into the hill and beneath the dwellings which cover it. A small passage is built with stones over the pipes ; and its cobwebs had never been disturbed. I entered with a light one hundred feet ; but chose not to proceed further alone. Mr. T. and myself together, afterwards penetrated forty feet beyond ; and were then stopped by some modern masonry under which the pipes continue. The passage is very narrow, and some parts of it we crawled through with great difficulty. But it would have well repaid further toil, if we could have reached the ancient reservoirs of the temple. Our general course had been north-west, (?) and we had now traced the aqueduct four or five hundred feet within the city along the side of Zion, and bearing towards the ridge which crosses the Tyropoeon ; through which it evidently passes into the Haram, as suggested in the Researches. The street which leads down directly from the southern end of the Bazars to the Haram, terminating in its principal western entrance, is on the summit of this ridge, descending towards the Haram the whole distance."

* I have a distinct recollection of this opening ; but we did not examine it further, probably for the same reason.—R.

Mr. Wolcott suggests, that this last remark may serve to correct the general statement made in the Researches (Vol. I. p. 394) as to the western entrances of the Haram, viz. that they all "are reached by an ascent, and some of them at least by steps." This does not hold true of the entrance from the street passing across the mound.*

Tombs of the Judges. The account of these in the Researches (Vol. I. pp. 527, 528,) was not drawn up from any minute examination or any measurements of our own. The description of the first and largest room is correct so far as it goes. As to the rest, Mr. Wolcott gives the following as a more exact description; beginning immediately after the quotation from Sandys respecting the side of the room "cut full of holes in manner of a dove-house."

"The upper crypts open out into regular arches, or arched recesses, three feet deep, each including three or four. On the east and south sides of the ante-chamber, doorways lead to two other apartments, each about eight feet square; the former of which has crypts on three of its sides like those in the ante-room, and the latter has only the lower rows with nothing but the arched recesses above. At the south-west corner of the ante-room, a few steps lead down through the floor to an irregular apartment, about twelve feet square under it, without niches. A similar passage in the north-east corner of the ante-room leads down eastward into a room

* In the Researches (I. p. 393) it is said that this mound "is probably rubbish, the accumulation of ages; though the houses in the vicinity prevented us from ascertaining whether it extends quite across the valley." This last remark, as it stands, may seem unintelligible; since one of the chief streets passes over the whole length of the mound into the Haram. But in passing down this street, one is not usually aware of the mound at all; and the other street which crosses it from north to south, we traversed only once, and did not then note, that the top of the ridge was occupied by a street. At that time we had no suspicion of the nature of the mound, or of its connexion with the aqueduct; all this occurred to me afterwards at Berlin; where, of course, I had only imperfect notes of an imperfect observation. Hence the mention of the houses; which it now appears have nothing to do with the matter.—R.

five feet square ; from which there is a passage eastward into a still lower apartment ten feet square, differing from the others in having on three sides the upper tiers of crypts alone with the arched recesses."

It is suggested in the Researches, that there may perhaps be passages down from the remaining corners of the large room. Mr. Wolcott ascertained that there is none in one of these corners, and probably none in the other. His more accurate description explains the statements of Cotovicus and Doubdan, referred to on p. 528, note 1.

Tomb of Helena. This mausoleum, heretofore commonly known as the Tombs of the Kings, is fully described, and its connexion with Helena vindicated, in the *Bibl. Researches*, Vol. I. pp. 528—538. Our own fruitless attempt at further examination, as also that of Irby and Mangles, are there detailed. A renewed attempt is mentioned by Mr. Wolcott.

"A quotation in the Researches* from Irby and Mangles, seemed to give encouragement that there might be another set of apartments connected with the tomb, and another entrance. Mr. Tipping accordingly hired two workmen to clear away the rubbish again from the opposite end of the portico, assisted by our man Yüsuf, who was also with the party which you employed. The work was done in a few hours. We found the block which the first party describe, over the supposed entrance. On reaching its upper surface, Yüsuf said that this was as low as you excavated. It is an irregular stone, three or four feet square, and seems to have been broken away from the front of the portico. We removed it, but found no opening beneath it ; and laid bare the rock for several feet, without discovering any trace of a passage. None probably ever existed. This supposition is confirmed by the appearance of the rock, which on this side is less firm and compact, and less suitable for excavation, than the opposite portion ; as is apparent from the face of it, both in the portico and in the court."

At the eastern end of the broad trench on the south of the court of this tomb, forming an approach to its entrance,† a small opening is visible in the face of the rock, leading into an excavated chamber. This we entered so far

* Vol I. p. 533.

† Ibid. p. 529.

as to perceive that the room was large and empty ; but did not examine it further, and, among the multitude of similar phenomena, we made no note of it. Messrs. W. and T. explored it, and found an apartment thirty feet by twenty-five. "On the eastern and southern sides have been cut deep channels, the former seven and the latter four feet wide, separated by a small strip of the rock, in which a narrow passage has been cut. The remainder of the apartment consists of the natural rock, cut into broad steps or offsets, leading down to the eastern channel ; a portion of the rock remaining in the middle as a support. The whole apartment was stuccoed. We were at a loss to assign its use ; but concluded it to have been a bath." It is difficult, however, to see what a bath could have to do in connexion with the Tomb of Helena ; and just as difficult to give any other probable explanation of the purpose of this chamber.

Tombs of the Prophets.—These tombs on the Mount of Olives were not visited by us, but are briefly described in the Researches (Vol. I. p. 539) from the accounts of Doubdan and Pococke. Mr. Wolcott furnishes the following description of them.

"The entrance to these tombs is through a hole in the rock above, into a circular apartment, about twenty feet in diameter ; a side entrance to which is blocked up. Two passages lead from it, (and a third appears to have been walled up,) extending thirty feet each, in a direct line. Between them run two galleries in concentric curves, one at their extreme end, the other in the middle. When free from rubbish, they are about ten feet high and six broad, arched and stuccoed. The outer gallery is 115 feet in length, and contains the niches, thirty-two in number, extending outwards on the level of its floor, on the further side. Two small chambers open into it, containing half a dozen niches. A narrow excavation leading from the most northern passage, terminates at the distance of more than one hundred feet, in a clayey, friable soil ; which is perhaps the reason that the galleries were not continued.

"These could not have been the 'subterraneous chambers' mentioned by Dr. Clarke ; which, moreover, were 'on the very pinnacle of the mountain.' The crypt which he describes at length, was a mere cistern. On the southern summit of the Mount of Olives, are three or four precisely like

it, about twenty feet deep, connected probably with former buildings here, of which there are traces. A few paces lower, between them and the tombs, is still another, ten feet deeper. They are similar to those which abound north of the city ; and inferior to some of them. We came across a large one in that quarter, supported by arches. The attempt of Dr. Clarke, to connect a common cistern with the idolatry of Solomon and the worship of Astaroth, devoting learned notes to the discussion, and sending travellers in pursuit of Pagan remains upon Mount Olivet, is most unpardonable."—Compare the similar remarks in Bibl. Res. I. p. 539, note 3.

Former Tower in the N. W. corner of the City. The remains of this tower, or bastion, are described in the Researches, Vol. I. p. 471, "as consisting of a large square area, or platform, built up solidly of rough stones, fifteen or twenty feet in height, and paved on the top." At the S. W. corner of it, near the ground, "three courses of large bevelled stones, rough hewn, pass into the mass diagonally, in such a way as to show that they lay here before the tower and bastion were built." These we referred to the ancient *third* wall of Josephus ; the foundations of which we could trace from near this point to a considerable distance northwards, outside of the city.

To our account of this ruin, Mr. Wolcott adds the following. "Besides the bevelled stones described in the S. W. corner, a doorway in the N. W. corner leads into a small room, in which are four similar layers ; and these, like the former, do not seem to have been disturbed. Mr. T. refers them to the age of the ancient wall. The site is perhaps the highest in the city ; and a strip of the Dead Sea is visible from the present summit. The native name of the ruin is Kûl'at Yellâd.

Mr. W. suggests, whether this point may not have been the position of the tower of Psephinos, described by Josephus ; remarking that the ancient wall appears to have here formed a right angle. But the position assigned by Josephus to that tower, was the north-west corner of the city as enclosed by Agrippa's or the third wall,—a point much farther towards the north, as is shown by the remaining traces of that wall.—See Bibl. Res. I. pp. 458, 465 sq.

Ancient Khân. During our visit to the well, connected with the fountain under the Haram, I recollect noticing to-

wards the south, (on the opposite side of the street, I think,) a large oblong open court, with traces of ruined buildings. I am not sure, whether this is the same described by Mr. Wolcott in the following paragraph.

" Passing north of the court just mentioned, I was struck with the appearance of its southern side ; and think it deserves a passing mention. Its foundations are the bevelled stones of Jewish architecture ; and three massive arches lead beneath a terrace supported by twenty-four columns of masonry. The plan was too extensive for a private edifice ; and I found on enquiry, that it was known as a ruined *Khân*, by the two names of *Khân Emîr Hasan*, and *Khân Otuz Bir*. It probably belonged to the early days of the Muslim conquest ; and is one of the most compact ancient substructures within the city. It is in the centre of the block, a few feet south of west from the well, and west of the Grand Mosk. It communicates at present with no street ; and descending into the court, although in the heart of the city, I seemed to be in entire seclusion."

'Amwâs, Emmaus, i. e. Nicopolis. This place we saw from Tell es-Sâfieh, but not afterwards. On our map it is laid down on the south of the road from Yâfa to Jerusalem, on the authority of Prokesch and others. But the text holds of it the following language : " It is said by some to lie about one hour from Lâtrôn towards the south ; while other information places it ten or fifteen minutes north of Lâtrôn, towards Yâlo."*

Mr. Wolcott communicates the following remark, under date of Jan. 11th. " I am reminded to tell you, that Mr. Tipping says you have put down Emmaus ('Amwâs) on the map in the wrong position, *south* of the Jerusalem road, instead of *north* of it, where he found it last week."

Correction in the Biblical Researches. Mr. W. was led to suspect, that the measure of 630 feet, assigned to the southern wall of the Haram, outside of the city wall, (Vol. I. p. 395,) was too great. This measurement included the distance, from the point where the city wall would join the south wall of the Haram, to the S. E. corner of the latter, viz. 60 feet for the exterior building in the corner, and 570 feet beyond ; as I find on recurring to my original pencil-notes.

* *Bibl. Res. Ill. p. 30. Comp. II. p. 363.*

This last distance Messrs Wolcott and Tipping found on careful measurement to be only 550 feet ; and further, by like measurement, both within and without the city, they ascertained " that the whole length of the southern wall of the Haram, as nearly as it can be measured, is 915 feet, instead of 955 feet as given by Prof. R." (Vol. I. p. 430,) making a difference of forty feet. " This correction," Mr. W. remarks, " will help his argument." I am, however, unable to account for the error. This measurement of the circumference of the city was one of our first in Jerusalem ; it was made by me alone, our two Arab servants carrying the tape. It of course did not pretend to any great accuracy ; and the correction made by Mr. W. of three feet in the length of the eastern wall of the Haram, (1525 feet, instead of 1528,) does not surprise me. Had the other error in the southern wall amounted to 100 feet, instead of 40, I should at once have supposed I had counted one length of the tape twice over. As it is, it may have arisen, perhaps, from some mistake in reading off the number of feet on the tape, when not stretched its whole length.

ARTICLE XIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*Lectures in Divinity, by the late George Hill, D. D., Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. Edited from his manuscript by his son, the Rev. Alexander Hill, minister of Dailly.* Philadelphia : Herman Hooker, 1842. pp. 781.

THE publisher of this volume of " Lectures in Divinity " has done a valuable service to the religious public of the United States. He has placed within the reach of Theological students and ministers of the gospel, in a convenient form and at a reasonable price, a body of theology well arranged and written in a lucid, didactic style. The author was a highly respected minister in the Church of Scotland, and for many years Professor of Divinity in St. Mary's College. The Lectures are divided into VI. Books, and these again into chapters

and sections. The books treat, in order, of the following subjects—Evidences of the Christian Religion—General view of the Scripture System—Opinions concerning the Son, the Spirit, and the manner of their being united with the Father—Opinions concerning the Nature, the Extent and the Application of the Remedy brought by the Gospel—Index of particular questions, arising out of opinions concerning the gospel Remedy, and of many of the technical terms of Theology—Opinions concerning Church Government. Under these general heads, we have a brief and candid history of the principal theological opinions which have prevailed on the earth, and a very fair presentation of those views, on different points, which the author could not adopt. Those who differ with him, as we perhaps should on a few points, will have no reason to complain of his unfairness, but must be prepared to meet his arguments with the same candor and kindness which he manifests. His views of original Sin, Atonement, Redemption, etc., are those of the Scotch Church generally.

2.—*The Poetical Works of John Sterling. First American Edition.* Philadelphia: Herman Hooker, 1842. pp. 268.

These poetical effusions are from the pen of Mr. Sterling, formerly a clergyman, now a gentleman of leisure and letters, who has been a frequent contributor to the pages of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, under the signature of Archæus.

The volume commences with the "Sexton's Daughter," which he who readeth once will wish to read again. It is a beautiful tale of tenderness and love, represented in the simplest, chaste language, and with the manner of an artist. The "Hymns of a Hermit," and several other interesting pieces, not found in the volume published in England in 1839, are introduced in this first American Edition.

Whilst we appreciate the style and generally the sentiments of the book, and discover much that is chaste, tender, pure, and beautiful, we cannot but regret that the publisher has seen fit to enclose it all in so homely an exterior.

3.—*Elementary Principles of Interpretation, translated from the Latin of J. A. Ernesti, with notes, and an Appendix, containing Extracts from Morus, Beck, Keil, and Henderson. By Moses Stuart. Fourth Edition.* Andover: Allen, Morrill, & Wardwell. New York: Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 142.

This small manual has already passed through three edi-

tions, and its value is, therefore, sufficiently known to the biblical student. As will be seen from the title-page, it is enriched by copious and important extracts from the *Hermetica* of Morus, and from Keil and Henderson on the qualifications of an interpreter. It presents in a brief space, and in the form of distinct rules, the principles by which the expounder of the Scriptures is to be governed, and is well adapted as a text-book on the subject, to those who are willing to devote time and patience to such acquisitions.

4.—*Manual of Sacred Interpretation, for the special benefit of Junior Theological Students; but intended also for private Christians in general. By Alexander McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York: Robert Carter, 1842.*
pp. 168.

This book is something new under the sun! It was written by one who holds the pen of a master, as every one who reads it will testify. We here have exhibited all the essential principles of interpretation, in four maxims and nine rules; and these are presented in so attractive a style, and with so happy illustrations, that one enjoys the reading, however dry we might naturally presume the subject to be. Every one may read and understand the lessons it teaches, and we are glad that the subject has been unfolded by one so admirably qualified, in a manner which, we trust, will secure the attention of ordinary readers of the Bible, and lead to a more general study of the just rules of exposition. The "Address to Students of Theology," at the close of the volume, is one that ought to be read by every young man having the ministry in view, or having recently entered it. He could not rise from the perusal without feeling himself inspired with a new zeal for prayerful, persevering, ardent study of the word of God.

5.—*The Millennium of the Apocalypse. By George Bush, Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature, New York City University. Second Edition. Salem: John P. Jewett. Boston: Tappan and Dennet, Crocker and Brewster. New York: Dayton and Newman, 1842.*
pp. 206.

The times are marked by attention to the prophecies, and therefore, eminently propitious for a second edition of Professor Bush's work. It will probably be read with even more interest now, than when it first appeared. The peculiarity of the

views consists principally in regarding the Apocalyptic Millennium as *past*, and interpreting the Dragon of the twentieth chapter of Revelation, as a symbol of despotic, idolatrous Paganism. The author, however, by no means rejects the idea of a future period of peace and bliss, when holiness shall prevail on the earth, but thinks this is not to be confounded with the thousand years of the binding of Satan or the Dragon. The book merits attention and study.

6.—*The Bible and the Closet: or How we may read the Scriptures with the most Spiritual Profit. By Rev. Thomas Watson; And Secret Prayer Successfully Managed. By Rev. Samuel Lee; Ministers Ejected in 1662. Edited by John Overton Choules. With a Recommendatory Letter from Rev. E. N. Kirk.* Boston: Gould, Kendall and Lincoln, 1842. pp. 140, 24 mo.

This little book, beautifully executed, is one of a series in course of preparation by Mr. Choules, derived from the writings of the Puritans and Nonconformists of England in the seventeenth century, for which he possesses a library of rare materials. The two Essays before us are a good beginning. That on secret prayer is not surpassed by any thing we have ever read on the subject.

7.—*Discourses on Human Life. By Orville Dewey, Pastor of the Church of the Messiah, in New York.* New York: David Felt & Co., 1841. pp. 299.

The author of these Discourses, it is well known, embraces the Unitarian views of Christianity, and his style of composition and manner have acquired for him some popularity. These sermons, or rather discourses, as they are more appropriately denominated, are certainly written in an attractive style, and there is an air of mystery about some of them, that would be exceedingly grateful to certain minds; but, when contemplated as part of the regular ministrations from the pulpit to a waiting assembly of immortal, sinful men, under probation for a few days in this fleeting life and then to pass to the judgment seat, and receive an award for eternity, dependent on their relations to Jesus Christ in this world, they seem to us to be exceedingly wanting in the essential principles of the Gospel. The precious blood of Christ is not there; the cross is cut down; and true religion is made identical with goodness. This might answer for a purer world than ours; but it is far

from being adapted to the wants of a guilty rebel against Jehovah's throne. The discourses undoubtedly inculcate a beautiful morality, derived from the philosophico-preceptive portions of the word of God, except that they leave the sinful soul of man, without that powerful incentive to holiness and goodness, which is found in the love of a crucified Redeemer, bleeding for the guilt of man and in order to his redemption. The heart-broken, agenized sinner, would look in vain to this volume, for that healing balm which should soothe his troubled spirit.

8.—*Comfort in Affliction: A Series of Meditations.* By James Buchanan, D. D. High Church, Edinburgh.—First American from the ninth Edinburgh edition. New York and Brooklyn: Robert Carter. 1842. pp. 254.

This Dr. Buchanan, minister of the High Church, Edinburgh, is not of the high church, in the sense in which it is commonly used in our own country, as designating that portion of the church which has little sympathy with the spirit of revivals, and makes the beauty of holiness to consist, rather in external rites than internal judgments and affections: he is of the Presbyterian denomination, pastor of a particular church, distinguished as the High Church of Edinburgh.

The volume before us is well worthy the reputation the Doctor has acquired. It is written in an uncommonly pure, chaste style, easy and flowing, and might well serve as a model of good composition—and to the afflicted, and consequently to all in this vale of tears, it is a rich treasure. The thoughts are embodied in twelve meditations, founded on as many appropriate passages of the word of God, and he who reads the whole with a right spirit, will bless God that he put it into the heart of his servant to write this book for the heavy laden. The first two meditations, built on the texts, "the Lord reigneth," and "he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men," are lucid and striking exhibitions of the government of God over his people, and must satisfy the tried pilgrim on these waste deserts, that he doeth all things well.

9.—*A Mother's Tribute to a beloved Daughter; or Memoir of Malvina Forman Smith.* New York: M. W. Dodd. 1842. pp. 198.

The subject of this memoir is a grand-daughter of the Rev. Dr. Griffin. In early life she enjoyed the benefit of his

counsels, and in his last days she watched over his sickness and death, in her father's house, which he had made his home for several months. The volume is, in a great measure, composed of the letters of friends addressed to Malvina, in the different stages of her life and education, and evinces, what it is primarily intended to show, we presume, the importance of making the conversion of their children, the paramount aim of parents. Whilst there is nothing remarkable in the experience or piety of the youthful subject of the Memoir, it may, on that account, be the more useful, because the more imitable, and the more likely to be the aim of others.

10.—*History of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, compiled chiefly from the published and unpublished documents of the Board. By Joseph Tracy. Second edition, carefully revised and enlarged.* New York: M. W. Dodd. 1842. pp. 452.

The subsequent recommendation of this work by the Secretaries of the Board, will probably be more effectual than any thing we could say—"The 'History of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, by the Rev. J. Tracy,' is far from being a mere abstract of the Annual Reports of the Board. The civil year, to which he has reduced his facts, does not correspond to the financial year, embraced in those Reports. This made it necessary for the author to consult the original documents, which he did with laborious and accurate research. The plan of his history, if not so well adapted as some others to continuous reading and popular effect, is admirably fitted for reference, and for aiding those on whom it may devolve to give instruction concerning missions at the Monthly Concert and elsewhere. What we say is of course not designed to imply, that the Board is in any way responsible for the correctness of the facts or opinions embodied in this work; but we may express our own conviction, that it will not soon be superseded by a history more comprehensive more concise, more clear and accurate, or more worthy of occupying a place in the libraries of ministers of the gospel, and intelligent laymen." We only add, that those interested in the history of Missions, will find some details in this volume, not published in the *Missionary Herald*; and we cherish the hope, that Christian families generally will give it a place not only in their libraries, but in their reading. This second edition is confined to the history of the Missions of the American Board.

11.—*Thirty-four Letters to a Son in the Ministry*, by Rev. Heman Humphrey, President of Amherst College. Amherst: J. S. & C. Adams. New York: Dayton & Newman. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1842. pp. 352.

The name of the author of this volume is a sufficient recommendation of its contents. Dr. Humphrey always writes well for the public, and his thoughts are seldom common-place. We know of no better "Pastor's Manual" than this. The young minister will here find the reflections of a matured and observant mind, on almost all subjects connected with his relations to the church and the world. We cannot but hope that every licentiate will possess a copy of a book so especially adapted to his wants, and so admirably filling a place hitherto comparatively a void. Here are the results of the Doctor's own experience, in valuable suggestions on,—Preaching as a Candidate—Settlement—First Sermons after Settlement—Doctrinal and Practical Preaching—Objects of Preaching—Study and Writing of Sermons—Different Kinds of Sermons—Delivery of Sermons—Public Prayer—Exchanges—Traveling on Sabbath to Exchange—Pastoral Visiting—Funerals—Catechising, Sabbath Schools, Bible Classes—Attending Ecclesiastical Bodies—Revivals of Religion—Ministerial Example—Miscellaneous Reading, Health, etc. etc. On all these topics, the remarks are eminently practical, and we think judicious. The letters on Revivals are particularly worthy of careful perusal by all who exercise the office of the ministry. We cannot but think, that the views expressed on the impropriety of encouraging a class of Revival-Evangelists, if we may use the term, and on the better way of calling in the aid of neighboring pastors, when there is such special attention to the interests of the soul, as to demand extra preaching and labor, are those of a sound, christian discretion. The proper conduct of revivals of religion is intimately connected with the best permanent interests of the church, and ought to secure the close attention of all who are likely to be interested in measures to promote them.

12.—*The Works of the Right Rev. Father in God, Joseph Butler, D. C. L., late Lord Bishop of Durham. To which is prefixed an Account of the Character and Writings of the Author. By Samuel Halifax, D. D., late Lord Bishop of Gloucester.* New York: Robert Carter. 1842. pp. 303.

The publisher has here offered to the religious and philosophical community, the complete works of Bishop Butler, so

well known as the author of "The Analogy of Religion." That part of his labors has long been before the public, and will doubtless be demanded, whilst man loves to think. Had the Bishop written nothing else, he had immortalized himself; and indeed little more is left us, the remainder of the volume being occupied by his brief essays on "Personal Identity," and on "Human Virtue," six Sermons, a Charge to the Clergy, and his Correspondence with Dr. Samuel Clarke. The whole is embraced in a large octavo volume, printed in a good, clear type of such size that the eyes will not be impaired by reading it; and we should be glad that more persons would try their eyes and their intellects in perusing and pondering such essays as the "Analogy." We promise them as a compensation, better eye-sight, it may be of the mind.

13.—*Sermons and Sketches of Sermons. By the Rev. John Summerfield, A. M., late a preacher in the Methodist Episcopal Church. With an Introduction by the Rev. Thomas Bond, M. D.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1842. pp. 437.

This is a handsome octavo volume of sketches of sermons, by one whose memory is precious to the saints, and must be especially dear to our Methodist brethren. We do not wonder that they desire thus to embalm him in their hearts. These Sermons show that Mr. Summerfield was not idle whilst he lived, and that, with his beautiful genius and creative powers, he did not deem it useless to spend time and thought on his preparations for the sacred desk. And we hope that these skeletons will be valued only as mementos of Summerfield, and not be a resort for lazy preachers, like Simeon's and some others.

It is evident from these sketches, that Mr. Summerfield was in the habit of studying his subjects well, and thoroughly imbuing his mind with them prior to his entering the pulpit. He knew beforehand what he was going to say, and when he came to say it, it was with fullness of illustration, and beauty of diction and manner. In our youth, we heard him preach from the vision of Isaiah, of which we find a sketch in this volume, and we shall never forget the impression left on us by his whole manner, and by the strikingly beautiful representation of the vision, especially of the seraph flying and taking the live coal from off the altar. It was graphic. We seemed to be transported bodily to the presence of the throne, and there to behold with our eyes the seraph, the altar, the sacrifice.

14.—*A Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. Comprising, the History, Description, and Scientific Principles of every branch of Human Knowledge; with the derivation and definition of all the terms in general use. Illustrated by Engravings on Wood. Edited by M. T. Brande, F. R. S. L. & E.* New York: Wiley & Putnam, pp. 1500.

The work is to be published in twenty-four semi-monthly parts, of fifty-six pages each, and, when completed, will make two large octavo volumes, in small type, though clear, containing an invaluable fund of information on the encyclopedia of Science, Literature, and Art. The whole circle of knowledge is divided into ten sections, each entrusted to one of the most celebrated scholars of the age, in his particular department—to such men as Brande, Liddley, Loudon, McCulloch, Owen, etc. These names are a sufficient guaranty for the proper execution of the work, and we confidently expect this to be the best Dictionary or Cyclopaedia, of its kind, in the English language. We cannot but regret that the typographical execution of the Greek words is not better. The accents are seldom introduced, yet sufficiently often to destroy uniformity.

15.—*The Twin Sisters; A Tale for Youth. By Mrs. Sandham. From the twentieth London Edition.* New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842. pp. 176.

This little volume seems to have commended itself to the English public, as they have called for the twentieth edition; and we presume it will find favor on this side the water. The tale is told in a simple style, and is intended to illustrate "the benefits of devotion, in the lives of two very young persons." They were twin sisters, who were early placed under the influence of a pious aunt, and thus led, by a blessing on her efforts, to walk in ways of righteousness and peace. The story will be interesting to youth, and the book is perhaps one of the safest of this description that can be put into their hands.

16.—*The Daughters of England; their Position in Society, Character, and Responsibilities. By Mrs. Ellis, Author of "The Women of England," etc. etc.* New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842. pp. 280.

Mrs. Ellis, the amiable authoress of this volume, is already favorably known to us by her "Women of England," "Hints

to make Home Happy," etc. The present volume is indicative of her deep interest in the proper education of her *sex*, and we are glad to learn, from her preface, that she intends, in future volumes, to "consider the character and condition of the wives and mothers of England." We think her peculiarly qualified to write on these important topics. Her style is such as to interest, and her thoughts and sentiments are deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity. One can scarcely help feeling that woman must be benefited, if woman will but read her remarks with a right mind. In the present work, she begins with "Important Inquiries," then proceeds to treat of "Economy of Time," "Cleverness, Learning, Knowledge," "Music, Painting, and Poetry," "Taste, Tact, and Observation," "Beauty, Health, and Temper," "Society, Friendship, and Flirtation," "Love and Courtship," "Artifice and Integrity," etc. Under all these topics there will be found most judicious observations, well worthy the serious consideration of the Daughters of America. We cannot refrain from giving our readers one extract from her remarks on Music. "If the use of accomplishments be to make a show of them in society, then a little skill in music is certainly not worth its cost. But if the object of a daughter is to soothe the weary spirit of a father when he returns home from the office or the counting-house, where he has been toiling for her maintenance; to beguile a mother of her cares, or to charm a suffering sister into forgetfulness of her pain; then a very little skill in music may often be made to answer as noble a purpose as a great deal; and never does a daughter appear to more advantage, than when she cheerfully lays aside a fashionable air, and strums over, for more than the hundredth time, some old ditty which her father loves. To her ear, it is possible, it may be altogether divested of the slightest charm. But of what importance is that? The old man listens until tears are glistening in his eyes, for he sees again the home of his childhood, he hears his father's voice, he feels his mother's welcome—all things familiar to his heart in early youth come back to him with the long-remembered strain, and, happiest thought of all! they are revived by the playful fingers of his own beloved child." The remainder of the passage is beautifully touching, but we are obliged to desist, praying that Mrs. Ellis may be long spared to the world!

17.—HARPERS' FAMILY LIBRARY:

No. 154. *History of the Expedition under the command of Captains Lewis and Clarke, to the sources of the Missouri, thence across the Rocky Mountains, and down the river Columbia to the Pacific Ocean: performed during the years 1804, 1805, 1806, by order of the Government of the United States. Revised and abridged, with an Introduction and Notes, by Archibald M'Vickar.* 2 Vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1842. pp. 766.

The Oregon Territory is just now attracting considerable attention; and it is but a few days since we had the intelligence of the departure of a large colony from the "far west" of western Missouri, to the farthest west of Oregon. The republication, therefore, of the travels of Lewis and Clarke, and of their exploration of this interesting country almost a half century since, cannot but be welcome. Although this Expedition may be familiar to those who are now among the grey-headed, there are, doubtless, many of the middle-aged and of the young, who will be glad to have so easy access to the history of it, as is provided in these volumes.

This Journal must always possess interest, as the narrative of the first voyage made up the Missouri, from its mouth to its springs, and as the first visit of white men to those almost boundless prairies, which stretch out from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, and which were then the play-ground of numerous tribes of the Red Men, and of immense herds of buffalo, deer, and other animals.

To the original Journal there is added, in these volumes, "a sketch of the progress of maritime discovery on the Pacific coast, a summary account of earlier attempts to penetrate this vast wilderness, and extracts and illustrations from the narratives of later travellers."

18.—*The Great Commission: or the Christian Church constituted and charged to convey the Gospel to the world. By the Rev. John Harris, D.D., President of Cheshunt College, author of "Mammon," "The Great Teacher," etc., with an Introductory Essay, by William R. Williams, D.D., Pastor of Amity Street Church, New York.* Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. New York: Dayton & Newman, 1842. pp. 484.

The writer of this excellent work on Christian Missions is

already favorably known amongst us, as the author of several prize essays, on subjects intimately connected with the best interests of the Church. It is well that Dr. Harris, endued as he is by God with superior qualifications, is disposed, by his grace, to devote his strong intellect and richly furnished mind, to the promotion of an evangelical spirit amongst the disciples of Jesus. The Essay before us presents the "great commission" before the Church, with great power, and in an aspect adapted deeply to impress the heart with a sense of obligation. It first unfolds the scriptural theory of Christian instrumentality, as presented and enforced in the word of God. In the second part, the benefits arising from Christian Missions, are portrayed in four chapters, in such manner as to illustrate their claims and awaken an increased zeal in the noble cause. Part third exhibits the encouragements to advance in this glorious enterprise. Part fourth proves that the objections commonly offered are but arguments for redoubled effort. In part fifth, is considered the want of entire consecration to this cause as a great defect, and in the sixth and last part, the principal motives are pressed, which should urge us to entire devotedness to the great objects of this grand enterprise.

19.—*The Golden Censer, or a Visit to the House of Prayer.*
Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln.

Appollos, or Directions to Persons just commencing a Religious Life. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln.

Growth in Grace, or the Young Professor directed how to attain to eminent Piety. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln, 1842.

Such are the titles of three small books, put up in neatly printed covers, and with gilt edges. They are part of a "miniature series of practical religious works," to be issued by the same publishers. The author of the first is the Rev. Dr. Harris. The design of the second is apparent from the title, and we can safely commend it to the recently converted. The third consists of choice selections from the works of Jonathan Edwards and John Angell James. This series of miniature volumes, if completed as commenced, will doubtless be a blessing to the Church.

20.—*The Life of Willbur Fisk, D.D., First President of the Wesleyan University. By Joseph Holdich.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1842. pp. 455.

The subject of this Memoir, before his death, published his travels in Europe, and it is not too much to say of them, that they were remarkably interesting. We now have his life, well written by the Rev. Mr. Holdich, and we presume it will be sought after, with eagerness, by the Methodist Connexion generally, as well as by many of other denominations. Although Dr. Fisk was strongly attached to the doctrines of his denomination, and entered somewhat into controversy with those who differed from him, his conduct of the controversy and his whole deportment were such, as to secure the respect and love of all who knew him. The volume before us proves him to have been a man of great energy and excellence, and one who labored not in vain. He entered, with zeal, into the great work of Missions and of Temperance, and seems to have been one of those who, in all his ways, acknowledged God, and sought frequent communion with him in prayer.

21.—*A Family Exposition of the Pentateuch. By the Rev. Henry Blunt, M.A., Rector of Streatham, Surrey, Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of Richmond, and formerly Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge. Exodus, Leviticus.* Philadelphia: Herman Hooker, 1842. pp. 238.

The "Lectures" of this author, on the Life of Christ, of Paul, of Abraham, Jacob, Elisha, etc., published in seven uniform volumes, by Mr. Hooker, have had a wide circulation, and acquired for the writer a merited popularity. The present volume is one of a series of Family Expositions, embracing Exodus and Leviticus, intended to give a brief view of the history of Moses in his relation to the children of Israel. The several expositions are founded, each on a passage of the Scriptures of some length, and are brief summaries of the history, with such explanations as are required, and such practical observations as would be naturally suggested. The book might answer a good purpose to be read, as Jay's Exercises are, one exposition each day. In Exposition XLIII., are some remarks on the advice of Jethro to Moses, well worthy the consideration of those in this land who exercise the elective franchise.

22.—**H KAINH ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ.** *Novum Testamentum Græce. Post Joh. Aug. Henr. Tittmannum, Olim Prof. Lips. ad fidem optimorum librorum secundis curis recognovit lectionumque varietatem notavit Augustus Hahn, in Acad. Vratisl. Prof. Editio Americana Stereotypa curante Edvardo Robinson, S.T.D. Neo-Eboraci: Sumtibus et typis Leavitt et Trow. Bostoniæ: Apud Crocker et Brewster, 1842. pp. 508.*

It is needless to say much more of this edition of the New Testament, than to announce it through the title page. It is a reprint of Hahn's edition, superintended by Professor Robinson, and printed at the University Press by Trow, whose fount of Greek and Hebrew is decidedly the best in the country. We should, therefore, expect it to be, as we think it is, the very best edition of the Greek Testament ever published in the United States. The paper is good, the margin sufficiently large, the type the best, the leading such as to relieve the eye in reading, and the size of the volume convenient. Besides the text, we have references and various readings at the bottom of the pages, and as introductory matter, the Prefaces of Tittmann and Hahn, together with notices of the principal manuscripts, translations or versions, and citations from the New Testament by the Fathers and others.

23.—*A Descriptive and Historical Account of Hydraulic and other Machines for raising water, ancient and modern; with Observations on various subjects connected with the Mechanic Arts: including the progressive development of the Steam Engine. In five Books. Illustrated by nearly 300 engravings. By Thomas Ewbank. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842, pp. 582.*

This is a large octavo volume, on a subject that must be interesting to a numerous class of readers. It supplies a want which was early felt by the laborious author himself, and is probably the only work of the kind in existence. It enters at large into the whole history of machinery for raising water, from the earliest periods down to the present time, and must be invaluable to the practical as to the inventive mechanic. It abounds in information of the machinery of the ancients, illustrated by engravings, which is well worthy the study of the philosopher and the antiquarian, and is not devoid of interest to the expositor of the Scriptures. He will find, in this volume, much that relates to the manners and habits of the

people described in the Bible, and on pages 399, 400 and 669. some observations on Ecolopilic Idols, that deserve attention, On the whole we have been exceedingly interested in the book, and hope the indefatigable author will be well rewarded for this service done to the mechanic arts.

24.—*An Exposition of the Creed.* By John Pearson, D. D., late Lord Bishop of Chester. With an Appendix containing the principal Greek and Latin Creeds. Revised by the Rev. W. S. Dobson, A. M., Editor of the *Attic Greek Orators and Sophists, etc.* New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842, pp. 616.

This republication of Dobson's edition of Pearson on the Creed, in so convenient a form, must be especially acceptable to the members of the Episcopal Church in the United States, and contains matter worthy the attention of Christians of all denominations. Although there is abundant evidence that this creed was not formed by the Apostles, nor any other symbol of doctrine that has come down to us, yet it expresses in a few words the most important doctrines of the gospel.—The descent into hell is differently understood amongst Episcopalians themselves, and by some omitted in the repetition of the Creed. Bishop Pearson gives the various interpretations of that article, and the reasons for them, with candor; and, even although he represents the remission of sins prior to baptism, as obtained by that rite, he includes so much in his subsequent definition of baptism, as to embrace faith, repentance and all that can possibly be considered requisite to the forgiveness of sins. This Exposition was originally preached by Bishop Pearson to his parishioners, in the form of sermons, and embraces a pretty good system of Divinity. Bishop Burnet has said of it; "Bishop Pearson on the Creed, as far it goes, is the perfectest work we have." To this edition there is added an Appendix containing the *Symbola or Creeds* cited by the author.

25.—*An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England.* By Gilbert, Bishop of Sarum. With an Appendix containing the Augsburg Confession, Creed of Pope Pius, etc. Revised and corrected, with copious, notes and additional references, by the Rev. James R. Page, A. M., Queen's College, Cambridge; Minister of Carlisle Chapel, Lambeth. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842, pp. 585.

This edition of the enterprising publishers is uniform with
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that of Pearson on the Creed, and ought to be its companion on the shelf. The author's text is strictly preserved by the present editor, the references have been verified, the canons and decrees of councils are given in the original, and the places where they are to be found specified, copious notes have been added, with indices of texts of Scripture and a list of authors. As the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England contain a summary of doctrine, this work of Bishop Burnet is equivalent to a system of Divinity, one too, written with learning and judgment. We should be pleased to have it well studied, and to find the ministry of the Episcopal Church in this and other lands, deeply imbued with its principles and spirit. While the Bishop is attached to his own church and her creed, as laid down in these articles, he is by no means exclusive in his views, nor does he shut out from covenanted mercies those who cannot adopt the whole of this Episcopal Confession of Faith.

26.—*The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice; or a defence of the Catholic Doctrine that the Holy Scriptures have been, since the times of the Apostles, the sole Divine Rule of Faith and Practice to the Church, against the Dangerous Errors of the Authors of the "Tracts for the Times," and the Romanists, as particularly, that the Rule of Faith is "made up of Scripture and Tradition together," &c.; in which also the Doctrines of Apostolical Succession, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, &c., are fully discussed.* By William Goode, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge: Rector of St. Antholin, London. Vols. I and II. Philadelphia: Herman Hooker, 1842, pp. 494 and 604.

So long and explicit a title would seem to be almost a sufficient statement of the argument of the book. The reader, however, must prepare himself for a variety of topics and a minuteness and extent of discussion which is not here even intimated. These two well filled octavo volumes contain a labored and learned defence of the doctrines and polity of the Church of England, in every point on which the author supposes them to have been assailed by the Oxford Divines, or to have been in any measure disparaged by their peculiar views. They present, at once, the best exhibition and refutation of the doctrines of the "Tracts for the Times," which we have read. The positions assumed by the author, on the apostolical succession, baptismal regeneration, and several

other points of doctrine and polity, are of course unsatisfactory to the dissenting denominations. But as opposed to the Anti-Protestant views and tendencies of the Oxford writers, they enlist our warmest sympathies. On the whole, we rejoice that these volumes have been issued from the American press, and cordially recommend them to our readers, especially to such as may have been accustomed to regard with favor the writings of the Oxford "Tractators."

27.—*Sketches of Foreign Travel and Life at Sea; including a Cruise on board a Man-of-war, as also a visit to Spain, Portugal, the South of France, Italy, Sicily, Malta, the Ionian Islands, Continental Greece, Liberia and Brazil; and a Treatise on the Navy of the United States.* By Rev. Charles Rockwell. Two Volumes. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. New York: D. Appleton & Co., and Wiley & Putnam. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. London: Wiley & Putnam, 1842, pp. 404. 437. Octavo.

We are sorry that we have not had time to read these volumes entirely through before expressing our opinion of them. We have, however, read enough to awaken our strong interest in them and to raise our estimate of their value much above the point of our anticipation. They are not hastily written sketches of scenes and incidents, like too many of our books of travels. It is several years since the author's return from abroad, during which, he has spent much time and labor in the preparation of his work. Without this labor,—in the language in which its outlines were sketched in the midst of the scenes and events which it describes,—it would doubtless have been an entertaining book. But it has become a valuable repository of information, and is thus fitted not only to interest the general reader, but to convey important instruction to the more accurate inquirer respecting the internal condition of the countries visited. Much prominence is given to the present state of Catholic Europe, and the recent religious revolution in Spain and Portugal, indicative of the inherent superstition, bigotry and idolatry of the Papal system. The author's remarks on the present condition and prospects of the Colonies of Western Africa are also well digested, and worthy of consideration, while his suggestions respecting the morals of the Navy of the United States and other abuses, are such as few who hold a connection with the Navy have dared to make pub-

lic. We have only space to add, that these volumes are handsomely executed, and appear to us, in all respects, to merit the degree of consideration, which the labor bestowed on them by the author, and the interest of the topics embraced in them have given him a right to expect.

28.—*The Complete Works of Rev. Daniel A. Clark, with a Biographical Sketch, and an Estimate of his Powers as a Preacher. By Rev. George Shepard, A. M., Professor of Sacred Rhetoric, Bangor Theological Seminary. In two volumes.* New York: Jonathan Leavitt. Boston; Crocker & Brewster. 1842. pp. 488, 440.

The readers of the Biblical Repository are aware that we place high, on the scale of excellence, the powers of the late Daniel A. Clark, as a preacher. His Sermons well deserve the high reputation they have acquired, for pungency, directness, and practical effect. We are glad to see them before the public in the respectable style of execution in which they are presented in these volumes, containing sixty-five full discourses, many of which had been before published, and thirty-four outlines of discourses, which the editor denominates "Short Sermons," and which fill about ninety pages of the second volume. To these are appended several miscellaneous articles from the pen of Mr. Clark, which appeared in different periodicals during the author's life. The "Biographical Sketch," etc., by Professor Shepard, the substance of which is embraced in his "Review of Clark's Sermons," which appeared in the Repository for October last, is discriminating and instructive. On the whole, we regard these volumes as containing a rich treasury of thought, of inestimable value, not only to ministers of the gospel, but to intelligent Christians of all classes. Few discourses are so well suited to supply the place of the living preacher. The engraved portrait of the author, which accompanies the work, will remind those who knew him, of the force and power of his manner, and increase their interest in these remains of one so lately removed from his labors.

29.—*Theopneusty, or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures: By S. R. L. Gausser, Professor of Theology in Geneva. Translated by E. N. Kirk.* New York: John S. Taylor & Co. Boston: Tappan & Deane. 1842. pp. 343.

Our readers were apprised of the character and scope of

this work by a review of the French edition, which appeared in the Repository for July, 1841. It now appears in English and from the American press; and the translator has enhanced its value by a few pages of Introductory remarks, in which he earnestly defends its main position, which is that the Scriptures,—all and every part of the Scriptures—are from God. This the author undertakes to establish by the authority of the word of God itself. This mode of reasoning, it is admitted, cannot be successfully used to convince the sceptic. To him, therefore, it is not addressed, but is designed to confirm the faith of believers in the divine authority of the whole and every part of the Bible. The author rejects all distinctions of inspiration, as the inspiration of *superintendence, elevation, direction, or suggestion*, and maintains that every part of the bible, every sentence, every word, is fully and equally inspired. The object of this argument cannot but be approved by all who receive the Scriptures as the word of God. But whether it is essential to the firmest faith in the divine authority of the Scriptures that the same degree of inspiration should be assigned to every word and sentence, be it in respect to the doctrine of the new birth, or the direction of an apostle concerning his cloak, may well be questioned, provided it be admitted, in both and in all cases, that the inspiration was all that the case required to make the teachings of the bible perfect for all the purposes of correction, reproof and instruction in righteousness. We are glad, however, to see this subject brought before the American public. The discussion of it, we earnestly hope, will be so conducted among us as not only to confirm the faith of believers, but also to convince even gainsayers that the Scriptures are the word of God, and shall stand for ever.

30.—*The Kingdom of Christ delineated, in two Essays on our Lord's own account of his Person and of the Nature of his Kingdom, and on the Constitution, Powers and Ministry of a Christian Church, as appointed by himself.* By Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. New York : Wiley & Putnam. 1842. pp. 296.

This volume is introduced to the American public by a short but highly commendatory address by Dr. Skinner. To us it appears to be a most reasonable as well as valuable publication. On the powers and ministry of the Christian Church, though the work of an Archbishop, it opposes with boldness

and strength the extravagant assumptions of the English Episcopacy, and admits the rights of the dissenting churches in a manner which few prelates have exemplified in their writings. To the High Church party in England, and especially to the Oxford "Tractators," it has proved itself a most unwelcome production. The latter, in a late review, in the "British Critic," express their embarrassment in the following language: "One of the many difficulties which press upon us in the present most unhappy state of our church, is the question of the proper course to be pursued by churchmen, when a Bishop delivers, *ex cathedra*, doctrines which are in fact heretical." Most of our readers, however, would reply, on the perusal of this work of Bishop Whately: "After the way which *they* call heresy, so worship we the God of our fathers." We trust it will be extensively read.

31.—*Mormonism in all Ages: or the Rise, Progress and Causes of Mormonism, with the Biography of its Author and Founder, Joseph Smith, Jr.* By Professor J. B. Turner, Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois. New York: Platt & Peters. London: Wiley & Putnam. Liverpool: Hyde & Peters, 1842. pp. 304.

This work, it has been well remarked, might better have been denominated an Antidote to Mormonism. It exposes with a bold and fearless hand the monstrous deceptions practiced by Smith and his associates upon their deluded followers, of whom they profess to number 100,000 in this country, and more than 10,000 in Great Britain, where their faith is making rapid conquests. This book is not only a history of Mormonism, but contains a copious and very instructive illustration of its spirit and tendencies drawn from the history of similar fanaticisms in all ages. It is written with considerable ability and research, and the author has enjoyed the best opportunities of personal acquaintance with the doctrines and polity of the community of which he treats. It is well adapted to be useful, not only in neighborhoods where Mormon lecturers are attracting attention, but also wherever there exists a tendency to fanaticism of any kind. We recommend it to ministers and others who would arm themselves with facts and principles suited to such a condition of things, which, unhappily, is neither rare nor uncommon in our country.

32.—*Discourses; intended as a Keepsake, for the Family and Friends of the Author.* By Jonathan Cogswell, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Theological Institute of Connecticut. Hartford: Elihu Geer, 1842. pp. 201. Octavo.

The circumstances in which this unpretending volume has come into our hands, precludes the propriety of criticism. It is printed but not published. It contains ten discourses on the Inspiration of the Scriptures—Necessity of Revelation—the Three Dispensations—Sin and its Consequences—Atonement—Justification—Christian Experience—Punishment of the Wicked—the Resurrection—the Judgment. These subjects are all treated in a sober evangelical spirit, it being the design of the author to render these brief discussions useful to such relatives and friends as may receive them at his hands. The volume is beautifully printed, and is altogether an appropriate gift from a clergyman in the evening of life to those friends in whose hands he may wish to leave some memorial of his faith.

33.—*Letters to the Young.* By Maria Jane Jewsbury. Third American from the third London Edition. New York: Saxton & Miles, 1842. pp. 264.

These "Letters to the Young," by Miss Jewsbury, have been so long before the public, and are so generally known and appreciated, that it is needless to say more, than that the present edition is neatly executed, and contains three letters and a poem not included in the former editions. The title of the poem is "The Lost Spirit," and the subjects of the new letters, "Slight Enjoyments, their use and importance"—"The Influence and Non-Influence of Christianity"—"The Character of Christ." These additions are gems.

34.—*Age of the World, as founded on the Sacred Records, Historic and Prophetic; and the "Signs of the Times," viewed in the aspect of premonitions of the speedy establishment, on the earth, of the Millennial State, by the second personal, premillennial advent of Christ, etc. etc.* By the Rev. R. C. Shimeall, Presbyter of the Prot. Epis. Church in the Diocese of New York. New York: Swords, Stanford & Co., 1842. pp. 364.

Another book on the Prophecies! We have only space to say of it, that it indicates research, and that the conclusions

at which the author arrives are these—that in 1847 the Lord Jehovah will appear for the restoration and re-establishment in Palestine of the seed of Abraham—that there *the sanctuary shall be cleansed*, then will be *the last end of the indignation*, and the extinction of the Turkish Empire and of Mystic Babylon.

35.—*A Memoir of India and Aghanistān, with observations on the present exciting and critical state of those countries. With an Appendix, on the fulfilment of a teat of Daniel, and the speedy dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.* By J. Harlan, late Counsellor of State, Aid-de-Camp and General of the Staff to Dost Mahomed, Ameer of Cabul. Philadelphia: J. Dobson, 1842. pp. 208.

This book will be found especially interesting at the present time, coming from one who has spent eighteen years amid the Pagans and Mohammedans of the East, having been first a surgeon in the service of the East India Company, but afterwards Generalissimo of the forces of Dost Mohammed, reigning Prince of Cabul. The volume contains interesting information of that comparatively unknown country, and much elucidation of the recent British operations there. It will be seen that the General is not very friendly to the British system of operations, and that he differs materially on many points from Count de Björstjerna, of Stockholm, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Great Britain, whose work on India is pronounced, by the English, the best in our language. The volume contains a map of Cabul and the vicinity. We may here be allowed to remark that the General is preparing a personal narrative of his residence in Asia.

36.—*A History of the Christian Church, from the earliest ages to the present time. In four volumes. Vol. I. Containing the History of the Church during the first and second centuries.* By Ernest L. Hazelius, D. D., Prof. of Theology in the Theol. Sem. of the Luth. Synod of South Carolina. Baltimore: Publication Rooms No. 7 S. Liberty street. New York: D. Appleton & Co., and Dayton & Newman. Boston: Tappan & Dennet, and Crocker & Brewster. Cincinnati: E. Lucas. Pittsburgh: C. H. Kay & Co. 1842. pp. 277

There is not much probability of a History of the Church

becoming popular, unless there is something special about it to recommend it. Ordinary works of this description are sufficiently numerous, whilst excellent ones are equally rare, particularly in our language. We should think the work of Dr. Hazelius not very suitable for a text-book in Theological Seminaries, as it is wanting in authorities, and too frequently cumbered with discussions and inferences, which would be in our estimation more appropriate elsewhere. The author's aim, however, in his own language is: "by facts and documents to put forth the main principles of the Christian religion, to show that these are found in the confessions of all our Protestant denominations, and also, in the same manner, to illustrate the origin of aberrations from the truth, and how that doctrine has gradually arisen, which is exhibited in the council of Trent. Also to exhibit the remarkable providence of God in the origin and progress of the reformation, with a view to show that it was the same providence which we discover in the origin and first progress of Christianity." These are good aims, and if accomplished satisfactorily in the succeeding volumes, may commend the work to public attention. The first volume embraces seven chapters, treating of the state of the heathen world, and that of the Jewish nation, the rise and progress of Christianity in the first century, its extension in the second, the mode of worship, doctrines and life of private Christians. Under these several topics, matters of considerable interest are discussed and we think, on the whole, a fair, candid representation is made, and such a history given as would be profitable for the mass of Christians to read. We regret that the style is not better, and the errata so numerous.

37.—*Letters to Persons who are engaged in Domestic Service.* By Miss Catharine E. Beecher. New York: Leavitt & Trow, 1842. pp. 235.

Here is a book somewhat novel—a book of Letters to Domestics; and we are glad that the typographical execution corresponds with the doctrine of the Letters, that "the station of domestics is honorable and respectable." This is a much neglected and often much abused class of our fellow citizens. How few heads of families manifest that interest in the temporal and eternal welfare of those in their employ, which is demanded by every consideration of expediency and duty.—How much are they left to themselves, without advice or admonition. Many have, doubtless, felt the want of just such a

book, as Miss Beecher has here furnished; and we cannot but hope and believe that ladies, generally, will be glad to put it into the hands of their domestics, and even, in many instances, sit down by their side to read it and comment on it. It contains eighteen letters, touching on all topics connected with the station and relations of those at service in families. Among others, there are observations on the importance of raising the respectability of this station—respectful manners—visiting—company—religious meetings—health—trials of domestics, and remedies—economy—care of children—dress, manners and language—the way to be happy, &c.

ARTICLE XIV.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

Dr. Karl Ferd. Ranke, ordinary Professor of Philosophy at Göttingen, and Director of the Gymnasium there, has been appointed Director of the Frederick-Wilhelm-Gymnasium at Berlin. Some investigations have been made of a fragment of an ancient inscription, consisting of five vertical columns of numbers, found at Athens by C. O. Müller. The Theological Faculty of Berlin consists of Drs. E. W. Hengstenberg, Ph. Marheineke, A. Neander, Fr. Strauss, A. Twesten, ord. Proff.; F. Theremin, Prof. hon., J. J. Bellerman, F. Benary, Fr. Uhlemann, J. C. W. Vatke, extraord. Proff.; H. G. Erbkm, F. A. Philippi, Privatdocenten. Dr. K. Ph. Fischer of Tübingen has become Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in the University of Bavaria. Dr. Ullmann, of Heidelberg has accepted the place of Dr. Augusti, at Bonn, and not Dr. Plucker as stated in the last number. The latter succeeds Dr. Augusti as Director of the Scientific Commission of Examination for the Rhenish Provinces. Dr. Ogbudski has been appointed Professor of the Slavic Languages and Literature in the University of Berlin. This University has 146 Teachers, and 1757 students. Prof. Ewald, of Tübingen has been transferred from the philosophical to the evangelico-theological-Faculty.

Spain.

The Minister of the Interior has sent the Director of the royal press into France and Belgium, to visit their Institutions for the Blind, and to purchase materials for printing suitable books and maps, in order to the establishment of a normal school for the blind.—The literature of Spain is assuming a more serious, manly aspect. In the last four months of 1841, there were issued, at Madrid alone, some seventy works on history, education, political economy, etc.—Toreno has acquired great celebrity by his history of the Spanish Revolution, and Eugenio de Tapia, by his history of Spanish Civilization, which is considered the most important work in the present literature of Spain.

Italy.

Father Luigi Tosti is writing a history of the convent of Mont Cassino, in which he promises a complete catalogue of its valuable manuscripts. In Florence, there has been formed a society of Artists, the only one in Italy, besides that at Rome. In the vicinity of Florence there has been recently found buried under rubbish, a very beautiful hearth, supposed to have been wrought by Donatello.

Greece.

The number of Instructors in the Otho-University at Athens is 36; of students 292; Medical 52, Theological 20, Philosophical 53, Juridical 167.

The Polytechnic School formed by the Engineer von Zentner, is now in successful operation, and Professor Boniota, from Paris, a celebrated limner, has accepted the invitation of the Dutchesas of Plaisance to remove to Athens and become a Professor in this Institution. He went at her charges and receives his salary from her.

Wallachia.

There are eight presses now in operation in this country, five of which are in Bucharest. The School at St. Sava has a library of about 11,000 volumes, which is open to the public.

Norway.

The Frederich-University at Christiana was opened in 1813, with six Teachers and eighteen Students. It now has twenty Professors, and eight Lecturers, and about 700 Students. Connected with it, there is a Botanical Garden—An Astronomical Observatory—A Library of about 130,000 volumes, open to the public daily from 12 to 2 o'clock—A Zoological and Mineralogical Museum—A Collection of Coins, amounting to more than 20,000—A Depository of Archives—A Repository of Northern Antiquities—A Collection of Models—A Naturalists' Cabinet—A Collection for the Faculty of Medicine.

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SECOND SERIES. NO. XVI.—WHOLE NO. XLVIII.

ARTICLE I.

PRESENT STATE OF THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE DEAF
AND DUMB IN THE UNITED STATES.

By John R. Burnet, of Livingston, New Jersey.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE subsequent article, although long, will, we trust, be acceptable to our readers. It is on a subject not often presented in the Repository, and was written by one who knows whereof he affirms.

The author was born in the possession of all his faculties, but when about eight years old, and after having learned to read, though not to write, he was deprived of his hearing entirely, in consequence of a violent attack of inflammation of the brain. Like others similarly affected, he soon lost the power of articulation, so that his utterances were unintelligible to strangers. Thus excluded from social intercourse, he resorted to books, and eagerly and attentively read those which fell in his way. His books were few and well digested. Of such as were valuable, and did not belong to him, he was in the habit of making abridgements.

In 1838, he entered the New York Institution for the Deaf and Dumb, for the purpose both of making himself familiar with the language of signs, and of enlarging his field of knowledge. After remaining a few months, he returned to the farm of his grand-parents, by whom he had been adopted, and where he now lives and labors to sustain himself and wife,

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whom he married about three years since ; an amiable young woman, also a mute, of the New York Institution.

Some eight years ago, he published a volume of "Tales of the Deaf and Dumb, with Miscellaneous Poems," which was well received by his own countrymen, and favorably reviewed in a Circular of the Royal Institution of Paris.

The views expressed in the present article, as well as the style, evince that the author is capable of close reflection, and has acquired a happy mode of expression.

1. *Observations on the Education of the Deaf and Dumb.* Reprinted from the North American Review, (for April, 1834,) Boston, 1834.
2. *Quatrième Circulaire de l' Institut Royal des Sourds-muets de Paris, à toutes les Institutions de Sourds-muets de l'Europe, de l'Amérique, et de l'Asie.* Paris. 1836.
3. *Reports of the American Asylum for the Education and Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, twelfth to twenty-fifth inclusive.* Hartford.
4. *Reports of the New York Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, first to twenty-third inclusive.* New York.
5. *Tenth and Thirteenth Annual Reports of the Pennsylvania Institution for the Deaf and Dumb.* Philadelphia. 1820 and 1833.

The number of those who, by the privation of the sense which serves as the ordinary channel by which knowledge is acquired, and thoughts interchanged, are set apart from their fellow-men, and even when placed in the most favorable circumstances, doomed to intellectual and social disadvantages that invest their case with a painful and peculiar interest, is much greater than any one ventured to suppose, before an enumeration of this class of persons had been, in several countries, actually made. These enumerations show one deaf mute, on a general average, to every fifteen hundred souls. We have, therefore, reason to believe that there are not less than half a million of our fellow-beings deaf and dumb.

Though the number known to exist in our own country is not so appalling by its magnitude as that just mentioned, it is still sufficiently large to awaken the most painful emotions in

the heart of every philanthropist. The census of 1830 gave six thousand one hundred and six as the number of deaf and dumb persons in the whole Union. By the census of 1840, having increased with the rapid increase of the whole population, they amounted to seven thousand six hundred and fifty-nine ; and there are conclusive reasons to believe, as stated in the twenty-third Report of the New York Institution above cited, that in each case the number returned fell short by many hundreds of the actual number in the country. These are our own countrymen, often our own friends and neighbors, sometimes even bound to us by the tenderest ties ;—nor is there one among us who can assure himself that a deaf and dumb child may not be born in his own family ; nay, if he has children yet in infancy, that some of them may not become deaf by sickness or accident, and consequently dumb.

Considerations like these give a high interest to the subject of the present article. We need not expatiate on the sad condition of a deaf mute, abandoned to thread the mazes of this vale of tears, unaided, unsoothed, unenlightened ; for the public mind is, on this point, rather prone to exaggerate than otherwise. Nor is it now necessary, in this section of the Union, to appeal to public sympathy for the means of establishing institutions for the instruction of the deaf and dumb. The Northern and Middle States contain three of the largest and best conducted Institutions in the world, and the Legislatures of nearly all those States have made liberal provision for the education of their deaf and dumb population, and have shown a willingness to extend that provision whenever it shall become necessary. Ohio, Kentucky and Virginia have also established Institutions, believed to be competent for the education of the deaf and dumb of those States respectively. Several other States farther West and South, have either already engaged or have shown a willingness to engage in this work of philanthropy ; and in view of what has been done within a few years, we may indulge the pleasing hope that, in a few years more, the intellectual wants of these our unfortunate fellow-citizens will, in every part of our country, be well supplied.

But though the art of instructing the deaf and dumb has been practised among us with success for a quarter of a century, and though it has enrolled among its professors the names of several men of distinguished ability as writers,—it

must be admitted that the reading public is very far from being fully and correctly informed, either with regard to its principles, its processes, the actual degree of success attained, or the causes which have prevented that success from being greater. Several very able and valuable articles have, it is true, from time to time been given to the public through different periodicals; and the annual reports above cited, those of the New York Institution in particular, present much valuable information, illustrated by enlarged philosophical views, on the theory and practice of the art, and on the statistics of the deaf and dumb. The circulars of the Institution of Paris are also exceedingly valuable, but they are in the hands of very few in this country; nor, when the great extent and population of our country is considered, can the fugitive articles and reports referred to, be said to have attained any thing like a general circulation. It is presumed, however, that few will read these pages who are not aware that the first systematic attempts to instruct the deaf and dumb in the language of their countrymen, so far as is now known, were made by Pedro Ponce, a Spanish monk, who died A. D. 1584; and that the benevolent De l'Epée founded at Paris, in the year 1760, and supported for many years from his own scanty fortune, the first institution for the instruction of those, constituting far the larger number, whose families have not the means to pay for their education. Those who feel a curiosity to learn more respecting the history of the art, are referred to the publications cited at the head of this article,—particularly to the North American Review for April, 1834, and to the twenty-first Report of the New York Institution. To the former and to many of the New York Reports, particularly the fifteenth, sixteenth and twentieth, the reader is referred for a sketch of the language of signs, and for many theoretical and practical details, not embraced in the plan of this article.

With regard to the subject we propose more fully to consider, namely, the actual degree of success attained by institutions for the deaf and dumb at this day, and particularly by those in this country, which are believed to have been at least as successful as those in any other country,—very different views may be, and have been taken, according to the particular instances of success which have fallen under the observation of individuals, and to the standard of comparison adopted

in each case. To those familiar, from personal experience, with the mental and moral condition of an uneducated and neglected deaf mute, a very moderate degree of success seems almost miraculous ; while those who measure the acquisitions of much the greater number, in written language, the only point on which the world is capable of judging, by the standard of the well educated who hear, not unfrequently form the opinion that the characters of the deaf and dumb are stamped with a very marked degree of mental inferiority, and that, whatever pains may be taken to instruct them, they can never acquire any literary or scientific reputation, nor, as a body, reach the intellectual average of their more favored brethren.

It is, indeed, rather remarkable that the most striking examples which can be produced of the literary capabilities of the deaf and dumb are, for the most part, persons who learned to read before losing their hearing, and whose cases hardly differ from that of a person who should have been, from an early period of life, immured in a library, with but little more than the necessary intercourse with his fellow-men. Such is precisely the case with James Nack, the distinguished deaf and dumb author, and probably the most extraordinary instance which any country can produce of high literary attainments in a person deprived of hearing in childhood. Cases like that of Nack, however, might occur as well before the possibility of instructing the deaf and dumb from birth was ever thought of, and, from some obscure hints in cotemporary writers, it appears probable they did,—though not perhaps to a degree equally remarkable.

It must be admitted that, while the advantages, both in a moral and intellectual point of view, conferred on so many deaf mutes by the institutions established for their instruction, are immense and incalculable, yet, in the greater number of cases, the degree of success in one point of high importance, instruction in the language of books and newspapers, has been but very moderate ; and that, comparatively speaking, but a very small number have attained the ability to derive from reading and writing, that degree of solace and enjoyment which they would afford to a well educated person, accidentally bereft of hearing.

To ascribe the result to any original inferiority of intellect, would be both unjust and absurd. The privation of a sense,

however important, is still but the privation of one means of acquiring knowledge, and affects the faculties of the mind only so far as it restricts them in that exercise which is as necessary to the development of the mind as of the body. We have seen that if this privation takes place after the individual has learned to read, if he has free access to books, he is not apt to exhibit any want of intellectual activity. Neither is the child born deaf, therefore born with any mental inferiority, for if a child born with all its faculties should lose its hearing before the power of speech has been acquired to any extent, it will grow up in character and mental habits utterly undistinguishable from the deaf and dumb who are so by birth. The case just supposed, is so far from uncommon, that it is believed to have occurred with nearly or quite one half of the whole number of the deaf and dumb. The mental peculiarities of deaf mutes must, therefore, be ascribed solely to the peculiar circumstances in which they find themselves placed ; and they differ from other men, only as plants grown from the same seed, and in the same soil, differ, according to the openness or closeness of the situation, the greater or less favorableness of the aspect, and the supply of aliment and of moisture.

Though the deaf and dumb are dumb only because they are deaf, yet their misfortune does not consist in the mere privation of the sense of hearing ; for the ideas acquired originally through this sense, namely, ideas of the variations of sound, constitute but a comparatively unimportant part of our stock of knowledge. If the established mode of communication among men were by means of a language of visible signs, whether natural or arbitrary, and if none but natural and imitative cries were used, the privation of hearing would be a matter of small moment, and, even if from birth, would involve no social or intellectual disadvantages. Though the case supposed is an imaginary one, yet the existence of a whole nation using such a language is by no means an impossible event. We have only to suppose that a colony should be planted, whether by accident or design, composed at first, exclusively of deaf mutes, and in a situation which would give them few opportunities for intercourse with the rest of the world. Of their posterity probably much the largest proportion would be able to hear, but would possess no spoken language ; and if we suppose the language of gestures to be

brought to a high degree of improvement in such a community, as it probably would be, it may be doubtful whether a language of sounds would ever be originated among them, as its necessity would not be felt. But in such a community the condition of the blind would be far more deplorable, and their education far more impracticable than that of the deaf and dumb is among us. As the ear could not supply to them in the situation supposed, the place of the eye, their condition would be precisely that of the deaf, dumb and blind, those most affecting, but happily rare examples, that show us what a helpless thing the human soul, despite its boasted powers and its immortal destiny, becomes by cutting off the usual nerves of communication with the external world, and with kindred minds. In these considerations we may find an additional motive for believing that speech is not a human invention as some have held, and that all that is has been planned by infinite wisdom, with a view to the greatest good of the greatest number.

We shall presently recur again to the idea of a deaf-mute community, which we have introduced in this place to enable the reader to conceive more clearly why the privation of hearing is, under ordinary circumstances, a doom so terribly severe to a social intelligence. The ability to hear words is of no value where there are no words to hear, and he who should be cast alone on a desert island, or placed in such a community as we have just supposed, would, in consequence of that ability, have no advantage whatever over a deaf mute. But the real misfortune of the latter, and it is indeed one of a magnitude not readily conceivable, consists in his being cut off from the ordinary social and intellectual intercourse of his fellow men. He thus finds himself, in every moral and intellectual point of view, thrown back into that state of nature from which society has been gradually emerging during thousands of years. That traditional knowledge, the fruit of the experience and meditations of successive generations, which accumulates in the memory of a child who hears without a sensible effort on his part, by merely listening to remarks made sometimes to him, far oftener accidentally in his hearing, is to the deaf child, except when placed in a community of deaf mutes, a treasure inaccessible—a book sealed.

It would be aside from our present purpose to give a dissertation on the characters of the uneducated deaf and dumb.

Let it suffice to say, that they are such as might be expected from minds constituted like our own, but not like our own cultivated and improved. That is to say, that they display the traits of untaught childhood, or of tribes little advanced in knowledge,—not as many, by a strange propensity to degrade their own species, would have us believe, of apes or monkeys. Such an opinion is not surprising in the vulgar, who are accustomed to think the power of speech the only difference between man and the ape; but we cannot restrain our surprise and indignation, when we find it gravely asserted and maintained by men in other respects sensible and intelligent,—even by not a few who have aspired to the first rank in philosophy. Strange to say, some eminent teachers of the deaf and dumb, who ought, of all men, to have known better, either judging from particular instances of early neglect and seclusion, or influenced by a desire to magnify their own success, have lent the sanction of their names to opinions degrading their uninstructed fellow-man to the level of the brutes that perish. It is certain that the deaf mute receives a mind and a heart by nature, in which the seeds of warm affections, and even of bright talents, are as frequently implanted as in the minds and hearts of speaking children, and need only as diligent cultivation to quicken them into as vigorous growth. Education has, in many instances, wonderfully improved his mental faculties, because those faculties were formed capable of improvement. The teacher can no more create a mind, where a mind is wanting, than the workman can manufacture a watch without the steel, the brass, and the silver.*

But it may be asked, if there is no original inferiority, why have not the deaf and dumb, instructed for years with unwearyed pains, by men of liberal education and of eminent ability, been raised, as a body, to the intellectual rank of their well educated fellow-men? To which we reply that very many, perhaps the greater number so educated, notwithstanding the scantiness of the period usually allowed for a task so arduous, have attained this rank,—so far as a knowledge of facts and principles, phenomena and causes is concerned;

* Tales of the Deaf and Dumb, with Miscellaneous Poems, by John R. Burnet. Newark, 1835.

but, from their generally imperfect knowledge of written language, the world cannot judge of the extent of their acquirements.

Instruction in written language is, in fact, the only real difficulty in their education. For all other purposes it might be sufficient, if those deaf mutes, whom the accident of birth scatters abroad at a distance from each other, seldom admitting of the mutual improvement of the dialect of gestures devised by each solitary mute for himself, should be collected in communities, or rather drawn together in particular towns and villages, in which there should be a sufficient proportion of deaf mutes to make their language generally intelligible for the purposes of business, of social intercourse, and it might easily be, even of public deliberative assemblies. In such a community the language of gestures might, in the space of a few generations, attain to a degree of perfection much greater than it has attained, even in the oldest existing institution, whose pupils seldom remain long enough to improve, to any considerable extent, the language they find in use, and moreover have their attention, during their limited term of study, occupied with a very different language,—a language, whose importance as a means of communication with the world in which they are to live, is too great to permit its being neglected for the improvement of one of which the use will have to be, in most cases, discontinued when they leave the schools. Yet, notwithstanding these disadvantages, the sign dialects of our schools are abundantly sufficient, not only for social intercourse, but for public instruction whether in history, science, morals, or religion.

In such a community the deaf mute, in every sense of the word a stranger in the world beside, would feel himself at home. He might not only rival his fellows in mechanical skill and physical endurance, but the wide arena of the mind would be open to him. He might not only excel as a painter, or a sculptor but even as an orator, for the language of pantomime in the hands of a master, is the most eloquent of all languages. Thus he could acquire all that power over the minds of his fellow-men, which eloquence never fails to give. Minds would be trained, and their faculties sharpened by free competition and collision with equal minds. Each individual would bring his own experience, the fruits of his own meditations, to swell the common mass of still accumulating in-

tellectual wealth. In short, though such a community would no doubt exhibit much that would be peculiar, yet, even though writing should be unknown, the present intellectual degradation of the deaf and dumb would by no means be one of its characteristics. And no doubt, some mode of writing would in time come into use, better adapted to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb, than the tedious and complicat-ed characters for words now in use.

With many of the educated deaf, and with some of their teachers, the formation of such a community has been a favorite project. But for that end, all the ties of early associations, of business, of country, home and kindred, must be broken up. It would be too much to expect such sacrifices from many of the families accidentally containing deaf mute children ; and if these children should be taken from their natural protectors, without regard to the yearnings of parental and fraternal affection, and settled for life in a community of deaf mutes exclusively, marriages would take place among them, when of suitable age, as certainly as in any other community ; and a multitude of children would soon grow up, able to hear with few exceptions, for deafness is rarely hereditary, but,—like those children mentioned by Herodotus, whom an ancient king of Egypt, desirous of ascertaining what was the original language of mankind, caused to be brought up in seclusion by dumb persons—without any spoken language, be-cause there was no spoken language for them to learn. The project of a deaf mute community on a large scale, is therefore generally considered an Utopian scheme. It is at pre-sent, and will long continue necessary to place the deaf mute child, for a limited number of years, in an institution, where all the facilities of intellectual development afforded by a deaf mute community are provided during the term of his stay ; and where, moreover, he will be taught, as far as practicable, a language universally intelligible among those to whose so-ciety he will return.

The causes which make the perfect acquisition of a written language so peculiarly difficult for the deaf and dumb, and their instruction in it a task so long and wearisome, are not generally understood. Strange to say, many people confound this case with that of children learning to read and write in ordinary schools. The latter, already masters, for all neces-sary purposes, of their mother tongue, have only to learn

twenty-six characters representing the elementary sounds of words already familiar. When the value of these characters is once well fixed in the memory, the only remaining difficulties are those arising from an irregular orthography. To the deaf mute, on the other hand, not only the characters representing words are strangers, but the sounds of the words themselves have not, and for him never can have any existence. When he has become familiar with the form of every letter in the alphabet, he is not a step further advanced towards a knowledge of words, than the English child who has learned the Hebrew alphabet, is thereby advanced towards a knowledge of the words of that language. In each case it is necessary to explain the value of each individual word, and the laws of construction, in the study of a foreign language, often present much greater difficulties than the nomenclature.

The Hebrew is here selected, because its alphabet, its words, and its syntax being all radically different from our own, it affords a good illustration, though still an inadequate one, of the difficulty of the acquisition of a written language, by those who, though living among the people by whom that language is spoken, have never heard a word of it, and to whom therefore, it is as truly a foreign language as the Hebrew is to us.

A still better illustration would be the case of an European or American attempting to learn from books the Chinese written language ; yet in that we are told, there are only about two hundred and fourteen radical characters, and, these being once well fixed in the memory, it becomes comparatively an easy task to understand and remember the thirty-three thousand characters formed by combinations of these. But if we examine the English language, we shall find several thousand words, primitives to us, though very many of them may be compounds or derivatives in the languages whence they were taken. Each of these primitive words must be retained by a direct effort of the memory, unassisted by any associations with other words, in our language, previously known ; and in the case of the deaf and dumb, they must be recollected, as we recollect the Chinese characters, by their appearance on paper, unaided by any associations of their parts with the sounds of words. To this class of learners, our written words must appear as a jumble of letters, each by itself sig-

nifying nothing, any more than the different strokes of the pen which compose one of the Chinese characters.

From this view of the case it is evident that the perfect acquisition of the written language of his country, must, for a deaf mute, require even more time than the perfect acquisition of the written language of China for an European, since for the former, the number of arbitrary characters is much greater, and the difficulties of construction are certainly not less.

Those aware of the severe mental labor which the study of languages, like the Hebrew and Chinese, exacts for so many years, will cease to be surprised that, in most cases, after four or five years instruction the deaf mute is, with respect to the study of written language, but little advanced beyond that point at which the education of those who hear usually begins,—namely, that at which the meaning of unfamiliar words can be explained by other words previously known; and that very many can hardly be said to reach this point, at least so as to derive benefit from the dictionaries in common use. We need not therefore wonder that so many, after completing the period allowed them, and returning to the society of those little qualified to aid or encourage them in intellectual pursuits, forget much that they may have learned in the school-room, and only retain so much knowledge of the simplest forms of language, as to hold necessary communication with those with whom they have to deal.

Yet even with this scanty knowledge of written language, the knowledge of facts, of causes, of principles, of family, social and moral relations, which every mute of ordinary intellect acquires by a residence of a few years in an institution for the deaf and dumb, is of incalculable value. It lifts him in the scale of being, giving him the sweet assurance that he is a man, a member of the same great family with those around him. A veil is lifted from the face of nature, and the curtain drawn aside that hid the once mysterious springs of human actions. The world is no longer to him bounded by the hills that close his own view. He sees the sun set, and knows he has gone to shine on other lands, to foster the growth of the tea and the coffee-tree,—to ripen the orange and the fig,—to light the path of the elephant-riding Asiatic through his tiger-haunted jungle, and to parch the desert where the Arab speeds from Oasis to Oasis, on his camel,

and where the lordly lion dwells alone. When the desolation of winter is abroad on the earth, he looks forward with confidence to the return of a summer as bright, as warm, and as fruitful as the last, for the promise has been explained to him, that seed time and harvest shall not cease. He has been taught to shun the intoxicating draught which too many have put to the lips of the uneducated deaf and dumb ; he has learned to respect habitually the rights of property, to set a sacred value on truth, and by their conduct in these respects, he knows whom among his fellow men to trust, and whom to distrust. With the world at large he can indeed hold but little intercourse, but with those familiar with his modes of expression, he establishes a dialect, partly of words and partly of signs, not only sufficient for all necessary purposes, but enabling him to mingle in the social parties, and share in the social enjoyments of those of his own age. If he cannot understand the inflammatory appeals, and personal abuse of a party newspaper, he at least knows the most material facts in the history of his own country, and the structure of its government ; he is aware why elections are held, and if he sides with a party merely because it is the side of his own best friends, he has a better motive of action than many can plead. If he does not hear, or seeing in writing, cannot fully appreciate the solemn words that bind man and woman together for life, at least he is fully sensible of the sacred nature of the relation, and is himself competent to enter, and often does enter into it. Though he may not comprehend the eloquent appeals made in behalf of missions, he has heard of missionaries sent to the heathen, and perhaps has even been personally acquainted with such. He knows why they were sent and by whom, and how they went, and can even point out on the map the country to which they have gone. If he cannot hear the public preaching of the word, or even feel the full force of the exhortations in tracts put into his hands, he knows why men meet one day in seven, and can often derive profit by meeting with his hearing neighbors, recalling to his own mind under the influence of the day, of the place and of the occasion, some exhortation delivered long before by his teacher in his own language of signs, some precept of the Saviour, or some scene from sacred history. Nay more, he not unfrequently obtains the assurance of meeting his fellow-worshippers in that celestial home, where finally the predi-

tion of the prophet shall be more fully fulfilled than during the brief abode of the Messiah on earth, where in short, "the deaf shall hear and the dumb shall sing."

We have now briefly considered the actual degree of success attained by instructors of the deaf and dumb. Though the instances of eminent success, at least during the usual scanty period of instruction, have been rare, yet, compared with the lot of far greater numbers who remain uneducated, the condition of the educated mute, even of one who would be considered below the average of his class, is one of intellectual, social and moral elevation, and his means of enjoyment of a far higher kind, and more accessible. It remains to be considered whether the almost insuperable difficulties which obstruct his perfect acquisition of written language, cannot be so far removed that the ability to derive high gratification from the perusal of books, shall no longer be the rare exception instead of the general rule.

We have spoken of written language as peculiarly difficult of acquisition for the deaf and dumb. If they consider each word as a single complex character, they are forced to commit to memory several thousand radical characters; and if, as is perhaps more common, they look on a word as an arbitrary jumble of letters, the case is, as we shall hereafter explain, still worse.

But the difficulty of acquiring words in the first instance, great as it is, is by no means the only, or even the principal difficulty. The ability to employ, without sensible effort, the signs for ideas furnished by any language in our ordinary social intercourse, and in our private meditations, is necessary to a thorough acquaintance with that language. The deaf and dumb must not only laboriously commit to memory the words of a written language and its laws of construction, but they must be led to form a system of ideas corresponding to those words, and to employ either the images of those written words, or some other system of signs, parallel with, and readily convertible into the ordinary language of their countrymen, as the direct object and instrument of thought.

This faculty can in general only be acquired by the constant colloquial use of words, and such colloquial use implies a mode of exhibiting words in conversation more rapid and convenient than ordinary writing. Till it is acquired, written language must ever remain to this class of learners, a foreign

language, whose phrases will, in general, be understood only by translation into their vernacular language of gestures. We shall first endeavor to put this principle in a clearer point of view, and then enquire what system of signs representing words, is most eligible, for we are firmly persuaded that, on the choice of such a system depends the question, whether the deaf and dumb may be, in any reasonable space of time, inducted into a perfect knowledge of written language.

To those whose language was acquired through the ear, words, whether they utter, hear, read, or merely think of them, are only variations of articulated sounds. Hence, most men find it difficult to appreciate correctly the peculiar circumstances of those, for whom this entire class of perceptions has no more existence than colors for a man born blind, and to whom, therefore, words in whatever manner they are presented, must belong to the class of visual, or that of tactile sensations. Whether in the case of a deaf mute who has been taught to articulate, the tactile sensations furnished by the contacts and motions of his own organs of speech constitute the material of words, or only recall the visible movements of those organs in another, or some other visible form of words, as in the case of the writer, those contacts and motions serving as representatives of sounds still remembered, though for many years unheard, is a question of much doubt. In either case, it is evident that to the deaf mute taught to articulate, words are very different from what they are to us. But there can be no doubt respecting the ordinary visible characters for words, whether composed of marks on paper, or of positions of the fingers. The one mode or the other may equally become to a deaf mute, the original forms of words, to which all other recognized forms of the same words will be referred. But in either case, words must be learned originally through the eye, and must therefore, ever belong to the class of visual perceptions.

Laura Bridgeman, the interesting pupil of the New England Asylum for the blind, presents the only instance in which we cannot doubt that words are conceived solely as tactile sensations. Other deaf mutes who, after acquiring some knowledge of words, had become blind, have indeed learned to recognize those words by the sense of touch; but the case just mentioned is believed to be the first in which an original knowledge of words has been acquired through this sense.

The radical difference, just explained, between the deaf mute's perceptions of words and those of men in general, must be steadily kept in view as the clue to many of the views and arguments presented in the following pages. It will also make it clear why the case of those who acquired a language before becoming deaf, differs from that of the deaf and dumb from birth. To the former, words are precisely what they are to other men, and though unheard for many years, their tones will still linger in the mind's ear, with all their variations of rhythm, cadence, accent, and emphasis. Such, as has already been intimated, is the case of the present writer, and he can therefore speak on that point from his own experience.

The mental habits of the deaf and dumb from birth, also differ from our own in another point, requiring explanation.

Metaphysicians recognize two modes of conducting mental operations. We may recall directly our original perceptions of objects, and of their relations whether in space or time: or we may recall them by means of signs standing some as the representatives of individual objects, but the greater number as the representatives of classes, of attributes, of states, of changes, of actions, of the relations of time and place, of cause and effect, of general principles.

The first is styled the method of direct intuition: It is the mode in which the mind of an uneducated mute recalls, compares, and combines at will the objects of his knowledge.

So long as the mind busies itself with the images of sensible objects, whether contemplated singly, or which is more common, as forming part of a group; so long as it follows, as in a camera obscura, the changes of place, color, attitude, relative position, etc., of objects,—so long as it recalls directly its own simple emotions and judgments, by recalling objects or actions adapted to excite the former or exercise the latter,—so long it may, and, in certain circumstances, does dispense with signs of any description in conducting its operations.

Even when a deaf mute has carried the pantomime, the natural language by which he communicates his ideas to others, to a considerable degree of perfection, he still thinks, for the most part, by the direct intuition of ideas;—because his pantomimic signs are either merely copies of the images in his own mind, as far as these are capable of being copied,

or abbreviations which suggest the entire image, in the same way in which the single letter *N.* suggests to us the word north, or the letters *MS.* the word manuscript. The order, too, of his pantomime follows the order of his perceptions, an order which, though strictly natural, appears inverted to those accustomed to the order of words in most spoken languages. It is the characteristic of a language of pantomime to present groups of ideas at once,—or, when it becomes necessary to exhibit the parts of an outline or group in detail, the most prominent or essential must be presented first, that they may be more easily retained in the mind till, by adding the other parts in the order of their relative importance, the group is completed.

When practice has made this mode of communication familiar, it becomes unnecessary to trace more than a few of the most prominent outlines. The mind of the spectator supplies the rest in the same way in which, seeing a part of some familiar object, we know to what object it belongs. And this species of abbreviation may be extended to examples and metaphors used to illustrate ideas beyond the limits of the material world. The two words, *fox* and *grapes*, instantly recall the whole fable and its application to those to whom they are familiar, and the sign language of the deaf and dumb is composed, in great part, of similar abbreviations. But we are wandering from our present subject.

From what has been said, it is evident that the employment of such a language demands the direct intuition of ideas, both to execute and to comprehend the pantomime with facility. Hence it is, that deaf mutes are far more skilful in the use of this instrument of communication than those who, from the almost exclusive use of an artificial language, have acquired the opposite mental habit. And *vice versa*, the invincible predilection of all deaf mutes for their own language of pantomime very seriously obstructs their familiar acquisition of a language more universally intelligible among men, partly by making the use of the latter less frequent, but partly, also, by confirming habits of mind very unfavorable to the ready conception of such a language.

Direct intuition, (including, of course, the actual contemplation of the image of the object in its presence, as well as of the same image recalled in the absence of the object,) must be, in the first instance, the foundation of all positive know-

ledge. It is the only mode in which the value of those signs can be determined which cannot be defined by other signs previously known, and therefore, the first conceptions, the first dawning of observation and reflection in the mind of a child who hears, must be, equally with those of a deaf mute child, by the mode of direct intuition.

But, teach the child to represent objects and their qualities and relations, classes, and their generic or specific differences, actions and their modifications, by separate signs,—signs, too, which the mind can, from their greater simplicity, grasp, arrange and combine more readily than it can the actual images of objects and actions ;—let him use such signs continually in acquiring and communicating ideas, and, though at first both the sign and the image will be present in the mind, yet the image will soon retire more and more in the back ground, while the sign will stand prominently forth. The case may, perhaps, be illustrated by comparing the sign to those labels in a cabinet of minerals, which often nearly conceal the specimen on which they are placed.

Let us further suppose that these signs become, in process of time, arranged in a customary order of collocation, very different from the natural order of ideas ;—that many of them come into use to denote general relations, as far beyond the limits of direct intuition, as the higher principles of geometry are beyond the simple truths called axioms ;—that the mind is led by them into the boundless realms of abstract existences where intuition cannot follow ;—and we can easily conceive that the presence of signs for ideas will become essential to the greater number of mental operations,—and that so intimate a union will be formed between the idea and the sign by which it is most usually represented—the latter standing to the former in the relation of body to soul,—that the mind will become habituated to consider, not ideas directly, but the signs of those ideas.

When a system of signs for ideas either originally arbitrary, as in the case of spoken words, or become so by successive changes and abbreviations, as with the Chinese written characters, and with many of the signs used by the deaf and dumb,—has been carried to a high degree of cultivation and refinement, by the successive labors of a vast multitude of superior minds, and, especially, when the memory has been stored with innumerable happy combinations of those signs,

in the form of proverbs, of passages from favorite authors, etc., the mental habit just referred to, assumes so much the character of an universal law, that we are hardly conscious of thinking at all unless we think by the aid of such signs. Hence some have denied that the deaf mute could think without a language to serve as the instrument of thought, and, thus, have most unjustly measured the extent of his ideas by the copiousness of his colloquial dialect. But, though we admit that the Atlantic cannot be crossed without a vessel, yet a practised swimmer will cross rivers which a man accustomed to rely on a boat, would think impassable without its assistance. And though the deaf mute who thinks by direct intuition, cannot attain to the same depth and reach of thought enjoyed by those who possess a more perfect mode of registering successive results and discoveries, he can, nevertheless, think and reason to a much greater extent than is commonly supposed.

Perhaps the most striking difference between the two mental habits under consideration is that, while the pantomimic signs of a deaf mute suggest but a very limited number of relations or associations, other than those obvious at first sight between the objects represented,—on the contrary, each sign in an artificial language brings with it a long train of associations, from the almost innumerable shades of meaning, both literal and metaphorical, of which each sign is susceptible, and the vast variety of combinations in which we have been accustomed to use it, or find it used. While the pantomimic signs, serving, as it were, as the object glass to a camera obscura, recall real images, a sign of the other class recalls not so much an image or outline, as some of the many associations with which we have been accustomed to connect that sign. It will be at once admitted that, to a blind man, the word *eagle* or *lion* cannot suggest the real image of those animals, but will nevertheless recall the ideas of their strength, courage, dominion over weaker animals, the soaring flight of the one, the kingly port of the other, and the innumerable historical and poetical associations founded on those qualities. There is a very large class of minds whose ordinary conceptions of words are very little different from those of the blind man. And indeed there are very many words which, though representing sensible objects, can hardly be connected with any particular images. Take, for example, such words as

church, temple, flower, fruit, laurel, cypress, steed, courser, hovel, palace, citadel, each of which is linked with such a throng of ideas, that those sensible images which are the objects of real intuition, if they appear at all, are most commonly overlooked, or at best, dimly distinguished in the crowd.

With mankind in general, the articulated sounds called words are the "signs thus used to represent ideas. When men have been accustomed, from the earliest glimmerings of recollection, to conduct their intellectual operations by means of such signs, arbitrary in themselves, and equally arbitrary in their mode of arrangement, the faculty of direct intuition becomes, not only much weakened, but greatly modified. The memory learns to cling tenaciously to articulated sounds, and recalls visual forms with comparative difficulty. Hence it is that, in order to assist our recollections of plants or minerals, for example, we find it necessary to give a name to each. Moreover, from the facility which such a system of signs gives to the processes of generalization and abstraction, the mind becomes habituated to contemplate rather general principles than particular examples.

It is not perhaps surprising that, deceived by mental habits like these, which, though acquired, have by custom become second natures, many have maintained that the articulations of the human voice have an exclusive prerogative to serve as the direct object and instrument of thought. Such an opinion, however, belongs to an age of philosophy little advanced, and is no more worthy of serious refutation at this day, than the once universal notion that the earth is at rest while the sun moves round it. Its origin is evidently to be traced to those systems of philosophy once venerated, but now only remembered to excite a smile, which were built exclusively on words, and akin to which was the mysterious and supernatural power ascribed to certain words used in spells and incantations ; notions which the stern and unimaginative philosophy of our days has long since banished to the realms of poetry and romance.

Absurd as the opinion in question may appear to us, it seems to have been held by most of the early instructors of the deaf and dumb, who, in consequence, gave their attention chiefly to supplying, by laborious instruction in artificial articulation, the necessary medium of thought ; forgetting that,

to the deaf and dumb, speech can never be what it is to other men, a language of sounds, but must be confined to the movements of the vocal organs,—in short, must become a language of visible, or possibly of tactile, but never of audible signs. Consequently, if such views were to be admitted, we should be constrained to regard the condition of the deaf and dumb from birth as utterly hopeless. Most fortunately for them, the instances of Massieu, Clerc, Loring, and others that might be named, afford illustrious proofs that a knowledge of sounds, or of articulation, is unnecessary to a more than common development of the intellectual faculties.

To this error succeeded another, which has also had a great influence on the systems of some celebrated instructors of the deaf and dumb. When at length deaf mutes were collected together in communities, the expansion of their natural language of gestures became so rapid, that men began to suspect its capability of reaching a degree of perfection equal to that of existing spoken languages. It was moreover observed that, with whatever care a deaf mute was instructed in written language, he still preferred to employ the language of gestures in his intercourse with all to whom that language was intelligible, and especially in his private meditations. Hence it was argued that he must always continue to think in that language, and to regard written words only as the representatives of his signs. It hence became a favorite labor with the benevolent De l'Epée, and with his renowned successor Sicard, to bring this language to such a state of perfection, that the task of instructing the deaf and dumb might be reduced to the mere process of translation, or rather to the mechanical substitution of written characters for their corresponding gestures,

If we suppose a whole nation of deaf mutes to exist together for successive generations, it is evident that, by the time they should have reached, (and they certainly might reach) a degree of knowledge and refinement equal to that of the present civilized nations of the earth, they would have formed a language of gestures equally copious, equally perspicuous and precise, and perhaps, in some respects, equally arbitrary with the spoken languages now in use. But it is just as evident that to comprehend and employ such a language, demands, in the first place, a corresponding development of ideas, and that where this condition does not exist, its signs

would have no more meaning, even for a deaf mute, than, for example, the words of a botanical description of genera and species, for a child ignorant of botany. If, then, we even suppose the herculean labor fully achieved, and a language of gestures produced parallel to that of speech, it will still be as necessary to teach the deaf mute the meaning of a gesture representing a word, as to teach him the meaning of the word itself.

Here, then, we come to the point which has been, of late, more vigorously discussed than any other connected with the instruction of the deaf and dumb,—namely, whether the pupil should be led to associate his ideas directly with written words, or should be furnished by the teacher with a gesture to represent the idea of each word—the gesture supplying for him the place of a connecting link between the word and the idea, which with those who hear, is supplied by the sound of the word.

Such gestures constitute what is denominated a system of methodical signs. We need not say that we regard as entirely erroneous the opinion held by some, that such a system of signs is absolutely necessary for the deaf mute, to stand as intermediate between ideas and the written characters for words. We fully subscribe to the maxim which is now very generally admitted, that any independent system of signs may become the direct object and instrument of thought. But one system of signs may be far superior to another in point of convenience and expedition, and, consequently, in utility; and hence, as we have already observed, the choice of a system of signs to form for the deaf mute the material of words, becomes a problem of very great importance, and one to solve which, all the circumstances of the case must be taken into view.

Before proceeding farther, it may be worth while to bestow a passing glance on the opinions of those who, as has just been intimated, have denied the possibility of characters for words, written *literatim*, fulfilling the all-important office of a direct representation of ideas. They seem to have been influenced, not so much by any sound philosophical views, as by their own experience. To those who have acquired a language through the ear, words are sounds, and all modes of depicting words to the eye, are merely representatives of words. Such persons, observing that to their own minds the

sight of a familiar written character invariably recalls its corresponding articulation, and that it is impossible for them to attach any ideas to the characters of ordinary writing without the intervention of such an articulation, hastily conclude that a similar necessity exists for the deaf and dumb. Hence, as we have observed, some instructors hold that artificial articulation, and others that the gestures called methodical signs, are necessary to stand for the deaf mute between written words and ideas.

This absurdity has been well exposed in the Twenty-second Report of the New York Institution. Sounds having no existence for the deaf and dumb, written characters devised to represent sounds, must, for them, be independent characters, which may indeed, by habit, be associated with certain gestures, or with certain movements of the vocal organs, but which may nevertheless be retained in the mind independent of any such association. What teacher of the deaf and dumb has not been, innumerable times, applied to for a definition of certain words or phrases, which his pupils had met with in reading, or in conversation by writing with those who hear, and which they had committed to memory for the express purpose of asking their meaning? And what well educated mute, though entirely ignorant of articulation, cannot use correctly many words to which he attaches no particular sign, and which he could not define by signs, without reflection and circumlocution?

But the question still remains, whether written words are not far too complex for the mind to conduct its operations by their aid with ordinary rapidity and facility. We confess that all the zeal and ability with which several very eminent instructors have plead the cause of written words, have failed to satisfy us on this point.

Those who maintain the practicability of leading the deaf and dumb to associate their ideas directly with the class of written signs under consideration, and to conduct their own mental operations by the immediate contemplation of the images of such written words,—appeal to various well known examples of ideographic writing, such as the characters used in algebra, the system of musical notation, and especially the written language of the Chinese.

But in all these characters, there is a kind of unity quite unknown to alphabetic writing. The Chinese characters are,

probably, the most complex of the kind known, yet, in every one, we are told, there is a single radical character, representing what some philosophers style the *mother idea*, and though two or three others may be added, forming a *tout ensemble* very complex to an European eye, yet each of these has, in theory at least, its appropriate office in modifying the principal idea.

But in alphabetic writing, we find the radicals to consist, not of a single character, but generally of about half a dozen, and sometimes of nearly twice that number. Pure radicals, it is true, do not usually consist of a great number of letters, but we have very many words in common use, which, though compounds or derivatives in their original languages, are primitives to the English student. *Institution, locomotive, anniversary, contemplate*,—these are but a few of the many instances in which the labor of learning our language is, especially to the deaf and dumb, increased many fold by the multitude of compound words adopted from other languages.

Here, however, the advocates of written words remind us that characters thus formed of several letters each, are analogous to spoken words of many syllables, which we find no difficulty in considering as the direct representatives of ideas, and which float along with the current of our thoughts without our being sensible of any embarrassment from their complexity.

With those deaf mutes who conceive words as composed of successive letters, as probably most of them do, the similarity between the two cases is undeniable; but it must be borne in mind that, on an average, there are nearly four times as many letters as syllables in any connected discourse in our language. If, then, a language can be found which employs in enunciating propositions, on an average, three or four times as many syllables as our own, such a language would be precisely parallel to the case under consideration.

But, as words of many syllables, or parts equivalent to syllables, however rapidly they may be uttered, must still be uttered by successive syllables, and however rapidly they may pass through the mind, must still pass by successive parts, it is evident that such a language must require, on an average, not only at least thrice as much time for communicating ideas as our own language requires, but also at least thrice as much time for any mental process, whether of memory,

reason, or invention, in which the mind busies itself directly with words as the signs of ideas.

The disadvantage just mentioned would, it is true, be of little consequence to the individual, if all around him were in the same situation. But there are few who will prefer to use so tedious a language in conversation, when they can employ one far more rapid; and hence, a person, ignorant of signs in a community of deaf mutes, and a deaf mute in the society of those who hear, would equally find themselves ignorant of the greatest part of what was passing around them.

This slowness of alphabetic writing as an instrument of communication is too palpable to be denied, but, if a corresponding slowness as an instrument of thought were to be admitted, it would by no means answer the purposes of its advocates. Some of the most zealous and able advocates of alphabetic writing, have been fully sensible that a system of signs for ideas which, by the multiplicity of its parts, puts thrice the ordinary distance between the premises of any proposition, must very seriously weaken the power of the understanding to draw conclusions from the consideration and comparison of those premises. Aware that such a tedious system of signs for ideas could hardly ever supplant the far more rapid language of gestures, and that, if it could, the change would be, in this point of view, far from advantageous, they argue, that the deaf and dumb can be taught to regard words as units, composed indeed of parts, but, like words of one syllable to those who hear, with those parts, or elements so intimately combined, that the mind becomes aware of the complexity of the word only by a particular effort of attention. In illustration, we are referred to the multitude of natural objects, of which, when become familiar, the conception is instantaneous, though each consists of a great, often an indefinite number of separable parts. Some of those who thus argue, sensible of the difficulty, we may even say the impossibility, of such an instantaneous conception of words by those deaf mutes who conceive words habitually under the forms of a *literatim* manual alphabet, as nearly all do in whose education such an alphabet is used from the beginning, advise that the use of this instrument, convenient and time saving as, compared with writing, it eminently is, be avoided, till the pupil has had time to acquire the habit of contemplating words as units, all whose parts being present together.

when the word is viewed on the slate, may all be present together when the image of the word recurs to the mind.

That, in this case, the desired faculty of the instantaneous conception of words may be attained, we are not prepared to deny, though the comparison with natural objects is far from bringing any aid to the argument. Natural objects, though composed of parts, have such a unity of individual character throughout, that each part may be separately recognized, as belonging to one particular object, and to no other. Cut a *hickory* into a thousand parts, and not only the bark, the wood, the leaf, the ament, the nut, will be recognized by the most cursory observers as belonging to a hickory, and to no other tree, but yet more, the fragments of each of these parts must be made very small indeed, ere it will become impossible for a practical botanist to say to what tree they belong. But what is there in any one of the seven letters, composing the word *hickory*, to suggest that particular word, more than thousands of other words?

The case is the same with all homogeneous substances produced by the art of man:—and though there are many artificial objects fashioned out of materials not homogeneous, or not peculiar to that object, yet, in such cases, there is always a certain adaptation of materials to the fabric, of the parts to the whole, which usually enables us, on the sight of any fragment, to say to what object it had belonged, or, at least, to enumerate those to which it might have belonged. The uses to which bricks are put, other than that of building a house, are not so numerous but that we can readily enumerate them, —but who can enumerate all the words which contain the letter *h*? Again,—we can distinguish at a glance the wheel of a cart from the wheel of a coach,—a piece of window-glass from a piece of wine-glass,—a fragment of a boot from a fragment of a book-cover, and so on *ad infinitum*; but what letter is there which can be said to belong to any one word, more than to perhaps five thousand other words?

The fact is, that of all known systems of written characters, those of ordinary alphabetic writing are the worst adapted to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb. To them there is no distinction of vowels and consonants. Consequently to their minds, one letter is equal to another, and the parts of words appear to have no necessary connection with,

or dependence on one another. Arbitrary characters would be apt to present a different aspect. They might, perhaps, often be complicated equally with the former, but on looking at the Chinese characters, we find, for the most part, certain principal strokes strongly drawn, to which other strokes are subordinate. A stroke on one side of the character, is, also, often matched by a similar stroke on the opposite side ; and one character is frequently distinguished from another by having its strokes in pairs or in threes, instead of single ones. Such characters are, also, brought more within the compass of a glance ; and though one character may be composed of a much greater number of strokes, it can never be said to be longer, and hardly to be larger than another. Let the reader who has at hand a specimen of the Chinese characters, and a specimen of the written words of some other language, whose alphabet is unknown or unfamiliar to him, compare the two together, and he will probably be satisfied that the former are much easier to recollect than the latter would be, independently of the sounds they represent.

To show that the reasons brought in support of a proposition are insufficient or inconclusive, is not, however, to prove the reverse of the proposition. Though we cannot recollect written words, as we do natural objects, by the necessary connection or adaptation of their parts, independently of the sounds they represent, still, to deny the possibility of the instantaneous conception of such a word would be, to deny the possibility of the instantaneous conception of a single letter, or of a single arbitrary character. The only difference between the two cases is in the greater or less degree of effort required of the memory. The word *it*, or *ox*, for example, is not more complex than the single letter *m*, nor the word *do* more so than the letter *g*. No doubt, the power of the human memory to retain complex forms like these, has a practical, if not an absolute limit ; but the power certainly exists in all minds, to a certain degree, and this degree may, at least with those of superior faculties, be sufficient for all practical purposes.

But, if we concede the power to exist to the extent just stated, we must also admit the possibility of the instantaneous conception of two or more words,—even of whole sentences. There are many sentences which, if written without the usual space between the words, would appear less complex than

some single words. *Alionisstrong*, presents fewer letters than the single word *representative*. *Aliontearsalamb*, has no more letters than the word *excommunication*. Words, it is true, are usually separated, but so are letters, not only in printed books, but also in the ordinary use of words by the deaf and dumb, through the medium of a manual alphabet. It is also true that a sentence is usually translated by a greater number of signs than a single word; but many words must be defined by several signs,—while many sentences may be instanced for which the deaf and dumb, in ordinary conversation, would use but a single gesture.

We grant, then, the possibility of the instantaneous conception of whole words, provided those words, fixed on paper, or on the slate, be habitually contemplated as a single complex form, and not as a succession of letters. We even admit that the limit at which words become too complex to be retained in the mind as single characters, *may be*, at least with some rarely constituted minds, much beyond the greatest degree of complexity found in any single word in our language. Will the advocates of alphabetic writing desire us to stop here? Or will they be willing to admit that a mind that can conceive as a unit a word of fifteen or sixteen letters, can equally conceive as a unit a sentence of the same number of letters, though distributed in five or six words? The habit of taking in at a single glance all the letters composing a sentence, is certainly not more difficult of acquisition, in itself, than the habit of taking in at a single glance the same number of letters when called a single word, and if we suppose the former habit once acquired, it would be difficult to fix any limits to its exercise.

This is to concede to the deaf and dumb a privilege far higher than those who hear and speak possess; a faculty which may be conceived as the prerogative of a superior order of intelligences;—and if we carry the idea of the instantaneous conception of sentences to its full extent, and imagine a mode of exhibiting sentences corresponding in rapidity,—as affording the medium of thought and of communication to an Uriel and a Gabriel.

Though the higher degrees of this faculty are palpably beyond the powers of the human mind, yet it is probable that an inferior degree is denied to us, more in consequence of the structure of our languages than from the feebleness of

our intellectual powers. Nothing would be easier than to devise words that should stand for whole sentences; and, in fact, every cultivated and refined language presents many words which can only be translated by circumlocutions in other languages. But, from the limited number of elements of which syllables may be composed, such words cannot be devised, to any considerable extent, without making them consist of nearly or quite as many syllables as would be necessary to express the same idea in separate words. There would, therefore, be little gained by their use, either in rapidity of conception, or facility of communication.

The case is different with respect to written characters, of which the elements may be more numerous, and capable of a much greater number of combinations than those of articulated syllables. In that written language which is probably read by many millions more than can read any other written language, we are told, there are from thirty to fifty thousand characters, each of which, when once become familiar to the eye and mind, can of course be recognized at a glance, and conceived as instantly as we conceive a single syllable, or a single object of sight. It is unnecessary to enquire to what extent such characters might be multiplied by combinations, so as to do away with separate characters for adverbs, adjectives, and even for verbs, without destroying the faculty of instantaneous perception. It is evident that, if we suppose the radical characters sufficiently simple, any simple sentence might be represented by a single compound character. And the absolute limit to the use of such characters with superior intellects, would be far beyond the actual extent to which they would be likely to be carried in practice.

Such a language would, however, be attended by one great disadvantage. The slowness of communication would halt so far behind the rapidity of thought, that either the mind must be, in a very great degree, restricted in that most valuable source of knowledge, and most powerful stimulus to intellectual activity,—free communion and competition with other minds,—a circumstance which must react most unfavorably on the development and improvement of the language itself; or else some other medium must be used for ordinary social and intellectual intercourse, the use of which must very seriously impede the perfect acquisition of the medium by which knowledge is to be preserved, and thoughts trans-

mitted to distant friends, and to posterity. Thus the Chinese use a spoken language quite independent of their written language, and thus the deaf and dumb are driven, by the slowness of alphabetic writing as an instrument of communication, to the language of gestures, their habitual use of which very seriously obstructs their familiar acquisition of the former. In fact, the difficulties in the way of the latter class of learners are much greater, for as we have explained, our written language is to a person ignorant of sounds much more difficult of acquisition than the written language of the Chinese.

Were a written language now, for the first time, to be formed, or were mankind, by common consent, to go to school again, and learn a new one, it would, no doubt, be possible to devise characters, composed of elements so simple, that the comparative slowness of writing them, compared with the rapidity of speech, or of gestures, if it did not quite disappear, would still be so greatly reduced as to present no serious obstruction to the familiar acquisition of such a language as an instrument of communication.

But the crook cannot be straightened in the oak, that grew in the sapling; and to substitute a regular mathematical outline, like that of Philadelphia or Washington, for the present accidental sinuosities and meanderings of New York, or London, is an achievement of which the wildest imagination can hardly dream. However ill adapted ordinary alphabetic writing may be to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb, it is still the only instrument of communication practicable for all deaf mutes, and intelligible to men in general. They must therefore be content to take it as they find it, with its anomalies, its complexity of parts, and its slowness of representation.

That some system of stenography may be devised for the deaf and dumb, which, while it should represent the same elements represented by ordinary writing, should by the greater simplicity of its elements, both simplify the pupil's ideas of words, and greatly abridge the time necessary for exhibiting them, we have not the least doubt. But, though such systems may have been devised, and their value acknowledged by some eminent teachers, no such system is known to be in use in any existing institution. Alphabetic writing is universally taught under the form only in which it is gen-

erally intelligible. To this form we must therefore, at present, confine our attention.

Complicated as are the arbitrary characters for words which ordinary writing presents to the deaf and dumb, we have found no reason to deny that the instantaneous conception of such characters is possible, nor yet that they may be immediately associated with ideas. But what is abstractly possible for those of superior faculties, is not therefore practicable for the average class of learners. That the use of such characters is attended by many disadvantages is evident, when we find that a deaf mute is considered to do uncommonly well, when he attains a command of language which would be considered quite mediocre in a foreigner learning our language. Supposing, therefore, the faculty of the instantaneous conception of written words to be attained, we have still to enquire whether such written characters can be expected to become, except in very rare cases, the ordinary instruments of thought to the deaf and dumb. That very few, if any, have acquired the ability so to use them, is universally conceded, and if we should show that no care and pains on the part of the teachers, no extension, even, of the period of instruction, can, under ordinary circumstances, secure this result, we may hope that our institutions for the deaf and dumb will adopt some system of signs representing words, more likely to secure a result so essential as that of leading the pupil to think directly and habitually in words or their equivalents. The adoption of such a system of signs, is in our view, (and in that view we do not stand alone,) the great desideratum in the art of deaf mute instruction.

For the better understanding of the question just proposed, we will recapitulate certain propositions growing out of the topics already discussed.

1. A knowledge of ordinary alphabetic writing is absolutely necessary for the deaf and dumb. This point is self-evident. But, farther:

2. It is not necessary for them, more than for mankind in general, to associate their ideas directly with written words.

Yet:

3. It is necessary, if we propose to give them a perfect knowledge of the language of their countrymen, to lead them to associate their ideas habitually and immediately with a system of signs parallel with, and readily convertible into the words of that language.

4. In the choice of such a system, the intelligibility of its signs among men in general, though not essential, (as the definition just given implies the ready convertibility, one into another, of the corresponding signs of different systems,) is an advantage not to be lightly rejected, as it will save the pupil the double labor of learning one system as an instrument of thought, and another as an instrument of communication.

5. A consideration of far greater importance than the universal intelligibility of the system of signs selected, is its capability of supplying to the deaf and dumb a convenient instrument of colloquial intercourse with each other, and with their more intimate associates who hear. The ease with which it may be acquired, by both classes of persons, the rapidity of communication which it admits, and the convenience of using it at all times and under all circumstances, ought therefore to be paramount considerations.

The systems of signs representing words known to be in use are four; 1. The labial alphabet, accompanied by artificial articulation; 2. Ordinary writing; 3. The ordinary manual alphabet; 4. Methodic signs. Of these only the first two fill the minor condition of being generally intelligible among men. Not one of the four can be said to fulfil, to the desired extent, the paramount condition of furnishing a convenient instrument of colloquial intercourse, for reasons in some cases self-evident, and in others to be presently explained.

There remain two modes of representing words, far superior in many respects to those just mentioned, but hardly yet used by instructors of the deaf and dumb; namely, stenography, and syllabic dactylography. These we shall hereafter consider.

Of the labial alphabet accompanied, of course, by artificial articulation, we shall say but little in this place. Its disadvantages are well set forth in the Twenty-second Report of the New York Institution. It is in far the greater number of cases, extremely difficult of acquisition for the deaf and dumb, and when acquired, its use is almost always irksome and painful to the deaf mute, and from the harshness and indistinctness of his articulation, disagreeable to those who hear. Hence, it is not attempted to be taught at all in this country. And though there are many European institutions

in which it is made the special business of instruction, the pupils, even of those institutions, hardly ever use it in their ordinary social intercourse among themselves ; and but few ever acquire it so as to find it beneficial, in any considerable degree, in an intercourse with strangers. Its greatest value is as a means of communication between the deaf mute and those whom he too often meets in the bosom of his own family, who can read and write but very imperfectly, or not at all, and who, when grown old before the necessity of learning the signs on his account arises, seldom acquire any skill in the latter mode of communication. Such cases are, fortunately, more rare in this country than in Europe.

Ordinary writing demands a much more particular consideration. While it fulfills the condition of being generally intelligible, it is, in other respects, the most ill adapted for ordinary colloquial intercourse of any instrument that could be chosen. But as some teachers of eminent ability have maintained that by rigorous perseverance in its use, by forcing it on the attention of their pupils, and by exacting it from them whenever they are capable of using it, the difficulties which prevent it from supplying the direct machinery of intellectual labor may be finally overcome, we will examine this point more in detail.

We cannot, indeed, perceive the necessity for so severe a course. The extra labor thus exacted on the part of both teacher and pupil, would, in our view, be much more profitably bestowed in familiarizing both with some mode of representing words more simple and convenient. We have seen that it is not necessary to the ready use of ordinary writing, that the pupil should conceive words primarily under that form, since we never do ourselves, and written words may as well be the signs of words to him as to us. It ought to be sufficient, therefore, to show that some other mode of representing words is far preferable, both for colloquial use and in intellectual operations. But we go still farther. As we have already intimated, we shall endeavor to show that the object proposed to be attained by this rigorous and exclusive use of ordinary writing is, as a general rule, wholly impracticable.

As we explained on a former page, the office of signs for ideas is two-fold. First: to replace, by something more simple and tangible, the images recalled by the laborious

process of direct intuition ; and second : to stand as the representatives of the results of reflection and comparison. In the former case, signs represent sensible objects and actions ; in the latter, they stand for ideas pertaining to the intellectual and moral worlds.

With regard to the former class, it is evident that a sign, as an instrument of thought, is valueless, if it be itself more complex, or more difficult of direct conception than the real image for which we would substitute it. And this we believe to be manifestly the case with many, if not all the signs furnished by ordinary writing. Take, for instance, the words *elephant, house, book, eagle, chain, gate*. Let the reader who is familiar with the appearance of those objects, shut his eyes, and try which he can most easily contemplate, the outlines of the objects, or the outlines of the written words. Neither, we may add, is the outline of the object more difficult or tedious to trace with a pen, to one as much practised in linear drawing as in writing.

The case is even stronger when we come to actions. A single image or group of images which the mind can contemplate at once, is equivalent to a whole sentence. When we say : *the frightened horse ran away with his terrified rider* ; or, *the old man walks slowly and feebly along* ; we ourselves, simply and easily conceived as are words to us, find no more difficulty in contemplating the group or image described, than in calling over the sounds used to describe it. And it is most unlikely that the deaf mute, however familiar with written words, should find it as easy to run over in his mind the group of written words arbitrarily representing the image, as to recall the image itself.

Even, then, if a deaf mute had never learned to substitute, for a long pantomimic description of an object, a single expressive gesture, though, in that case, he might use a written word as the most convenient instrument of communication, even with his daily associates, still it could hardly, in his private meditations, replace the actual image of the object. The case is widely different from that of sounds, which not only furnish signs for objects more simple than the outlines of the objects themselves, but, yet more, belong to a very different class of perceptions,—a class, for retaining and combining which, when they are not excluded by the defect of hearing, the human mind has an aptitude quite remarkable,

and certainly not exhibited, in the same degree, with respect to any other class of arbitrary signs.

Whether this greater facility of retaining perceptions of articulated sounds be innate in the constitution of the human mind, or only the fruit of early and long continued habit, it is unnecessary to the present argument to inquire. We may, however, observe that children, whether themselves deaf or not, brought up among deaf and dumb persons, will learn a language of natural signs with the same facility which those who hear display in learning a language of words; and will acquire considerable expertness in such a language, long before their attention can be fixed on the written characters for words. This is precisely on the same principle that every child will understand what is meant by even a very indifferently executed picture, before he can remember a single letter of the alphabet. From such facts, we are warranted to conclude that only a language of gestures, can ever become to a deaf mute what speech is to us,—a language to be learned in the first dawnings of the intellect, and to become linked to our ideas in bonds knit before the memory began its record, and sitting so easily as to be felt as incumbrances no more than the every day clothes we wear.

If the view of the case just taken is correct, it can scarcely be possible that a deaf mute will ever habitually and involuntarily think by the intuition of written words as representatives, merely, of sensible objects and their qualities, changes and relations, which he can readily conceive by immediate intuition and express by pantomime. For him to do so, would be to reverse the ancient fable, and compel the knight to carry the horse on ordinary, that the horse might carry him on extraordinary occasions.

But when we come to consider that class of ideas beyond the limits of real intuition, which the mind can hardly contemplate, apart from some sign employed to express them, it must be admitted that written words may be habitually employed as the direct representatives of such ideas, provided the idea has not been previously associated with some sign more simple and convenient. And we believe this will be found to be the extent to which deaf mutes will avail themselves of the images of written words as the habitual instrument of thought; namely, for the expression of general and abstract ideas for which they have devised no simple ges-

ture ; to which must be added proper names of persons or objects not known to them by sight.

For the correctness of this view of the case, we appeal to every instructor of the deaf and dumb, who has taken pains to inquire into the mental habits of his pupils. There is no better criterion of these habits than that afforded by the free and unrestrained flow of thoughts in the moments of familiar conversation. The educated deaf and dumb, in their ordinary conversations with each other, will very often use single words to supply the want of convenient signs for certain ideas, and particularly for proper names of strangers, distant places, etc., but they will seldom spontaneously use words in connected sentences. Thus, here and there an unconnected word will float along mingling with the crowd of images and gestures of which their thoughts are composed, and the number of words so used will no doubt be greater, in proportion as their language of signs is less zealously cultivated, and extended by their teachers.

Such mental habits, while they admit of an indefinite acquisition of single words, are very unfavorable to a familiar acquaintance with the laws and usages of construction. Deaf mutes who thus use words, may be admitted to think, so far, in written words, but not in written language,—at least not in the written language we would teach them.

But, though we seriously doubt the practicability, if not the possibility of leading the deaf and dumb to use, habitually and involuntarily, the images of written words in connected sentences, as the ordinary machinery of thought, we do not by any means doubt the possibility of leading them, after some years' instruction in written language, to associate their ideas directly with written sentences by a special effort of the mind. To attain the ability to do this will, except with the few gifted with superior faculties, require a considerably longer term of instruction than is often allowed, and a more persevering and exclusive use of words, than most deaf mutes will consent to, while the use in conversation of words, or their equivalents continues as tedious as at present. Still this ability has certainly been acquired by many deaf mutes. The well educated mute will read understandingly or write from memory whole pages without the intervention of gestures, unless he has been carefully taught to regard words as merely the representatives of gestures ; and may also acquire the ability

to write, in his own independent compositions, by the direct contemplation of the necessary grammatical relations and connectives between the principal words of each sentence. Similar faculties have been acquired, with respect to some foreign or dead language, by multitudes who yet never attained the ability to think habitually and involuntarily in the forms of that language, and to whom it did not cease to be a foreign language, requiring more effort to understand, and a far greater degree of effort to employ than their own language. It must be borne in mind that the ability to read or write a language without employing any process of translation, is very different from the ability to think without sensible effort in that language. In our private meditations we seldom trouble ourselves with more words or phrases than are necessary to the exact expression of our ideas ; and these will be such as most readily present themselves, consequently, in most cases such as we have been most in the habit of employing in connection with those ideas. Yet we may be able to recall, after reflection, many synonymous, or nearly synonymous words and phrases, either in our own language or in others, and we can recognize a still greater number of such synomyms, when we meet with them in reading or conversation. It is precisely on this principle that many can read a foreign language who cannot write it. And thus, to the educated mute, written sentences will, in general, be only synomyms for certain expressions in his own language of gestures. The former may, perhaps, by an effort more or less laborious, be recalled independently of the latter, but they will hardly ever recur to the mind spontaneously.

But it may be asked whether the deaf mute, when deprived of the society of those who understand his gestures, and placed in situations where he will be compelled to read and write, will not, by degrees discontinue the use of gestures, and of real images in his private meditations ; and thus, from acquiring more and more the facility of thinking in written words, at last come to do it involuntarily ? A similar change of mental habits often occurs to persons who have resided many years in a foreign country ; and have been compelled to use its language and disuse their own. That the result is within the bounds of possibility, we are not prepared to deny ; but in the case of the deaf and dumb, we think it will arrive, if at all, much more tardily than in the case of a person dis-

using his own language in favor of one composed of the same elements, not very dissimilar in its general syntax, not essentially more complex in the composition of its individual signs, not much, if any more burdensome to the memory, and equally rapid as an instrument of communication. In all these points, as we have shown, ordinary written language compares most disadvantageously with the natural language of the deaf and dumb, whose more intimate associates usually find it much easier and more convenient to acquire and use their own language of gestures, to an extent sufficient for ordinary purposes, than to submit to the labor of writing words. We cannot therefore agree with those, who hold that habit alone determines the deaf mute to associate his ideas with gestures rather than with written words. We might as well say it is only habit which decides the man of wealth to carry in his pocket a thousand dollars in bank notes rather than in silver. If the disadvantages of ordinary writing do not amount to a moral impossibility that the supposed change will, in rare cases, and with minds of peculiar structure finally supervene, still they are sufficient to show that the result is, in far the greater number of cases, altogether hopeless, or at least, that the ordinary experience of mankind cannot be brought forward to prove its practicability.

We have already observed that nearly all deaf mutes who have been taught, from the beginning of their instruction in language, to spell words on their fingers by means of a *literatim* manual alphabet, acquire the habit of considering words, whatever form those immediately before the eye may assume, as composed of those successive positions of the fingers which represent each successive letter, and that, consequently, words must appear to them to consist of three or four times as many successive parts as to us, who conceive words by successive syllables. As an instrument of communication, the manual alphabet is far superior to writing. It is less universally intelligible, it is true, but it may be used, after practice, with greater rapidity. Those with whom a deaf person will often have to associate, able to spell, but hardly to write, find it much easier to acquire dexterity in the use of the manual alphabet, than to learn to write rapidly and legibly. It may also be used in a light wholly insufficient to read writing. It may be employed in a conversation between two persons at the distance of several yards, even from the

windows of opposite houses on a narrow street, without requiring a page to carry to and fro the tablets. It may be used where writing materials cannot be obtained, or where some obstacle, as the motion of a carriage, might make them useless. It admits to a much greater degree than writing, of that character of life and animation given to conversation, by the observation on the part of the interlocutors of each other's countenance and gestures. Finally, it is to some extent, available as an instrument of communication in the dark; and thus has been used to communicate with deaf and dumb persons who, after learning the meaning of words, had become blind. But however superior it may be to ordinary writing as an instrument of communication, as an instrument of thought its disadvantages, as we have already shown, are even greater. Its positions should, therefore, be used rather as the signs of written words than as the material of words.

We have now considered the two forms under which, in American institutions, words are presented to the deaf and dumb. The only other form known to be in use, that of the labial alphabet, we have observed, is in most cases much more difficult of acquisition than even writing, and, therefore, is not taught in our schools. We have discovered, as yet, no mode of representing words capable of furnishing to the deaf and dumb, signs for ideas sufficiently simple and convenient to compete with their natural language of pantomime, and to supply for them the ordinary dialect of conversation, which we have shown is an essential condition to any system of signs designed to supply the direct machinery of thought.

We have already mentioned the system of signs called *methodic*. In the view of many, these furnish the necessary connecting links between words and ideas. Though not directly representing words, nor yet generally intelligible, nor even by any means easy of acquisition to the acquaintances of a deaf mute, they possess the important advantage of simplicity, and are thus easily retained and combined in the minds of the class of learners for whose use they are designed. And they may, with much labor indeed, be extended till every word in the language is associated with its corresponding sign. But when we find that the institutions which use these signs, have not been more successful than others in producing pupils thoroughly conversant with written language, we may well be led to suspect practical disadvantages

in their use, greater than at first sight appear. In fact we shall find that, whatever be the case, methodic signs never become colloquial among the deaf and dumb. A particular formula of written language may be retained in the mind more readily by associating the words which compose it with these signs ; and this seems to be the extent of their advantages in the point of view under consideration.

We will pause a moment to enquire into the causes which have prevented those instructors, who have relied on methodic signs, from deriving from them in practice, the advantages which their theory seems to promise. Methodic signs consist in part, of those abbreviations of pantomime used by the deaf and dumb in their ordinary social intercourse, and in part of signs, sometimes derived from the former, and sometimes purely arbitrary, devised by the teacher to stand for grammatical inflections and words of grammatical connection, for which the colloquial dialect of the deaf and dumb, rarely has any corresponding gestures. Signs of the former class, though quite numerous in every community of the deaf and dumb, are still far from sufficient to represent all the words of a copious and refined language. It therefore becomes necessary for the teacher who uses methodic signs, to devise new gestures in proportion as his pupil's knowledge of words is extended. If these gestures are happily chosen, they are readily adopted into the ordinary colloquial dialect of the pupils, and very many of them will have learned by usage from the more advanced, the gesture representing a word, long before, in the course of instruction, they reach the word itself. Though in this case the labor of the teacher is lightened, as he is saved the necessity of a long pantomimic explanation of a particular word, when he finds that the pupil already possesses a gesture expressing the same idea,—yet, the multiplication of signs of this description encourages the pupil to make more constant use of his favorite language of gestures, by supplying its deficiencies. On the other hand, those signs representing grammatical inflections or words of grammatical connection, being not only entirely useless in the language of pantomime, but very often incompatible with the employment of that language in its most pleasing and expressive form, never to any extent become colloquial. The principal assistance they were designed to render, namely, familiarizing the pupil with the syntax of artificial language by daily colloquial use, is thus entirely lost.

Methodic signs have been employed with great success by some eminent instructors as a means of teaching the elements of written discourse. They are, however, employed only in dictating sentences in the school room. As a system of signs representing words, they are even less likely to become colloquial among the deaf and dumb, than written words themselves. Their employment therefore, however advantageous it may be in the point just mentioned, in no wise tends to remove the great difficulty. Such signs skilfully used, may facilitate the progress of the pupil, but will not enable him to think in words, or to form a system of ideas parallel to words.

After the view we have given of the disadvantages attending all the modes of exhibiting words now in use, the reader will, probably, cease to feel surprise that only here and there a solitary mute has attained to a thorough knowledge of the language of his country, and that to perhaps the greater number, the reading of an ordinary book or newspaper is a task too irksome to be attractive. By extending the period of instruction, a more gratifying degree of success might, in many instances, be realized, but even this will be insufficient in the greater number of cases, while the colloquial use of words continues as slow and wearisome as it is at present.

Unless, then, some mode can be discovered of exhibiting to the eye written words or their equivalents, with a rapidity nearly approaching to that of speech, we shall be constrained to acknowledge that the deaf and dumb from birth must, with rare exceptions, ever remain inferior to other men in the ability to seize with facility the precise ideas conveyed in written sentences; and still more inferior in the ability to express their own ideas with clearness, propriety and elegance.

Whether such a mode of exhibiting words can be discovered, is a problem yet to be solved.

Two systems of signs for words have been proposed so this end; namely, stenography, and syllabic dactylography. Neither is known to form part of the system of any existing institution; nor is it known that the first has ever been submitted to the test of any fair experiment in the instruction of the deaf and dumb. Syllabic manual signs have been employed by particular instructors with eminent success; but the systems of those instructors are either lost, or from the multiplicity of arbitrary positions which they present, extremely difficult of acquisition even for the teacher of the deaf and dumb, and, therefore, impracticable as a means of

colloquial intercourse between the deaf mute and his friends and relatives who hear.

The limits of an article like the present will not permit our examining the few systems which have been proposed ; or even bestowing more than a hasty glance on the principles which must serve as guides in devising a system for the use of the deaf and dumb. Such an examination would moreover transcend the design of the present essay, which is rather to show what has been done than what may *possibly* be done.

A system of arbitrary signs, whether written or manual, for every syllable, or even for the greater number of commonly occurring syllables in a language so abounding in monosyllables, and so multitudinous and irregular in the forms of its syllables as our own, is manifestly an impracticable creation. A system of stenography, or of tachy-dactylography, to be useful, should be founded on the principle familiar to every reader who has had the curiosity to examine any of the systems of short-hand so rife at this day ; namely, the selection for each letter of a mark or sign so simple that, while each letter continues separately recognizable, the combination of several letters to form a syllable or a word, shall hardly be more complex, or require more time to form than a single letter by the alphabets in common use. The learning of such a system would be reduced, in the first instance, to the learning of an alphabet ; and the only remaining difficulty would be to acquire the expertness in its use which diligent practice would soon give.

None of the published systems of stenography for the use of reporters are adapted to the circumstances of the deaf and dumb. A system for the latter must provide for spelling words at length, and according to the usual orthography, as well as for abbreviating them. The necessity of giving the pen a rapidity equal to that of the human voice, a rapidity not essential to the instructor of the deaf and dumb, leads the stenographer into such violent abbreviations that the same character stands for many different words, if slightly similar in sound, and the most expert reporter is obliged to rely on the connection to decypher his own writing. The absurdity of proposing such a system for a class of learners, who can know nothing of resemblances in sound between words different in orthography, and for whom the most distinct perception of each word is often insufficient to determine the sense, is too palpable to require illustration.

It may be doubted whether the advantages derivable from the best system of stenography that could be devised, would repay the instructor of the deaf and dumb, for the labor of familiarizing himself and his pupils with that mode of writing. Such familiarity can only be acquired by the practice of years; and after all, the tediousness of ordinary writing as an instrument of record, of epistolary correspondence, and of deliberate composition, are disadvantages which the deaf and dumb only share in common with those who hear. It is only when the former are compelled to use it in cases in which the latter would use speech,—whether in social intercourse, or for the more rapid repetition of lessons and of examples in the school-room,—that the want of some more rapid and convenient mode of exhibiting words begins to be seriously felt. In such cases a syllabic dactylography would be as much preferable to stenography as the ordinary manual alphabet is preferable to ordinary writing. Indeed, all the advantages enumerated in another page, as giving to the ordinary manual alphabet a preference over writing, as an instrument of communication, would be equally applicable to a well devised system of syllabic dactylography; while the single objection to the former as an instrument of thought, namely the multiplicity of successive parts into which it necessarily divides every word, would not be applicable to the latter system.

Whether any system of dactylography can be devised which shall impose no greater burthen on the memory of those who hear than the learning of a new alphabet, while it shall admit of a rapidity of exhibiting words materially greater than by the manual alphabets now in use, is a problem on the solution of which probably depends the answer to the inquiry, whether words can be made colloquial among the deaf and dumb, and whether the language of their countrymen will ever cease to be to them a foreign language? To many it appears altogether impracticable. The writer, however, has devised a system which he is rather sanguine will answer the ends proposed; but which he has not yet had an opportunity of testing by experiment.

Upon many of the points hitherto considered, there exists among instructors of the deaf and dumb a considerable, often a radical diversity of opinion, or of practice, and some of the views we have expressed may, by many, be dissented from; but there are other aids to this class of teachers, the want of

which is generally felt and acknowledged, and concerning the importance of which there can be no difference of opinion. One great desideratum is a Vocabulary for the use of the deaf and dumb. The ordinary dictionaries are by no means adapted to their use,—the definitions in such dictionaries being very often harder to understand than the word defined. A child learning a foreign language, is provided, not only with a vocabulary explaining each term in that language by equivalent terms in his own, but also with another, furnishing him with the corresponding expression in the language he is to learn for each term of his own. As we have repeatedly had occasion to remark, the language of gestures or the pantomime is the native language of the deaf mute; and the written language we attempt to teach them, remains, till they have thoroughly acquired it, a foreign language. Let us suppose they have acquired a respectable stock of words, say, besides the many they have forgotten, two or three thousand, which, however, have seldom been selected according to any regular method. These amount to less than one-fourth the words in common use, and to less than one-tenth of those in occasional use, besides that many of them will often occur in connections giving them a new sense. In reading any ordinary book, therefore, they will meet in every page, indeed, almost in every line, with unknown or unfamiliar words or phrases, the meaning of which can only be learned by application to the teacher, who may not always be at hand,—for if they apply to Johnson or Webster, they will generally find the word defined by others to them equally unintelligible. When they leave the school, as they are too often obliged to do, half educated, the frequent recurrence in books of such unfamiliar words which no one near them can intelligibly explain, very often disgusts them entirely with reading. This is the principal reason why so many deaf mutes, after leaving school, either remain at a stand-still, or yet oftener retrograde in almost every branch of knowledge there acquired. They meet with similar difficulties when they seek a word to express some familiar idea, which a French or German child studying our language, would readily find in his dictionary. The only assistance of this kind which the deaf mute can at present derive is from a book of pictures, of which there exists no extensive collection for their use.

These disadvantages are the natural consequences of the colloquial dialect of the deaf and dumb being wholly unconnected with their written language. Hence their knowledge of words is usually far in arrear of the expansion of their ideas, whereas, with children who hear, the reverse is often the case. If by any means similar to those we have proposed, words could be made, to any considerable extent, colloquial among the former as they are among the latter, the difficulty would soon in a great measure disappear. Still, when the deaf and dumb want words to express their ideas, they have signs for those ideas. If those signs could be fixed on paper, and arranged in a certain order, whether logical or conventional, vocabularies could easily be constructed capable of rendering the same assistance to the deaf mute which the Latin student derives from the common double lexicons of that language.

It has been proposed to form such a vocabulary by the aid of a species of symbolic or ideographic writing parallel to the signs of the deaf and dumb. But, after all, design forms the only language capable of being fixed on paper, which a deaf mute can learn without pains-taking instruction from his teacher. Hence the employment of any species of symbolic or ideographic writing, would only impose on the instructor the task of teaching two written languages instead of one.

The want of a dictionary of the English language adapted to the use of children, whether deaf and dumb, or hearing and speaking, has recently been, in part, supplied by a little volume bearing the name of the late able principal of the American Asylum.* The plan of this compilation is excellent, and we hope soon to see it carried out on a more extensive scale.

Though the present article has already become much longer than we had intended, we have gone over but a small part of a field on which volumes have been written, and on which much yet remains to be written. The reader who should be led by curiosity or personal interest in the instruction of the deaf and dumb, to inquire farther into the subject,

* The School and Family Dictionary and Illustrative Dictionar. By T. H. Gallaudet and Horace Hooker. New York, 1841.

- is referred to the publications cited at the head of this article, to the *Encyclopedia Americana*, and to the celebrated work of Baron Degerando,—“*De l'Education des Sourds-Muets de Naissance.*”

ARTICLE II.

REVIEW.

The Works of Nathanael Emmons, D. D., late Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass., with a Memoir of his Life. Edited by Jacob Ide, D. D. Six Volumes. Boston. Published by Crocker and Brewster. 1842.

THE first of these volumes contains a brief Autobiography of the late Dr. Emmons ; an “Additional Memoir,” by his Editor and Son-in-law, Dr. Ide ; a further delineation of his character, in a “Lecture, read before the Senior Class in the Andover Theological Seminary,” by Prof. Park; also a series of sermons, the most of them Ordination Sermons, on subjects connected with “the Christian ministry.” The remaining volumes consist almost entirely of Sermons. Those in the second volume are on “Social and Civil Duties.” Those in the third are chiefly funeral discourses, and are collectively entitled “Instructions to the Afflicted.” The sermons in the fourth and fifth volumes are doctrinal, and are so arranged by the Editor as to constitute a regular system of theology. The sermons in the sixth and last volume are of a miscellaneous character.

Dr. Emmons was born, April 20, 1745, in the town of East Haddam, Conn. He was the sixth son, and the twelfth and youngest child, of his parents. He was averse to labor, but loved learning; and after much entreaty, obtained permission of his father to commence the study of languages, at the age of seventeen. He was fitted for Yale College in about ten months ; and though his class contained some distinguished scholars, as Dr. Lyman, Dr. Wales, Gov. Treadwell, and Judge Trumbull, yet, in the judgment of his classmates, he was accounted worthy, at the close of his

collegiate life, of the most honorable appointment which *they* had it in their power to confer. Being destitute of property, he engaged, for several months, in the business of teaching; after which he entered upon the study of theology, first with Rev. Mr. Strong, of Coventry, father of the late Dr. Strong, of Hartford, and afterwards with Rev. Dr. Smalley, of Berlin.

Dr. E. was blessed with pious parents, who, he says, gave him much good instruction in piety and virtue, and restrained him from all outward acts of vice and immorality. He was the subject of frequent and deep religious impressions, almost from childhood; but seems not to have experienced a change of heart, until after he began to study for the ministry. The account which he has left us of his impressions and feelings, preceding and accompanying this most important change, is highly satisfactory, and must be given in his own words:

"It had always been my settled opinion, that saving grace was a necessary qualification for a church member, and much more for a minister of the gospel. Accordingly, when I began to read divinity, I began a constant practice of daily reading the Bible, and of praying to God in secret. With such resolutions, I entertained a hope that God would very soon grant me his special grace, and give me satisfactory evidence of this qualification for the ministry. Nor did I ever indulge a thought of preaching, unless I had some good reason to believe I was the subject of a saving change; for I viewed a graceless minister as a most inconsistent, criminal, and odious character. All this time, however, I had no sense of the total corruption of my heart, and its perfect opposition to God. But one night there came up a terrible thunder storm, which gave me such an awful sense of God's displeasure, and of my going into a miserable eternity, as I never had before. I durst not close my eyes in sleep during the whole night, but lay crying for mercy with great anxiety and distress. This impression continued day after day, and week after week, and put me upon the serious and diligent use of what I supposed to be the appointed means of grace. In this state of mind I went to Mr. Smalley's, to pursue my theological studies. There I was favored with his plain and instructive preaching; which increased my concern, and gave me a more sensible conviction of the plague of my own heart, and of my real opposition to the way of salvation revealed in the gospel. My heart rose against the doctrine of divine sovereignty, and I felt greatly embarrassed with respect to the use of means. I read certain

books, which convinced me that the best desires and prayers of sinners were altogether selfish, criminal and displeasing to God. I knew not what to do, nor where to go for relief. A deep sense of my total depravity of heart, and of the sovereign reign of God in having mercy on whom he will have mercy, destroyed my dependence on men and means, and made me almost despair of ever attaining salvation, or becoming fit for anything but the damnation of hell. But one afternoon, when my hopes were gone, I had a peculiar discovery of the divine perfections, and of the way of salvation by Jesus Christ, which filled my mind with a joy and serenity to which I had ever before been a perfect stranger. This was followed by a peculiar spirit of benevolence to all my fellow men, whether friends or foes. And I was transported with the thought of the unspeakable blessedness of the day when universal benevolence should prevail among all mankind. I felt a peculiar complacency in good men, but thought they were extremely stupid, because they did not appear to be more delighted with the gospel, and more engaged to promote the cause of Christ. I pitied the deplorable condition of ignorant, stupid sinners, and thought I could preach so plainly as to convince every body of the glory and importance of the gospel. These were my views and feelings about eight months before I became a candidate for the ministry."

The religious sentiments of Mr. Emmons, at the time when he entered college, were of an Arminian character; but of these he was thoroughly cured, during his collegiate life, by the instructions of a tutor, and by the study of Edwards on the Will. He left college a Calvinist, of the old school, and put himself under the instruction of Mr. Strong, who was known to be of the same sentiments. He was here directed to the study of Willard's and Ridgely's expositions of the Assembly's Catechism, and other books of the like stamp, by which means he became thoroughly grounded in the old Calvinistic explanations and doctrines.

Dr. Smalley was under the imputation, at this period, of having broached or advocated some novelties in religion; and why Mr. E. was induced to exchange the instructions of Mr. Strong for those of the "New Divinity" teacher, does not appear. The kind of intercourse which he held with his new instructor, and the effect which his teachings produced upon him, he has himself described; and the passage is too interesting to be omitted:

"When I first went as a pupil to Dr. Smalley's, I was full of old Calvinism, and thought I was prepared to meet the Dr. on all the points of his new divinity. For some time all things went on smoothly. At length he began to advance some sentiments which were new to me, and opposed to my former views. I contended with him; but he very quietly tripped me up, and there I was at his mercy. I arose and commenced the struggle anew; but before I was aware of it, I was *floored* again. Thus matters proceeded for some time; he gradually leading me along to the place of light, and I struggling to remain in darkness. He at length succeeded, and I began to see a little light. From that time to the present, the light has been increasing; and I feel assured that the great doctrines of grace which I have preached for fifty years, are in strict accordance with the law and the testimony."

It was while this doctrinal struggle was going on between the teacher and his pupil, that Mr. E. was the subject of that deeper spiritual conflict which has been described above. The change in his theological opinions, and his supposed change of heart, were very nearly coincident.

Having become a convert to the opinions of his instructor, Mr. E. was destined soon to encounter another difficulty. In October, 1769, he appeared before the South Ministerial Association in Hartford County, to be examined for license to preach the gospel; when it appeared that several of the more aged ministers were opposed to his teacher's sentiments, and of course to his. He had a long and critical examination upon the disputed points; and when the question of his license was at length put, several of the ministers voted against it, and one remonstrated against it in writing. The difficulty between the ministers was afterwards adjusted; but the talk and bustle growing out of it served to render young Emmons (to use his own expression) "a speckled bird." After preaching as a candidate between three and four years,—one evidence, among many, that the most respectable candidates did not find it easier to obtain settlements in this country, from fifty to a hundred years ago, than they do now—he was ordained over the second church in Wrentham, (now Franklin) Mass., in April, 1773. His pastoral relation to this people continued, without interruption, to the day of his death—a period of sixty-seven years; for more than fifty of which he discharged personally and stately the duties of his office.

An eminent example this—and it may as well be noticed here as any where—of the benefits of permanency in the pastoral relation ; and a strong rebuke of that spirit of restlessness and change, which has been superinduced upon the old steady habits of New England.

It has been often remarked, that there is ordinarily little of stirring, exciting incident to diversify the course of a parish minister, and give interest to the story of his life. His duties are of an even, uniform character. They succeed each other, from week to week, and from year to year, in much the same manner ; and thus even a long life wears away—not indeed, if he is faithful, without great results, but without the occurrence of many unusual or striking events. This, which is true in general of gospel ministers, is thought to have been specially so of Dr. Emmons. His parish, though highly respectable in point of numbers and intelligence, was secluded and quiet. He had no change of location, either accomplished or seriously contemplated, to diversify the scene. His habits, too, were studious and retiring, he being seldom out of town, and but little abroad even among his own people. And yet there were incidents, in the course of his long life, of a trying and deeply interesting character.

Mr. E. was first married in April, 1775, about two years after his ordination, to Miss Deliverance French, of Braintree. With this amiable companion he enjoyed much happiness, for the space of about three years, when she was taken from him by consumption, leaving him the father of two lovely and (as he thought) too dearly loved children. "I loved them," he says, "to excess ; and God saw it was not safe, for them or for me, that they should long continue in my hands." They were suddenly seized, one after the other, with dysentery ; and died, almost together, of that wasting disease.

"Thus, in one day, all my family prospects were completely blasted ! My cup of sorrow was now filled to the brim, and I had to drink a full draught of the wormwood and the gall. It is impossible to describe what I felt. I stood a few moments, and viewed the remains of my two darlings, who had gone to their mother and to their long home, never to return. But I soon found the scene too distressing, and retired to my chamber, to meditate in silence upon my forlorn condition. I thought there was no sorrow like unto my sor-

row. I thought my burden was greater than I could bear. I felt as though I could not submit to such a complicated affliction. My heart rose in all its strength against the government of God, and then suddenly sunk under its distress, which greatly alarmed me. I sprang up, and said to myself, I am going into immediate distraction; I must submit, or I am undone for ever. In a very few minutes my burden was removed, and I felt entirely calm and resigned to the will of God. I soon went down, attended to my family concerns, and gave directions respecting the interment of my children. I never enjoyed greater happiness in the course of my life, than I did all that day and the next. My mind was wholly detached from the world, and altogether employed in pleasing contemplation of God and divine things. I felt as though I could follow my wife and children into eternity, with peculiar satisfaction. And for some time after my sore bereavements, I used to look towards the burying ground, and wish for the time when I might be laid by the side of my departed wife and dear little ones."

This school of crushing affliction was a highly instructive one to Mr. E. It was good for him that he was called to bear the yoke in his youth. So he thought afterwards.

"I learned to moderate my expectations from the world, and especially from the enjoyment of children and earthly friends. I have scarcely ever thought of my present wife and children, without reflecting upon their mortality, and realizing the danger of being bereaved of them. And I have never indulged such high hopes concerning my present family, as I presumptuously indulged with respect to the family I have laid in the dust. I have likewise learned, by past painful experience, to mourn with them who mourn, and to weep with them who weep. I used to think before I was bereaved, that I heartily sympathized with the afflicted, at funerals; but I now know that I never entered into their feelings, and was a stranger to the heart of mourners. I now follow them into their solitary dwellings, and mourn with them after their friends and relatives have left and forgotten them. Their heaviest burden comes upon them while they are sitting alone, and reflecting upon the nature and consequences of their bereavements. This I now know was my case. How many painful hours did I experience in secret! And how many tears did I shed in silence! How dreary did my empty house appear! And how often did its appearance, after I had left it

for a time, and returned to it, awaken afresh my past sorrows ! The same causes, I am persuaded, have the same effects upon other mourners ; and therefore I cannot easily forget them, nor cease to sympathize with them, in their solitary hours."

In less than two years after the distressing bereavements above described, Mr. E. entered again into the marriage state. His second wife was a daughter of Rev. Chester Williams, of Hadley, and daughter-in-law of Rev. Samuel Hopkins, D. D., the immediate successor of Mr. Williams. This excellent lady was spared to him, to superintend his domestic concerns, and be the partner of his joys and sorrows, for almost fifty years. His family, too, like that of Job after his affliction, was renewed to him, and more than renewed. He was blessed with six "promising children," two sons and four daughters, and three of whom were spared to follow their father to the grave.

During the war of the revolution, Mr. E., in common with other ministers, and with every other class of citizens, suffered exceedingly. The depreciation of the paper currency rendered his salary little more than nominal; while his debts, and the personal wants of himself and family, were pressing realities. His people, also, were so much embarrassed with the expenses, labors, and fatigues of the war, that many of them neglected to attend public worship, and became indifferent to every thing of a religious nature. Some, who had been his warm friends, became cold and distant in their behaviour towards him, and treated him, in particular instances, (so, at least, *he* understood it,) with disrespect and contempt. It was under impressions such as these that, in the beginning of the year 1781, and again in 1784, he asked a dismission from his people. The requests, in both instances, were denied.

Near the close of the year 1784, in the midst of the discouragements above referred to, God began to pour out his Spirit upon the people. A revival of religion commenced, and continued for more than a year, in the progress of which about seventy professed to find joy and peace in believing. This was, indeed, a glorious and solemn season. At that day, when revivals were almost unknown, it was a remarkable season. It put a new face upon Mr. Emmons' congregation, and gave him new courage and zeal in the ministerial work.

It attached his people to him, and him to them, and cured most of those evils of which he had before complained.

Early in the year 1794, God was pleased again to pour out his Spirit, though not in so great measure as on the former occasion. About thirty made a public profession of religion, and the church in Franklin became, what it long continued to be, the largest in the vicinity.

Dr. E. was favored with still another season of special revival among his people, though the Memoir before us does not mark the date of it, or record any of its peculiar features. Indeed, during the last half of his ministry, there were always those among his people who were deeply and specially interested on the subject of religion. Hopeful conversions and additions to the church, were events of rather frequent occurrence. In the course of Dr. Emmons' ministry, three hundred and eight persons became members of his church. It is known, also, that many became pious under his ministry, who professed their faith in other places. If it be considered that, during the earlier and larger part of his ministry, it was a time of great religious declension in Massachusetts, when the enemy was coming in like a flood, when revivals of religion were unfrequent, and when many of the churches in his vicinity were either overrun or torn asunder, by the prevalence of Unitarianism, and its kindred errors, these facts indicate, not only the steadfastness and faithfulness of the man but a much more than ordinary measure of success in the conversion of sinners. Nor were his efforts and success in the salvation of souls confined to his labors in the pulpit. Like Moses, he was "faithful in all his house;" and a considerable number of those who lived in his family have acknowledged his private conversation with them to have been the means of their conversion.

Of the early trials and afflictions of Dr. E. we have already spoken. These were followed by a long period of domestic comfort, and also of peace and prosperity among his people. But the fell destroyer at length returned, and with the exception of the three children who were settled abroad, and who still survive, all his family were again laid in the dust. His beloved daughter, Deliverance, was taken from him in 1813. His second son, Erastus, on whom he had depended to reside with him, and who was peculiarly qualified to "rock the cradle of his declining years," was next removed, in the

spring of 1820. Within less than three years from the death of this son, another daughter, Sarah, who had made her aged father the principal object of her care, and whose strength had often been exhausted by her unremitting attention to his wants, began to decline, and was speedily cut down.

It is remarkable that neither of these children gave evidence of piety, until after the commencement of their last sickness; and that they all were brought to rejoice in the Saviour before they left the world. The evidence of a saving change which they were enabled to furnish in the last days of life, though of great comfort and value to surviving friends, was not such as a faithful minister would think it safe to insist upon before his people; and it is interesting to see, in the case of Dr. E., how wisely and cautiously he presented this subject in the pulpit, and how the feelings of the tender, afflicted father, were all bowed and merged in the higher responsibilities of the ambassador of God. At the close of an appropriate and excellent sermon, preached on the Sabbath following the death of his son, he spoke of his late bereavement in the following words:

“ This subject, and the late instance of mortality, in this place, calls aloud upon those in the midst of their days, to prepare to follow one of their own age into that vast eternity, whither he has gone and never to return. He lived stupid, thoughtless, and secure in sin, until he was brought to the very sight of death. He was carried away with the vanity of the world, and the pleasing prospects of living, and abused the calls, the mercies, and patience of God; which gave him pain, self-condemnation, and remorse. He was constrained to say, ‘ The world, the world has ruined me.’ He was brought to give up all his vain hopes and expectations from the world, and to feel the duty and importance of choosing the one thing needful. But whether he did ever heartily renounce the world and choose God for his supreme portion, cannot be known in this world. In his own view, he did become reconciled to God, and derived peace and hope from his supposed reconciliation. But it is more than possible, that like others on a sick bed, he built his hopes upon a sandy foundation. Let his case, however, be what it may, he is dead, and called away from his relatives and friends, just as he entered the meridian of life. His death, therefore, speaks with an emphasis to parents, brothers and sisters; and especially to

those of his own age, to be wiser and better than he was; and not to delay seeking and serving God, to a dying hour."

But God had yet another trial for his venerable servant, before he should be permitted to enter upon his eternal rest. In the summer of 1829, his faithful wife, on whom he had chiefly depended for the direction of his domestic concerns for almost fifty years, and of whom he used often to say, that she had *supported* him, was taken away. This was a solemn and trying event to Dr. E. He felt that a day of calamity had come. The following letter, announcing her death to her brother, John Hopkins, Esq. of Northampton, is so touching and pertinent, and withal so strongly characteristic of its author, that we shall be excused in quoting it.

FRANKLIN, Aug. 6, 1829.

"Dear Brother,—The last Sabbath, about four o'clock in the morning, Mrs. Emmons exchanged that day of rest, I hope and believe, for 'that rest which remaineth to the people of God.' Your loss is great, but mine is irreparable. I am emphatically a pilgrim and stranger on the earth, having neither father nor mother, nor brother nor sister, nor uncle nor aunt, living. I am left alone to bear the heaviest affliction I have ever been called to bear, in an evil time. Though I enjoy usual health, yet the decays of nature and the infirmities of old age, render me less able to bear troubles and sorrows than I was in former days, when I was called to suffer breach after breach in my family; therefore this last and widest breach seems destined to bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to my grave. I sympathize with you, and I know you will sympathize with me. You knew the excellent character of your sister, but I knew more of her excellence, worth, and importance to me. She was indeed a rich blessing to me, and to her family, and to her people, among whom I believe she never had a single enemy. She was eminently a pattern of patience, meekness, and submission during a long life of peculiar trials, bodily infirmities, pains and distresses. She was—but I forbear. Her health was visibly declining through the winter and spring, but we did not view her immediately dangerous until the Tuesday before she died. She was apparently struck with death Saturday evening, but did not expire till morning. She retained her senses to the last, and left the world, not in triumph, but in that hope which was an anchor to her soul, both sure and steadfast. You and Mrs.

Hopkins will, I hope, in your best moments, remember your aged and bereaved brother.

"NATH'L. EMMONS."

By this bereavement—the severest that could possibly have been inflicted on him—Dr. E. was left in a very lonely and trying situation. Those who he had expected would continue with him, and be the solace and support of his declining years, had all gone before him to the grave. Feeling the necessity, not only of a companion in his solitude, but of some one on whose care he might lean, amid the increasing infirmities of age, Dr. E. entered again into the marriage state in September, 1831. Some of his friends entertained doubts as to the propriety of this measure; but the event proved that he judged correctly in regard to it. The excellent lady with whom he connected himself was Mrs. Abigail M. Mills, widow of the late Rev. Edmund Mills, of Sutton, Mass.; and to the care with which she watched over him, and the constancy and kindness with which she ministered to his wants, he was greatly indebted for the quietness and comfort of his remaining days.

Dr. E. continued stately to discharge the duties of the ministry until May, 1827, when he experienced a fainting fit in the pulpit, which was followed by a temporary illness. He received this as an intimation in providence, that it was time for him to retire from the active labors of his office. Accordingly, he sent a communication to his people, informing them that they must no longer depend on him for the supply of the pulpit, or for the performance of any ministerial labor, and that he renounced all claims on them for future ministerial support. He soon recovered from his illness, and probably was as able to preach for several succeeding years, as he had been for some of the years previous. Still, he seems never to have regretted the step which he had taken. He was now almost eighty years of age; and he had a great dread of the mistake into which some aged ministers fall, of protracting his labors beyond the period of his usefulness. "I always meant to retire," said he, "while I had *sense enough* to do it."

He lived to witness the settlement and dismission of one colleague, and the settlement of a second; and was exceedingly happy in both these connections. We have also the

testimony of his colleagues, that his intercourse with them was uniformly such as made them happy. One of them says, "I seriously doubt whether the minister now lives, with whom I could spend nine years of such uninterrupted harmony, and perfect good-will, as I did when associated with Dr. E." The other says, "During my connection with Dr. E., his conduct was such as to command my highest respect, my deepest veneration, my sincere and ardent love. I never saw the man, (my own reverend father excepted,) whom I so much revered and loved. In fine, Dr. E. was such an one as a modest humble man, who is willing to be outshone by the brightness of a sun of almost unrivalled glory, would wish for a senior colleague. At the feet of such an one it was delightful to sit, and listen to the gracious words that proceeded out his mouth—to the great things of God's law which he unfolded."

From the time when Dr. E. retired from the duties of his office, he uniformly declined taking any part in the public services of the sanctuary, or even in private religious meetings. He well knew the attachment of his people to him, and the high value which they set upon his services, and he was determined not to stand in the way of his successor. He feared, too, that should he perform occasional services, he might be led to continue them, until they had become tiresome to his people. But though he was no longer, in the active sense of the term, a minister, he was a good parishioner. So long as he had health and strength, he was always in the house of God on the Sabbath, and was always ready to do his part to sustain the institutions of religion. It was his constant endeavor to encourage the heart and strengthen the hands of the acting minister, and to promote the union, peace, and prosperity of the people of his charge.

Dr. E. was a kind husband and an indulgent father, refusing no gratification to his children which could be afforded them, in consistency with the higher claims of duty. He paid particular attention to the religious instruction of his children, seeking above all things for them, as he did for himself, a personal interest in the Saviour. It was his practice to take them alone, and converse with them freely upon their character and condition as sinners, and upon the necessity and obligation of their immediate repentance and acceptance of Christ.

The leisure which he enjoyed in his old age rendered him, in some respects, more companionable than he was in the midst of the severe studies and labors of his earlier years. On this account, he is said to have been more familiar with his grandchildren than he had been with his children. He insisted upon frequent visits from those of them who were near him; and with those that were at a distance he had occasional correspondence. The Memoir before us contains several letters addressed to his grandchildren; and they are admirable specimens of the artlessness, good sense, and genuine affection, which this venerable patriarch was accustomed to manifest towards his descendants, when now almost ninety years of age.

Dr. E. was always a domestic man. The retirement and quietness of his own dwelling were more congenial to his studious disposition and habits, than any exciting scenes abroad. Still, as he had leisure, in the last years of life, and as his health was sufficiently firm to enable him to endure fatigue, he was induced to make several journeys of considerable length, after he had passed the age of ninety. He visited New York, at the Anniversaries, in the spring of 1835, and was treated with great respect by the numerous friends to whom he was introduced. He attended most of those meetings of the benevolent societies which were held in the daytime, and enjoyed the exercises highly. Two years later, he visited his only son, Hon. Williams Emmons, of Hallowell, Maine, and returned rather benefitted than injured by the journey.

During the last few years of his life, however, it was perceived that his health and strength were gradually failing. His memory grew more treacherous; his flesh wasted; and although he continued to enjoy, for the most part, a brisk flow of spirits, yet at intervals there seemed to be a suspension of his usual vivacity. During a portion of the day, he often appeared heavy, and would sometimes remain for hours in a gentle slumber. He spent much of the time in reading, until he became too weak to endure the exercise. At the age of ninety-two, it is believed that he read as much as most ministers do, in the meridian of life. He not only made himself acquainted with the leading periodicals of the day, but encountered many a massy volume. When he became unable to read much himself, he improved every opportunity to hear reading from others.

For several of his last years, Dr. E., seems to have lived in the constant expectation of death. He conversed much upon the subject with the members of his family, and with his younger brethren in the ministry. He often dwelt, in his contemplations, on the glories of heaven, and upon the desirableness of departing to be with Christ, and to join the blest society above.

“‘I want,’ said he, on one occasion, ‘to go to heaven. It is an inexpressibly glorious place. The more I think of it, the more delightful it appears.’ After alluding to the development of God’s gracious perfections in heaven, and expressing his desire to behold this exhibition of divine glory, he added, ‘And I want to see *who* is there; I want to see brother Sanford, and brother Niles, and brother Spring, and Dr. Hopkins, and Dr. West, and a great many other ministers with whom I have been associated in this world, but who have gone before me. I believe I shall meet them in heaven, and it seems to me our meeting there must be peculiarly interesting.’ He then added, ‘I want to see too the old prophets and the apostles. What a society there will be in heaven! There we shall see such men as Moses, and Isaiah, and Elijah, and Daniel, and Paul. I want to see *Paul* more than any other man I can think of.’ At this time his mind seemed to be filled with anticipations of heaven. He dwelt upon it with intense interest, and said much of its glory and blessedness. In connection with what he said on this occasion about heaven, he expressed more fully than was usual for him, his feelings respecting the gospel. With great apparent emotion he said, ‘I do *love* the gospel. It appears to me more and more wonderful and glorious every day. I think I now understand something about the gospel; but I expect if I ever get to heaven, to understand a great deal more.’”

In his last sickness, Dr. E. was able to say but little. His throat was so filled with phlegm, that he could not distinctly articulate. But he had left nothing which need be said in a dying hour. He had given his friends and the world entire satisfaction, with regard to his preparation for heaven; and the instruction which he was able to impart for their benefit, he had taken a more favorable opportunity to give. On Wednesday morning, September 23d, 1840, after a night of severe distress, occasioned principally by the difficulty of breathing, his spirit took its upward flight.

The sensation occasioned by his death was deep and general, beyond what his immediate connections had anticipated. People of all classes felt that a great and good man had been taken away, and that the whole community had suffered an irreparable loss. His funeral was the greatest that had been attended in that vicinity for a century. There were present not less than fifty ministers of the gospel, besides many laymen of distinction, and a vast concourse of people, all showing, in their countenances and deportment, the sincere affection and profound respect, in which this aged divine was held.

In person, Dr. E. was not above the middle size, of a light complexion, an erect posture, straight and well proportioned in his limbs, and capable, in early life, of great bodily activity. Indeed, to very advanced age, he excelled most young ministers in the quickness and firmness of his step, and the rapidity of his movements. He had a small, bright blue eye, and a countenance not only beaming with intelligence, but indicating much pleasantry and humor. The engraving in the commencement of these volumes, is a good representation of him, as he was during the last twenty years of his life.

In his constitutional temperament, Dr. E. had much vivacity and sprightliness, and a brisk flow of animal spirits. In early life he may have possessed a temper somewhat excitable ; but in later years, this had become so much softened by divine grace, and mellowed by experience, and soothed and subdued under the influence of long restraint, that it gave neither himself nor others any trouble.

In his intercourse with all men, Dr. E. was courteous and affable, but was specially free and sociable with his friends. No man enjoyed such intercourse more than he ; no man was capable of making it more agreeable. In conversation, as in reading, he was not confined to theological subjects, but was able to take a wide range. He knew how to be grave and instructive in his remarks, and he knew how to spice them with all the pungency of attic wit. Few young ministers who visited him, escaped without some specimens of his power of retort, which they would be likely to remember. Professor Park, in his Lecture, has collected numerous anecdotes of Dr. E., and many of his pithy, instructive apothegms, which are well worthy to be recorded. It deserves

to be mentioned, however, to the credit of our venerable friend, that he never carried his humor into the pulpit. In all his hundreds of written discourses, there is probably not a single risible expression. Nor did he ever indulge in wit and humor in such ways, or to such an extent, as to lower the dignity of his profession. No man knew better than he how to keep his proper place, and how to keep those around him in their places.

It is well remarked by the editor of these volumes, that the distinguishing quality of Dr. Emmons' mind was *discrimination*, or the ability to discover the peculiar relation which one truth or fact sustains to another. He did not treasure up so many facts as some men; but perhaps the man never lived, who was able to see, with greater clearness, the relations between facts, or who actually traced out more important connexions between the various truths which his mind had grasped. He was not deficient as to the extent of his reading. Few ministers ever read more books than he. And yet he *studied* much more than he read. In the acquisition of new materials of knowledge, the relation which these bore to the knowledge already gained was always a primary object of attention. He not only believed, like every other good man, that all the doctrines of the gospel are consistent with each other, and that every thing else is consistent with them, but he made it an object to *see* and to *show* this consistency. This was, in fact, the great labor of his life. He spent his days, as he often remarked, in "making joints." How well he made them those will be best able to judge, who most faithfully study, and most thoroughly understand his works.

Dr. E. was an *independent* thinker. He called no man master on the earth. If there ever was an individual who had broken quite away from the trammels of human authority, it was he. All men *profess* to think for themselves. None are willing to own that they hold opinions, merely because these are held by great and good men. Still, it is an undeniable fact, that comparatively few think much on religious subjects, without the aid of others. The great majority go as far as they are led, and no farther. But such was not the case with Dr. E. He early "threw away his crutches," being determined to walk without them or not at all. And what he had done in this respect, he wished others to do. He used to tell his students, and those whom he advised re-

specting their studies, to *think independently*. "Young ministers feel themselves weak or lame, and they think they must use crutches. But if they would ever do anything in the world, they must learn to walk alone."

And Dr. E. was as independent in the *expression* of his opinions, as in the formation of them. He would never conceal a doctrine, merely because it was unpopular. He had no fear as to the consequences of *truth*, if exhibited seasonably and scripturally, either to himself, to his hearers, or to the cause of God. This independence extended not only to religious doctrines, but *practice*—to questions of morality, as well as those of theology. It made no difference to him, whether any particular practice among his people, or in the churches, was fashionable or unfashionable; or whether its abettors were few or many, high or low, rich or poor, friends or enemies. If the practice was thought to be contrary to the word of God, and of injurious influence to the souls of men, it was sure to meet with his open, undisguised rebuke. Numerous instances might be mentioned, in which he felt constrained to say and do things which he knew would give offence, not only to men of the world, but to some of his ministerial and Christian brethren. Yet, when his mind was made up, and the case was clear, he never spared. If others stood with him, it was very well; but if not, he had the ability to stand alone.

Dr. E. was not only an independent, but an *original man*. There were many who followed him, but he followed nobody. In the formation of his opinions, and the expression of them, in his doctrine, style, mode of sermonizing, and manner of delivery, he was *himself*, and nobody else. He investigated the same subjects on which other great men had written, but in a manner as truly his own, as though he had never seen their writings. He examined their reasonings on all connected points, with the same originality and independence of thought, as that with which he examined the subjects themselves.

Another distinguishing trait in the mind and character of Dr. E., was *consistency*. That he was consistent in his reasoning, is admitted by those who are very far from adopting his sentiments. "Give him his premises," said one, "and you cannot resist his conclusions." "I do not believe his doctrine," said another, "but I admire his logic." And this same unflinching consistency, he carried out in his conduc-

and life. "It was commonly said of him," remarks Professor Park, "that every one knows where to find him;—knows what he will think of a new measure, or how he will treat an old friend, standing up or sitting down, at home or abroad, silent or conversing, cheerful or grave, he was just like himself. 'He never did that, for that does not sound like him,' was good logic with regard to his conduct; and this was his great distinction above other men."

In all his habits, both of body and mind, Dr. E. was characterized by *neatness* and *order*. In every article of his dress, in all the furniture of his house, and more especially of his study—his books, his papers, his desk, his chairs, even to the hanging of his hat, and the standing of his shovel and tongs, every thing was in its place. And so it was with respect to his mind. His internal furniture, like that without him, was perfectly arranged. Every thing there was in its place, and ready to be brought out of its place, at the bidding of its master.

Another of Dr. Emmons' habits, deserving of notice, was that of *thoroughness*. Whatever he seriously undertook, he was likely to carry consistently through. In his reading, he was careful to read thoroughly, pondering and digesting what he read, and laying up the results for present or future use. When he entered upon the investigation of any subject, he did not leave it half studied, but was sure to pursue it, till he had arrived at some satisfactory issue. It was this habit of thoroughness, which led him to abstract himself so entirely from the business of the world. He early formed the resolution, that he would give himself wholly to the ministry; and this qualifying word, *wholly*, meant something in his lips. "He would subject himself," we are told, "to no kind of secular labor; not even to harness his horse, feed his cattle, or bring in his wood." When the house was preparing, into which he was to remove, with his bride, near the commencement of his ministry, he never saw the inside of it till it was finished, although he boarded within sight of it, and passed it almost every day. On one occasion, when his hay was exposed to be wet by a shower, and his hired man came to him for some assistance in securing it, he kindly but promptly answered, "No, I am not going to leave my work to do yours." It may well be questioned whether his notions, on this subject were not carried to an extreme; but they were

strongly indicative of the character of the man, and of those habits of thoroughness and self-control to which he had vigorously trained both mind and body.

In his habits, Dr. E. was strictly a man of *temperance*. He not only abstained almost entirely through his whole life, from intoxicating drinks, but he was temperate in respect to the quality and amount of his food. He was not, indeed, squeamish and whimsical on this point (like some at this day) analyzing his milk, and weighing his bread, or limiting himself to a set number of mouthfuls ; but he preferred a simple diet, avoided what hurt him, and through life was careful to rise from his meals with an unsated appetite. He retired to rest early, enjoyed quiet sleep, and rose refreshed, from one morning to another, to renew his labors. In consequence of his abstemiousness, he was able to live almost entirely without exercise. He affirmed, in his old age, that he never had taken one hour's exercise, merely for the sake of it. "All that a visiter would notice," says Professor Park, "was, that he rose early in the morning, read his Bible and meditated until the breakfast table was brought into his room ; walked from his study chair to his repast, afterwards back to his chair, moved again when the dining table was spread for him, consulted his noon-mark, returned in due season to his chosen seat ; repeated these journeyings for the evening meal, and before ten o'clock retired to his repose. This seemed to be, and for successive weeks it often was, nearly all the muscular exertion made by one who lived nearly a hundred years."

Among the interesting traits in Dr. Emmons' character, Prof. Park notices the combination of qualities which are often thought to be discordant ; such as true dignity with child-like simplicity, modesty with self-respect, candor with inflexibleness, kindness with severity, quickness in his mental operations with judiciousness, care and perseverance. Another instance of the same kind which may be mentioned, is a truly conservative spirit, united with the spirit and habits of a reformer. That Dr. E. was, to some extent, an innovater in his theology, and lay strongly under the imputation of "New Divinity," cannot be denied, and yet, in the general tendencies of his mind and character, he was a genuine conservative. He commenced the study of theology a Calvinist of the old school, and was driven from his ground only by hard struggles. He taught the Assembly's Catechism to his own

children till they were grown, and to the children of his parish for more than fifty years. His pronunciation, dress, and manner of delivery, were all in the antiquated style. He wore his three cornered hat as long as he wore any. It is to be attributed to the same trait of character, that he declined adopting some of those measures which are commonly resorted to in modern times, with a view to promote religion in the church and world. He was accustomed to the old methods, and they seemed preferable to him.

The *pastoral* character of Dr. E. was somewhat peculiar, though on the whole of a high order. Undoubtedly, the most important part of a pastor's work is, to *feed his flock*; and this our friend did, with great diligence and fidelity. He fed them with knowledge and understanding. He fed them with food *convenient* for them. He presented Divine truth in all its aspects, and so divided it among his people, as to give to each his portion in due season.

Dr. E. was also a *watchful* pastor. He took great pains to be acquainted with all his people; and in the prime of life, there were few among them who were not well known to him, either in person, or by their characters. And every individual with whom he was acquainted was an object of his almost daily consideration. He enquired into their belief and practice on the subject of religion; noticed the manner in which they attended upon the means of grace; and sought, by all suitable methods, to enlighten and sanctify them; and thus fit them for heaven. The great number of occasional sermons which he preached, (not a few of which are contained in the volumes before us,) furnish abundant evidence of the deep interest which he felt in his people, and of the solicitude with which he labored to impress upon them the solemn lessons of Providence, as well as the instructions of the written word.

Dr. E. was an *affectionate, sympathizing* pastor. In the sick chamber, and at the house of mourning, he was not only appropriate and instructive in his conversation and prayers, but he was peculiarly kind and sympathetic. His own deep afflictions, in the early part of his ministry, had been a means of improving his feelings in this respect, and of preparing him to meet the afflicted in the most appropriate and acceptable manner.

But with all his sympathy and affection for his people,
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Dr. E. would never excuse or palliate their sins. They were as sure to meet his rebuke, when their conduct was known to be censurable, as they were to receive his sympathy in the day of trouble. He was wise as to the time and manner of administering reproof; but no offender could long sit under his preaching, or be in the habit of familiar intercourse with him, without receiving in some form or other, decisive evidence that his conduct was understood and disapproved. His pastoral supervision was thus a constant source of encouragement to the righteous, and of restraint to the wicked.

Dr. Emmons' plan of pastoral supervision and labor was somewhat different, indeed, from that which is ordinarily pursued at the present day. Except in cases of sickness or affliction, or when individuals or families manifested a particular desire to see him, he was not in the habit of visiting his people. He encouraged his people to visit him, and to open their minds freely to him, on all subjects on which they wished for religious instruction; but he did not ordinarily visit them. He believed that he could do them more good by laboring for them in the study. This plan of proceeding, however, he adopted for himself, without pretending to decide that it would be the best for other ministers.

"He made much of the maxim, 'Know thyself.' He was often heard to say that 'some ministers have a peculiar talent for conversing with individuals and families on religion, and can do more good in this way than they can by preaching; and it is important that those who have this talent should know it, and pursue such a course as will enable them to improve it to the greatest advantage.' But he knew that the most efficient way in which he could operate upon his people and do the most good in the world, was by studying and preaching. In the discharge of these duties, he felt himself to be in his own proper element, wielding the instrument which God put into his hand. That he might have his time for study, was the great reason why he relinquished his pastoral visits in the usual form; and near the close of life, he said himself that he thought he had acted wisely in so doing. 'If I were to live my life over again,' said he, 'I would pursue the same course.' Others, who are the best acquainted with his talents, and who have seen the effects of the course which he pursued, generally think that he acted wisely."

It should be added, however, that in seasons of revival, when the feelings of people were interested, and they were willing to converse on the subject of religion, Dr. E. changed his plan of pastoral labor, and sought opportunities of conversation with them out of his study. After a lecture at the meeting house, he would sometimes request those who desired conversation with him to tarry; and not unfrequently more than half the congregation would stop, either to converse or to hear.

In estimating the *learning* of Dr. E., we must keep in mind the period and the circumstances under which he was educated, and the class of subjects to which he would naturally be led to confine his attention. As a critic on the original Scriptures, who had waded, with the Germans, through all the mysteries of Hebrew philology, and become deeply versed in Oriental literature, he was not learned. He was educated at a period when these studies were but little valued or attended to in this country, and they should not be expected of him. Nor was he learned, in all the minutiae of Sacred Geography, or Ecclesiastical History, to the extent to which some are learned at the present day. But if an intimate and extended acquaintance with all those branches of English literature, which stood in any way connected with his profession, gives claim to the reputation of learning, Dr. E. was learned. Or if a thorough and profound acquaintance with that noblest of all sciences—which has to do with God, his government, and the destinies of immortal beings—which takes hold alike on the heights of heaven, and the depths of hell, and reaches from eternity to eternity, gives claim to the reputation of learning, Dr. E. was learned. In the science of theology, from top to bottom, from beginning to end, in all its departments and ramifications, so far as these are laid open to the view of mortals, he was perfectly at home. He had an extent and an accuracy of knowledge here, in comparison with which not a few of our modern critics upon Hebrew points and sacred localities are but pygmies.

Of the theological opinions of Dr. E. our limits forbid us to go into a prolonged discussion. They lie naked and open in all his writings, and may be easily gathered from the volumes before us. He was not a Calvinist, in precisely the sense of Calvin, or of the Westminster Confession; and yet he claimed to be, and was in the main, a very thorough, con-

sistent, *supralapsarian* Calvinist. He believed in the literal universality of God's purposes and providence ;—that "he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," and "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." He believed, of course, in the doctrines of personal and eternal election and reprobation. He believed that man is a free, accountable agent, under the government of God, having all that moral liberty that he needs, or that a creature can possess. He believed that all sin and holiness are in their natures *actual*, being the properties of voluntary exercises and actions only. He believed that sin came into the world, not because God could not exclude or prevent it, but because he saw that he could over-rule its existence for a greater good ; and that the plan of redemption was adopted, not as a remedy for the evils of the fall, but on account of its own inherent, most excellent character and results, tending to advance the divine glory in the highest possible degree, and thus promote the greatest possible good of the intelligent universe, as a whole. He believed that, in consequence of the apostacy of our first parents, all men are naturally and totally depraved, so that from the moment of birth to the moment of regeneration, there is nothing of a moral nature in them which a holy God can approve. He believed that the Lord Jesus Christ, the second person in the adorable Trinity, took upon him our nature and flesh, and by his sufferings and death on the cross, made full expiation for the sins of the world. He believed that regeneration is an instantaneous change in the internal exercises or affections of those who experience it, of which the Holy Spirit is the immediate and efficient author, but in which the subject of it is free and active. He believed that pardon or justification is all of grace, the sole ground of which is the provided atonement, and the proper condition of which is faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ. He believed that, though it is possible for regenerated persons to fall away, and in themselves they are in danger of it, so that they need motives and warnings against it, yet it is certain that they *never will*—being "kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation." He believed in the resurrection of the body, the general judgment; and a future and endless state of reward for the righteous, and of punishment for the wicked. In point of church government, Dr. E. was thoroughly Congregational, not only holding to the proper inde-

pendence of individual churches, but thinking it important to guard their independence with peculiar vigilance.

We have given this brief synopsis of the leading theological sentiments of Dr. E., not for the information of those who have read his works—they need no such information; but to show with how much propriety he claimed to be a Calvinist, and to vindicate him, in the eyes of some who have not read his works, from the charge of dangerous, heretical innovations.

But it will be asked, perhaps, “Did he make no innovations? Was the charge of “New Divinity,” so long and often urged against him, altogether without foundation?” These questions may be answered, in part, in his own words:

“I was early and warmly attached to genuine Calvinism which I believed to be built upon the firm foundation of the gospel itself. This system, I have thought and still think, is the very form of sound words, which the apostles and their successors taught, long before Calvin was born; and which has been constantly maintained by those who have been justly called *Orthodox*, in distinction from *Heterodox* christians, ever since the propagation of the Christian religion. But Calvinism has lost much of its purity and simplicity by going through so many unskilful hands of its friends. This has given great advantages to its enemies, who have clearly discovered and successfully attacked some of its excrescences and protuberances.”

* * * * *

“I know that some Calvinists maintain that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity; that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers for their justification; that sinners are under natural inability to turn from sin to holiness; and that Christ made atonement for the elect only. I grant, these are gross absurdities, or mere wens and protuberances, which must be pared off from true Calvinism, in order to make it appear consistent with both reason and Scripture. Accordingly, modern Calvinists readily surrender their formerly untenable outposts, and now find it more easy to defend their citadel against all attacks of their most numerous adversaries.”

The question as to Dr. Emmons’ innovation or improvements in Christian theology may be further answered in the language of Dr. Ide:

"If he was not the first that discovered the truth that all sin and holiness consists in action, or in voluntary exercises of the mind, he was the first to make an extensive use of this principle in explaining the doctrines of the gospel. By common consent, the 'Exercise scheme' is his. He not only believed with others, that much of the sin and holiness of men consists in their voluntary affections, but that all of it does; and this principle he carried out in all its bearings upon the subject of human depravity, the connection of Adam with his posterity, the doctrine of regeneration, the free agency and accountability of man, and the government of God. From this principle it follows that the depravity of mankind is not a corrupt nature inherent from Adam, but their own voluntary opposition to God; that regeneration consists not in the implantation of a new principle distinct from the affections of the mind, but in a change in the affections themselves from sin to holiness; that God does not require men to alter the nature which he has given them, or to make themselves new faculties or powers, but to exercise that holiness of heart, for which he has given them the requisite capacity."

"That mankind are free and active while acted upon, or that they are free moral agents while doing that which the agency of God disposes them to do, is a distinguishing feature of Dr. Emmons' theology." "He believed that God exercised a real, a universal and a constant agency over all his intelligent creatures, and that at the same time they enjoyed the most perfect freedom conceivable. He never made the agency of God limit the freedom of the creature, or the freedom of the creature counteract the will of God. In all his addresses to God, and descriptions of his character, he speaks to and of him, as doing all his pleasure in heaven above, and on earth beneath. In all his addresses to man, he speaks to and of him, as a free moral agent, capable of doing or not doing the whole will of God, and as accountable for the manner in which he improves the powers which God has given him."

The doctrine of the Divine agency or efficiency, especially as exerted in the production of evil, has been often urged as an objection to Dr. E. And it must be confessed that he has used language, particularly in his sermon on *Reprobation*,* which, if it were somewhat modified, would be less

* Vol. iv. Serm. 24.

likely to be misunderstood and perverted. But what is that Divine agency or efficiency, by which God has made and governs the world, and by which he turns and controls the hearts of men? It consists altogether, according to Dr. E., in the *Divine will*. In creating the world, God simply willed that it should be, and it was. The changes also which take place, in both the natural and the moral world, are brought about by the mere will of God. The agency of God in the conversion of Paul was but the *will* of the Holy Ghost, that Paul should turn voluntarily from sin to holiness. And the agency of God in hardening the heart of Pharaoh, so that he should refuse to let the people go, was but the *will* or *choice* of God, all things considered, that his heart should thus be hardened. And do not all consistent Calvinists—all those who hold to the universal decrees or purposes of God, believe as much as this?

The following specimens of Dr. Emmons' manner of illustrating this difficult subject, in familiar conversation, are presented by Prof. Park.

'Do you believe that God is the efficient cause of sin?' 'No,' was the reply. 'Do you believe that sin takes place according to the usual laws of nature?' 'Yes.' 'What are the laws of nature according to Newton?' 'They are the established modes of the Divine operation.' 'Do you approve of that definition?' 'Yes.' 'Put those things together.' Dr. Emmons was always satisfied, if a man would adopt the common definition of the laws of nature and would believe that sin takes place according to these laws. Again, he once asked a teacher of theology, 'Do you believe that God is the efficient cause of sin?' 'No.' 'Do you believe that he created the world by his mere volition; that he willed, and it was done?' 'Yes.' 'Do you believe that his will is creative; that he has only put forth a volition for an event, and the event takes place?' 'Yes.' 'Do you believe that on the whole he willed sin to exist?' 'Yes.' 'Was not his will creative then?' Pause.—'Is there any more harm in causing a thing to be, than in willing it to be?' Pause.—'My theory is, that God caused moral evil in the act of willing it; and you believe that he performs that act. I believe that he caused it in no sense morally different from that in which you believe he willed it. Where then is the great discrepancy between you and me?"

The controversy between Dr. E. and some of his opponents, in regard to this question of the origin of sin, according to Prof. Park, is a curious one.

"They believe that God has created within us a nature which is sinful. He denies it, for this, among other reasons, that such a belief makes God the author of sin which man has no freedom in committing. He believes that God creates the wrong exercises of a free agent. They deny this theory because it makes God the author of sin. Their doctrine makes God the cause of a moral evil which we have no agency in committing; his doctrine makes God the cause of a moral evil which we have no agency in committing."

Perhaps nothing which Dr. E. has written has been more strenuously objected to than his views of unconditional submission. He did hold and teach that, in submitting to God, the sinner must make no conditions or reservations—that he must lay down his weapons, and yield himself up to his offended Sovereign, to be saved or destroyed, as shall seem good in his sight. But this is no more than what every consistent Calvinist, and we may add every faithful ambassador from God to men teaches, the world over. All good men do not use the same phraseology, in treating of this subject. All might not approve of some of the expressions of Dr. E. But all who have faithfully negotiated between God and men have held and enforced the doctrine of unconditional submission. It is one thing to submit to God on certain conditions of our own proposing, and quite another to submit without any conditions. The latter is the submission which the gospel inculcates, and God accepts; the former is properly no submission at all.

But if the most obnoxious features of Dr. Emmons' theology were so very like what other Calvinists have believed and taught, why were they thought by many to be peculiar to him? And why, in particular instances, did they excite so strong an opposition? This was chiefly owing, we think, to his peculiar manner of setting them forth. In the first place he delivered all truth, not excepting those doctrines which to the natural heart are most unpalatable, with great *clearness* and *directness*. They lay clearly in his own mind, and he brought them out clearly before the minds of others. He studied no circumlocution; he used no soothing, softening,

qualifying words ; but marched directly up to the point which he wished to exhibit, and made it stand out, in all its inherent offensiveness, to the view of the natural, unreconciled heart. In some few instances, we think that he used stronger expressions than the truth of the case required. In his determination not to be misunderstood on the one hand, he laid himself open to misconception on the other. For example, in the Sermon on Reprobation, before referred to, we have the following passage :

“ When Moses called upon him (Pharaoh), to let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for him, and procured him respite, God stood by him and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the day of his death. This was absolutely necessary to prepare him for his final state.”

If Dr. Emmons' *meaning*, with respect to the agency of God in the production of sin, was what has been explained above, it is evident that, in this and the parallel passages, he expressed something more than his meaning, so, at least, ordinary, unschooled minds would understand him. Men need not a little preparation, in order to receive expressions like those we have quoted in the sense in which the author intended. “ It is extremely difficult,” says Dr. E., in his Autobiography, “ for hearers to understand some doctrines, until they have been taught others from which they flow, and with which they are intimately connected.” This consideration should lead ministers of the gospel to be exceedingly cautious in their exhibitions of the Divine word, that while they obscure no important truth on the one hand, they leave it not liable to be received in, or perverted to, a bad sense on the other.

In some instances, owing perhaps to the clearness with which a particular truth lay in his own mind, Dr. E. failed to express it, just as he intended it, to the minds of others. The whole was so plain to him, and all the necessary limita-

tions and qualifications were so well understood, that he forbore to use requisite precautions in the representation of it. We have an instance of this, in his Sermon entitled, "Forgiveness of sins only for Christ's sake;"* the principal object of which is to show, that forgiveness is the *only* favor which God bestows upon men on Christ's account." Most readers and hearers would understand from this, that men receive no favor, except forgiveness, *through Christ*, in *consequence of Christ*; or as in any way connected with his mediation. But such was not the meaning of the author. He believed, like other Christians, that we "are blessed with *all* spiritual blessings, in heavenly places, in Christ Jesus;"—that our very life and breath, the probation we here enjoy, and all the favors connected with our probation, whether temporal or spiritual, whether in providence or grace, flow to us through Christ, and as a consequence of his mediation. Still, there is a *peculiarity* attending the blessing of forgiveness. It stands connected with the atonement of Christ as no other Divine favor does. It was to lay a foundation for *forgiveness*, that his atonement was made. "We have redemption through his blood, *the forgiveness of sins*." He shed his blood "for *the remission of sins*." To remove the obstacles in the way of forgiveness was the grand object of the atonement; and forgiveness stands connected with the atonement as no other blessing does. It may be said to be the only favor which is bestowed directly and strictly for the *sake of* the atonement; while all our other blessings, temporal and spiritual, flow to us *consequentially*, through the mediation of the Son of God.

By those who are acquainted with Dr. E. only through his publications, and more especially his earlier publications, his character as a *preacher* is liable to be misapprehended. His first volumes of sermons were chiefly of a doctrinal, and to some extent of a metaphysical character. The subjects required this mode of discussion, and it was with great propriety adopted. Still, the impression was made upon those who knew nothing of the man, except from his published sermons, that he was a dry, doctrinal, metaphysical preacher, who dealt only with the understandings of his hearers, but

* Vol. V. Serm. 47.

came not nigh their consciences and hearts. The same impression has been made, to some extent, by the preaching of those who have undertaken to *imitate* Dr. E. Perhaps no preacher in New England ever had so many palpable imitators as he, not only as to the doctrines he taught, but his style, plan, and manner of delivering them. Nor is it too much to say, that *some* of this crowd of imitators have done their great exemplar much injustice. They have held up only the dry bones of Dr. E., without any of his life, soul, body, freshness, to animate and cover the skeleton, and give it comeliness and power.

That Dr. E. was a doctrinal preacher is very true ; but he was also *practical*—pre-eminently practical. That he dealt soundly with the understandings of his hearers is also true ; but no man ever dealt more faithfully with their consciences and hearts. No man ever stirred up more effectually the opposition of the carnal heart, or edified and comforted more satisfactorily the hearts of those who were truly pious. Let any one examine the second, third, and sixth of the volumes before us, and he will be satisfied as to the practical character of Dr. Emmons' ministry. No important subject whether of moral or Christian duty escaped him, but all were unfolded, enforced, and dwelt upon as occasion required.

The *style* of Dr. E. was peculiar and inimitable. It seems easy to the reader or hearer, and many have tried to catch it, and make it their own ; but in general, they have fallen far behind the original. It was *natural* to him ; and till another arises to whom it shall be as natural, it will never be successfully imitated. His style may be characterized as neat, pure, flowing, luminous—rising often into the region of elegance and eloquence. But whenever it does rise, it rises without any seeming effort. It is raised and fully sustained, by the strong current of thought and emotion. It may seem superfluous to give any specimens of a style so extensively known and admired ; but we can hardly resist the temptation to present a single paragraph. It is from the Sermon on the primitive rectitude of man.*

“ How happy was Adam in his original state of moral rec-

* Vol. 4. Serm. 33.

titude and perfect innocence? His body was full of vigor and free from pain. His mind was full of light and free from error. His heart was full of holiness and free from moral impurity. His eyes and ears were feasted with a vast profusion of new, beautiful, grand, and delightful objects. His inheritance was rich and large, comprehending the world and the fulness thereof. His sensibility enjoyed the love and approbation of his Creator. He was permitted a free and unrestrained access to the fountain of holiness and happiness. God presented him with the delightful prospect of a numerous and happy posterity. Heaven and earth appeared unitedly engaged to raise him as high in knowledge, holiness and felicity, as his nature would admit him to rise. There was nothing within nor without to interrupt his enjoyment, nor to bring a cloud over his bright and extensive prospects. His habitation was Paradise, and his heart was heaven."

In his method of sermonizing, Dr. E. was generally, though not invariably, uniform. What he says of himself, in the early part of his ministry, was true of him to the end of it:

"I seldom preached textually; but chose my subject in the first place, and then chose a text adapted to the subject. This enabled me to make my sermons more simple, homogeneous, and pointed; while at the same time, it served to confine the hearer's attention to one important, leading sentiment. Those who preach textually, are obliged to follow the text in all its branches, which often lead to very different and unconnected subjects. Hence, by the time the preacher has gone through all the branches of his text, his sermon will become so complicated that no hearer can carry away any more of it than a few striking, unconnected expressions. Whereas, by the opposite mode of preaching, the hearer may be master of the whole discourse, which hangs together like a fleece of wool."

That a sermon planned after Dr. Emmons' usual method may have simplicity, connectedness, and general unity, and be admirably adapted to the purpose of instruction, is very obvious; but is it so well adapted to make a single and deep *impression*? There is a sermon in the volumes before us on the declaration of Solomon, "The words of the wise are as goads;" the leading sentiment of which is thus stated: "Every wise preacher will aim to *impress* the minds of his

hearers."* We regard this as a very just, important, and scriptural sentiment. The words of Peter on the day of Pentecost were as *goads*, with which he pricked three thousand to the heart, and so deeply impressed them, that they cried out together, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" Every wise preacher will aim, so far as he can, to preach as Peter did, and to produce, in his measure, the same results.

Dr. Emmons' sermons, as to the plan and structure of them, have not unfrequently been compared to a tree. And the tree, in order to suit the comparison, must be fair and stately, having a straight, comely trunk, with two or three main branches, and a spreading, flourishing top, answering to the several inferences with which his sermons are almost invariably closed. Now such a tree is a beautiful object, and may be fitted to answer many valuable purposes; but it is not an ox-goad, nor can it be made into one, or anything resembling one, without a good deal of hacking and trimming. It may well be questioned, whether a series of inferences in the last half of a sermon, drawn out legitimately though they may be, but yet touching on a variety of topics, does not detract from that singleness and depth of impression, which it should be the object of a sermon to make. A sermon constructed after this manner may be highly instructive, and calculated to keep up the interest of a congregation, but will they be so deeply impressed with the one great truth or subject which the sermon was intended to enforce, as though some of the inferences had been spared, and a more direct, prolonged, and fervid application had been made?

The character of Dr. Emmons' *piety*, like that of his preaching, has been often mistaken; and perhaps from the same cause. By those whose only knowledge of him was derived from some of his earlier and more doctrinal publications, he was regarded as possessing a clear head indeed, but rather a cold heart—as laying greater stress upon certain metaphysical, doctrinal distinctions, than upon fervency of spirit, and an elevated, devotional piety. But these impressions were entirely erroneous. Dr. E. had a mind susceptible of strong emotion, and his piety, though uniform, was deep and ardent. To illustrate this, the writer may be in-

* Vol. i. Sermon 7.

dulged in relating an incident which fell under his own personal observation.—While I was a settled minister in the state of Massachusetts, it was my privilege to receive a visit from my venerated instructor. It was a time of general religious interest among my people. In the course of conversation, I stated to him some interesting particulars respecting the revival, and especially in regard to several very young persons who had recently indulged hope. The feelings of the good man were so much moved, that the tears literally dropped from his face, wetting not merely the collar of his coat, but the floor.

During the whole of his Christian life, Dr. E. had his hours of secret meditation and prayer, which he observed with singular exactness and punctuality.

“It was known to all who resided in his family, and to many others who were occasionally there, that at certain times no one could enter his study, unless there was something special to call them there. He made the word of God his constant companion. He studied this, not merely as his text-book, or the source whence to draw his subjects, and materials for his sermons, but as the means of purifying and quickening his feelings and assisting his devotions. He took pains to shut the world out of his heart. He dreaded its intrusion as he did the most deadly foe; and that it might not exert an undue influence over him, he *guarded* against the pressure of its cares and the fascination of its enjoyments. To him the Sabbath was a delight. Its sacred hours he devoted exclusively to the services of religion, and not only taught but required all his household to do the same. He would keep no one in his employ who openly profaned the Sabbath, or neglected the public worship of God, or refused a prompt and respectful attendance upon the devotions of the family.”

We have said that the piety of Dr. E. was of a *uniform* character. It was not feverish, fitful, and inconstant. It was not his habit to be highly excited one day, and cold and languid the next. He was not active and faithful in the discharge of his duties for a little season, and then for an equal or longer time negligent and unfaithful; but from week to week, from month to month, and from year to year, he was the same spiritual, devoted, and active minister of the Lord.

Jesus, the same burning and shining light in the church of God.

The religious character of Dr. E. was *symmetrical and proportionate*. He was not conspicuous for some of the Christian graces, while others of equal importance found no place in his heart; nor did he allow himself in the neglect of a part of his religious duties, while he was full of zeal in the discharge of others of comparatively less importance. The extent and accuracy of his knowledge of Christian doctrine and duty prepared the way for a beautiful symmetry in his religious exercises and practice.

In his religion, as in every thing else, Dr. E. avoided all appearance of *affectation and ostentation*. He never did or said any thing, for the sake of showing off his piety. He seldom talked much on the subject of his own feelings, and never appeared more serious, more heavenly-minded, or more interested in religion, than he really felt. His views on this subject may be learned from the following advice, which he once gave to a new convert: "Maintain a uniform Christian deportment; but never make great *pretensions* to piety. Those who make great pretensions too often become like Peter at the Judgment Hall. Their diaries are too often the records of religious vanity."

Dr. E. passed the greater part of his ministerial life, prior to the date of theological seminaries in this country, and was pre-eminently useful as an instructor in Divinity. The manner in which he was led into this employment is thus described by himself:

"At the commencement of my ministry, it did not once occur to my mind that I should become an instructor in divinity. The first young gentleman that applied for instruction, proposed to tarry but a few weeks, and accordingly left me as soon as he proposed. I had then no expectation of any future application. But pretty soon after this, another young man in the vicinity wished to live with me a little while; and being in a bereaved situation, I consented to receive him into my family, and assist him in his theological studies a few months. Still I had not the remotest thought of becoming an instructor of candidates for the ministry; but it so happened, that numbers successively put themselves under my instruction, and in the term of about fifty years, I have taught between eighty and ninety pupils."

His method of instructing, he tells us, was the same which his own venerable teacher, Dr. Smalley, had pursued with him. He furnished his pupils with a system of theological questions or subjects, on each of which they were expected to read and write. The books put into their hands were generally the best authors, on both and all sides of the question under consideration. When the dissertations had been prepared, they were read in the hearing of the instructor, and the pupil was favored with his remarks. These remarks were not exclusively theological.

"I used to remark," says he, "upon their manner of arranging their thoughts, upon the sentiments they exhibited, and upon the beauties and defects of their language. I cautioned them against a flowery, bombastic style, on the one hand, and on the other, against a too low, vulgar, slovenly manner of expression. I recommended a plain, neat, perspicuous, energetic mode of writing and speaking, which all could understand, which none could dislike, and which some of the best judges would admire. I commonly spent some time every day with my students; either to hear their compositions, or to converse with them upon particular subjects. I often discoursed upon the duties, difficulties, advantages and trials of ministers. I inculcated the importance of being prudent, faithful, and exemplary, in every part of their ministerial duty. I urged them to give themselves wholly to their work, and never encumber themselves with the concerns of the world, or dissipate their minds by mixing with vain and unprofitable company. I endeavored to point out how they should treat their parishioners of various characters and dispositions, and taught them as well as I could, how to become able and faithful ministers."

Though Dr. E. placed books in the hand of his pupils, upon the different and opposite sides of nearly every question which came before them, he did not leave them under the impression that he had no opinion of his own, or in doubt as to what his opinion might be. His mind was made up, and he gave sufficient indications as to the decision to which he had come; and although he never took it upon him to overbear or dogmatise, yet the student was well aware that if he swerved materially from the known faith of his teacher, he must be prepared to answer his objections, and to meet his scrutiny.

Dr. Doddridge instructed many young ministers; and in the plenitude of his candor, he was accustomed to draw out the arguments on both sides of important questions, and to make no decision of his own. The consequence was, that his school was made up of Arians and Trinitarians, Arminians, Calvinists, and Antinomians; and not many years subsequent to his death, it became a Unitarian school. Dr. Emmons' method of instructing was very different from this. He had as much candor, it may be, as Dr. Doddridge. He was frank, open-hearted, kind, conciliating, and altogether patient of contradiction; but he was *decided*. He did not press his opinions upon his pupils, except by the force of reason and argument; but they all knew what his opinions were, and through what a searching examination they must expect to pass, if they rejected them. The effect which Dr. Emmons' direct, decided manner of teaching had upon the minds of his pupils was peculiarly happy. It made them *decided* men. Their professional education was restricted indeed, being too exclusively theological. They had not the advantages which the Seminaries now furnish, in Sacred Literature, Homiletics, Ecclesiastical History, etc. But of the large number of ministers who pursued their studies under the direction of Dr. E., very few were ever known to swerve from the Orthodox faith, and as a body of men, they have not been surpassed, probably, by any of their contemporaries.

Dr. E. was highly useful, not only as a preacher and instructor, but also as a *counsellor*. His wisdom, his disinterestedness, his deep acquaintance with the principles and usages of our Congregational churches, and his profound regard for these principles, not only as having been bequeathed to us from our Pilgrim forefathers, but as having their foundation substantially in the Scriptures, rendered him a most suitable person to be consulted, in all cases of interest or difficulty growing out of our Ecclesiastical constitution. And he was consulted frequently and long. In the course of his ministry, he was invited to more than a hundred Ecclesiastical Councils, nearly all of which he actually attended.

Dr. E. was an early and true friend, an earnest and active promoter, of Christian **Missions**.

"He was one of the founders of the Massachusetts Missionary Society, and one of the leading and most efficient men

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in their primary operations. He was their first president and their first preacher, and the chairman of the committee who prepared their first address to the public. He was one of the editors of the *Massachusetts Missionary Magazine*, a valuable periodical, which was established for the purpose of promoting the great object of this society; and an able contributor to its pages. How much he did for the diffusion of the gospel and the salvation of men, by his connection with this society, cannot be ascertained until the disclosures of the great day. But no one, who is acquainted with the extensive and still increasing influence of this society, can doubt that the agency by which it was formed and its early operations sustained, will yet be recognized as an important instrument in the conversion of the world."

From the *Massachusetts Missionary Society* proceeded naturally and obviously, in due course of time, the *American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, which is now spreading the light and blessings of the gospel in every quarter of the world. Of this latter body, Dr. E. was, for many years, an honorary member. He contributed liberally to the funds of the Board, was deeply interested in its various operations, and devoutly rejoiced in its success.

Like most of the great and good in our times, Dr. E. was a devoted friend and patron of the *American Education Society*. He was one of the original members of this Society, and sustained the office of an honorary Vice President, till his death. The volumes before us contain his very able and instructive sermon, preached before the *Norfolk Branch of the American Education Society*, in the year 1817.* The Report of the *American Education Society* for the last year—the year following Dr. Emmons' death, contains the following tribute to his memory:

"His friendship for this cause remained to the last. His desire that a pious, learned, and able ministry should be perpetuated in our country—an object to which, after the manner of his day, he had eminently devoted the energies and resources of his great mind—continued undiminished during the long and tranquil period of his retirement and decline.

* Vol. I. Serm. 20.

Like a ruling passion, most worthy of its sublime object, it appeared strong in him even in death."

Dr. E. was particularly interested, says his biographer, in the operations of the American Home Missionary Society. "As soon as he heard of its organization, he sent on thirty dollars, to make himself a life member; and he continued to contribute to this object as long as he lived."

Indeed, Dr. E. was a member of most of the benevolent associations of the day. It is known already, and will yet be known more and more, that he lived not in vain in respect to the great cause of Christian benevolence.

The publications of Dr. E. are very numerous. Besides the two hundred and twenty-three discourses and essays contained in these volumes, Dr. Ide has given the titles of half as many more, which were issued during the author's life. Among the first of his publications was a "Dissertation on the Qualifications for Christian Communion," in answer to Rev. Dr. Hemmenway, of Wells, Me., which appeared in 1793. To this Dr. Hemmenway replied; and Dr. E. published a rejoinder, in 1795. As this was the first, so it seems to have been almost, if not quite, the last of his public controversial efforts. The subject of this controversy was one of great interest in our church from fifty to a hundred years ago. The pamphlets of Dr. E. contain a very thorough examination of it, and did much good at the time of their publication. They are also a rare specimen of Christian candor and courtesy towards an opponent; and we regret that room was not found for them in this edition of the author's works.

The various publications of Dr. E. have been exerting an influence—a strong and good influence—for more than half a century. They do not, therefore, appear before the public at the present time, under the disadvantage and uncertainty of an experiment. The experiment has been made, and made satisfactorily. These publications have already accomplished a vast amount of good, and they will do still more, in time to come. A great many persons, clergymen and others, have publicly acknowledged their indebtedness to the writings of Dr. E. A much larger number, probably, have felt their indebtedness, without the formality of acknowledging it. In the language of Dr. Ide,

"The attention which he paid to the doctrines of the gospel, and the success which attended his efforts to illustrate and enforce them, has doubtless turned the attention of many others to the subject of doctrinal discussion, and encouraged them to engage in this too much neglected part of a minister's work. The great amount of instruction contained in his sermons, and the perspicuous and interesting manner in which this was presented to his hearers, has no doubt determined many to carry none but beaten oil into the sanctuary. The definiteness and precision with which he treated every subject on which he wrote, has not only removed many difficulties from the minds of others respecting these subjects, but, at the same time, made them more accurate thinkers and writers. What he has taught respecting the nature of moral agency, human depravity, and regeneration, has prepared the way for that more direct and apostolic mode of address, both to saints and sinners, which has been gaining ground for more than forty years among the ministers of New England. The palpable distinction which he made between saints and sinners, and which he presented before the public in so many forms, has doubtless exerted a powerful influence to make other ministers more discriminating in their preaching. Could the whole effect which his ministry has exerted upon ministers, and through them upon the churches and the world, be seen at one view, we should be prepared to acknowledge both the reality and importance of his success."

Though Dr. E. was not indifferent to the good opinion of others, yet he was the farthest of all men from *seeking after* popularity, and making sacrifices of principle in order to gain it. He preferred beyond every thing the favor of God, and the approbation of his own conscience; and in order to secure these, he was often constrained to say and do things which he knew would render him unpopular with the world. And yet few men, after all, have been so highly honored in view of the world, as he. God turned the reproaches of his enemies into blessings. They were led, in many instances, to admire and praise him for the very things which were once the objects of their dislike and condemnation. Few men, in their old age, have excited so much attention, and been the objects of so much respect, as he. Clergymen of all denominations, and gentlemen of every profession, far and near, for some reason or other, manifested a peculiar interest in him. Strangers of distinction called upon him, so-

licited his acquaintance by letter, invited him to distant places at their own expense, and seemed to vie with his particular friends in efforts to promote his honor and happiness. And when he was dead, the mourning was like that of Israel for Moses and Aaron. The respect heaped upon his memory was spontaneous and universal. In him, therefore, was verified most signally the declaration of God—"Them that honor me, I will honor." He was an eminent example, before all men, of the contempt of that popularity "which is *run after*," and of the possession of that respect and esteem which are called forth, in view of strict consistency, unbending integrity, and high moral worth, sustained amid all the vicissitudes and temptations of a tried and laborious life.

Professor Park justly regards it as one of the sources of interest in Dr. E., that he stood before the present generation as "the representative of choice men among the ancient clergy of New England."

"He often spoke of himself as being left alone, all the old familiar faces long since veiled from his view. There has ever been a melancholy and sombre interest flung over such a man, staying so long behind his time, and watching over the fourth generation of his successors. He has been likened to the bird that lingers in a northern hemisphere, long after its companions have sought a more genial clime; to the soldier compelled to slacken his movements, and loiter alone in the land of the enemy, when his comrades have marched through, cheered with the sound of the bugle and the society of a full band, in the hope of soon regaining their home and enjoying their laurels. He has been compared, by an ancient poet, to the oak that stands solitary, after the surrounding forest has been hewn down, and that stretches out its stiffened arms, as if to implore mercy from the winds and the storm."

"But he has gone; numbered at last with the friends of his youth, allowed to rejoin the company from which he had been severed so long. The last of our patriarchs has left us; and men whom he baptized in infancy wept at his funeral when they had well nigh reached their seventieth year. 'Nothing was more affecting to me,' said one who witnessed his obsequies, 'than to see those old men weeping over the corpse of their father.'"

In remarking upon the volumes before us, we have not thought it necessary to go into a critical examination of particular discourses. This would be an almost endless, as it would be altogether a superfluous labor. These discourses, or the most of them, have been long before the public. They have been extensively and attentively read. Hundreds and thousands have reviewed them, each one for himself, and formed a judgment, and reaped the benefit.

Nor have we thought it necessary to remark upon every point, whether of metaphysics or theology, in which the sentiments or language of our author may be regarded as open to objection, or susceptible of improvement. To do this would lead us into a length of discussion altogether incompatible with our present limits and designs.

But we have endeavored faithfully to exhibit *the man*, as he appears to us in his biography and his publications, and as he has uniformly appeared to us, during a long and intimate acquaintance. We have endeavored that our readers should have the means of understanding his *character*—his intellectual, moral, and religious character—his character as a student, a pastor, an instructor in theology, and a minister of Christ. That his works will have many readers there can be no doubt; and by those who understand and appreciate his character, they will be read with increased interest and profit.

The religious community are under great obligations to the Editor and Publishers, for the manner in which these volumes have been brought forth. The Memoir by Dr. Ide is plain and modest, brief and yet full, just in its delineations, and written altogether in good taste. The Lecture by Professor Park is in his usual vigorous, racy style, abounding with anecdote and incident, and by all who dip into it will be sure to be read through. The mechanical execution of the volumes is throughout of a high order, conferring much credit on all concerned.

In closing our notice of these volumes, we only regret that they are limited to six. There should have been ten of them. The Editor informs us that he has in his hands the materials for ten volumes, as valuable as those included in these six; but that the amount published is as much as it was thought prudent to issue at the present time. We say decidedly, and we feel sure that subscribers and purchasers generally will say the same, *Let the four remaining volumes*

be published, as soon as they can be prepared. Let them be so published, as to conform, in size and appearance, to those already issued. In the writings of Dr. E., however multiplied, there is no prolixity, sameness, or repetition. His ingenuity and power to interest were inexhaustible. Whatever subject he took in hand, his views were always fresh, striking, and original. We are decidedly of the opinion, that the remaining volumes are called for, and should be forthcoming without unnecessary delay.

If there is any one class of persons to whom, above all others, we would recommend the works of Dr. E., it is our young ministers, and those who are studying with a view to the ministry. To the older evangelical clergy, more especially of the Northern and Middle States, his writings are already, to some extent, familiar. They have read them, and pondered them, and been profited by them. But to the younger portion of the clergy, to candidates, and theological students, these writings will be, in great measure new. Nor should it be any objection to the reading of Emmons, that individuals do not adopt his sentiments. No matter (so far as the question of reading is concerned), whether you receive them, or not. No matter whether, on all points of disagreement, you shall be convinced, or not. The interest, the pleasure, the profit of reading him will not depend materially on this circumstance. Even if you reject many of his conclusions, you will, as one said before, "admire his logic." You will find yourselves more than repaid for the perusal of his works, by the force and ingenuity of his reasoning, by the originality and comprehensiveness of his views, by the example of his flowing, pellucid style, and the clearness of his method. The peculiarity and freshness of his thoughts, will awaken thought on your part. He will suggest views, considerations, arguments, which never occurred to you before. He will put you upon new topics of interesting study, and open before you fields of inquiry, which you may enter and explore for yourselves. Again, then, we say to the class of persons here addressed, *By all means, read Emmons.* And be not satisfied with reading the volumes once, and then laying them aside; but have them on your study table, or somewhere within the reach of your hand. They require not only to be read, but *studied.* They are among the few books, pourred

forth from the teeming modern press, which will *bear* study, and are worthy of it.

ARTICLE III.

EXAMINATION OF THE REV. A. BARNES' REMARKS ON HEBREWS 9: 16-18.*

By M. Stuart, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Andover.

I have read with attention, the remarks of my highly respected friend and brother, the Rev. A. Barnes, of Philadelphia, on the exegesis which I have given of Heb. 9: 16-18, in my volume of *Commentary* on this epistle. I need not assure him, who knows me so well, that I am not in any degree offended by his strictures; for of the *manner* of them I cannot complain; and as to the *matter* of them—that only furnishes me with an occasion of reinvestigating the difficult passage, usually called difficult, to which he has invited my attention once more, in order that I may ascertain, at least for myself, still more definitely, whether I have defended an erroneous opinion. A somewhat thorough re-investigation of the whole subject has ended in the conviction, that Mr. B.'s arguments are not sufficient to establish the position, that I have misunderstood, and in my *Commentary* misinterpreted, the passage in question.

I hope and trust, that this state of mind is not the result of prejudice in favor of my former views. I have lived long enough to know that men are not infallible; at all events, to know that I am not. I am one of those who believe, that in respect to many of the details of sacred science, *truth is the daughter of time*. I do not mean, of course, that truth in itself is changed by time, but that we must gradually and by protracted and patient effort come to the knowledge of many truths; and among these are to be found not a few, which are far from being unimportant. Being a full believer in all this, I deem it quite possible, that I may yet in many cases be justly corrected, as to my expositions of the Scriptures; and it

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can be hardly otherwise than certain, that in some I have failed to do justice to the sacred writers.

That Mr. B. differs in judgment from me respecting the true meaning of Heb. 9: 16-18, I can have no right even to regret, unless I can be well assured that he is in the wrong and I in the right. There has been a difference of opinion among interpreters, respecting this passage, long before our time. It is not a case, however, out of which any heresy can well be made out on account of such a difference. And even if it could, my respected brother and myself are not among the class of men who are over-anxiously seeking after heresy, or over-zealous speedily and loudly to proclaim it on slight occasions. I trust we can look upon honest differences of opinion (and such there may be), on points like the present, as affording new impulse to study and investigation. Happy for all who must differ on such points, if they can turn the matter into such a shape as to make it a means of their own improvement, and perhaps of casting light on the paths of other inquirers. I trust that Mr. B. and myself will at least show, that we are not only disposed ἀπηθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, but that we are capable of carrying into execution our good intentions.

If I may state, in the briefest compass possible, the grounds why Mr. B. has failed to satisfy me by his criticisms and arguments, I would say,

(1.) That his interpretation of several *important words*, in themselves considered, does not appear to me to be well grounded.

(2.) That some *important facts*, on which the conclusion to which he comes mainly depends, do not appear to be correctly stated.

First, then, I must dissent, in various respects, from Mr. B.'s views of the meaning of διαθήκη.

On page 52 et seq., he avers that διαθήκη "does not properly denote *compact, agreement, or covenant*," but that either "συνθήκη, σύνθεσις, or συνθεσία," is the appropriate word for such a meaning." Again, on page 56 he avers the same thing, and also says, that "although in classic Greek the word [διαθήκη] may have the notion of a *covenant* or *compact* remotely, yet it cannot be shown to have that meaning in a single instance in the *Scriptures*."

We join issue on these points, and proceed forthwith to the work of investigation.

I state, without fear of contradiction on the part of any who have made extensive investigation in respect to the words before us, that *διαθήκη*, which in its most generic sense unquestionably means *arrangement*, *disposition*, *disposal*, in respect to any thing, is also employed, often and familiarly, in the sense of *compact*, *agreement*, or *covenant*, between two contracting parties of the same or the like condition or rank; yea is so employed in the Scriptures, as well as in the classics.

When Mr. B. states, and insists on it (as he often does), that *συνθήκη*, or *σύνθεσις*, is the appropriate word for *contract* in Greek, he is plainly misled by the *etymology* of the word. *A priori* we should naturally conclude that the case is as he states; for the preposition *σύν*, united with *θήκη* or *θέσις*, would seem very appropriately to denote *contract*, *covenant*, or *compact*. But *usage* has otherwise ordained, for the most part. Thus the word *σύνθεσις* is appropriated mainly to rhetorical and logical expressions. It means the *placing* or *putting together*, i. e. *composition*, of words and sentences, as joined in ordinary speech or written composition. In logic, it means the joining or bringing together the different elements which form *data* for a general proposition or conclusion. In respect to this meaning of the word, it may be applied to mathematical, as well as other ratiocinative processes. It is only in an unusual and nearly tropical sense, (tropical, if *usage* be considered), that it is ever employed to designate *contract*, *agreement*, *compact*, etc.

Even so is it with *συνθήκη*. It belongs to rhetoric and composition; and, so far as these are concerned, there is no difference between the signification of *σύνθεσις* and *συνθήκη*. Of the two, the latter admits more frequently the tropical sense of *compact*, *agreement*, etc. But such a usage is quite seldom, either in sacred or profane writings.

In this latter sense, indeed, *συνθεσία* is prevailingly employed. But it also means, in the latter Greek, *emulation*, *contention*, *rivalship*, acted out so as in some way to come into clashing or contest. It might have been employed in common parlance, had *usage* so willed it, instead of *διαθήκη*, to designate the idea of *compact*, *covenant*, etc. But it seems to have been almost in a state of general desuetude. The simple truth is, that *διαθήκη* has commonly usurped the place

of all these words, as employed to designate either *compact*, *covenant*, or *agreement*.

This is perfectly natural. *Διαθήκη*, *arrangement*, *disposition*, is so generic, that it comprises every kind of arrangement. But, in far the greater number of cases where the word is employed, the context demands a specific or limited sense. This *διαθήκη* very conveniently designates ; for at one time it is *compact* or *agreement* ; at another, *testament* ; at another, *covenant* ; at another, *statute*, or *law*, or *ordinance*, i. e. authoritative arrangement ; at another, *promise* of good ; at another, *threat* of punishment, i. e. arrangement for moral and retributive government. Nor do even these comprehend all its meanings. But these are enough for our present purpose.

The sequel will present the evidence in respect to such of these meanings as we are now concerned with. For the rest, I may refer to any good New Testament Lexicon, and also to any good Lexicon of the Septuagint ; but specially to the Concordances of the Greek Scriptures, i. e. both of the Old Testament and of the New.

For my statement in regard to the proper meaning of *σύνθεσις*, *συνθήκη*, and *συνθεσία*, I may refer to Passow's most excellent Greek Lexicon, which contains the sum of what I have stated. Confirmation of these statements I have sought for extensively elsewhere, and found it in abundance ; but I do not think it necessary to occupy room here in stating my other sources. There is no good ground to doubt that Passow is in the right.

As to the fact of actual *usage*, I may appeal, in order to confirm what I have said, to the Septuagint, and to the New Testament. Not one of the words, *συνθήκη*, *σύνθεσις* or *συνθεσία*, ever occurs in the New Testament ; and in the Septuagint we find no use of *συνθεσία*. The word *σύνθεσις* is indeed employed there, in a few cases ; but only in the sense of *composition*, i. e. the compounding of things together, e. g. spices, unguents, etc.; see Exodus 35 : 26, 30 : 35, 25 : 6, al. It occurs some fifteen times, but always in such a sense.

Συνθήκη, however, occurs only *three* times in the whole of the Old Testament, viz. Isaiah 30 : 1, 28 : 15, Dan. 11 : 6 ; and there in the sense of *agreement* or *compact*. But often as the idea of *compact*, etc., is designated in the Old Testa-

ment Scriptures, these are all the examples of employing the words now before us. In the Apocrypha we find five instances more of the same method of employing *συνθήκη*.

Compare now this with the use of *διαθήκη*. In the Old Testament, according to Mr. B.'s own statement (p. 52), we find it employed nearly three hundred times, and in the New Testament thirty-three times. Of course all that I have stated above, about the usage of the words under consideration in common parlance or in writing, must be regarded as abundantly confirmed. In fact, we might appeal to most of the classics themselves, and come out with the same result.

Can it be possible, now, that the sacred writers of the Old Testament, and of the New, have had no occasion for designating the idea of *agreement*, *covenant*, *compact*, etc.? Certainly this is not the case. These are frequent words; and this leads us directly to the examination of Mr. B.'s position, that "διαθήκη cannot be shown to have such a meaning in a single instance in the Scriptures." Bib. Rep. p. 56.

As the dispute here turns upon that which is simple matter of fact, and facts are within our reach, it is easy to settle it.

In Gen. 21: 27 seq., *διαθήκη* designates the mutual *compact* or *covenant* between Abraham and Abimelech; comp. vs. 26, 32. In Gen. 26: 28, it designates the *agreement* between Isaac and Abimelech. The same between Jacob and Laban, Gen. 31: 44; between the Hebrews and the heathen, Ex. 23: 32; between the same parties in Ex. 34: 12, 15; and again in Deut. 7: 2; the covenant between Joshua and the Gibeonites, Josh. 9: 6, 7, 15, 16; between the Hebrews and the heathen, Judg. 2: 2; between Jabesh and Nahash, 1 Sam. 11: 1, (I follow the designations of our English Bible here); between David and Jonathan, 1 Sam. 20: 8; same in 1 Sam. 23: 18; between Abner and David, 2 Sam. 3: 12, 13, 21; between David and the Hebrews, 2 Sam. 5: 3; between Hiram and Solomon, 1 K. 5: 12; between Ben Hadad and Asa, 1 K. 15: 19; between Ben Hadad and Ahab, 1 K. 20: 34; between Jehoïda and the rulers, 2 K. 11: 4; between David and the elders of Israel, 1 Chron. 11: 3; between Asa and Ben Hadad, 2 Chron. 16: 3; between Jehoiada the priest and the people of Israel, 2 Chron. 23: 3, 16; between Job and his own eyes, Job. 31: 1; between Job and Leviathan, Job 41: 4 (Sept. 40: 23;)

between different heathen nations, Ps. 83: 5 (Sept. 82: 5); between sinners and Hades, Is. 28: 15, 18; between the King of Babylon and a prince of Judah, Ezek. 17: 13, 14, 15, 16, 18; between a desolating king and others, Dan. 9: 27; between Ephraim and the Assyrians, Hos. 12: 1; between the Tyrians and other nations, Amos. 1: 9; between Zechariah and the people, Zech. 11: 10; between man and wife, Mal. 2: 14.

Besides the specific examples here produced, where the meaning *διαθήκη* is *compact*, *covenant*, *agreement*, etc., beyond all possible doubt, there are many examples more, which are either repetitions of some of these, or else of the same nature with them. But these are enough. If there are any words in the Septuagint, the meaning of which is settled, the meaning in question of *διαθήκη* belongs to that class.

I shall not undertake to account for it, how Mr. B. came to overlook what lies on the face of the whole Septuagint, and what, therefore, is common to many different writers of different times; for the Septuagint is a version made by many different hands, at different periods. About the meaning of *διαθήκη*, however, as intended to designate *contract*, *covenant*, *league*, etc., there is no difference of opinion. Mr. B. represents the Seventy and New Testament writers as every where carefully and accurately observing and keeping up the distinction between *διαθήκη* and *συνθήκη*, and consequently as designing never to use the word *διαθήκη* in the sense of *compact*, etc. How much foundation there is for this, the reader has already seen, and will further see in the sequel. The simple state of the matter is, that *διαθήκη* covers nearly the whole ground, and that the other words (which he names *appropriate*), are never at all employed in the New Testament, and only one of them three times in all the Old Testament, to designate the meaning of *covenant*, *agreement*, etc. This shows conclusively, that *διαθήκη* holds the place and rank which I have already mentioned. It matters not what an *a priori* argument on the ground of etymology might decide. A master-critic has truly said: “*Usus et jus et norma loquendi.*”

It is proper here, in further unfolding the meaning of the important word *διαθήκη*, to notice in passing one or two of the most frequent meanings of it in the Old and New Testaments, which are not matters controverted at all between myself and Mr. B.

We have seen above, that the usual word for *mutual compact, covenant, agreement, treaty, etc.*, in the Septuagint throughout, is διαθήκη. Something of this character it retains in almost all the other cases in which it is employed. The most common, by far, of these cases is that, in which the *תִּרְבּוֹת* between God and the Israelities is introduced. Indeed this includes the greater part of the 300 cases, in which the word is found in the Septuagint. In a majority of the instances now under consideration, διαθήκη seems equivalent, at first view, to *law, statute, ordinance, prescription, etc.*; e. g. Ex. 19: 5. 24: 7, 8. 31: 17. 34: 10, 27, 28. Lev. 2: 13. 24: 8. 26: 15, 25. Num. 11: 33. Deut. 4: 13. 9: 9, 11. 5: 2, 3. 10: 8. 17: 2. 21: 1, 9, 21, 25. 31: 9, 16, 20, 25, 26. 33: 9. Josh. 7: 11, 15, et alibi saepe. But in a great portion of these cases, there is evidently an understanding, that, while the διαθέμενος or lawgiver prescribes the regulations which are designated by διαθήκη, those to whom they are prescribed are assenting thereto, and engage, either tacitly or expressly, to comply with the conditions necessary to bring them within the reach of the *promises* which the διαθήκαι contain. For in very many cases *promises* and *threats* are appended; and sometimes merely one of these, and sometimes the other; e. g. Gen. 6: 18. 9: 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, where it seems almost like a simple promise, and so in Gen. 15: 18; but in Gen. 17: 9—14 we see a conditional, i. e. mutual διαθήκη, and so in Deut. 7: 9, 12. 8: 18. But the instances of seemingly simple *promise* are not numerous. Besides those already mentioned, they may be found in Ex. 2: 24. 6: 4, 5. Lev. 26: 42—45. Num. 25: 12, 13. Deut. 4: 31. 2 Sam. 23: 5. Neh. 9: 8. 89: 28, 34, 39. Is. 54: 10. In all cases of simple *promise*, and in all cases of *law, statutes, ordinances, etc.*, intermingled with promises or threats, there is of course an implication, that these are conditional, i. e. that the promises are only to the faithful, the threats only for those who remain disobedient. It follows, therefore, that although there is not the simple *form* of a compact or agreement, yet there is an *implied* conditional covenant, i. e. a covenant usually expressed on the one side, and implied on the other. Of course it will easily be seen, that where the ancient dispensation, with its laws and statutes, its threats and promises, is named *תִּרְבּוֹת*, or διαθήκη, (as it is in all parts of the Scriptures), this appellation carries along with

it the implication of appointment or arrangement on the part of the διαθέμενος, and of obligation on the part of those to whom the covenant is addressed.

Nor does the use of the word διαθήκη, in the New Testament, differ from that already mentioned. For the system of Mosaic laws or institutions it is employed in Rom. 9: 4. 2 Cor. 3: 14. Gal. 4: 24. Heb. 8: 9. 9: 15, 20. Rev. 11: 19. For ordinance it is employed in Acts 7: 8; for promises of different kinds in Luke 1: 72. Acts 3: 25. Rom. 11: 26. Gal. 3: 17. Eph. 2: 12. It naturally designates also the *new dispensation* or Christian *τάγμα*, which the Saviour came to institute; Matt. 26: 28. Mark 14: 24. Luke 22: 20. 1 Cor. 11: 25. 2. Cor. 3: 6. Heb. 7: 22. 8: 6, 8, 10. 9: 15. 10: 16, 29. 12: 24. 13: 20. Mutual engagement or contract between parties, it designates in Gal. 3: 15.

With the exception of the application of διαθήκη to designate the *New Testament dispensation*, which is merely in the way of analogy to the antecedent use of it under the Jewish dispensation, there is no new meaning given to the word by the New Testament writers. Indeed the meaning just excepted hardly needs to be excepted, because it is so analogous to the common and earlier use of the word.

But there is one, and between Mr. B. and myself a controverted meaning of the word διαθήκη, which yet remains to be examined. It is that of *last will* or *testament*.

Mr. B. concedes, that "in classic Greek the word *remotely* has the signification of *will* or *testament*," p. 56. But why does he say *remotely*? Passow, after mentioning the generic signification of the word according to its etymology, viz. *arrangement*, *disposition*, places *testament* first in the rank of all its specific meanings. Donnegan does not even give the generic signification, because it is seldom to be found in practice, but gives *testament* as the first and principal meaning. Demosthenes, Socrates, Plato, and all the writers of golden Attic, so employ it; and if any one has the least doubt of this, he may look into Alberti, Observ. Philol. in Lucam 22: 29, and all his doubts will be dissipated. It is as clearly a classical sense of διαθήκη, as *word* is of λόγος; and therefore not a moment of time need be here occupied to prove it. It is conceded by all lexicographers and commentators.

The question whether it is employed in the Scriptures, is simply an inquiry about *facts*. That it may be employed, if occasion requires, no philologist of course can doubt. But whether occasion requires, is a matter to be ascertained merely by examination.

Testament, in the modern sense of this word, does not occur in the Old Testament; nor does it appear that the thing, i. e. a *written will*, was in usage among the ancient Hebrews. The Mosaic law settled inheritances. Whatever did not come within the statutes of Moses, was *orally* disposed of by individual possessors, at the time of their death. But in later times, specially among the Greeks and Romans, the making of *wills* was common. In the time of Paul, this was a well-known and familiar usage; and although ἡράκλιτος clearly never means *testament*, and διαθήκη (when employed to translate it) cannot in the Old Testament well be supposed to mean *testament*, yet it would not follow, that, when the epistle to the Hebrews was written, there might not be occasion to employ διαθήκη in the sense commonly given to it among the Greeks, i. e. to designate *will* or *testament* by it.

A re-examination of the New Testament passages has led me somewhat to doubt some of my former convictions as to the use of διαθήκη in this latter sense. I have stated, in my Commentary on the Hebrews, as quoted by Mr. B., an opinion, that the meaning of *testament* is confined to the word as employed in Heb. 9: 16, 17. I am now rather inclined to the belief, that when the Saviour, at the last supper, appeals to his *blood of the New Testament* (Matt. 26: 28. Mark 14: 24. Luke 22: 20. 1 Cor. 11: 25), he means the blood which is to ratify the *testament* or διαθήκη that is to be made valid by his death. Before the death of Jesus, the ancient covenant was in full authority. Jesus himself observed all its ordinances, and so did his disciples. *The Kingdom of heaven*, in the gospel-sense of this phrase, could come only by, and after, the death of Christ. Now, as his death was at once the dissolution of the old covenant and the confirmation of the new, nothing could be more natural than to look upon the διαθήκη thus introduced, in the sense of a *testament*, rather than that of a covenant. The author of this διαθήκη confirmed and ratified the whole, and made it operative, by his own death.

There is one most important particular which Mr. B. does not seem to have sufficiently noticed. Under the ancient *regime*, the covenant between God and the people was sanctioned or ratified by the blood of slain animals. Neither of the contracting parties (so to speak) was called to lay down life. Nor was Moses, the mediator between the parties, called to give up his life as a sacrifice. But the Mediator of the new covenant is both God and man. As man, he is mediator; as God, he is law-giver or author of the covenant. In speaking of him, however, simply as he was, i. e. as one person, we say, and we may say, that one of the parties to this covenant gave up his own life to ratify and sanction it. In the fact that he did so, we have good reason to compare this new covenant rather with *will* or *testament*, than with compact or covenant as usually understood. Nothing could be more natural. It alters not the nature of the thing. The obligation or the binding force of the *διαθήκη* is the same in either case. It is merely the manner in which it is sanctioned, that gives the coloring or shade to the meaning of *διαθήκη*, when employed to designate it.

Viewed in this light, were not our translators in the right, when they translated *διαθήκη* (in the passages just referred to above) by *testament*? I am, on the whole, inclined to believe that they were; and also that Paul, in Heb. 9: 16, 17, recognizes and adverts to this meaning, and designs to leave the impression that he so understands the word, as employed by Jesus in instituting the Last Supper.

In the like sense *διαθήκη* seems also to be employed in Gal. 3: 15. "The *διαθήκη* which none can annul," more naturally means a *will* than a contract; for the latter may be annulled in almost all cases, by the contracting parties, whenever they please, while a *will* is an instrument over which no living person has any power.

I do not urge these passages strenuously. They are capable of another sense. But it seems to me, in looking back upon them at the close of the examination which I have just made, that they are more significant, if they are viewed in the light in which I have now placed them.

Shall we give up then, the meaning of the word *διαθήκη*, as designating *testament*, in Heb. 9: 16, 17? Certainly we may and ought to give it up, in case the context does not oblige us to admit it; for the greater part, not to say the

whole of scriptural usage elsewhere pleads in favor of a different sense. Yet it is not a safe rule to determine the meaning of a particular word in any passage, by a majority of votes (so to speak) elsewhere against it, or rather when that majority goes for a meaning somewhat diverse. For example, the word *ἐξουσία* is employed nearly one hundred times in the New Testament, in the sense of *power, authority, magistracy, etc*; yet in 1 Cor. 11: 10, the Apostle says, that for certain reasons "a woman ought to have *ἐξουσία* upon her head." Now it is not possible to give this word the meaning here, which it has every where else, both in sacred and profane writings, without depriving the passage of all tolerable sense, and making it altogether unmeaning. Of course we seek for another meaning here, and one not authorized by usage elsewhere. So Paul says in Phil. 1: 21, "For me to live, *Χριστός*," i. e. *is Christ*. Surely the sense of this latter word must differ here from its meaning in any other passage. It would be very easy to produce a large list of words, from the Greek, Hebrew, or English dictionaries, which belong to the same category, i. e. they have in some one passage, a meaning altogether *sui-generis*. This is necessary, however, for none who are conversant with usages of language.

It is no valid argument then, nor even a specious one, against rendering *διαθήκη* in Heb. 9: 16, 17, by *testament*, that this meaning cannot elsewhere be found in the Old Testament, or the New. Such a meaning is common in the classics of the highest standing. Such a meaning then may properly be assigned to *διαθήκη*, in case the context indicates the necessity or propriety of so doing. In my apprehension, it is both proper and necessary.

The form of the expression in Heb. 9: 16, does not seem to admit of any other fair grammatical construction of *διαθήκη*, than the one which I formerly put upon it, viz., that of *testament*. The verse runs thus: "Where there is a *διαθήκη*, the death *ενῶ διαθεμένου* must of necessity take place." Mr. B. says (p. 66), that "*διαθέμενος* is nowhere else used in the sense of *one who makes a will*." As it respects the Scriptures this is to be conceded, and for the same reason, that *διαθήκη* nowhere in the Old Testament means *will*. This participle is indeed to be found but once (Ps. 49: 6), except in the passage under consideration. Yet the verb *διατίθημι*, is used times almost with-

out number, in connection with διαθήκη its conjugate noun. In the Old Testament, it is so used when διαθήκη means *compact*, *covenant*, *agreement*, etc.; and in fact it is employed in nearly every case where διαθήκη is employed. In all cases it designates the *action* of making a covenant, statute, ordinance, etc., and not the *instrument* which ratifies it, or even the action itself of ratifying it. So in Plato, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Polybius, Josephus, and others, διαθέσθαι is the ordinary verb for designating the *action of making a testament*, or the *disposing of any thing by will*; see Bleek, Comm. on *Heb. 9: 16, 17.*

It is not possible, without an offence against Greek idiom that τοῦ διαθεμένου should be made to mean the *victim*, which by its death and blood ratifies a covenant. This victim is not an *agent*, but a mere passive *instrument* or *symbol*. But διαθεμένου is essentially, and by its very nature as a participle of Aor. 2 Middle Voice, a word of *active*, not of *passive* meaning. The διαθέμαντος of a διαθήκη is by an absolute necessity of usage and grammar, an agent who constitutes, or assists as a party in constituting a διαθήκη, let this mean either *testament* or *covenant*. It is fairly susceptible of no other interpretation.

Such being the case, it is impossible with propriety to render διαθήκη in *Heb. 9: 16, 17*, by *covenant*. The death of a covenanter, or of a contracting party, surely is not necessary to the validity of a covenant or contract. Nay, so far is it from this, that very many, if not most contracts are rendered null and void by the death of either contracting party. Consequently it is impossible to render διαθήκη *covenant* here, unless we force upon τοῦ διαθεμένου a meaning of which it is not susceptible.

Equally unsatisfactory is Mr. B.'s explanation of ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς, in v. 17. He says that "it is not limited merely to human beings, i. e. to *dead men*, but may be extended to other things." He has made no distinction, however, between the use of νεκρός as a *noun*, and νεκρός as an *adjective*; nor allowed for the difference between a *tropical* and a *literal* sense. All the examples by which he endeavors to prove that the meaning may be extended beyond that of *dead men*, are adjectives, and not nouns. The word νεκρός, either as noun or adjective, is employed some one hundred and twenty times, in the New Testament, and always in the sense of *deceased* or *dead men*, where it is a noun. It is used some thirty times

in the Septuagint, in the same manner. There also it has, in five instances besides these, the meaning of *corpse*, viz., in Deut. 18: 26; Is. 26: 19; Jer. 7: 31; 9: 21; 19: 7; and this is the most ancient and frequent meaning of it in the Greek classics. No example stands on record, to my knowledge, where ὁ νεκρός, the noun, ever designates *the dead body of a beast*, much less of a *sacrifice*. One may say of a lion, or of a tree, or of faith, or works, or any other thing, that it is *dead*, νεκρόν, using the word as an adjective, which simply expresses the *quality* or *attribute of deadness*; although such a usage is very rare. One may use the word *dead* in a tropical sense as an adjective, to designate spiritual coldness and lifelessness. But νεκρός as a noun, is confined (tropical usage only excepted) to *dead men*, i. e. dead men in opposition to, or in distinction from, living ones (which is the universal New Testament usage), or else the *dead bodies* merely of such men, i. e. their *corpses* (which is usual in the classics, and sometimes in the Septuagint). But in the New Testament, the word for *human corpse*, is οὐτῶμα; see Rev. 11: 9.

But there is another objection against interpreting νεκρός in the manner of Mr. B., which is still stronger than that already made on the ground of usage. It is this, viz., that had the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews designed here to express the idea of a *sacrifice* made in order to ratify a covenant, he would beyond all reasonable question have employed the word θυσίας, or θυσοῖς, the only appropriate words for such a design. Θυσιατήρειον is the name of the *altar* on which sacrifices are laid; θύω is the appropriate verb to designate the action of *killing* them; and θυσία is the word that New Testament usage, (and the Septuagint also), every where exhibits, in order to designate the animal slain for a sacrifice. No less than fourteen times does the epistle to the Hebrews exhibit it. I need not cite the passages, since every good Lexicon, and of course every Greek Concordance will readily supply them. This is a usage so plain, so appropriate, so frequent, that to assume the use of νεκρός, in the case before us, in the sense of θυσία, is plainly to do violence to the *usus loquendi*, unless the context imperiously demands it. But in my own apprehension, the context furnishes decisive reasons against it.

Besides, we know that the Jewish law forbade the offering

of any animals in sacrifice, *which died of themselves*. They were to be brought *alive*, and to be slain by the altar. Why then should Paul here choose a word which is doubtful, to say the least, (i. e. *νεκροῖς*, which means *something already dead*, and which therefore might mislead his readers), when he might avoid all occasion of this kind by choosing *θυσία*. It is quite incredible that he should have done so. It was a spontaneous matter here, as every where else, when a *victim* is presented as an offering of any sort, to call it *θυσία*.

A word, in this place, on the difficulty which Mr. B. finds in my rendering *τετὶν νεκροῖς* by *after men are dead*, p. 70. He says that *τετὶν* means *upon* or *over*, and not *after*.

It would be easy to adduce good authority for such a translation as I have given. What else can *τετὶν* mean in Acts 11: 9; John 4: 27. Xen. Hist. Græc. iv. 4, 9. Demosth. 927. 3. Xen. Anab. vi. 1. 11, 12, unless it be *after*? Still I have no anxiety to vindicate this shade of meaning. It is very easy to justify my rendering for substance, in case I give up this form of expression. An unquestionable use of *τετὶν* is to designate the *condition* or *circumstances* under which any thing takes place or is done; see Passow's Lex., but specially those two masters of Greek idiom, Kühner, Gramm. § 612. 3. b. Winer, N. Test. Gramm. § 52 c. a. The very phrase in question *τετὶν νεκροῖς*, Winer paraphrases by "erst wenn ein Todesfall eingetreten ist," i. e. *only when death has taken place*. Does this differ in *sense* from the phraseology I have employed? If the reader will consult Passow, Kühner, Winer, or Dr. Robinson's Lexicon, he will find abundant confirmation of the meaning here assigned to *τετὶν*.

With that shade of meaning thus attached to *τετὶν*, which has now been developed, I might correctly translate *τετὶν νεκροῖς*, *on condition that men are dead*. The plural number is here used instead of the singular, merely because the writer wishes to state the usage adverted to as *general*, and not as limited to any particular individual. The plural, therefore, is more to his purpose.

As to supplying the word *men*, in this case where *νεκροῖς* has no expressed antecedent, it is a matter of course, on the supposition that the passage refers to *human beings*, and not to animals. Nothing therefore is gained in favor of the ren-

dering proposed by Mr. B., by our giving up the word *after*. We must still translate *εἰ* *on condition that, in case that*, which certainly accords with a well known and established meaning of this particle.

Yet this is not all with which the exegesis of Mr. B. has to contend. Paul says, that the *διαθήκη* "is of no avail so long as the *διαθέμενος* is living," v. 17. A contract, covenant, or compact of any kind that is common among men, cannot be described by this; for, as has already been remarked, most compacts are rendered null by the death of one of the parties, and none of them depend on this for confirmation. No sacrifices were needed to confirm them; although they were sometimes resorted to in order to make the obligation more solemn and impressive. It is not possible, therefore, that covenants in common use can be meant here; for the description does not fit them at all. And yet it is to something in common use, something well known, acknowledged, and general, to which the writer most evidently appeals. His design is, to sanction a particular case by a generally acknowledged and known usage. "Death, as all acknowledge, the death of a *διαθέμενος* must take place, ere the *διαθήκη* in question can be valid." We have seen, that *διαθέμενος* of necessity means the agent, or one of the *agents*, who makes the *διαθήκη*. Now the victim that is sacrificed to sanction what has already been done, is not the agent in making the *διαθήκη*. Nor is the action of *sanctioning* here indicated. *Μήποτες λοχίς* is the Apostle's expression, i. e. it has no strength, no force, is of no avail. Such a principle was never acknowledged among the Hebrews. All that a sacrifice could do in a case of compact, would be only equivalent to what an *oath* does now in the same case. It is not essential; it only makes the obligation more impressive.

But Mr. B. himself acknowledges, that any of the usual covenants among and between men cannot be meant by the apostle. He refers the whole matter, therefore, to *covenants between God and man*. Here, he avers, "it was a settled principle, that in a *בְּרִית* or *διαθήκη* between God and man, there must be the death of the sacrificial victim. It was an indisputable principle," p. 66, comp. 64.

Here then we must join issue again, upon a *matter of fact*.

The ten commandments given at Mount Sinai are often explicitly called a *בְּרִית* i. e. a *διαθήκη*, and were the most

solemn of all transactions of this nature. There was no sacrifice on that occasion; but afterwards, when the laws were more fully completed, the confirmation by sacrifice took place as related in Ex. xxiv, and Heb. 9: 18 seq. Nothing could be more appropriate.

Yet this rite was *not* always repeated, when the people made a covenant with God. In Deut. 29: 10 seq., a solemn and express covenant of the whole Hebrew nation with God is described; yet not a word is said respecting any sacrifice. In Joshua xxiv. is an account of a covenant between God and his people, through the intervention of Joshua, yet there is not a word respecting any sacrifice. In 2 K. xi. we have an account of another covenant between the same parties, mediated by Jehoiada, and yet there is no intimation of any sacrifice. In 2 K. xxiii. is an account of King Josiah, with the priests, prophets, and people, all entering into a most solemn covenant with God, and yet there is no sacrifice of confirmation; see also the same in 2 Chron. 34: 31, 32. In 2 Chron. 15: 12 seq., it is related of King Asa and all his people, that they made a covenant with God, *after* the usual ceremonial sacrifices had been offered, and then that "they *swore to the Lord*" to keep the covenant, instead of confirming it by sacrifices. In 2 Chron. xxix. is an account of Hezekiah and his people entering into a covenant (v. 10.) with the Lord; and although sacrifices followed, they were the usual offerings of the temple, and not sacrifices of confirmation. In Ezra x. is the history of another covenant between God and the people, but *not* a word respecting sacrifices.

How stands this matter then in the Bible? Simply thus: We have the history of a sacrifice when God covenanted with Abraham, and also with Israel at Sinai, *two cases*; and we have, as exhibited above, *seven cases* of covenant with God, where there is not one word respecting a sacrifice of confirmation, and no reason whatever to suppose that there *was* any. It is difficult, with such facts before us, to see how Mr. B. could be so misled, as to state that in covenants between God and man, "there *must* be the death of a sacrificial victim," and moreover, that "this is an indisputable principle," p. 66.

Let us sum up the whole matter. *Διαθήκη*, which generically designates *arrangement*, may also, and almost as a

matter of course, designate any particular kind of arrangement, viz., *will* or *testament*, *covenant*, *treaty*, *compact*, *agreement*, etc. In all these senses it is actually employed in the classics; in most (if not all) of them in the Scriptures. It may also mean *statute*, *prescription*, *ordinance*, and either of these as comprising a *promise* or a *threatening*. These meanings are common to the Septuagint and to the New Testament. Yet in none of these, *will* or *testament* excepted, is the death of a *διαθέτως* necessary to make valid the *διαθήκη*; in most of these *arrangements*, death would render the *διαθήκη* null and void. In none of them, even including *testament*, is a sacrifice for confirmation necessary, as we have abundantly shown from the Scriptures. Such a sacrifice is merely occasional, and only adds peculiar solemnity to the occasion of making it. There remains therefore, no way whatever in which we can, as philologists, justify the rendering of *διαθήκη* here by *covenant*. It is not true, that a sacrifice for confirmation of a covenant, either with God or with man, was necessary. In both cases it was only occasionally (and that very rarely) resorted to, as sacred history shows us; but it was resorted to, as has just been remarked, merely for the purpose which among us is now subserved by an *oath*. By the word *testament*, then, we must render *διαθήκη* in Heb. 19: 16, 17.

I must even venture to do this, in the face of MacKnight, Doddridge, Bloomfield, Michaelis, Steudel, and Dr. J. P. Wilson, who have inclined to the opinion espoused by my much respected friend and brother, and to whom he appeals. He might have added Tholuck, in his recent *Commentary on Hebrews*; who, however, speaks very cautiously, and takes the attitude of asking why the thing may not be as he supposes it to be, rather than that of seriously laboring to show that it is so. He felt the pressure of philology in opposition to his views; but he felt also, that the *logic* of the apostle would be put in jeopardy by translating *διαθήκη* as our English version has done, and of two difficulties he chooses that which seemed to him to be the least. And this appears to be the main difficulty with Mr. B.

Whether Tholuck is right, in respect to Paul's *logic*, remains to be examined. But as to the other authorities in *Greek*, adduced by Mr. B., I must frankly confess, that the opinion of no one of those whom he names would settle a

question of Greek usage in a manner satisfactory to me. Respectable men they are, and part of them quite learned in some matters ; but *Greek* was not the element of their greatness. Some of them should not even be named, where a question of nicety in Greek idiom is concerned.

The main objection, then, among all who have embraced the same opinion as Mr. B., (and these are few indeed, none ancient, that I know of, and only here and there a solitary person among the moderns), is, that the apostle's logic is held up as weak and inconclusive, by the rendering of *διαθήκη* as meaning *testament*. Mr. B. has drawn out what he supposes to be the necessary syllogism, in such a case, on p. 61 seq. The substance of his syllogism thus drawn out, is as follows : "The death of a testator is universally acknowledged to be necessary, in order to render valid his *testament* ; therefore the death of a sacrificial victim was necessary in order to make good a *covenant*." This mode of reasoning, he suggests, "would be less forcible than what we are accustomed to attribute to the apostle," "nor would it be admitted as sound in any court of law."

So I am apt to think, as well as my friend. But whether he has fairly understood and stated Paul's *logic*, (if indeed it be logic and not mere illustration), is another question, and one on which something must be said, in order to defend still further that rendering of *διαθήκη* which I have advocated. I remark, then,

First, that Christ is the mediator of a new *διαθήκη*, v. 15 ; and being such, his death, (i. e. the death of him who proposes or is the author of the new *διαθήκη*, and not of a symbolic victim), took place, in order that offences under the first *διαθήκη* might be forgiven, and that those who are called of God might receive their everlasting inheritance, v. 15.

Here are two things entirely different from the arrangements of the old covenant. (1) Here is the death of the author himself of the new *διαθήκη*. (2) The death in this case is at the same time the only death that is truly expiatory for the sins of men. It was even necessary for the pardon of offences under the Jewish dispensation, notwithstanding all their ritual sacrifices. The victims sacrificed as a mere *token* of confirming a covenant, were in no sense expiatory, and could be nothing more than mere symbols of solemn ratification. But here is a ratification by the death of the author

himself of the new διαθήκη. Here is a double purpose answered. His death renders valid his *testament*; and his death makes expiation for the sins of all men who are *ταπεινοί*, v. 15.

Now nothing could be more natural, in this case, than for the Apostle to call the new διαθήκη thus made and sanctioned, a *testament* or *will*. The old covenant was ratified by the blood of a slain animal; the new by the blood of its author. Here is one of the very things which was the occasion why the latter was called *new*. And here too is the whole secret of its being called a *testament*, rather than a *covenant*. The *instrument*, if I may so speak, is in itself just the same, whether you name it a *covenant* or a *testament*. It is only the manner of establishing or confirming it, which gives rise to the appellation or idea of a *testament*.

Mr. B. has gravely undertaken to show, that the Lord Jesus made no proper *will* or *testament*; which he explains by saying, that "he made no disposition of property after his death; he left no legacies; he did not even direct where his body should be entombed," p. 59. True—all true to the letter! But then, what sort of *inheritance* did he leave? What kind of possessions had he for distribution? It will not be questioned that his possessions were *spiritual*; that his heirs are *spiritual*; that his *testament*, if indeed he has made one, is therefore entirely of a *spiritual* nature. And has he not left *such a legacy* to his followers? If not, why are they so often called his *heirs*; so often said to take an *inheritance*? Is not the blessed Gospel itself—the New Testament sealed, i. e. ratified, by his blood—a *testament*? A *testament* too, making a distribution of more, and more important blessings, than all the other *testaments* ever made, have distributed.

I do not say that the nude literal sense of the word can be applied, in its common acceptation as used to denote a *post mortem* distribution of worldly goods. The very nature of the case forbids such a supposition. But this we may say, viz., that the word *testament* is quite as appropriately applied here, as the word *covenant* is to the ten commandments and to the statutes of Moses. After all that has been said about *ταπεινοί* and διαθήκη, nothing is plainer than that usage has made the basis of these words when actually employed, to be the idea of *covenant*, *compact*, or *agreement*. There is an implied obli-

gation of assent and obedience on the part of those to whom God addresses commands and ordinances, as the condition and counterpart of promised blessings on his part. So that, whether we regard διαθήκη as applicable to the old dispensation or to the new, it *literally* describes neither, and yet it substantially and significantly describes both. It describes the first, in the way of designating a conditional agreement or arrangement, made without the death of either party, and therefore not appropriately named a *testament*, but called διαθήκη in another sense of the word. It describes the gospel dispensation in the way of designating it as a *testament*, i. e. διαθήκη is used here in this sense, because the author of this διαθήκη, laid down his own life to confirm it, and because its efficacy was not established, or the διαθήκη was not really valid and operative, until the death of the διαθέτουσα. Who can refuse to see that Paul, by giving such a sense to the word διαθήκη in Heb. 9: 16, 17, has made it far more significant and appropriate, than if he had spoken of a διαθήκη in the sense of *covenant*? His aim, evidently was to throw into high relief the death of Jesus; and by speaking of διαθήκη in the manner in which he has spoken, he has fully executed his purpose.

Still farther to confirm these views, let it be noted, that down to the moment when Jesus exclaimed on the cross: *It is finished*, the Mosaic dispensation was in full force and entirely unrepealed. From that moment it was abrogated, so far as it was purely Mosaic, or rather so far as it was ritual and symbolic. The whole tenor of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as other parts of the New Testament, establishes this beyond a doubt. "When that which is perfect is come, then that which was in part is done away." "In that he saith, *A New Covenant*, he hath made the first old." Down to his dying day, the Saviour obeyed the Levitical law, and enjoined it upon all his disciples, down to the same period. But his death brought every thing in the spiritual world into a new relation or state. The Holy Spirit could not be poured out in extraordinary effusions, until Jesus had suffered; see John 7: 39; 16: 7; Acts 1: 16, seq. The gospel could not be preached to the Gentiles, until after the death and ascension of Jesus. During his life, therefore, the kingdom of God is spoken of as *nigh*, rather than as having come, and if the latter phraseology is ever applied, it is only in the way of anticipation. All this, and much more

of a similar nature, which might readily be adduced, serves to show how easily the apostle may be vindicated for calling the new dispensation a *testament*, rather than a covenant. The death of Jesus, and that only, put the seal on all which is peculiar to the new dispensation; and all that is peculiar, and therefore *new*, (as the Apostle names it), comes to the *heirs* of salvation in the way of a testament.

The *propriety*, then, of calling the gospel dispensation a *testament*, under circumstances like these, no considerate person, we may well suppose, will call in question, when he has once examined the whole ground. There is even less of the tropical in the name διαθήκη thus given, than there is in the same word when it is applied to the ten commandments, and to the laws and ordinances in general of Moses.

But conceding all this, it will still be said, that the difficulty in respect to the *logic* yet remains. How can the Apostle draw the conclusion, that because a *testament* is confirmed only by the death of the testator, therefore the ancient *covenant* must be confirmed by the death of a victim, slain in sacrifice? Mr. B. thinks Paul was a somewhat more expert logician than this would show him to be.

So too, I must also believe. But then I am far from regarding this as a fair statement of the Apostle's logic. Let us see whether the case, on more thorough examination, does not present a different aspect.

The author of the epistle to the Hebrews has argued at length to show, that all the ritual sacrifices of the Mosaic dispensation were utterly insufficient in themselves to procure the pardon of sin with God. "It is impossible," says he, "that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin," Heb. 10: 4. He says also, that "the law was only a σχέδιον, sketch or shadow, of good things to come, and not the σκέψις, the filled-out or complete picture, of those things," Heb. 10: 1. An important politico-ecclesiastical purpose was doubtless accomplished, by the sacrificial rites of the Mosaic law; but the conscience of the worshipper was not at all freed from the pressure of guilt in the sight of God, by any offering of such a nature. *The Lamb of God* was the only victim which could take away the sins of the world.

Hence we are taught, by the epistle to the Hebrews, to regard all the ancient ritual sacrifices as *types*, *shadows* or *symbols*, of the great and really expiatory sacrifice that was

yet to be offered. The paschal lamb, for example, was a type of Christ, "our passover, who was sacrificed for us," 1 Cor. 5: 7. All the sacrifices, which had respect to sin, under the ancient dispensation, were, and could be, nothing more, in their highest design, than symbols or types of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, which made an end of sin and brought in everlasting redemption.

The apostle urges this point in the context, which precedes the verses that I am laboring to explain. "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." But that blood must be, not the blood of bullocks or goats, but of him "who διὰ πνεύματος ἀγίου offered himself a spotless victim to God," Heb. 9: 14. Mark now the difference between the two cases. The symbol or type consists of the blood of *bullocks* and *goats*, i. e. of some animal merely; while the anti-type, the really expiatory sacrifice, is a *rational being*, one who makes an offering διὰ πνεύματος αἵματος. Under the ancient law, *human* beings could not be sacrificed. This was so arranged for the best of reasons. A horror of shedding human blood was increased by such an ordinance; but, what was still more, the blood of any common man, or of any mere man, would have been altogether insufficient to atone for sin. It must be a man in some way exalted to such a dignity, that his death would be an equivalent or satisfaction for the sins of those who should receive pardon. On the person of Jesus this dignity was conferred. In him were united all the qualifications necessary to constitute a victim that might take away the sins of a world.

Such is the light in which the apostle places the subject of atoning sacrifice, in the context that precedes the passage before us. But with chap. 9: 15, however, begins a theme which is partly *new*. Having already shown, that all the sin-offerings of the ancient dispensation were merely types and shadows of the really efficient and expiatory sacrifice, and that they were instituted for the very purpose of being so, he now proceeds to a new point of comparison between the old dispensation and the new. In this comparison the new dispensation is presented as the substance or essence, and the old as the shadow or type. One very simple question here arises: Must the type conform to the reality, or the reality to the type?

We can be at no loss for an answer to this question. Christ

did not offer up himself as a victim, because offerings for *sin* had been instituted under the Jewish dispensation. No, they were instituted because he was to become an offering for *sin*; they typified him; he did not appear and suffer because of them. In other words, the *shadow* exists because the *substance* does, not the *substance* because of the *shadow*.

What I now would ask for is, that we may carry forward this very simple and obvious consideration, and apply it to the *new* comparison between the old and new dispensation, which the apostle introduces in Heb. 9: 15-18.

Christ by his death confirmed and rendered valid the new *διαθήκη*. This commenced, in its full reality, only from the time when the death of Christ took place. It was ratified by no symbolic ritual sacrifice, but by the death of the Author himself of the dispensation. And inasmuch as this was the manner in which the new dispensation was confirmed or made valid, nothing could be more appropriate or descriptive than to name it or speak of it as a *testament*.

In this respect the ancient dispensation could present only a *symbol* or *type*, not an identical similitude. The mediator of the old dispensation, Moses, did not die to confirm it; nor was he, except in a very subordinate sense, the author of this dispensation. It was sanctioned only by the blood of slain beasts. Of course Paul could not name the ancient dispensation a *testament*, with any propriety. It was valid without the death of either of the parties making the *διαθήκη* or *covenant*. But when the *new διαθήκη* was made, it received a sanction as much higher than that of the old, as the nature of the new *διαθήκη* was more excellent than that of the old. The blood of its Author and Mediator sanctioned and confirmed it.

The blood of Christ then answered a double purpose, as represented by the apostle. First, it "cleansed from all iniquity;" secondly, it ratified the new and everlasting *διαθήκη*. Different courses of sacrifice were required, under the ancient dispensation, in order to symbolize both these purposes or ends. There were *expiatory* sacrifices, and there was a *ratifying* sacrifice. The latter was the symbol of the blood of Christ, so far as this was concerned with the ratification of the new *testament*. A human victim could not be slain for this purpose. This could not be done even where *expiatory* sacrifices were required, much less where merely *ratification* was concerned. Consequently the blood of bul-

locks and goats, as described in Heb. 9: 19, seq., was employed as the symbol of Christ's blood, so far as this was shed for the purpose of ratifying the new *diabήσιν*. The same course was taken, as to the symbols of the great and really expiatory sacrifice. Those symbols were not human beings, but goats and bullocks.

We come now to a fair position, in which we may examine the apostle's *logic*. And what is the syllogism which he makes out, in the sentence that follows, *εἰσιν* ? v. 18. It is easy to see the whole, if we look at the reference implied in *εἰσιν*. Plainly this is not merely to the general usage or general principle, as stated in verses 16, 17, but to the *whole paragraph* including verses 15-17. In fact, there is here, but one main proposition. Vs. 16, 17, as the *γάρ* in each shows, are but mere *causal* statements, showing the grounds on which the preceding affirmation rests. And what then is the sum of this whole matter? Simply this, *viz.*, that because the death of Christ was to confirm a new testament, the ancient type of this was so arranged as to prefigure it. Because Christ was to die and confirm the New Testament, by his own blood, therefore blood was shed in the way of confirming the old covenant, in order to symbolize the shedding of blood for the confirmation of the new one. But *human* blood could not be shed under the ancient dispensation, in this case; for this could no more be done, in the case of sacrifice for *ratification*, than it could in the case of sacrifice for *expiation*.

Where now is the lameness or the deficiency of the logic or *ratiocination*? We do not call it bad logic, when the apostle argues, that because the offering of the Lamb of God was to take away the sins of the world, therefore offerings of beasts to typify this, were appointed under the ancient dispensation: Why is it bad reasoning, then, or "reasoning that would not be regarded in a court of law," when the apostle argues thus: "Because Christ's blood was to render valid the new dispensation, (on which ground we may with propriety name it his *Testament*,) therefore the blood of goats and bullocks was used to ratify the old dispensation, in order that it might symbolize that blood which ratified the new one?" This is the very drift and essence of the apostle's representation and of his logic. The different *names* of the two dispensations are mere accidents, not changing in the least the

nature of the things with which they are concerned. But it so happened that in Greek, in which the apostle was writing, διαθήκη with equal propriety designated both *covenant* and *will*. He applies it to either dispensation in that sense which the nature of the dispensation respectively admits, or rather demands. And this is all the mystery there is about the matter; a mystery which does not seem to demand a second Daniel in order to solve it.

The point of reasoning is not that "because a *will* is valid only by the death of a testator, therefore a covenant must be confirmed by blood." This does not hit the mark of Paul's logic at all. His point is simply this: "Because the new dispensation, (properly named *testament* on account of the death of the author which sanctioned it), was ratified by blood, therefore (ὅτε, whence or therefore) the old dispensation, (which could only be called *covenant*), which was designed throughout in its ritual to be *symbolic*, required blood in order to its ratification."

If this syllogism is lame, I have not eyes to see it. It seems to me to walk quite as erect and alert as the other, viz., that because Christ's death was necessary to atone for sin, therefore symbols of it, i. e. expiatory sacrifices of beasts, were ordained as a part of the ancient dispensation.

I know well that Paul, or whoever may be the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, has often been charged here with poor logic. Even Bleek, in his recent Commentary on this epistle, does not exempt the author from the charge; and Rückert exults in such charges against Paul, as well as Fritsche and Meyer. But it needs sharper optics than I have, to see either imperfect or childish ratiocination here. The simple truth is, that the apostle's main point has often been mistaken; and then he has been charged with all the consequences of oversight, or want of sight, in his interpreters. I must solicit permission, however, to be indulged in entering my gravest protest, against injustice of such a nature. The fault is not in Paul, although some of his epistles have in them things, which Peter himself seems to intimate were hard to be understood. Paul goes deep indeed into sacred mysteries; for how could he, who had been caught up into the third heaven and taught there, avoid so doing? Yet I do not think, that Peter would have reckoned the passage that I have now re-examined, among the passages which he seems

to regard as difficult. I say *seems to regard*, for it may well be doubted, whether Peter bears testimony respecting what Paul writes, or in regard to the subjects which he canvasses; see *περὶ τούτων, τὸν οἶκον* (not *τὸν αἴτην*), in 2 Pet. 3: 16.

At all events, it is time, as it seems to me, that discussion were at an end respecting Heb. 9: 16-18. The case is, on the whole, so plain that when the words as well as the object in view, are soberly weighed, I cannot well see how any philologist can bring himself to doubt. When I first published my Commentary on the epistle to the Hebrews, I received several letters from highly respected friends, calling in question my interpretations, and defending, in a variety of ways, that now advocated by Mr. Barnes. I have adverted to these in my second edition. Mr. B. has now called up the subject anew, and I have to thank him for being the occasion of my now becoming more satisfied than ever, that the ground which I then took was firm and tenable. I would hope that his own mind may now be satisfied, and also the minds of others, who have hitherto been hesitating about the exegesis which I had given. If not, the way is entirely open for him or them, to show either the erroneous philology or the bad logic, that I have employed, if indeed I am fairly exposed to either allegation. The simple lover of truth will never hesitate in desiring his own errors to be exposed; and readily will he receive the truth, from whatever quarter it may come. It could scarcely come to me, if I am in an error in regard to the subject discussed, from a more acceptable quarter, than from the highly respected friend and brother, who has given occasion to this renewed investigation.

ARTICLE IV.

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS OF THOMAS CARLYLE.

By Rev. Merrill Richardson, Terryville, Ct.

IT is not often that we would attempt to ascertain a writer's religious sentiments from his popular literary productions. Surely this would be an unfair, as well as a useless course to pursue in the case of most Reviewers. But while Carlyle is pre-eminently distinguished as a man of letters, he so blends the two, religion and literature—rather, we would say, making them one and the same thing—that in reading his literary productions we are compelled to dwell upon his singular articles of faith. His religion shows itself upon almost every page. In his estimation of men ; in his criticisms upon their literature and philosophy ; and in his remarks upon their views of political and ethical science, it is their religion which he first shows us ; and with him this is the test by which he will try men and all their works ; this is his clue to all which is worth the knowing of man and of his doings. It is a maxim with him, and he every where proceeds upon it, *that given the religion of a man, or of a nation, what the individual or nation is, will readily appear.*

'A man's religion,' he says, 'is, in every sense, the chief fact with regard to him. Not his creed, not his profession and assertion ; but the thing a man does practically believe, and lay to heart, and for certain knows concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe ; his duty and his destiny there ; *that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest.* This may be a religion, or a no-religion ; an affirmation or a denial ; a heathenism or a christianism ; a system embracing one God or many. Knowing what was believed, or what was disbelieved upon this subject, and we have the soul of the history of the man or the nation. For the thoughts they had were the parents of the actions they did ; their feelings were parents of their thoughts ; it was the unseen spiritual in them that determined the outward and actual ; hence their *religion* is the primary fact to be ascertained about a man or a nation.'

It is in accordance with the above statements that Carlyle proceeds, whenever the conduct and doings of men come in review. In his Essays, his own sentiments touching religion are freely declared. He looks at all men and at all things through a religious medium. When we least expect it, we meet with the most sublime and startling thoughts bearing on this subject. And after a close perusal of most of his pieces, the reflections which pass through the mind are of a religious cast.

We deem it proper, therefore, to attempt to ascertain Carlyle's religion, or his "*no religion*," from his literary productions. The truth is, we cannot read his writings and not know very much of his peculiar *faith*. He lays down no creed, and yet no man's creed is more plainly written. The items of his faith are not numbered and in order like the "five points," or the "thirty-nine articles;" yet a careful study of his works will give us about as clear a view of what he believes as we have of the creed of Calvin, or of the church of England. In fact, using the term religion generically, Carlyle may be styled a religious writer; he is so understood. And we apprehend that no moralist or minister is exerting so much influence to form the religious opinions of some portions of our country as this Reviewer. Says a writer in the British and Foreign Review, "We speak from some experience, when we say that the prevalent inclination of men to despise and disbelieve has been in many cases increased by the influence of Mr. Carlyle's opinions. In America, where he is said to be even better known than in England, his imitators appear to be so eager to obey his precepts, by action, earnestness, and reverence, that they seriously propose to each other to cultivate originality by forgetting all the instruction they have derived from Europe, and to revive the spirit of religion by the abolition of all forms of worship, and the rejection, or which is equivalent, the indiscriminate adoption, of all existing and imaginable creeds."—[Am. Eclectic for March, 1842, p. 229.]

How much influence his writings have had in causing the disturbances of a certain ecclesiastical denomination in Massachusetts, we would not wish to decide. He early received the congratulations of many literary men of that State. And the compiler of his *Miscellanies*, in his preface, makes the following remark:—"It is a fact worth remembering in our

literary history, that his rich and cheerful genius found its earliest audience in or near New England, from young men who had complained with the first Quaker, that, in the multitude of teachers, none spake to our condition."

Carlyle is now read in many of our Colleges and Seminaries, with more interest than any other writer. Not read at first for his Theology ; but so striking and peculiar are many of his thoughts upon man's spiritual nature, and his connection with the Deity, that he is soon studied for his religion. Novel and startling ideas respecting the general and long established habits of thought and action are constantly suggested to the mind—quaintly and yet most significantly expressed ; the whole aspect of the subject seems changed ; it is new, it looks philosophical ; it is dressed in an attractive, often in a fantastic garb ; there come clustered around it figures of speech which would make Quintilian stare ; images from the heavens above, and from the earth beneath, and from the waters and all else under the earth, rise in grotesque forms before the mind ; the whole subject is so pictured out that we are forced to look—at times, at the skill of the artist—always at the figures upon the canvass. There is beauty ; often the finest touches of poetry ; there is sublimity of thought and diction to recommend it. We read and re-read it, and continually see more and feel deeper. All our former settled notions in matters of faith are liable to be jostled ; and in some instances, to our knowledge, have been set tottering to the fall.

That Carlyle loves the element which Madame de Staél gave to the Germans—the *air*—a glance at his Miscellanies will show. Yet, with few exceptions, he does not soar so high ; does not so far transcend, that the less aerial may not follow. He takes us kindly by the hand, promises us safe conduct and speedy landing, when he invites us to go with him into the azure deep of his still more transcendent neighbors. We follow—for who can help it with such cheerful company ?—and if, while more unaccustomed to such giddy heights, to look upon such vast and confused prospects, we do not see objects so distinctly as he would have us, yet we feel reluctant to descend ; certainly till we are satisfied there are or are not worthy sights to behold.

Familiarity with German literature, particularly with the philosophy of Kant and his expositors, would aid us much

in a thorough examination of Carlyle's spiritual nature. Confessing our want of such familiarity, we proceed, with an eye upon his writings generally, *to state, in as brief a manner as possible, the view Carlyle takes of most of those subjects, in treating of which he has given us a clue to his Religious Sentiments.*

To quote particular sentences of his and say: in these he means this or that, would be as unfair and foolish as it would be to take the same course to ascertain the religious belief of the Poet. Much of his writing is poetical, though the rhyme and capital letters are wanting; and more than poetical license must be granted him in his prose. His assertions and denials; his admirations and his condemnations; his lamentations and his rejoicings; his love and his hatred, are so often reiterated and so strongly expressed, that it is not difficult to know his moral feelings. He appears a most fearless and independent thinker. The 'tight-lacings' of all creeds and parties he seems utterly to discard. He stands alone, a perfect Cyclops, hurling his thunderbolts with fatal aim at whatever he hates; yet embracing with the kindest, fullest heart, whatever he loves. And he loves much and he hates much; but the objects of his affection and contempt are not those of any particular class of mortals. He is most frequently found worshiping before shrines which the civilized world has long since pronounced idolatrous; and often breaking in pieces as dumb idols the gods of the worldly, great and learned. He is more devout in sight of the Caabah at Mecca than before the great Cathedral of London; for he sees as clearly that the black stone in the former descended from heaven as he does that the pomps and splendor of the latter can claim this high origin; and he would feel that in Mecca he was surrounded with more *sincere* worshipers than he would find in the metropolis of his own kingdom. But we hasten to the point directly before us.

And first, *Carlyle's Lamentations*. His burdens are those of the ancient Hebrew Prophets; the unbelief, the heartlessness, the idolatry of the age. He is a perfect Jeremiah, wanting the girdle and perhaps the tears! when he looks at the irreligion of the eighteenth and thus far of the nineteenth century. And his Jeremiads are numerous, strong and pathetic.

‘Faith is almost universally wanting; sight and sound

have taken its place. The church, the state, every corporation, every society and sect has wrapt itself in forms, and sits cold and heartless, in the sable pall of death. Deep thought has left the mind ; deep, ardent feeling has been excluded from the soul. Machinery has every where been substituted for sincere, strong individual activity. Does one wish to suppress a vice, correct an error, burn out some of the sins of this sinning world ?—he has no spiritual fire within him self, like an Isaiah, a Paul, a Mahomet, a Dante, with which to do it ! Not he ! To engage in such Titan labors man has now no faith or strength. His vanity cries so loud to be gratified that he cannot engage in silent, single-handed, patient effort. There must be flourishing of trumpets ; he must call in others to assist—at least to look on and applaud ; he must form his party, issue his periodical, send out his agents, erect his chapel,—in short he must do all by machinery. The age is mechanical. As in the physical world the draught horse is turned loose as too slow and powerless, and the fire horse harnessed in his place, so in the spiritual world the natural, patient effort of individual man is supplanted by mechanical furtherances. And in all this there is no spirituality, no heart !

‘ Christianity, *religion*, whose only appropriate channel is the soul of man, is propagated by strictly mechanical fixtures. Instead of the exercise of pure Reason, appeals are made to the same low passions and faculties for the spread of the gospel as for constructing a rail-road. Great meetings are called ; vain and hollow-hearted speeches are made, and puffed in all the prints of the realm. What they call the spirit of piety is generated almost by the same natural process as the steam of the engineer. And then comes what is miscalled Benevolence ; that is, one gives a large sum—tells of it—others tell of it ; then another gives because he gave ; and another still, knowing that his name will be published with the sum annexed, and not liking to be out-charitied, gives ; and so on through all the parts of this machinery of Vanity. Is this the not letting the right hand know what the left hand does ? Is this the secret almsgiving and prayer enjoined in the gospel according to Matthew ? Does not true virtue, by the very act of exposing itself, cease to be virtue ? O, for a Paul, a Mahomet, a Luther, a Knox, even a Bunyan, or a Quaker Fox, that has the spiritual strength and firm faith

to speak from *the heart* his God-given behest to this ostentatious, superficial, infidel, idolatrous age !

‘ Men in this age see only the surface; they have only the eye of the understanding, not the eye of reason: they bow down to forms, and sincere soul-stirring worship is not to be found. Philosophy and chemical analysis is substituted for the feeling, worshiping heart. Man in our days sets about *explaining* every thing. The world, earth, air and water are now no longer emblems of Deity, the garment of the Eternal; but mere *monads*, curiously indeed, yet haphazardly thrown together; deserving and exciting no admiration. The very lightnings of heaven are nothing but electricity which any American Franklin can bottle in his jar ! Everything must be *accounted for* and receive a scientific *name*. And when men have done this, they see no more to be done: they call this *understanding* nature, and rest satisfied with the mere jargon of names ! Thus man satisfies himself with meaningless terms, and views it a weakness to wonder and adore !

“ Why,” thinks he, “ if I had the elements (an important acquisition we should think) I could do as well if not better myself.” Asks your philosopher, with his shallowness and self-sufficiency, “ What is that flower but carbon and a little nitrogen or hydrogen ? It must, *of course*, be what it is, if you give it a little earth, air and water ! That thunder-cloud which used to excite so much wonder and terror in weak minds is nothing but *vapor*. And the sweeping tornado, every one now knows, is only air set in motion.” The beaming eye of the beautiful maiden must be analyzed; this part called the lens; that the aqueous humor; the other the retina; what folly to be pierced to the heart with its look ! Any boy can construct the same thing essentially with a glass and a piece of wood. The telescope is almost as perfect an instrument.

‘ Thus God is explained away and excluded from the mind, and the heart is left without an object of worship. Standing in the midst of wonder and miracles, man with senseless indifference now looks upon God’s Universe as exhibiting only a little chemistry and philosophy. A noble, religious trait of earlier times—reverence for great men, has well nigh vanished in our days. Great men themselves are scarce; and this is deplorable enough. Rulers are not, as they formerly were, the able men, or the good men; where Democratic tendon-

ties are strong they are mere popinjays, that have risen by their lighter specific gravity ! So many assume the airs of great men that are not men at all, but the merest shams and semblances of men, people begin to distrust the reality of any greatness existing. The King who was once a great man, clothed with authority, wondered at and feared, is now viewed as quite a small man ; not a whit superior to scores of his subjects. His sceptre a piece of mere gilt wood ; his crown a bit of pasteboard decked with gold. Men see in him no delegated power or quality of the Deity ; but only a man like themselves, tinselled and bespangled, yet by no means to be wondered at and revered. Formerly it was not so. The King was the great man ; quite god-like—a being before whom men reverently bowed. But alas ! the age has become insincere, superficial. Men see nothing beyond the outward vesture of things. The “Open Secret” as it has been well written, is hid from their eyes.

“ The same irreverence possesses the heart in view of the works of nature. God is not seen in them. We attribute to senseless names what the sincere convictions of the heart formerly ascribed to God. To the earnest Arab soul, the twinkling star, which looked down upon his desert path, was the eye of God. He felt that God saw him ; and in the star he worshiped the Eternal. Now, a star is all that is seen ! For the French in the last century no God existed ; not so much as the symbol of a God. King, priest, the throne, the altar, the heavens above, the earth around, contained nothing of wonder or admiration. An infidel, self-conscious Voltaire, and a pretty black eyed female of unmentionable character, were the highest objects of the nation’s worship ! The same Godless soul was prevalent, though in a less degree, throughout Europe. While some were asserting that there was no God, others, doubtless, with the best intentions, yet with the superficial logic of the understanding, were attempting to prove there was ;—just as if it were a *questionable* point whether there really was or was not a God ! Mistaken souls ! is the God you worship a probable God only ? Have you no ethereal reason to see a God every where within and around you ? Will you thus apply your debating faculty—use only your parliamentary logic with which you discuss bills for taxing and feeding or starving men, to find for yourselves and them a God ; and

thus witlessly grant that, after all, there is a *perhaps* about his very existence? Bethink yourselves—how will you pray with *such* a *perhaps* in your head and heart? If you have no *inner eye* to see a God, hold your tongue! Cease logically to babble about it, and thereby perplex simple minds. The ignorant savage, without your logical forms of promise and inference, *knows*, as he knows his own existence, that there verily *is* a God. Take lessons from him, then, or cease thy debating! Yes, go to the men you call heathen, and learn sense from the Norwegian, the Mohammedan, the Burmese, who know what is still a matter of doubt in your own mind! The torpedo quality of your philosophy and logic has benumbed your soul, put out the clear light of reason, and destroyed all spiritual life within you. It has done to your soul what a certain chemical process sometimes does to the dead man—it has changed it to stone. The childlike awe and wonder which possessed the bosoms of the primitive races—and which was somewhat prevalent in the days of chivalry, is wanting. The fertilizing river, which awakened admiration and praise in the heart of the Egyptian and Bengalese, as a benevolent Deity, is now viewed by this infidel age only as a highway for merchandise; the beautiful, wide-spreading plain is measured to ascertain its fitness for an iron road; the majestic mountain, so far from elevating the mind and inspiring the heart, is looked upon only with a covetous eye for the mineral treasure of its bosom. The whole earth is now simply a huge cornfield, and valued at the net product of its grains!

The same heartless superficiality pervades every department of literature, and runs through the whole of our moral science. Our poetry for the most part is mechanical: certainly a product of the head rather than the heart. Rules are laid down for making poetry with the same precision as for working out a problem in mathematics. We even have rhyme-books published, so that the manufacturer of poetry shall have no more to do in his business than the joiner has in his—the chief thing being *happily to dovetail!* No God-inspired Miltons, Shakespeares, Dantes, Homers, speak to us in musical tones; giving utterance to burning souls. True a Göethe has just spoken thus to us; but he is read by few except the truly pious of his own nation. There is indeed the dawning of a fairer day, for the snarling, impious Byron

is giving place to the cheerful sacred music of Coleridge and Wordsworth. But this day yet stands tip-toe upon the tops of highest mountains ;—let us praise God that all have not bowed the knee to Baal !

‘ And what shall one say of an age that receives as authentic, for its system of *Moral Sciences*, the gospel according to Jeremy Bentham ? O the times ! depraved, corrupt to the core ! Tremble, oh earth ! Hear and avenge, oh heavens ! Sinful man, in the gospel according to Bentham, has no duties to do in this God’s Universe, where he is placed to work out an immortality of *holiness*, but such as the “greatest happiness principle” shall dictate ! Sweet, sweeter than the honey-comb, to him who rolls sin as a sweet morsel under his tongue, will be such a system of morals ! Give us a cast iron Bishop from Birmingham ; put a metal tongue into his sounding head, and let it peal through the universe, that pleasure and duty are synonymous terms ! Sinner, speedily take your arithmetic and make your estimate (only be cautious in your calculations)—Will you be *happier* to be indolent than to be *active* ? to remain in ignorance than to seek for knowledge ? to indulge, rather than to curb, your passions ? Then is *duty* plain ! Do you love to eat and drink to the full ? Look well to your digestive apparatus, and if this will endure, take thine ease—eat, drink ! It is the easiest thing in the world to test, by this standard, the virtuous or the vicious quality of an action : do it as you would test the utility of a threshing machine ;—are you benefitted by it ? For are not virtue and utility, that is the greatest personal happiness, the same ? And has, let me ask, the infinite nature of duty dwindled to this ? Is it so that man hears no voice speaking within him except the net result of pains and pleasures ? Did the God-man Jesus reason thus ? Was Paul balancing pains and pleasures when he determined to know nothing but Christ and him crucified ? Is it possible for the image of the Eternal to become so deaf to His voice ? Can man, by nature so noble, and endowed at least with some glimpse of the Infinite reason, believe himself a mere iron balance upon which to weigh hay and thistles ?

‘ Thus our literature and our ethics partake largely of the superficial, calculating spirit of the age. Few think deeply ; fewer feel deeply. We boast of the “march of intellect ;” of the “progress of the species.” Apparently in many

respects it is so. But man's spiritual nature suffers. There is no faith but in things which can be seen, and handled, and enjoyed. It is a sickly growth. There is activity, but it is a self-conscious, a frenzied activity, and not a healthy activity. There is a mania to be popular in literature and religion, as well as in politics. Take a single fact:—your pretty story-telling Walter Scott, who threw off his volumes like leaves in Autumn, is greedily read, and is called *great*; for a long time the *greatest*. It required no thought to read him; the intellect was not taxed in the least. Scott did not speak to the inner soul of man; he did not interrogate the depths of being, and bring forth responses from the Eternal oracle. Not he! He knew the age, and he wanted a wand;—he wrote, for he knew he should receive wages and applause.'

So much upon the lamentations of Carlyle. It would be difficult to say less and yet give a clue to his way of thought upon some of those subjects, in writing upon which, the religious aspect of the man comes in sight.

Let us now, in the same manner, see how Carlyle views *Men*—men who have been distinguished. His classification of men is peculiar; whether of individuals or of nations. Their religion, or their "no-religion," is his chief mark of distinction. But by religion he means vastly more than is usually meant to be conveyed by this term; but he plainly tells us what he means. With him, that is a truly religious man, who has a soul to see and to feel the true, the beautiful, the good, the poetical, in every thing. Isaiah, Paul, Mahomet, Luther, Knox, Bunyan, Fox, Goethe, Burns, are perfect models of spirituality; of true heavenly piety. What are commonly called sins—for example, the sins of such a man as Burns, go for little with Carlyle; over them he drops a tear and utters notes of pity; but he excuses. For such men had heavenly spirits; they were sincere; they saw the deep things of God in every emblem of God; and they had fire within them to burn out some of the sins of the world.

'Burns soul was musical—in perfect harmony with nature,—a true *Æolian* harp, which, as touched with the breezes of heaven, gave forth the sweetest sounds. He was poor; he had to guage beer-barrels for his daily bread; he loved liquor and good cheer; he felt degraded by his employment; he was tempted, he fell! We will weep over him, for we love him; and denounce the irreligious age that so received

one of the choicest gifts of heaven. His sun shone as through a tropical tornado, and the pale shadow of death eclipsed it at noon. Tears lay in him and consuming fire, as lightning lurks in the drops of the summer cloud.'

'Mahomet, though he had faults, (as who has not?) and though in some respects he had wrong notions, and did wrong acts, was a true heaven-sent prophet. He possessed the mild Arab heart; ardent, clear-seeing. He saw the world given to the worship of mere forms and dead images. He saw the Catholic Church corrupt and idolatrous. He saw also that there was reality in man and in nature; and he mourned over the sensual, hollow worship around him. He had deep thoughts and feelings; his imagination was kindled; he burned with holy desire to impart his feelings to others. He told his wife—she assented; he felt encouraged—became intensely absorbed; felt impressed by a higher Power to do something to enlighten and bless his benighted race. When he felt clear upon any thing that had agitated his mind, he considered it as a revelation from heaven. And thus for twelve hundred years he has been the spiritual guide of millions. And knowing that men then and there were the same as ourselves, we cannot suppose they would have believed, lived by and died by, what was wholly so essentially a lie. Grant that his religion was faulty; but it supplanted one more faulty. Did he take the sword? Let the sect that has been without fault in this respect, cast the first stone at the Arab Prophet!'

'Luther saw errors and shams similar to those which Mahomet saw. He was a sincere, strong-souled man, ready to do battle for truth against kings and popes, and all earthly powers. He lived at too late a period of the world to be deemed a prophet, much less a god. The day is past when the Great Man will be esteemed, either by his own or succeeding generations, a Deity, or even as one directly sent of God. As a Priest, he was found faithful in declaring God's will to the people. No dumb dog this! Like all great heroic souls, he would have been content, peaceably and in silence, to feed his flock with the sincere milk of the Word. He did not covet—he dreaded public warfare with the world around him. But tell my people a lie? Never! by God's help, never!'

Of Christ, Carlyle directly says little or nothing. In one or two instances he appears to start awe-stricken at the very mention of his name ; as though nothing but sacred silence became us when the mind rested upon him. In several places he calls him the "Divine Man," the "God-Man ;" and phrases of this import are often applied. But unless one is determined to see nothing out of the way in this writer, it must be evident, from all his indirect allusions to Christ, that he views him as a Prophet *in the same sense* he considers Mahomet a Prophet. He would deem Christ decidedly, almost immeasurably, greater than any other character. 'He was not only *nearer* right than other prophets, and great men, but he was *wholly* right. He saw clearly into the eternal truth of all things which pertain to man's spiritual nature and destiny. He spoke to the inner souls of men. His words were from the heart, and they reached the heart. His gospel was triumphant, for it was true ; men could see its truth, and *truth seen* will do its work of enlightening and reforming. All systems owe their success, as far as they have any, to their truth and not to their error. No wonder, then, that the gospel has done more for the world than any other published religion.' We doubt not Carlyle would say all this and much more in favor of Christ. The fact that he applies to him the epithets of divinity, in itself, proves nothing either way. Epithets of this kind are showered bountifully upon numerous individuals in his writings. We must look at the leading features of his belief ; and unless we can find him inconsistent with himself, (and we are confident we cannot) it would be utterly impossible to weave our belief respecting Christ into Carlyle's system of faith. He would heartily laugh at such an attempt.

The question has often been asked, "Why, since Carlyle is so independent a writer, and since the subject of religion, in some form or other, is always in view, why has he not told us in so many words what he thinks of Christ, if his opinion here is peculiar ?" A fair question, and we shall attempt an answer. Carlyle does not wish to disturb the mind upon this subject. He knows that men will have some system of religion ; he knows and he feels that the Christian system, with Christ for its centre, is the best—the only one for civilized society. And he knows another thing ; that the great mass of men have neither the ability nor the inclination

to examine that kind of reasoning which he would use ; and hence he would consider that only evil could result from laying violent hands upon the commonly received opinions of Christ and his gospel. He would have Christ revered a thousand fold more than he now is. It is one of his burdens that men do not see more that is good and god-like in all great men. And there is so little thought in respect to the great mystery of being, that there must be both the exoteric and esoteric doctrines ; and did men desire it, it would be impossible to *initiate* the greatest portion. Let the sensuous, statute system stand open for the reception of all ; and as fast as they can bear it, let them take the maximum gradum —into the full effulgence of the sun of Transcendentalism !

We believe that Carlyle would deplore the licentious opinions which his writings are generating. And if he kept the keys of his Spiritual Temple, he would not admit into its Holy of Holies one half that are rushing in ; and we are sure he would turn out, as too unholly and sensual, some who are profaning it by their presence. He does not wish to pull down, but to build up ; this is apparent both in his political and religious opinions. But some of his admirers, being unequal to the task of building up with such ethereal materials, and anxious to show their earnestness to *work*, will do nothing but pull down. Animals know when the proper season for moulting comes ; Carlyle would have men as wise ; and not set about violently rending asunder their old "garments" till new ones were formed beneath. Neither the snake nor the eagle is guilty of such folly ! He would say to his adherents, 'If you are initiated—truly *converted*, you will be content to enjoy your heavenly visions in silence : do not disturb those who are not worthy of receiving what is revealed to you ; you will do them no good, but injury.' In his opinion of Christ, as well as of the natural goodness of the human heart, Carlyle would be classed (if he must be classed at all), among the Unitarians. I think he transcends them—but they claim him, and there is no good ground for disputing the claim.

One other character that finds favor in the eyes of Carlyle must not be omitted : be not astounded, reader, at the incongruity ; the man is James Boswell, Johnson's biographer ! 'Call Boswell as vain as you please ; but take care how you sport with him ; for he had a noble vein of spirituality in his

nature. Why did he so fawningly follow Johnson at a time when Johnson was a poor, obscure, ill-fed, ill-favored man? The answer is plain if you have an eye to see it,—he saw, at a time when no other man did 'see,' Johnson's *greatness*. Boswell had reverence in him as well as vanity; and Johnson was in reality the divinest man of his age, and Boswell bowed at his shrine! He only worshiped earlier what all England worshiped at a later day. As a spiritual man, Boswell was one of the first of the age.' It would help us in coming to a correct view of Carlyle's 'spirituality,' to dwell upon particular individuals concerning whom he has uttered his anathemas; but space will admit of only a word.' Byron finds no favor in his sight; for while Byron had talents, 'he was only a sickly sentimentalist; his heart was of gall; he did not embrace Nature with a warm bosom; he loved nothing that was truly lovely; he hated nothing which deserved hating. All the strings of his heart were ajar—dissonance and not melody was the result. He was *sincere* in nothing. His music stirred, but did not soften and cheer the soul. Beauteous, bountiful, loving Nature had no smiles and no blessings for this fallen spirit. He never ascended into the Mystery of Being farther than to doubt and despair. Reverence, sincere, earnest worship, found no place in poor Byron's heart.'

Napoleon is admitted with reluctance into his calendar of great men. 'We will call him a hero of a low order; for while he had insight into the realities of things, and saw clearly the difference between a *some*-thing and a *no*-thing; while too there was red earnest in the man, yet he lacked sincerity—the cardinal quality for a truly heroic man. He became ambitious—too self-conscious, and on the whole had better be consigned to the list of fighting captains.'

The class called "gentlemen," comes into his writings for sportive illustrations, or to receive the lashes of irony, and is then dismissed. These, and that species of the human race named "dandies," he considers quite a useless and profitless part of God's creation. The hard-handed, thinly-clad, and scantily fed day laborer is infinitely superior and more worthy of our regard. His sympathies are with the poor and the suffering. To see how he handles political demagogues and all who strive to be noticed by the world, would be amusing and instructive, but out of place here.

Carlyle takes enlarged views of men of all countries, and of all ages ; this is a prominent feature of his writings. He is constantly suggesting new trains of thought about *men*. The thousand different aspects which society has assumed ; the habits, the dress, the customs, the forms of religion and civil polity, seen in different ages and nations, are no obstacle to his vision. In his eye all these are but the outward vesture, and he attempts to strip them all off. Beneath all these he sees the same throbbing heart, the same strong desires ; the same hopes and fears that he sees in himself. The written creed of man's religion, the laws of his statute book are no part of man—often no true index of what man is. Neither in estimating man as a spiritual being would he have us much regard the advancement of science and literature in his age and country ; not too rigidly inquire whether he worships in a Mosque, Pagoda, Cathedral or Meeting-house, or in no house at all. The one great, almost sole inquiry should be : What does man *sincerely believe* concerning this universe, and his duty and destiny in it ? Know this, and we know what is most worth the knowing, about the man or nation. Now, Carlyle would consider that nation truly religious, (faulty as its religion might be) which had a sincere, soul-stirring worship, and worship with him is the deep emotion of admiration and wonder. It is the same in kind, whether felt in view of a man, or a mountain, a flower, or a star ; a king, priest, pope, or God. 'Did Boswell stand in awe before the giant intellect of Johnson ? Did he admire, did he wonder ? then did he worship ! Did the ancient Icelander have the same emotions looking at an ice-berg ? No wonder then it was to him a God ! Does the beautiful lily of the standing pool excite the like feelings in the soul of the Poet ? this is the purest devotion ! Was Zoroaster awe-stricken as he looked up to the burning orb of day ? How should he feel otherwise than that a God was looking down upon him ? Was not the ancient Persian right in feeling that every star was an eye of Deity ? and, if he felt this, should he not have done homage ? If the Norwegians viewed Odin *so much* greater than themselves, are we not to commend them for making him a god ? that is, for looking upon him with *infinite* wonder. Even the heartless superficiality of our own time has left a remnant of devotion for those we highly value. O that men would *think* deeper ! descend beneath the surface of

things and not be deceived and be-fooled by mere semblance and formulas, and creeds which are only the outer garment of realities. Simpleton ! can you not see the difference between a bit of cloth and a god-inspired soul ? Will you call that rich, sensual, tinselled bishop who divides his time between hunting excursions into Scotland, and feasting and riding about in his gig at home ; who fleeces but never feeds his flock, will you call him a *religious* man, destined for heaven, because you occasionally see him pompously going to a Christian church, and consign to eternal night and Orcus the Mussulman who, with a burning, wrapt soul, five times a day, most devoutly kneels to Allah ? Will you forever be calling that heathenism and a lie, deserving damnation, which leads its devotee to consecrate all upon its altar, and with a wonder which transcends all your logic, bows before some idol of Nature ; while those who, with sleepy heads and lifeless spirits, meet in a framed house, and go over a different set of forms, are the only elect of God ? Clear thy mind of cant ! Does not God look at the heart ? But you say, "other nations worship false gods ;" very true, they have many erroneous ideas of God ; but be assured the image you see is not the thing they worship. They use this only as an aid to the mind ; and cannot we believe that their idea of God, in many cases, is as near the reality as the ideas men called Christians, form of him ! Bethink yourself ! what is a man's god ? is it not the thing he thinks most of ? loves most ? the thing he wonders at and admires most ? If you will look at the subject you will find as great a diversity of gods in London as in Calcutta or Pekin ! The Burmese worship Gaudama ; now drop the name which is a nothing and look at the real thing which they worship. You will find this to be a great, good being, who formerly ruled their ancestors, and gave them great blessings, for which they are "thankful." You say the "Hindoo worships the Ganges." Not exactly so. It is not so much water, so much oxygen and hydrogen, but a living spirit that enriches their rice-fields, that he worships ! and is it not the true religious soul which sees God in his works ? The origin of all you call heathen idolatry was nature-worship—a recognition of God in every thing ; a god who gave them fruitful land, refreshing showers, a cheering sun, and a spangled heaven. They embraced Nature as a kind and loving and fruitful mother ; they loved her sincere-

ly, ardently ; they admired, they wondered, they worshipped ! They had not, as we moderns have foolishly attempted to do, *explained* everything ; given to this and that some long scientific name, and then called it *understanding* nature ; and so ceased to wonder. Science is good, but the soul cannot live upon such bread alone ! In child-like simplicity and faith primitive people looked upon all things ; they saw God in all things, and they bowed down and adored ! And what grown child in England—take him from the House of Lords—would not instantly down upon his knees, if with all his science and logic, he was to look, for the *first time* in his life, upon the sun rising in all his majesty and glory in a clear eastern sky.'

'Do you say, "these nations have now debased themselves by bowing before mere dead Matter." Not to a much greater extent, I answer, than Christian nations. Christianity is far superior to any other religion ; it is exactly right ; but a dead formulary named Christianity is just as *dead* a thing as a dead formulary named heathenism ! And a spirit moved with devout admiration at God's works in India is just as acceptable to him as though found in England. The fact is we are not to proceed in this way to know man's spirituality. Do men—does a nation, modern or ancient, here or elsewhere, really feel that they *are in God's universe* ? Do they lay it to heart that God is in them and around them—here and every where—looking upon them from the heavens over their heads, from the earth beneath their feet ? Is the deep fountain of their souls stirred with wonder, admiration and love ? Find we such men, and whether in Scandinavia or in Great Britain ; whether in the first or the nineteenth century, I embrace them as true spiritual brothers. Leave the difference in original talent and advancement in science and civilization out of the question ; whenever or wherever you find a soul sincere, earnest, in love with nature, feeling the beauty, the poetry, the truthfulness of nature ; standing awe-stricken as in the presence of Omniscience, you find a high, noble existence ! I demand that he shall be a true man, and not a sham of a man ;—one that sees and feels the reality of things and not the superficial covering of things ; and whether he be a Bunyan tinkering his kettles, a Burns delving the earth or guaging barrels, a Quaker Fox cobbling shoes, a Mahomet changing religions, or a Crom-

well changing dynasties, I care not, he is my brother ! Such a soul is *inspired* in the highest sense of the term. The Memnon statue, which uttered sweetest music when touched with the mellow light of morning, is a true and beautiful symbol of every faithful prophet, poet and priest. Their light is in the insight of pure reason seeing the "open secret" of the Universe ; and touched with this light they give forth music—utter truths in harmony with the eternal principles of nature : and hence the soul of every true man responds. Is not every man, till he becomes dead in the wrappage of forms, something of a poet—of a *transcendentalist* ? Even so. Probably there never was a human heart that had not at times some touch of the poetical, the beautiful in nature. That emotion was a *holy* emotion ; so far forth he was *religious*. From Job down to the present time man has looked through Nature up to God. As science has advanced, the heart, foolishly enough, has ceased to wonder, until man almost begins to think there is nothing to wonder at ! He deceives himself with names and vainly supposes he sees through it all ! Silly fool, he begins to think he could make just such a world. In fact he has actually attempted to make a man and a goose ; and fancied he had succeeded with his *goose*, for it would *digest* ! He collects some of God's elements, puts them together and calls it *making* a thing ; and then wisely looks around to receive applause for his skill. Ancient people viewed Nature as she was—great, animated, wonderful, and reverently bowed before her. David, the Hebrew singer and poet, saw God in every thing ; all Nature was alive to his pious soul, and he called upon mountain, river, tree, and flower, to praise God. "Let every thing that hath life praise him !" All nature was to David what it is to every poetical, religious soul—an *Æolian* harp breathing the sweetest music, and inspiring the heart with devout rapture. He also, and he only, is the man after God's own heart who hears this music, who feels this rapture !

' Rather than imitate David, the professed ministers of God at this day try to make men devotional by thundering against all sects but their own ; forcing their people to swallow a particular creed—some *thirty-nine* "articles of faith," as they call them ; when probably not one in a hundred of their parishioners is capable of understanding these articles ; or ever, any more than the Chinese or Mussulman, undertakes

by personal examination to try to understand what their teachers say about them. So narrowed and prejudiced has the mind of each religious sect become that it doubts whether there is any spirituality beyond the precincts of its own ecclesiastical forms. They turn their weapons of warfare against each other ; accuse each other of error, perversion of Scripture, of being formal and dead ; (and, really one might say for the best of reasons if they only knew it.) The direct aim,—the absorbing subject with each sect, or the leaders of it, is to shape, by crampings and stretchings, sometimes with racks and thumbscrews—tropically at last by way of excommunication and cry of heresy, every mind to fit some pre-established creed ; as unintelligible to common minds as the Shaster. Our curates and bishops consider their flocks in a thriving condition provided they are dumb before the shearer, and drive easily into the fold : whereas, if one having been sheared too close, shivers with cold, or bleats for greener pasturage, such an one must be warmed and nourished by an ecclesiastical hounding, or die by starvation if it will continue to feed upon the same dry straw thrashed for the thousandth time. Spiritual leaders do not lead their flocks by still waters and into green pastures ;—give them the sincere milk of the word that they may grow thereby. They are made to digest, at least to swallow and ruminant, the tough beef of knotty logical points of theology ; doctrines which have been decided and rescinded some hundred times from Augustine down to Elizabeth. Hence, instead of burning hearts impressed with the infinite nature of duty, and crying out, “What shall we do to be saved ?” as in apostolic days, our houses of worship are filled with listless minds and unfeeling hearts. Would that thou wert either cold or hot ! thou art neither, therefore I will spew thee out. Better than so, give me the wild savage, who, though uncultivated, rough, and looking through strangely diffractive media, sees a Great Spirit in the heavens above, in the silent forest, the brook, the flower, and every thing around him ; and hears his voice sweetly whispering to him in every breeze.’

We have thus endeavored to exhibit the light in which Carlyle views certain things which bear upon our subject. Without much circumlocution, we saw no other way of doing this than the one the reader has seen ;—not by an attempt to imitate his style (this would be folly;) but by giving some of

his thoughts in a very concise form and somewhat in his spirit and language. Those who have read his works will bear testimony to the veracity of our statements: we have certainly aimed to give a true view of the writer's thoughts, as far as our limits would permit. Extracts could have been made; but isolated passages from Carlyle would be very unsatisfactory as proof, for in this way any thing could be proved respecting him; the plan we have taken was more laborious, but better for our present purpose.

Having looked at the religious aspect of certain objects through Carlyle's medium, we think we can pretty confidently state what he is *not*, if we find it difficult to define what he is. Much of his writings would seem to show him a most sincere believer in a Divine Revelation, and a Christian of the truest, warmest heart. Other passages, together with the whole tenor and spirit of his thoughts in any way bearing upon what is usually termed religion, conclusively show that he is not what the Christian world generally would consider a true believer.

What then are Carlyle's religious sentiments? Is he a Pantheist? Is he a Transcendentalist? Infidel? Atheist? Deist? Has he betaken himself to the mysticism of Plato? All these inquiries have been made. It would be easy to prove, by detached passages from his several works, that he is *either* or *all* of these; and as easy, by the same process, to prove he is *neither*. The fact is, we cannot make a Procrustean bed of this sort, and then, by stretchings or clippings, make Carlyle fit it. Shall we call him a religious Eclectic? This is too indefinite for our purposes, although there would be truth in the term. Is he aiming to form a new sect? One would judge otherwise from reading him: certainly that he had no *purposes* of this kind. Yet indirectly this may be the result. Says the Review, quoted in the fore part of this article, "Good or bad, Mr. Carlyle's thoughts will be largely adopted within the next twenty years." This cannot apply less to his religious than to his political views.

In respect to the nature of God, of Christ, the Inspiration of the Scriptures, religious worship, the sanctions of the divine law, miracles, regeneration, and kindred topics, Carlyle most manifestly differs from the commonly received opinions. And his views upon these subjects are so expressed, and artfully commingled with them is so much that is

true, forcible, sublime and beautiful, as to render him of all writers of all ages, the most fearfully dangerous to what has been considered Orthodox Christianity. After what has been said we are prepared somewhat more definitely to state his views upon these points.

The common, and the scriptural view of God in Christian communities is this, viz. :—A person who governs, and not a principle working in *Nature*, or *Nature itself*; a being of intellect, susceptibility and will; separate from His physical creation, rather than identical with it. Not poetically, figuratively, or in any mysterious transcendental sense, a person, but in reality. He knows, he sees, he feels. He is the lawgiver, the ruler and the judge of His intelligent creatures. A Being who is pleased with the right, and offended with the wrong moral conduct of men. Now Carlyle often receives him as such, but only in a figure. To give force to his thoughts, poetical beauty to his beautiful expressions, Carlyle often endows his God with all the attributes of the Jehovah of the Jews. But his God is a principle; an all-pervading, an all-mighty, infinite It! Except for poetical, and rhetorical purposes nothing more. And in several instances we have found men in the ordinary labors of life, eating of this same spiritual food, ground for their consumption in certain mills for the purpose.

Of Carlyle's view of Christ, we have already spoken. He believes the Bible *inspired* in the same sense that the writings of Dante or Shakspeare are inspired. All thought that is true to Nature (and Carlyle means much by this) is inspired thought. Whenever a man's genius is beyond common, and utters true, good, poetic thoughts, he says we call it ethereal, heavenly, inspired; it is beyond us; we cannot fathom it and therefore we give it some *supernatural* quality.

All discussion upon what is termed the "Plenary Inspiration of the Bible," he considers folly, and treats it with a degree of contempt. 'The soul of man is plenarily inspired, and this should suffice.'

He treats what he terms the 'logic proof' of Christianity in the same way. 'Man's pure Reason' will see not only

* We hardly need say that Carlyle gives to what is termed the 'higher reason,' the same province in matters of Faith as Kant, Coleridge, &c.

so much farther into the hidden realms of truth, but is adapted to provinces where the understanding will essay in vain to penetrate ; hence the believer, if he understand his ground, will never descend to any fencing of this sort.'

What Carlyle says of worship—and his "Heroes" is full of it—taken by itself is very beautiful and truly excellent. But taken, as it surely will be, in connection with all other kindred topics, its tendency is to make the mind satisfied with a very refined species of idolatry. We have already, perhaps, said enough upon this subject. He often defines worship to be "wonder"—"wonder infinite," to whatever object rendered. How easy would it be to name devout men according to Carlyle's notions of devotion, whom the Christian world has had the best of reasons for not considering religious !

He quotes scripture phrases with much significance, often happily. Bible language, as is the language of all other books ever written, is familiar to him. 'Winged words' are his vocation, and no man ever had more, or better for effect. Milton's imagery of Paradise is none too strong for him to express the rapturous feelings of the devout soul ; nor Dante's imagery of hell to express the agony of remorse. Upon this subject he has most forcibly uttered what every Universalist minister is forever trying to utter ; and many a profitable pearl will this class of religious pearl-divers fetch up, together with sea-weed and mud in abundance, from these prolific waters. In a tropical sense, Carlyle believes all the poets and prophets say about heaven and hell. He makes life a most serious concern to mortals ; words were rarely ever put together with more appalling force in favor of right, and in opposition to wrong. Here his notes are the clearest, the strongest, and the most imperative ! He throws around the lowest, as well as the highest of mortals, an infinitude, and would make him feel the full weight of his responsibility. Would that there was nothing to counteract the impression !

Upon a future state, he is so Unitarianly general in his forms of expression, as to make it difficult to state with much confidence his belief. Here he *so transcends* as to leave him in Platonic, or German fog, out of sight of those who yet live in "time and space." We judge, however, that when this 'phantasm of a material body and world' shall vanish, he supposes we shall enter upon a higher state ; or then the present 'apparent parts' of the 'Universal All' will be more or less happily united.

Upon miracles nothing but the style is Carlyle's; the thoughts have been often advanced in attempts to answer the arguments in proof of revealed religion.

The account he gives of the "Conversion" of his Professor Teufelsdröckh is in keeping with his general theology, and probably was designed to express his view of the doctrine of Regeneration. It is the common method of philosophizing upon a most momentous Bible doctrine. No wonder that, in speaking as he has upon this, and almost every other subject touching practical piety, he has "spoken to the *condition*" of so many in New-England—particularly in Massachusetts. The Quaker's complaint can cease for some twenty years.

We say what we do know, when we assert that many young men in our Seminaries of learning have lost their faith in the Bible as a special revelation from God by reading Carlyle. They are captivated by the novelty, the picturesque beauty and sublimity of his thought and diction. His two-edged, quaint, and grotesque expressions soon cease to repel, and actually chain the mind as if spell-bound, before this literary Circe. Pride of intellect, the love of originality in many cases, prepare the mind for the reception of the erroneous, together with so much that is true and good in this singular writer. And then few minds, it is apprehended, are entirely and uniformly beyond the precincts of Doubting Castle; and those who indulge much in sceptical trains of thought must be particularly on their guard, or a parley with Mr. Carlyle will prove fatal.

His writings are, and will continue to be extensively read. He will have *admirers*, enthusiastic and ridiculous 'thaumaturgic' imitators. His uncouthness will offend the tastes of some and he will be thrown down with the cry—"It is so unnatural;"—"All affectation;"—"A jargon of Germanisms," etc. But he will be read; and he may be read with profit. We doubt whether many minds will long continue to be particularly delighted with his peculiarities. The fever will be high, but not continue at its height for a great length of time.

His French Revolution stands unrivaled as a series of vivid, glowing pictures of that frightful catastrophe. This is Carlyle's master work, and it can be read with great profit, not only for its history, but for its sound reflections. It is the least objectionable of all his writings, on the score of awak-

eping sceptical trains of thought in the mind of the reader. And we believe the bad influence of all his works might be counteracted in a great measure, particularly among the youth in our Colleges and Seminaries, by a little pains on the part of the instructors. That words of caution are needed here, is but too manifest.

ARTICLE V.

ON AN EXPRESSION IN ACTS, 27: 17.

By Theodore D. Woolsey, Prof. of Greek Literature, Yale College, New Haven.

THE following remarks, suggested by a passage in Plato's laws (Lib. 12, p. 945, C.) are laid before the reader nearly in the order in which the subject presented itself to the writer, and with the hope of explaining the precise meaning of $\text{ὑποζωνύντες τὸ πλοῖον}$ in Acts, concerning which some doubt has existed.

The passage in Plato is to this effect. He is speaking of the difficulty of finding a set of magistrates competent to supervise the other magistrates of the state. "There are many occasions," says he, "when a polity may be dissolved, as there are of dissolving those parts of a ship or of any animal, which having a common nature spread through them all, are in different circumstances called by the various names of cords, ὑποζώματα and tendons." As in this passage, Plato classes this thing pertaining to a ship, whatever it may be, with the cords and muscles of the body, and implies that the structure of a ship would be weakened or destroyed, if it were loosed or broken, it seems not improbable that a ὑπόζωμα is something in a ship like a cord or cable, by which its frame is tied together. Ast, however, in his edition of Plato's laws, and after him Cousin in his translation (*) under-

(*) Ast: *tabulata quibus navis latera coutexebantur.* Cousin: *Rèces de bois qui ceignaient le corps des vaisseaux, et en soutenaient la charpente.*

stand the word of boards, by means of which the sides of a ship were woven or connected together. It is singular that the very passages to which Ast refers after giving this explanation, and which Cousin borrows from him, are as well adapted as they can be to show that it is untenable. The first is from Athenæus Lib. 5. p. 204, A. He is giving an account of an enormous galley of forty banks of oars belonging to Ptolemy Philopater, and among other particulars says: "it took (τέλαμος, i. e., the space upon it required) twelve ὑπόζωμα: each was of six hundred cubits." It would seem that something like cables going round the whole ship must be here intended. And there is the more reason for thinking so, because the length of the vessel is put down at 280 cubits in the same passage. The double of this length and forty cubits allowed for the curvature of the sides, would make the length of the hypozoma. In the other passage, (from Vitruvius 10. 15, near the end of the work,) the thing seems to be mentioned without the name. The architect is describing a battering-ram, and says, "a capite ad imam calcem tigni contenti fuerunt funes quatuor crassitudine digitorum octo, ita religati, quemadmodum navis a puppi ad proram continetar: ejusque praecincturae funes transversis erant ligati, habentes inter se palmipedalia spatia." That is "four ropes eight fingers' breadth thick, had been stretched from the head to the extreme part of the foot of the beam; so bound to it as a ship is held together (or girded) from stem to stern. The ropes which formed this girdle had been fastened together by other transverse ones, and had spaces of a foot and a hand-breadth between them." Here Vitruvius teaches us apparently, that ships were kept together by ropes passing horizontally so as to enclose the sides. What else could the ὑπόζωμα have been?

The only other passage in the early classics, where this word occurs, so far as I am informed, is in Plato's republic, Lib. 10. near the end. The context is embarrassed by certain difficulties which need not delay us now. The immediate passage may be translated thus; "for (he said) that this light is the connecting bond of the heavens, which like the hypozomata of galleys keeps their whole circumference together." Here Stallbaum explains the term by the general words, "cingula triremium, quibus navis latera quasi continentur;" and then adds, "vocem alii aliter interpretati

sunt." Schleiermacher renders the word in question by "streiben" props, or boards, or beams, I suppose, put along obliquely to counteract the strain upon the sides of the ship.

But even here the idea of a continuous rope seems more natural. For the light spoken of was one undivided thing, unlike the separate boards along the sides of a ship, but quite similar to a rope encircling the vessel. If Plato here refers to the milky way, as is not improbable, or if the passage was suggested to him by a dogma of Parmenides concerning something in the likeness of a crown,—("stephanem appellat continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit coelum." Cic. de nat. Deor. 1, 14,) by which Parmenides also may have intended the milky way,—at all events a girdle encompassing a ship answers well in the comparison.

Passow, however, in his lexicon, with obvious reference to this passage defines *ὑπόζωμα* as "a rewers bench running across to the side of the ship; also called *σύνδεσμος*, because it forms the connexion between the ship's walls." But this explanation, besides being for other reasons wholly inadmissible, hardly deserves notice, after the passage from Athenaeus given above, except on account of the respectability of the source from which it comes.

The view which we now seem obliged to take, that the *hypozoma* was a cable going around the sides of vessels, is confirmed by a passage of Apollonius Rhodius 1, 367, seq. When the heroes had chosen Jason to be their captain, and he had made his inaugural address, they stripped off their garments and went to work to get the vessel ready for sea. At the suggestion of Argus the shipwright, "they tightly girded the vessel (*τειχαρτως ξυσταν*) inside with a well twisted rope, (*τοστρεπει σύδεστι οπλω*) stretching it taught on both sides, (*τινάζενοι ξύστρεσσι*) in order that the planks might be well secured by the wooden pins, and might resist the opposing force of the running waves." It is obvious that this cable must have run along the sides and not under the vessel, for in the latter case only a single part,—say the middle,—of the ship could be strengthened by one cord.

We may presume that Apollonius describes what was usual in vessels, or at least in vessels of war. Hence, when in Polybius (27, 3, 2.) "Hegesilochus advised the Rhodians *ὑεζωνισσεν* forty ships";—which is explained by Schweighäuser, as answering to "reficere," and by Passow, as

meaning "to provide a ship with rowers benches, or in general, to equip it,"—it is evident that the sense is to fit a vessel for sea by girding it with cables, in order that it may the better resist the action of the waves.

It is possible, but in my view not probable, that this custom is spoken of by Thucydides (1. 30), where, however, another term is used. "At the same time"—it is there said—"they manned their ships: ζεύγαντες τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὁρες πλωτίμους σιναὶ," i. e. having joined or bound together the old ones so that they might be fit for the water, and having made the rest ready for sea." Gölle, in his excellent commentary on this place quotes a note of Vanderberg on Horace Carm. 1. 14, as explaining it. The passage in Horace is, nonne vides ut sine funibus | vix durare carinae | possint imperiosius | aequor! And in this passage we may find the hypozomata referred to. "The ropes," says Vanderberg, "which Horace speaks of as used in repairing vessels, are what the French call 'des cables.' If a ship-leaks, the keel is sometimes surrounded with those small ropes to which the French give the special name of grelins, and which serve, as far as possible, to bind the starting planks of the keel together. To bind ships in this way is expressed by the term *cintrer* in French." To this of Gölle, Arnold gives his sanction; and adds, that "the Russian ships, taken in the Tagus in 1808, were kept together in this manner, in consequence of their age and unsound condition." Whether this be the true sense of this passage, or the phrase must be understood of timbers carried across from side to side, or of planks nailed on outside to bind the old planks together; it will be admitted, I think, so far as our enquiry hitherto throws light upon the hypozoma, that it must have been applied to the ship in a different way. For the passage from Vitruvius makes it necessary that these ropes should have run around the sides, and that from Apollonius—in which by the way a new ship is spoken of—confirms the same point by assigning all the effect to a single cable. And the length of the hypozomata mentioned by Athenaeus (v. s.) is much too great for the supposition that they went under the vessel. To this too, we may add that the violent storm recorded by the Evangelist in *Acts*, rendered it impossible to do any such thing as passing cables under and around the keel. Moreover, if ropes had passed under the keel, one would think that

the boat would have been needed in this operation, and yet the boat was first lifted on deck.

A word or two may here find their place relating to this verse in general. The sense is, "after they had hoisted up the boat, (*τὸν ἀράνες*) they made use of additional means to resist the storm (*Βονδίσαις τὸν ὥντο*) by undergirding the vessel. The connexion of events named in the verse seems to be merely that of time. The boat was floating behind the vessel; and as the storm grew harder, fears were felt that it would be staved in by the blows of the waves. It was secured and raised on board with much ado, and then the gale forced the crew to strengthen the side work of the vessel by additional means.

The specific meaning which we have attached to ἵπτογωνόν and ἵπτόζωμα, accords well with the more common senses in which these words are taken. Of the former, Wytenbach (Eclogae historicæ, p. 355,) observes thus: “ἱπτόζωνται succingi tria fere notat; inter reliquas vestes cingulum corpori circumdare; inferiores partes, id est lumbos et pudenda, tegere cingulo; longas vestes altius a pedibus sursum reductas cingere ad facilitatem incessus.” This word is of not unfrequent occurrence in the two last senses. A remarkable instance of its use may be found in Plutarch's life of Demetrius, §47 χρυσοῦς τετρακοσίους ἵπτοζωμένος; i. e. having in his girdle, which was used as a purse, four hundred staters of gold. Ἰπτόζωμα, which is a rarer word, denotes, 1. a girdle—properly, I suppose, but dare not affirm, either a girdle *under* the clothes, or especially, one worn *below* the hips. 2. The *diaphragm* in medical writers. 3. In one of the lexicists; Julius Pollux, some part of the rudder of a ship. It is obvious that any thing encircling a ship longitudinally, better answers to the notion of a girdle, than if, like a horse's girth, it went under the body of the vessel.

In opposition to all this, the only ancient authority, so far as I know, which can be adduced, is that of a scholiast on Aristoph. Knights, 279; where the demagogue Cleon, threatens to prosecute his rival, and accuses him of exporting ζωμενά for the Peloponnesian galleys. Of this word the scholiast says, ζωμενά, τὰ λεγόμενα ὑποζώματα εἰσὶ δὲ κύλα τῶν νεῶν. The same scholium is found again in Suidas. But a gloss on this passage gives the correct definition: ζωμενά σχονία κατὰ μέσον τὴν ναῦν δεσμούμενα. The same words, with ὑποζώματα inserted after the first, are found in Hesychius.

If by *κατὰ μέσον*, these authorises mean mid-way between the water's edge and the gun-wale, they are strictly correct. Mitchell follows the first-mentioned scholiast, although the nature of the case might have set him right. Cleon would be expected to say, "I accuse this man of exporting for the Peloponnesian galleys *ὑποζωμα*, but the poet jocosely puts a word of similar sound in its place—*ξυστημα* booths, of which certainly the enemy, especially the Spartans, had no lack. We might imitate the play on words by speaking of sending griddle-cakes to the Dutch instead of girdle-ropes. The joke in part consists of putting in the place of something valuable and hard to be obtained, a very common and trivial thing. Now the Peloponnesians could be at no loss for planks; but long and large ropes, perhaps of a peculiar shape, flattened so as to fit* tighter, might not be manufactured every where.

So far the writer had examined the meaning of *hypozoma* independently, and, with the exception of the paragraph preceding this, in which he followed Boeckh, was led more or less to oppose the opinions of the critics whom he consulted upon the passages quoted. On turning, however, to Boeckh's new work on the naval affairs of Athens, containing the inscriptions recently found in the Peiraeus relating to the naval affairs of that state during the age of Demosthenes, (Berlin, 1840.) we find full confirmation for the view of *hypozoma* here taken, both in the inscriptions themselves, and in the introductory treatise by the distinguished editor. 1. In the inscriptions, the appurtenances of the ships, of which many inventories are given, are divided into wooden and hanging, *οξινὶ γύλανα* and *εγγυασσά*. The *hypozomata* are always in the latter list with the sails, cordage, etc., and usually at the head of it. In one instance bits of old *hypozomas* taken from the enemy are mentioned:—to this dignity of being inventoried old bits of rotten boards would hardly attain. In inscription 14, besides the full tale of hanging gear belonging to several enumerated ships, it is said that other *hypozomas*, two or more to a vessel, and lying loose, had been provided for them according to a vote of the people. Some vessels, again, have these loose girding-ropes, without mention of others,

* This idea is from Boeckh.

fastened on and in their places. This is just the case with the ship of Alexandria which carried Paul to Rome. 2. As was to be expected from the most eminent scholar of the present age in all matters of fact relating to classical learning, Boeckh has the passages above cited and several more.* We

*Boeckh, after mentioning that various writers have explained the word in different ways on the supposition that it denoted something of wood, adds, "erst Joh. Gottl. Schneider (zu Vitruv. 10. 15, 6,) hat dabei an Tauwerk gedacht." This appears to be incorrect, as even a note of Schweighäuser's on Appian (vol. 3. p. 876 of his ed.) will show,—a passage which I had examined before finding it cited by Boeckh himself. That critic on *διαζωνυμένους τὰ σκάπη* amongst other things writes, "sic Grotius ad Acta Apostol. 27, 17, διαζωνυμένες τὰ τλοῖον recte interpretatus est, *funibus navem ligantes ne vi ventorum et fluctuum dissiliret*. Eademque notione usurpatum verbum simplex videmus apud Apollon. Argonaut. 1 368." Thus so early a critic as Grotius had a good view of the sense, though he probably conceived of the ropes as going under the vessel. And Schweighäuser's Appian was earlier by 23 years than Schneider's Vitruvius. This last book I have not examined. Again, in speaking of the passage from Apollonius Boeckh says, "Apollonius of Rhodes calls this process *ζώσαι*—an operation which in his poem, contrary to the usual practice, was performed before the side-planks were properly fastened together with nails. According to the received reading, this was done from within (*ἐνδόθεν*), which however is entirely impossible. The reading has therefore with reason been rejected as incorrect." But Boeckh, I feel confident, is wrong in the first of these positions. Apollonius by *ἴνσος ἀγοταρο γόμφος ἀδόγαρε*, cannot mean, as he supposes, that the planks were not already nailed, but the sense is simply that the ship was girded in order that the pressure of the girding-rope might keep planks and nails in their places;—that the planks might not spring, but *ρεδίον βίην ἔχοις ἀντίωσαν*. All this is plain, I think, from this consideration; that the ship was put together long before and that what is here described took place just before launching it into the water. With regard to *ἐνδόθεν* I had felt a difficulty, and had conjectured *ἔκδόθεν* before finding it in Brunck. But on reflection *ἐνδόθεν* does not appear so very indefensible as it might be thought at first. The sense is not that the rope passed along *within*, but that the argonauts *from within* pulled

add from him the following particulars. The instrument is called in Latin, Tormentum. Isidore says (Origines, I9, 4, 4), "Tormentum, Funis in navibus longus, qui a prora ad puppim extenditur, quo magis constringantur. Tormenta autem a tortu dicta restes funesque." And of this nature are the ropes in Horace in the passage cited above. He finds the hypozoma quite visible on a small brazen work in relief, belonging to the Berlin museum, representing the prow of a ship of war. Indeed four of them, more or less perfectly preserved, there appear;—a fact which well accords with the twelve encompassing the mammoth vessel of Ptolemy Philopater.

ARTICLE VI.

REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE PLAN OF SALVATION.

By Rev. J. Blanchard, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. A Book for the Times. By an American Citizen. New York: 1841.

THIS work were more fitly termed—"Philosophy of the PROCESS of Salvation." It aims to present, in connected view, that whole wonderful train of expedients by which God conducted the Jewish mind and character, and through theirs. the mind of Christendom, from the Egyptian, or heathen, into the Christian state; to show that no other process but that detailed in the Scriptures, could have accomplished the proposed end, viz. the elevation and salvation of fallen man; and thus irresistibly to establish, from its sole exclusive adaptedness to man, that the Bible scheme of redemption is from God.

it tight. Perhaps ἐνδοῦσσε would be clear to us if we knew the whole process. The rope may have been secured to the sides from time to time by cords passing through holes and fastened within, or itself have passed inside and out at intervals.

If any one takes up this book, who is familiar with the works written on the "*Plan of Salvation*," "*Moral Agency*," "*Necessity*," "*Ability*," etc. etc., he will be pleasingly disappointed in three particulars, viz. to find the book *short*, *original*, and *understandable* in every part; leaving a distinct impression on the mind which can be remembered and used.

I can never divest myself of the impression that, in most existing treatises on the Divine and human agency as connected with man's salvation, the writers' minds were obstructed and hampered by the philosophy of the ancients, in which there is no escape from mere universal fortuity, but in the doctrine of a universal Fate; and no refuge from Fatalism but in the idea of a blind unreasoning chance;—two opposing absurdities which have no mid-land of truth between them.

In the philosophic drama of *Æschylus*, entitled "*Prometheus Bound*," after Vulcan, by command of Jupiter, had riveted Prometheus, yet living, to the Caucasian rock, where vultures were to gnaw his ever-growing liver for the period of 30,000 years, the poet makes the executioner attempt to console Prometheus and reconcile him to his horrid confinement, by reminding him that all other beings were linked as fast in fate as he was in iron; for,

“*Jupiter excepted, none are free.*”

And I confess that much of the reasoning used to prove what is commonly called the sinner's moral *inability* to repent and believe, seems to me to leave him in much the same condition with Prometheus upon his rock—helpless, yet liable to suffer; exposed to torment, with no power to escape. For if there be in him an *absolute* inability to repent, something different in kind from the *unwillingness* of incorrigible thieves to abstain from theft, be that inability *moral* or *physical*, the result is the same—and all offers of salvation made to sinners so circumstanced, are but loaves set before felons who are starving upon gibbets—in their sight, indeed, *but beyond their reach!* Nor do I see how sensible men could ever admit such an idea, unless to avoid what they supposed the only other possible, viz. that the sinner regenerates himself—is the author of his own salvation.

In referring to the works of Luther, Edwards, and other great Protestant writers, to illustrate the power of the an-

cient philosophy, I need not say to the intelligent reader how far these luminaries were from destroying men's responsibility by any system of antinomianism whatever. Yet detached parts of their writings may be selected where they seem to account for human volitions as they would for the dropping of acorns, and by the same law of causation.

Luther, replying to the "DIATRIBE" of Erasmus, says:—

"Man, before he is created, can do nothing in any way to promote his creation. Neither after his creation can he do any thing to preserve his existence. Both his creation and his preservation are the result of the sole pleasure of the omnipotent and gracious energy of God." And, "The very same may be said of the new creature. The man before he is renewed by the Spirit, can do nothing, attempt nothing to prepare himself for this new creation. Neither after he is renewed, can he do any thing to insure a perseverance in his new state."

Now this language cannot fail to impress the reader, that when *Luther philosophized*, his mind beheld men only as separate pieces of mechanism, or rather as parts of one grand *machina Mundi*, one universal machine, whose propellant energy is—God. Luther, more than almost all men of his time, was deeply versed in the scholastic philosophy; and it is only confessing him human, to suppose that his mind was so oppressed and overborne by the mighty intellects of antiquity, that Zeno and the Stoics had more to do in moulding his theory of God's government of the world, than Christ and the Apostles.

A preceding age furnishes the intellectual atmosphere in which a succeeding one thinks and examines. Hence it happens that many generations of minds approach a subject in the same way—view it from the same point—and though their conclusions vary somewhat with increasing light, yet their conceptions are of the same general aspect and hue. And this seems to me to have been pre-eminently the case with reasonings upon the human will, and the control which God exercises over it.

The fatalism of the Stoics has not only colored some detached sentiment culled from the volumes of Luther, but masses of what has passed for Christian philosophy seems to me entirely pagan in all except the name. Thus West, in his "Moral Agency," argues that God has admitted sin as a part

of his universal plan, not indeed as a thing good and desirable in itself, but upon the same principle that the surgeon chooses the pain of an amputation, viz. for the general good which is to come of it. His mind seems laboring under the same terrible incubus—the idea that “*excepting God, none are free,*” and of course no will in the universe can be strictly and properly responsible for sin, but God’s!—that God’s perfect, eternal, universal sovereignty, and man’s absolute freedom of choice, cannot co-exist, but that one must give way to make room for the other.

Our blessed Saviour never seems to have felt this difficulty, under which human philosophy groans. He demanded pure and perfect submission of will, and called it the highest freedom. He did not leave to human pride, exclusive jurisdiction over a single sparrow, to hasten its fall, or to defer it beyond the appointed time. Nay, he established his Father’s jurisdiction over “every hair of the head,” and brought into captivity “every thought” of the heart. And when, in principle, he had thus reached and subjugated the last fragment of the man, he calmly avers, “*Then are ye FREE indeed.*” He casts down and dashes in pieces every thing that exaltheh itself against his reign; and then, when every nerve throughout the universe lies relaxed and slackened at his bidding, or crushed beneath the chariot-wheels of his power—in that instant, he proclaims every willing subject a king and a priest; assigns to him a throne of judgment and a robe of white. His system exhibits the control of God as infinitely perfect, and the condition of man as infinitely free.

Now the advantage which Jesus had over uninspired teachers, in treating subjects involving moral agency, was, that “*He knew what was in man, viz. SPIRIT.*” He looked upon the soul *just as it is*, as differing totally, *in kind*, from all unspiritual existences, and having another law than they. While our writers treat the will as if it was governed by the law of causation—the very same which controls air and water, and iron and wood. Says Edwards—

“By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended **CAUSING** that the act of Will or choice should be thus and not otherwise.” Again—

“The determination of the Will supposes an **EFFECT** which must have a **CAUSE.** If the Will be determined there must be a Determiner.” Again—

"It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will."—*Edwards on Will*, P. I. Sec. II.

He then proceeds to push those who contend for a self-determining will into the absurdity of holding that an effect, to wit, a volition, can be its own cause; or that, upon their scheme, there must be a *former volition* to determine the *first volition*, which is absurd.

To me there seems to be somewhat more of this philosophy pagan than its costume. For if our volitions, all our acts of will, are produced, as effects, by the simple law of causation, then the First Cause is the only cause; every act of choice, each human purpose, is but one link in an indissoluble chain of effects, becoming, in their turn, causes to new effects—beginning in God, and running on through eternity. And thus man is reduced to the nature of the ox, whose motions for the day are "determined" by the weather and his appetites—by nature without, and nature within him; except, perchance, his course is varied by some interposing act of God.

The best that can be said of the above writers is, that they were less in error than their antagonists; who, admitting their principles, sought, (but in vain) to shun their conclusions. To save man's freedom, they, in effect, denied his dependence, and maintained a liberty inconsistent with God's sovereignty; as the others, a sovereignty, inconsistent with liberty.

The philosophical writings of COLERIDGE may be comprehensively defined to be '*A bold and strenuous attempt at separating material forms of thought and speech from the Philosophy of mind; and, out of ours, to construct a language proper to spiritual beings.*' In doing this he had to contend with the following obstacles: to wit—That men's minds are, for the few first years of life, exclusively, and for the balance *mainly*, directed to material objects, and their grand material law, *viz.*, cause and effect. Second, that thereby human thought and speech are so materialized that most words carry in them some reference to matter, its forms, nature, or laws. And, third, that the few purely spiritual words have no settled uniform meaning among men. Add to these difficulties in the way of a philosophy proper to spirits, the overbearing influence of the Philosophy of the Ancients,

and it will be confessed, that the effort to deliver the Will from the yoke of "Cause and Effect," and construct a language proper to its nature, is an attempt, which, if it be an honor to fail even in great undertakings, can bring no disgrace. Coleridge thus speaks :

"Whatever is comprised in the chain and mechanism of Cause and Effect, of course necessitated by some other thing antecedent or concurrent, this is said to be natural, and the aggregate and system of all such things is said to be Nature. It is, therefore, a contradiction in terms to include in this the Free-Will, of which the verbal definition is, that which originates an act or state of being."—*Aids. Note.* 29.

This paragraph contains the parting point where his system, and that of the Germans to whom he was indebted, depart from that of Locke, the Scotch metaphysicians, and Edwards of our country. It is *the separating of the will from nature, and denying the applicability to it, of her grand generic law of cause and effect.*

But when once the Will is thrust out from the pale of Nature, and located above and beyond the precincts of natural causation,—what shall we say of it? How describe it? In what words? What are its laws? Its mode of being? And its action? These questions are to be solved by going directly to the Will itself, and inspecting it: even as the Zoologist, an animal, or the chemist, simple substances, writing down the phenomena as first facts from which to reason; back of which they do not pretend to go: or if they do, find nothing.

Now, one of these first truths respecting Will, settled by universal consciousness, and proved by men's treatment of each other, is, that it can be *responsible*, though *governed, controlled*, and yet *free*, even in its wrath praising God; and yet for that wrath, justly punishable! That even "*govern*" and "*control*" lose all idea of *coercion* from their meaning, when applied to the Will, and assume a new peculiar signification proper to spirit alone. The blessed Saviour constantly assumed this principle when he spoke of man, or to men; and he found no more difficulty in treating the human will as environed by his Father's control, yet free, and responsible, than he did in treating water as fluid, or iron as hard.

"But," says the Necessitarian, "what do you gain by

denying the Will to be determined by the strongest motive according to the fixed law of natural causation, seeing that your inquiries, like ours, must end in believing unexplained facts?"

I answer, we gain relief from the absurdity of confounding men's misfortunes with their crimes, from condemning and punishing men for acts which their souls yield under motive, as the smitten flint gives fire, and cannot help it. We gain all the difference between a *man* in the image of God, though defaced, and a beast who never had that image. We gain the distinction between a *Will* which is "a law unto itself," and therefore praise or blameworthy, and an *instinct* operating by a fixed law of Nature, and, therefore, worthy of neither. We gain, also, a rational account of the feeling of *remorse* for wicked acts; and, above all, we gain deliverance from the revolting supposition that God and human courts, punish men as guilty, who as truly obey the laws which God gave them to obey, as the smoke that rises or the snow-flake which falls.

The language of Coleridge on this point hath great force. He says:

"The doctrine laid down by Jonathan Edwards and the late Dr. Williams, which represents a Will absolutely passive—clay in the hands of a potter, destroys all Will, takes away its essence and definition as effectually as in saying—This circle is a square, I should deny the figure to be a circle at all. It was in strict consistency, therefore, that these writers supported the Necessitarian scheme, and made the relation of Cause and Effect the law of the Universe, subjecting to its mechanism the moral world no less than the material or physical.—*Aids.* 106.

Nor can I see how one who believes that all human acts and purposes are mere *effects*, produced with unavoidable necessity by pre-existing causes, can help feeling, in view of future punishment, what Coleridge calls, "The horror which a being capable of eternal pleasure or pain is compelled to feel at the idea of an Infinite Power about to inflict the latter upon an immense majority of human souls, without any power on their part, either to prevent it, or the actions which are, (not indeed its causes) but its assigned signals and preceding links in the same iron chain!"

How far the author of the "*Philosophy of the plan of Sal-*

vation" is from subjecting the human Will to the same necessitating law of causation which governs Nature, may be seen pp. 67-8, where the grand distinction between Nature and Will is clearly and happily stated.

"The laws which govern the material world are sketched in books on natural science ; such are gravitation, affinity, mathematical motion. Those laws by which the irrational creature is controlled are usually called instincts. * * * * The law which drives them [animals] to the act is as necessitating as that which causes smoke to rise upwards."

"But, *physical law*, or *necessitating instinct* would not be adapted in its nature to the government of rational beings. * * * Man has a will and a conscience."

It is matter of profound gratulation that a book has at length appeared, devoted wholly to the explanation of God's agency in man's salvation, which neither curtails the freedom of man to give place to the governing presence of God ; nor takes away the control of God to make room for the liberty of his subjects. For every writer must do one of these, who regards our volitions as *effects*, and the *Will*, like water, as governed by causation, which transferred to mortals, is fate. The brevity and popular style of the work prevented the author from considering every point which an inquisitive mind might desire to see elucidated ; but I am persuaded that no fair-minded skeptic can fail of being taken along with the writer as far as he goes. And if, in exploring the vast and mighty "Plan of Salvation," he does not take you to every summit of truth, or even bring you through to the end of the way, he surely puts you into the right road, and leaves you travelling in the right direction. And I greatly err if the careful reader of the book does not see "The bondage in Egypt,"—"The deliverance—The giving of the law at Sinai—The Mosaic ritual—Its abolition by the coming of Christ—The doctrine of faith—Of the Holy Spirit—The means of grace—And their practical effects—in a light in which he never saw them before, viz., as a series of means, each following the other and necessary to it ; adapted with infinite skill to the recovery of lost man, no one of which could have been omitted and the end secured ; and, all together, forming an illuminated flight of steps, rising gracefully, each above the other, and offering to fallen, abject man, a ready, and sure, and glorious return to God.

The author thus clearly sets forth, I may almost say, *paints* the state of moral and mental ruin from which man was to be raised.

"Man fell into deep moral debasement but one step at a time. The sun, moon, stars and other conspicuous objects of creative power and wisdom received the first idolatrous homage. * * * * As the nations grew older, images, which were at first but few, and clothed with drapery, became more numerous, and were presented before the worshipers in a state of nudity, and in the most obscene attitudes." After adducing from established authors proofs of the above positions, he proceeds :

"The only way, then, in which relief was possible for man was, that an object of worship should be placed before his mind, directly opposite in character to those he had before adored. If his heart were ever purified it must be by tearing his affections from his gods and fixing them upon a righteous and holy Being. *But for man to form such an object was plainly impossible. He could not transfer a better character to his gods than he himself possessed.* The effect could not rise higher in moral purity than the cause. * * * He could only transfer his own imperfect attributes to the gods, and by worshiping a being characterized by these imperfections, he would receive in himself the reaction of his own depravity."—pp. 24, 25, 27, 28.

Whoever carefully considers the truths and principles disclosed in the above transparent paragraphs, will perceive that mankind were not only a *fallen* race, but a race *still falling*. The pit into which sin had thrown them was an abyss,

"Within whose lowest deep, a lower deep,
Still threat'ning to devour them, opened wide!"

It is one attribute of man's immortal nature that he can never be so bad but he may become worse : and his condition keeps pace with his character. Such, our author clearly shows, was the sunk and *sinking* state of the race, when God's scheme of redemption found it. Its limbs screwed fast in the vice of despotic government—its intellect darkened by the rayless pall of impenetrable ignorance—its conscience confounded by the worship of impure idols, and blinded by the bewildering force of lust—its remnant virtues waning—

its wasted powers expiring—hope was at the last glimmer, and despair had well nigh reached its full.

And the author has thus incidentally brought to view the grandest and most sublime of the *present* effects of God's interposition for man's salvation, viz., that he caught our race midway of its fall and reversed its earthly destiny, changed its direction from a downward to an upward progress, which has continued ever since. Fierce, malignant passions, a shattered and debased reason, a will impotent for every good, with disgusting and depopulating vices copied from their gods, had accumulated upon the race; every wretchedness to be found in the condition of a decayed tribe of barbarians, hastening, by rapid strides, toward utter extermination. Such was the moral and physical state from which God's plan of salvation has led mankind up to what they now are—a progress which includes in itself every improvement in the civil, social, and religious condition of man; all the discoveries in science, and all the inventions of art; every thing, in short, which has civilized the institutions, ennobled the intellect, softened the manners, and adorned the society of mankind.

Now let any one consider the *nature* of an attempt to revive a single family decayed, or to restore a dilapidated and sinking State; to put courage into cowards, industry into idleness, and vigor into imbecility; to stop the numberless sluices of corruption, teach abstinence to the pampered, make the soft muscle compact and rigid, and thus give energy to enfeebled intellects, and firmness to faint hearts—and whoever can appreciate the difficulties of an enterprize like this, will see that the power of God displayed in reversing the earthly destiny of our race immeasurably transcends the sublimity of that might, which should arrest the fall of a shattered globe, with all its continents, and seas, and mountains, and rivers, heave it again upon its centre, and restore the harmony of its revolutions.

The bondage of Egypt, according to our author, was necessary to unite in one the mind of the Jewish nation—a kind of crucible-fire, in which the character of the people would be, by the force of common suffering, fused and moulded into one manageable mass. And their deliverance, by a series of miraculous plagues, inflicted not only upon the people of Egypt, but their gods, powerfully alienated their minds from

the customs of the one, and the worship of the other, and thus prepared the nation's mind for such future impressions as God designed to make upon it.

After the mind of the Hebrews was thus disenchanted from, the worship of the gods of Egypt, which, in effect, resembled the sorcery of the fabled Circe, whose enchantments turned men into swine, they are thus introduced to and made acquainted with the *holiness* of the true Lord :

"In the out-set, the animals of Palestine were divided by command of Jehovah into clean and unclean. From the class distinguished as more pure than the other, one was selected to offer as a sacrifice. It was not only to be chosen from clean beasts, but as an individual, it was to be without spot or blemish. This sacrifice the people were not deemed worthy in their own person to offer unto Jehovah ; but it was to be offered by a class of men who were distinguished from their brethren, and set apart for the service of the priest's office. Thus the idea of purity originated from two sources, the purified priest and the *pure* animal *purified* entered into the offering of the sacrifice. But before the sacrifice could be offered, it was washed with clean water, and the priest had, in some cases, to wash himself and officiate without his sandals. Thus, when one process of comparison after another had attached the idea of superlative purity to the sacrifice ; in offering it to Jehovah, in order that the contrast between the purity of God and the highest degrees of earthly purity might be seen, neither priest, people, nor sacrifice, was deemed worthy to come into his presence, but it was offered in the court, without the *Holy of Holies.*" pp. 75-76. Thus was the idea of holiness conveyed into minds before destitute of it, and therefore incapable of attaining to it.

And thus the whole "Mosaic machinery," so wearisome in its details, to the young, in the hands of our author becomes a mighty moral engine, every part of which is instinct with a living faculty, working toward some grand moral end. And precepts, and promises, and altars, and sacrifices, and priests, and statutes, and purifyings, and sprinklings of water and of blood, appear one vast system of moral screw-blocks, and cords, and pulleys, to raise the human character from the slime-pits of Egypt, where it lay among the pots, a thing of brute passions, intent on their gratification, to the summit of

Calvary, where it appears, as a forgiven sinner, beholding the Lamb of God!

I might easily, with the reader's pardon, multiply extracts from the work; but I design not to supersede the reading of the book, but to invite to it. And as I trust I have said enough to convince the reader that it is no ordinary production, nor one which an intelligent man can neglect without injustice to himself, I close with the sincere prayer that it may be the means of guiding many thousands of minds, which have been poisoned and perverted by the plausible cavils of skepticism, as the author's once was, to the knowledge and joyous obedience of the truth.

ARTICLE VII.

THE LEVITICAL LAW OF INCEST.

By Rev. J. M. Sturtevant, Prof. of Math. and Nat. Phil. Illinois College.

EDITORIAL REMARKS.

THE subsequent article will evince, that the recent decision of the General Assembly (Old School) of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, in the McQueen case, has awakened attention to the Scriptural Law of Incest, throughout the length and breadth of the land. And we shall not be surprised to find the attention of Biblical scholars in other countries, renewedly directed to the subject by the expositions now being published in our own. The article before us comes from the "far west," and, we think, surpasses any view we have seen of the controverted question, in its analytical force and just sequences.

It was transmitted early in July, and of course written before the publication of the "Biblical Argument" of "Omicron," in the *New York Observer*. Considerable similarity will be apparent between the two articles in the process of argument and in the conclusions; and whilst "Omicron" possesses more power, as we presume also more knowledge, in the grammatical argument, Prof. Sturtevant presents the subject in a more popular and equally convincing form.

We think, however, that the Professor will see cause to change his opinion of "the acute and unanswerable philosophical argument by which Dr. Sereno E. Dwight has proved, that to take a wife to her sister, means to take one wife to another," and that, had he read the argument of "Omicron," he would have thought and written differently. It seems to us that the idiom has been misunderstood in its application to this case. And we doubt not, the writer of the following logical article, on a review of the case, will be satisfied that both Dr. Dwight and himself are mistaken in referring Lev. 18: 18, to polygamy. Mr. S., in order to be relieved from the difficulty arising from this passage, lays the emphasis on the phrase "to vex her," and adopts the opinion, that polygamy in general is not here prohibited—in which he is probably right—but only a particular case.

Had Mr. S. made as careful and independent an investigation of this idiom, as he has of the other features of the subject, he would probably have arrived at the same result with "Omicron," and then would have found strong confirmation of his view in Lev. 18: 18, instead of feeling himself obliged to meet it as an obstacle in the way of his argument.

Let "Omicron's" view of this passage be substituted in Prof. Sturtevant's article, for that which he has adopted from Dr. Dwight, and, it seems to us, it will then present a remarkably clear, correct and satisfactory view of the Lexical Law of Incest.

Is it not apparent that this law, as expressed in the xviiiith chapter of Leviticus, was a law for the Jewish people, founded on the peculiar relations of society existing among them, and especially those of the two sexes? Do not those peculiar civil and social relations meet us at every step of the specifications, satisfactorily accounting for some singular distinctions, otherwise inexplicable? We freely confess that, although once of a different opinion, we cannot but believe now, that there is no divine prohibition of the marriage of a deceased wife's sister. The expediency of such a prohibition in the present state of society must be left for civil and ecclesiastical legislators to determine.

We trust this point will be calmly, dispassionately and candidly reviewed by those judicatories, whose books of discipline lay a penalty on the man who marries his deceased wife's sister; and, if it be found that the Bible does not prohibit such a relation, and it be nevertheless thought inexpedient, let it be so represented in the book, and no more.—ED.

A recent grave decision of a great ecclesiastical tribunal has invested the subject named at the head of this article with an extraordinary interest at the present time; and the discussions and resolutions of other ecclesiastical bodies have served not a little to increase and extend that interest. It is simply in the hope of contributing his mite to render this excitement of interest in the question subservient to the cause of truth, and to lead the public mind to a view of the subject in which it may rest, free from the danger of being again and again excited about it, without coming to any satisfactory conclusion, that the writer has been induced to give to the public the results of an investigation, which was made some time ago. And in this point of light it is certainly a question of no inconsiderable moment. While opinion continues, as new, unsettled and wavering, individuals will be found whose convictions will favor, and whose circumstances will seem to them to require the formation of matrimonial connexions, deemed by others forbidden and incestuous. The discipline of the church may then be expected to be called into requisition, the happiness of multitudes in the sacred circle of home to be interrupted, the peace of society disturbed—perhaps the standing and usefulness of pious and good men in the church ruined for life; and (if those whose consciences are offended by these marriages are right in their opinions,) the morals of the church and the nation are corrupted, and God is offended. If then, God has legislated on this subject at all, it is a matter of great importance to individuals, to families, to the church, and to the nation at large, that His legislation should be clearly understood, and its limits accurately and precisely drawn.

A full discussion of the question involves two leading points of inquiry, viz., First,—*To what extent is the Levitical law binding on the conscience of Christians?* And,

Second,—*What is the true limitation and definition of the crime of incest in the Levitical law?*

The first of these points of inquiry will be waived entirely in the present article, except so far as it may be found to be involved in a full discussion of the second. It cannot be fairly and fully discussed without giving to his inquiries a wider range, than comports with the present design of the writer; and he fears that by entering upon it he might be found rather to have excited fresh controversies, than made any pro-

gress towards settling that which exists. He believes that such a discussion is by no means necessary in order to settle the question which has recently agitated the public, to the complete satisfaction of every candid mind. It will therefore, for the sake of the argument, be admitted, that the Levitical law of incest is of perpetual obligation ; not that we are by any means convinced that this is true, but because it is foreign to the present purpose to prove it false, since the argument about to be presented would be none the less conclusive, if it were true. The attention of the reader will therefore be exclusively directed to the following inquiry, viz. :—

What is the true limitation of the crime of incest in the Levitical law ?

It will be perceived, that the bare statement of the question in this form, cuts us off on both sides, from all general reasonings about expediency, convenience and comfort of parties concerned in any given case ; or indeed about general morality in the application of our doctrines to society. There is reason to apprehend that a failure to notice this obvious consideration, has often led inquirers entirely astray in the investigation of this question. They have come to the examination of the Mosaic law, assuming, that as it is the only legislation we find in God's word, on the subject of incest, it must of course be the only safeguard of modern society, against a general prevalence of that crime. Hence they have felt themselves under a sort of virtuous necessity, of so interpreting that law, that it shall meet the necessities and suit the circumstances of modern Christian society. This view of the subject is certainly inadmissible. The question is not what the Levitical law *ought* to be in order to answer the ends of modern society ; but what *is* the Levitical law ? The interpreter has no right to assume that it was designed to be of perpetual obligation, and then to reject all interpretations, which in his judgment would militate against its fitness as a universal rule of morals. He should rigidly confine himself to the terms of the law, and to what he knows of the circumstances, habits and manners of those to whom it was given, as illustrating the intent of the law-giver.

The law of incest is recorded entire in Leviticus, 18th chapter, 6—18 verses, where the first mention is made of the subject in the word of God, and is in the following words :

6. None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him to uncover *their* nakedness: I am the Lord. 7. The nakedness of thy father, or the nakedness of thy mother shalt thou not uncover: she is thy mother; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness. 8. The nakedness of thy father's wife shalt thou not uncover: it is thy father's nakedness. 9. The nakedness of thy sister, the daughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be born at home or born abroad, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover. 10. The nakedness of thy son's daughter; or of thy daughter's daughter, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover; for theirs is thine own nakedness. 11. The nakedness of thy father's wife's daughter, begotten of thy father, (she is thy sister,) thou shalt not uncover her nakedness. 12. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's sister: she is thy father's near kinswoman. 13. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy mother's sister; for she is thy mother's near kinswoman. 14. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's brother, thou shalt not approach to his wife: she is thine aunt. 15. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy daughter-in-law: she is thy son's wife; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness. 16. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness. 17. Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter, or her daughter's daughter to uncover her nakedness; for they are her near kinswomen: it is wickedness. 18. Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, besides the other in her life-time.

The subject is several times mentioned afterwards, in the writings of Moses, but no where is any thing added to the specifications of the passage cited above.

The first inquiry which seems to present itself is: does this law refer to marriage? Of this there is no room for reasonable doubt. The terms of it certainly include marriage, whatever else they may include; and that they refer mainly if not exclusively to marriage, is evident from the consideration, that if marriage is not the thing intended, then there could be no propriety in these specific enactments; for the things forbidden are included in more general prohibitions. It will therefore be assumed and conceded, that the thing forbidden in this law is, *marriage with one who is near of kin*,

and our only remaining inquiry is, what are the degrees of kindred to which this prohibition extends? And here, as seems to the writer, we meet the main difficulty which has hitherto embarrassed the subject—On what principle is the law to be interpreted? There are obviously two principles, upon either of which it may be interpreted, and we shall come to very different results according as we adopt the one or the other. These two principles may be thus stated:

1. The sixth verse, which is in the words; “none of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover *their* nakedness,” is a general principle, of which the specifications which follow are only specimens, given for the purpose of illustration; so that the full extent of the law can only be ascertained by applying the general principle to all other cases, where the same nearness of kindred exists, as in the cases which are specified.

2. The sixth verse states the general principle, and the specifications which follow define accurately and precisely the cases to which it is to be applied, so that no case is included in the law which is not specified.

It will be necessary for us to determine which of these principles of interpretation is the true one. The first will be called, for the sake of convenience, the principle of implication—because it extends the law by an implication claimed to be embraced in the terms used, or inferable from the nature of the case, to a considerable number of unspecified cases. It is that upon which Dr. Hodge has founded his very ingenious argument, in the case of Rev. Archibald McQueen, as reported in the *New York Observer*: it is the doctrine of the standards of the Presbyterian church, as well as of most of the Protestant communions, having been derived by them all from a common source—the Roman Catholic church. It is also advocated, as a sound and safe principle, and even as absolutely necessary to public morals, by many great and good men. It is therefore to be examined with deference and candor. Still the writer feels himself called on entirely to dissent from it, and to maintain that the specifications which occur in 7—17 verses, are to be regarded as a precise definition of the cases, to which the general principle stated in the sixth verse is to be applied. The reasons of this dissent are the following.

1. *The terms of the law do not require the principle of*

implication.—On the supposition that the specifications were designed completely to define the extent of the general rule, the language would not necessarily be different in any respect from what it is. Of the truth of this assertion the reader must judge for himself by a careful examination of the language of the statute. It is true that the reason of the prohibition is given; but when God gives a law and gives a reason for it, are we required to extend the law to all other cases, where we think the same reason exists? Has God any where recognized any such ability and duty on our part, to judge of reasons and of fitness in matters of divine legislation? On the other hand, if God had designed the law to be applied to other cases by implication, would he not in all probability have made the language different from what it is? Would he not have added an express authority for such extension?

2. If the general principle is not defined by the specifications, it has no definition, it is left indefinite as to its application.—It is contended by some that the specified cases are a measure, by which nearness of kin is to be judged of. But what authority have we for this assumption? Certainly no such rule of measurement is recognized by the statute, and the assumption that God designed that they should be so used is entirely gratuitous. There is not in any word of the statute a hint, that this mode of limitation was intended. If, then, the specifications themselves are not a limitation of the general rule, God has provided none, and the Jewish lawyer was left at liberty to extend or contract the range of the principle, according to his own notions of fitness, propriety or necessity. Is this probable?

Dr. Sereno E. Dwight, in his "Hebrew Wife," has suggested, that a conscientious man would not be willing to marry his father's brother's daughter, lest he should commit half the sin of incest. But if this law is not limited to the specification, it is difficult to see why he should consider such a case as involving half the sin of incest, and not the whole of it. Certainly the kindred may be called near, without any misuse of language, and if so, it is embraced, according to this mode of interpretation, under the law. It is not indeed precisely so near as any that are specified, but, as has already been remarked, the law contains no warrant for instituting this standard of measurement. Indeed, according to Dr. Dwight's mode of reasoning, one would suppose that

a conscientious man would hardly venture to marry at all, for in doing so he certainly runs a great risk of committing some *smaller* fraction of the sin of incest, if not the *half* of it.

3. *The extension of a general enactment, to a variety of unspecified particular cases is very much at variance with the general tenor and character of the laws of Moses.*—They are characterized, almost if not entirely without exception, by a minute and precise specification, which leaves nothing to inference or implication. Any one may satisfy himself of the truth of this remark, by collecting the Mosaic legislation, which bears on almost any single subject, as for example the priesthood, the tabernacle service, uncleanness, or the Sabbath. The principle of interpretation from which I dissent, entirely exempts the law of incest from this general characteristic of the code. Now, is it at all probable that a Jew, accustomed to be guided in all his relations to the law, by its abundant, minute and exact specifications, would see the propriety of adopting in this case, an entirely different principle of interpretation, and rest in mere implications and inference? Is it not rather evident, that he would interpret this law just as he would that of uncleanness, as applying to the cases specified and to those only?

4. *The cases specified make up a system complete in itself.* If they were intended merely as illustrations of the general principle, and not as a precise limitation of it, we should expect of course, that on presenting them all at one view, they would be found to have been selected indiscriminately from the various classes of cases designed to be embraced under the general statute, and to be obviously a part of an incomplete system, which was to be filled out, by applying the general rule to all other cases embraced in its terms. Now it turns out, that on presenting them all at one view, they do not appear to have been so selected, but form a complete and consistent system, without any addition. Instead of being selected indiscriminately from all the different classes, they in every case either include all of a given class, or specify none from it. To set this point in its true light, the following table has been prepared. The reader will here observe, that the specifications extend to four generations, viz., a man's father's generation, his own, his son's, and his grandson's. These are numbered in the table, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, beginning with the father's.

1st generation.		2d generation.	3rd generation.	4th generation.
Collateral.	Lineal.			
	Father's sister. Mother's sister. Father's brother's wife.	Sister. Half-sister. Brother's wife.		
	Mother. Father's wife.	A man may not marry his	son's wife,	Son's daughter, Daughter's daughter.
	Mother.	Wife's	daughter.	son's daughter. daughter's daughter.

Let us now examine this table, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it bears the appearance of promiscuous and incidental selection in illustration of a general principle, or of precise limitation of the cases to which a general principle is to be applied? In order that the results of this examination may be stated with clearness and brevity, it will be necessary to premise that there are three classes of relatives embraced in the table, viz., a man's own blood relatives, the blood relatives of his wife, and affines, meaning by the last, such as have become relatives by being married to relatives. With this explanation, the whole table is embraced in the two following rules, viz :

1. A man may marry no blood relative, either of himself or of his wife, in either of the four generations of lineals, nor any collateral blood relative of his own, in the first and second generations.

2. A man is forbidden to marry any affinis, who has been married to any one who was a member of his own family, or who by our usage would bear his name, in the first and third generations of lineals, and in the first and second generations of collaterals.

The reader is here requested to compare the specifications

with the table, and the table with the rules just given, in order to satisfy himself whether or not the writer is borne out in his assertions, that the specifications make, without any additions, a complete system: whether they are capable of being reduced to simple general rules or not—and whether they invariably, in given degrees of kindred, embrace all of a given class or exclude all. Is this then illustration of a general principle, or definition? If a considerable number of cases are intended to be embraced in the law, which are not specified, why are none specified from the classes to which they belong, while all the individuals are specified in each of the classes, from which any cases are taken? If a man's collaterals in the third generation are as much forbidden as in the first, why are they all specified in the first, and not one of them in the third? If the collaterals of the wife are as much forbidden as a man's own, why are all his own collaterals specified, through two generations, and not one collateral of the wife in any generation? Does this look like miscellaneous selection of cases for the purpose of illustration? Had it been designed to illustrate a principle equally applicable to both the first and third generations, would it not have been far more appropriate to the purpose, to have specified father's sister, and sister's daughter, than to have specified both father's sister and mother's sister, and to have omitted both brother's daughter and sister's daughter? Is it not still more improbable that *all* the illustrations, fourteen in number, should have been selected in the same manner, so that in every instance to which the rule of implication is to be applied, it is to be applied to a whole class, from which not one case has been specified? And yet it is plain that, if the rule of implication is a part of the law, this is a simple statement of the circumstances in which we are left to apply it. The reader will judge whether it is probable that if the principle of implication is the one on which the law was designed to be interpreted, the implied cases would have been *all* found in this condition.

Again, the specified cases form a system constructed according to two simple general rules, to which there are no exceptions. If now this system is to be extended to other cases not specified, it must be by introducing additional rules, for these rules do not embrace a single case not specified. What then are the additional rules to be? Two are claimed:

First, That a man is as near of kin to his wife's blood relatives as to his own. And,

Second, that when a man is forbidden to marry any relative in a generation back of his own, he is by implication forbidden to marry one of the same nearness of blood, in a generation following his own.

In reference to the first of these, we shall have occasion to examine it more in detail in the sequel. It is sufficient to say of it here, that it is an assumption entirely without proof, either in the terms of the law or in any of its attendant circumstances. Let those who contend for this principle prove it—let them show that it was a known and recognized part of the Levitical law, and we shall be ready to unite with them in filling up the vacant line in our table; but, till they have done this, they have no right to write a syllable there. It must still be vacant.

As to the second rule proposed above, to be added to the system, the same may be said; it is a gratuitous assumption, and on those who insist on it as a part of the Levitical law, is the burden of proving that it is so. It can be admitted when that is proved, till then it has no authority, however plausible it may appear.

For example, father's sister, mother's sister, and father's brother's wife, are all specifically forbidden; what they have to prove is, that brother's daughter, sister's daughter, and brother's son's wife, were equally intended to be forbidden, though not one of them is specified. And in addition to this they have to bear in mind, that there is in such a system as the Mosaic, an obvious reason for forbidding the first three, which does not exist in the case of the last three. That system was one of subordination; the wife was subordinated to the husband and the child to the parent. It might, therefore, have been regarded as a violation of due subordination—as “confusion,” for a sister of the father, to whom reverence was due from the son for his father's sake, to become the son's wife; but no such objection would lie against that son's marrying an equally near relative of the third generation. The reason here conjectured would therefore be an objection against a man's marrying his aunt, but none against his marrying his niece. Now, it is not asserted that this is the reason of the law, but can it be proved that it is not? And if not, can it be proved that the Levitical law was intended alike to forbid an aunt and a niece, when the one is speci-

fied and the other is not, nor any other collateral relative in the same generation with her? Must not this assumption remain entirely without proof? The writer must here again remind the reader, that our question is not, what is right in our circumstances, but what was the Levitical law? And in this view of the case he confidently asks, is there any evidence that it was ever intended to extend beyond the specified cases? Must not this rule by which it is proposed to extend it to other cases, be regarded as entirely unsupported by proof? Have we then any right to treat it as having the authority of a divine law? This part of the argument will here be cheerfully resigned to the judgment of the candid reader.

5. *Another reason for dissenting from the principle of implication is, the fact that specific cases of incest are probably referred to in no less than* eighteen instances, and certainly in sixteen, in subsequent portions of the Bible, and yet among them all there is not one case which is not distinctly specified in the original enactment, Leviticus 18: 6-17.* If, as is so confidently claimed, the Levitical law was meant to extend to a variety of cases not specified, as much as to those which are, why among the whole eighteen cases afterwards mentioned in the Scriptures, is there not found one of the implied cases? I say *not one*—especially when it is claimed that the implied cases are more numerous than the specified? The burden of proof here rests with the advocates of implication, and the question is submitted for their careful consideration.

6. *Another weighty objection to the principle of implication lies in the fact that the cases which it is claimed are left to mere inference, as it would seem to very doubtful inference, are the very cases in which marriage is not likely to be contracted.*—The cases forbidden are those of the nearest relatives; those which are left to implication are the more remote blood relatives and the collaterals of the wife, where, if at all, the law would be most likely to be broken. The barrier is weakest where strength is most needed, if indeed the sin of incest, according to the law, really lay outside of the speci-

* See Leviticus 20: 11, 12, 14, 17, 19-21. Deut. 22: 30. Deut. 27: 20, 22, 23. Ezekiel 22: 10, 11. Matt. 14: 3, 4. 1 Cor. 5: 1. 1 Kings 2: 13-24.

fied cases. Which of the two, for example, is a man more likely to marry, his mother, or his niece? his own sister or his wife's, his father's sister or his wife's niece. I know it is claimed that some cases of very near kindred are left to implication. It was even claimed in the late discussion at Philadelphia, that a man is only forbidden to marry his daughter, by implication. In reply to this I will only refer the reader to the terms of the law, Lev. 18: 17, and remark that when it is shown how a man can marry his own daughter, without transgressing the *very letter* of this statute, I shall think the objection well founded.

As to the absence of a specific prohibition to marry a man's grandmother, I could hardly think the danger of the occurrence of the event sufficiently imminent, to suggest the necessity of providing against it by a specific statute. I should think it a case which, bad as man is, might be safely left, not to implication, but to the law of nature. It is then obvious, that if the principle of implication is to be resorted to at all, it is to be applied to the very cases in which positive and specific statute was most of all needful. Does this look like the wisdom of a divine legislator?

This argument derives great force from a consideration of the peculiar history of the Jewish people. The case of marriage with the sister of a deceased wife, is that violation of this law of implication, which occurs probably much more frequently than any other. This is certainly what the nature of the case would lead us to expect. Was it then the design of the Jewish lawgiver to denounce and brand this connexion as incest? Could a Jew be expected so to understand the law? What Jew did not revere and honor the patriarch Jacob? and yet what Jew was ignorant of the fact that Jacob first married Leah, and afterwards, even while she was yet alive, her sister Rachel? Could a pious Jew be expected to comprehend, that by a mere implication from the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus, the shame of incest was to be attached to the holy patriarch and his wives, and stamped on the origin of more than half of the tribes of Israel? Is it reasonable to suppose, that a Jew would so interpret this law? Surely not. If such a marriage had been intended to be branded and treated as incestuous, the lawgiver would surely have deemed, that to a son of Jacob a specific and positive enactment would be most necessary.

The writer has now done with the principle of implication. He has shown, he trusts, to the satisfaction of the candid reader, that it is neither required by nor consistent with the terms of the law—that if the law is not limited to the specific cases, it has no limitation for which any divine authority can be given—that the principle of extending the general statute by this sort of implication, is at variance with the general character of the code—that the specified cases form of themselves a complete system, constructed according to two simple, invariable rules, and which cannot be extended to one unspecified case without adopting a rule, which would rest on no other foundation than a gratuitous assumption—that eighteen *specified* cases of incest are mentioned in the subsequent portions of the Scriptures, and not one *implied* case—and that, if the sin of incest really lies, according to the Levitical law, outside of the specified cases, then the divine legislator has constructed his barrier against the sin, so as to be weakest precisely where the greatest strength is necessary.

He now wishes to ask the reader, can this principle be sustained as a safe guide in interpreting the law under consideration? Still more, is it a principle of sufficient strength to sustain us in excluding loved Christian brethren from our fellowship under the Christian dispensation? Has it sufficient strength to sustain great ecclesiastical bodies in sternly deposing Christian ministers, of otherwise blameless characters and lives, from the sacred office? and excluding them and their wives from the sweet privilege of a seat at the table of the Lord? in bringing pain and anguish of spirit to their domestic circle? in inflicting disgrace and mortification on their innocent and unoffending offspring? and in infusing bitterness into the cup of all their friends and kindred? Brethren and fathers in the ministry are earnestly entreated to reconsider this matter in the light, not of a perishable and fallible human standard; but in the light of the Bible and of eternity, and in the spirit of candor and Christian love.

But before the subject is dismissed, it is desirable it should be viewed in still another light. Grant for the sake of the argument that the principle of implication is to be admitted, can it still be applied so as to prohibit marriage with the collateral relatives of a deceased wife?

By referring again to our table it will be seen that the entire line of wife's collaterals is vacant—not one of them is

specifically forbidden. It is confidently asked, does the omission of this *whole line* mean nothing? Is it not a strong presumptive argument that it was never intended to be embraced under the prohibition? Let us then again examine the assumed principle by which the law is made to cover it through four generations—the principle, I mean, that a man sustains the same nearness of kin, in the eye of the Levitical law, to his wife's blood relatives, as to his own. It has already been remarked that this is, to say the least of it, a groundless assumption; but that is not all, it is directly contradicted by other portions of the Levitical law. The argument in its defence is this:—a man may not marry his brother's wife by specific statute: he is in the same nearness of kin to his brother's wife, and to his wife's sister—and therefore he is forbidden to marry his wife's sister. Now it is enough for our purpose to say of this, that it is without proof, and therefore without authority. No proof ever was produced that, in the eye of the Mosaic law, the kindred was the same in these two cases. But we are not obliged to rest the argument here. There is proof positive that the kindred was not the same in the two cases. To that proof the attention of the reader is now invited.

1. The Israelites were divided into tribes, families, and households. This assertion will not be questioned, but for a clear and full exhibition of it, the reader is referred to Josh. 7 : 16, 18.

2. This division always followed the male line, with no regard to the female whatever. A woman before marriage was reckoned as belonging to the tribe, family, and household of her father; after marriage, to that of her husband, wherever she had been born. Her marriage took her out of the family of her father, and incorporated her with that of her husband. In proof of this assertion, the reader is referred to Num. 36 : 1-12. In this passage we have a distinct recognition of the fact, that when a woman married she was not only herself removed from the tribe and family of her father to that of her husband, but that, if she inherited property, that would, according to the general law of inheritance, be transferred with her. We have also a distinct statute to meet the case, obliging virgins possessing an inheritance to marry within the tribe and family to which the inheritance belonged; this specific law being obviously necessary, in order to preserve in perpetuity to each tribe its own inheritance. It is also observable that the case is not

provided for, by ever reckoning the husband to the tribe and family of the wife, as it obviously might have been had the general principles of the law allowed it. But they did not allow it, and therefore it was never permitted in any case. The only remaining practicable mode of providing for the case was that adopted: to forbid women possessing an inheritance to marry out of their tribe and family; although, if they possessed no inheritance, they might marry any Israelite.

Leviticus 21: 1—3. In this passage a priest is forbidden to defile himself for the dead among his people; but for his kin that is near unto him, for his father and his mother, his son and his daughter, for his brother and for his sister, *a virgin that is nigh unto him*, which hath no husband, for them he may be defiled. An unmarried sister is so "near unto him that he may be defiled for her"—but if she was married she was in the eye of the law no longer so near to him that he might go into mourning for her. The fact of her marriage had essentially changed the nearness of her kin to him. Had then the same fact made no change in her nearness of kindred to the rest of her family? Had she ceased to be near of kin to her brother and not to her sister? Did she continue to be as nearly related to her sister as before? And had the same fact which had removed her from being near of kin to her brother and her sister, made her husband as near of kin to them as he was to his own? that is, nearer than she was herself? Would the advocates of implication apply to this passage their doctrine, that a man is as near of kin to his wife's blood relatives as to his own, and therefore contend, that though a priest is solemnly forbid to put on mourning for a married sister, he still might for her husband? In all consistency they must do it, for he, according to their doctrine, is just as near of kin as an own brother, and for an own brother the priest might put on mourning. Let the advocates of implication dispose of this case consistently with their principles, if they can. When they have done so, the writer will be ready to give the subject a reconsideration.

There is but one mode of disposing of this case, or that of the daughters of Zelophehad. By referring again to our table, it will be seen that within certain grades of kindred, a man was not permitted to marry an affinis of his own family. The reason is obvious. The wives of his male relatives were considered as incorporated with his own family,

and as having thus become near of kin to him. By the same principle they had ceased to be near of kin to their brothers and sisters, or so near as before, by being removed from their family, and as the case might be, from their tribe. Thus a man might not marry his father's brother's wife, because she was of his own family, and near of kin, but he is not prohibited his mother's brother's wife, because, though the wife of a relative of the same nearness of blood as the other, she had by no means the same nearness of kin ; for she belonged to another family, and might belong to another tribe. So a man must not marry his brother's wife, because she is in his own family, but he may marry his wife's sister because she is of another family, and may be even of another tribe : his marriage, instead of making him near of kin to his wife's collateral relatives, had caused her to cease to be near of kin to them, and had created a nearness of kin between her and his collateral relatives. With this principle our whole table is strictly consistent. In certain degrees a man may never marry an affinis of his own family, lineal or collateral ; a collateral of his wife he is never forbidden. It is now confidently asked, can any man, in view of these facts and considerations, maintain that in the eye of the Levitical law, a man's nearness of kin to his brother's wife, a member of his own family, is the same as to his wife's sister of entirely another family, and perhaps another tribe ? But this must be maintained, or the prohibition of marriage with the collateral relatives of his deceased wife must be given up.

The attempt has sometimes been made to set aside the interpretation which is advocated in this article, by reasoning from what is supposed to be the design of the law. It is claimed by some, that the design of the law is to remove all temptation to illicit intercourse of the sexes, among members of the same family ; and that this reason applies as much to the wife's collateral relatives as to a man's own. But where is the proof that this is the design of the law ? This again is an assumption, with no proof. Nor is it alone without proof. The evidence is against it. If this had been the design of the law, there is no connexion which it would have been more important to forbid than that of step-brother and-sister. They generally live under the same roof, and are associated in all the operations of the family as brother and sister, and yet marriage in this relation is not forbidden by the broadest ex-

tension of the law. The marriage of cousins is not forbidden; and yet if this were the design of the law, it ought to have been forbidden rather than most of those which are specified. As there is therefore good reason to believe that this is not the design of the law, all conclusions drawn from the supposition that it is, must be without foundation.

Is it then still urged, as an objection to the interpretation which has been given, that it leaves some cases unprohibited, in which, in the circumstances of modern society, it is evidently undesirable and improper that the marriage relation should be formed? It is admitted that it does; but it is claimed that this cannot invalidate the interpretation, if it rests otherwise on substantial reasons. We have no right to set up a modern standard to interpret the Mosaic law by. Why indeed should we expect the law of incest in that code, to be better suited to the circumstances of modern Christian society than the more general law of marriage? Surely no one contends for an interpretation of that law, which would render it suited to our case. In a certain case of very frequent occurrence in our day, a man was required by that law to marry his brother's widow. Does any one think that law ought to be enforced now?

The Levitical law did not even prohibit polygamy. It is indeed claimed by Dr. Sereno E. Dwight, that polygamy is forbidden in Leviticus 18: 18. "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister to vex her, to uncover her nakedness, besides the other in her life-time." Dr. Dwight deserves great credit for the acute and unanswerable philological argument, by which he has proved, that to take a wife to her sister, means to take one wife to another, that is, to take a second wife in addition to one he already had. But it will be observed that the thing forbidden is not the taking of a second wife in the life-time of the first, but it is the doing of it "to vex her." It is not a general prohibition of polygamy, but a prohibition of it in a particular case, implying of course that in other cases it was permitted.* Indeed, how can any one entertain

* We take the liberty of inserting here an extract from the communication of "Omicron," in the New York Observer of August 6, 1842, generally attributed to Dr. E. Robinson.—Ed.

"The philological difficulty above alluded to, is perhaps

the idea that David and Solomon, and others, in taking a plurality of wives, were acting in direct violation of the known letter of the divine law? It is claimed by some that the king

not less real. The phrase, 'a woman to her sister,' does indeed occur no less than eight times elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, in the general meaning 'one to another'; but only of inanimate objects in the feminine gender, viz. of the curtains, loops, and tenons of the tabernacle, Exod. xxvi. 3 bis. 5, 6, 17; and of the wings of the living creatures, Ezek. i. 9, 23, iii. 13. The like phrase in the masculine, 'a man to his brother,' occurs in all about twenty times; mostly of men, but also in a few instances of inanimate objects or insects, as Exod. xxv. 20; Joel ii. 8. But it is to be remarked, that in every such instance, this phrase, whether masculine or feminine, has a reciprocal distributive power; that is, a number of persons or things are said to do or be so and so *one to another*. A plural nominative invariably precedes, connected with a plural verb; and then the action or relation of this verb is by this phrase marked as reciprocal and mutual among the individuals comprised in the plural nominative. Thus: 'the children of Israel said one to another,' Exod. xvi. 15, and often. So Abraham and Lot 'separated themselves one from the other,' Gen. xiii. 11; Neh. iv. 19; Isa. ix. 19, in the Heb. 'they shall not spare one another.' Hagg. ii. 22, 'And the horses and their riders shall come down, each by the sword of the other,' i. e. they shall destroy one another. So of the other examples. This, then, is the idiom; and to this idiom the passage in Levit. xviii. 18, has no relation. There is nothing distributive nor reciprocal implied in it. The phrase here refers only to the object of the verb; upon which object no trace of mutual or reciprocal action passes over. To bring it in any degree under the idiom, it should at least read thus: 'Wives (בָּנִים na-shim) one to another thou shalt not take;' and even then it would be unlike any other instance. But further, the suffixes attached in the singular to the subsequent words [her nakedness, besides *her*, in *her* life-time,] show decisively, that such a solution is inadmissible; and these of themselves limit the words to two specific individuals, who have here no mutual action one upon the other, in the same literal sense as in the preceding verses, viz. *a wife to her sister*.

was forbidden to practise polygamy in Deut. 17: 17, where, speaking of the king whom the Israelites should set over them, it is said, "Neither shall he multiply wives to himself that his heart turn not away." By looking back to the 16th verse it will be seen that he is forbidden to multiply horses; does this mean that he should have but one horse? No more does the prohibition to multiply wives, imply that he should have but one wife. Indeed, the giving of such a charge to a people in reference to their king, implies the existence and toleration of polygamy. How would such a charge sound given to a king of England or France, or to a President of the United States?

It is then undeniable that the Levitical law of marriage is, as a whole, inadequate to the necessities and unsuited to the circumstances of modern Christian society. The idea of introducing it as our code, would be revolting to every mind. Is it then an objection to an interpretation of a particular part

"It may also be remarked, as a fact of no little importance in this connection, that all the ancient versions adhere likewise to this literal and obvious interpretation; as the Chaldee Targum of Onkelos, made about the time of our Saviour, and the Samaritan and Syriac versions made not long afterwards. As to these, it might indeed be replied, that they merely follow the cognate Hebrew idiom, and therefore decide nothing. But the oldest version of all, made two or three centuries before Christ, and into a language not cognate, I mean the Septuagint, is certainly not liable to any such reply, and is nevertheless the most decisive of all. This version, in all the other eight instances of the feminine phrase, renders it 'one to another,' by means of some form of the Greek words *ἕτερος* *heteros*, or *ἄλλελων* *allelon*; but here in Levit. xviii. 18, it gives to the same phrase the literal sense, 'A wife to her sister thou shalt not take,' *γυναῖκα δὲ* *ἄδελφην* *αὐτῆς* *οὐ λήψῃ*. It would be in vain in this case to say, either that the Seventy had before them a different text; or that they did not understand their own language and its idioms; or that they were unacquainted with the manner in which their fathers interpreted the Mosaic law.

"It appears to me, therefore, that we are compelled, by all sound laws of interpretation, to understand this 18th verse of a wife's sister, and of her alone."

of that law, namely, the law of incest, that it is not suited to our circumstances? What reason had we to expect it to be better adapted to our necessities, than the more general law of marriage, of which it is a part? The writer promised at the outset not to discuss this point, any further than it should be found to be involved in the question of interpretation. But it is appropriate here to ask the reader, if the whole Levitical law of marriage, including that of incest, does not bear pretty clear marks of having been intended for the Jewish state, rather than for universality or perpetuity?

Is it still asked what is our security against incestuous marriages? It may be answered, that it certainly is not in forcing an interpretation on the laws of Moses which they will not bear. Any who may be found engaged in such an effort, will prove in the end to have been poor defenders of public morals. The truth seems to be, that our safe reliance for the purity and sound morality of Christian nations, on many points of great importance, lies, not in any specific divine enactment, but on the enlightened and benevolent general morality of the gospel, and on the obvious inexpediency and injurious tendency of certain acts and usages; and to this general class we should refer both polygamy and incest. They are proved bad, by the common experience of the civilized world—the civil law condemns them—and there are no indications of any disposition to throw down the barriers which are erected around them. These barriers are defended by the voice of nature, and cherished by the sentiments of civilized man. It is admitted, for example, that there is no law, human or divine, against the intermarriage of first cousins; and yet in this country such marriages are rare, and the common sentiments of the people are decidedly against them. Still stronger will be found to be the prevailing popular voice against the intermarriage of those nearer blood relatives which in two or three instances are not prohibited by the Levitical law, as we have interpreted it; nor while the morality of the Bible continues, in any degree, to influence our legislation, is there any danger that the law of the land will cease to forbid them. Here it would seem that wise men, wise rulers, and most of all, wise and righteous ecclesiastical judges, should be content to let the question rest. The suggestion may not be out of place, that it would be well for ecclesiastical judicatories who are governing the church of Christ, and trying to bind

the consciences of mankind, by a law of incest, professing to derive its authority from the Levitical code, and yet covering about twice as many cases as the Levitical law ever embraced, to see to it that they be not found to lord it over God's heritage. It is time for them so to modify their laws on this subject, as to be more consonant with the law which they profess to enforce, and to do this as speedily as possible, that some reparation may be made to the good men who are already suffering under the execution of a law, which God never enacted, and that no more victims may be immolated to this system of intolerance and oppression.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE NECESSITY FOR EDUCATION SOCIETIES.

By B. B. Edwards, Professor in the Theol. Sem., Andover.

This world appears to be a state of discipline for men in an associated capacity. Societies of Christians meet with the same trials with which as individuals they are beset. The same hard warfare is to be encountered, the same sleepless vigilance to be maintained. Alternate sunshine and storm are alike experienced; and it is sometimes equally difficult to ascertain the cause of adverse providences. Not unfrequently the lowliest and the most delicate flower in the valley is crushed. How often God's wrath lieth hard upon some gentle, loving and broken-hearted creature, who had been already trained in the school of sorrow, and who of all others seemed least to need any further trial. A cause exists, but it is behind the clouds. So of a public institution. It seemed essential to, or intimately connected with, the progress of Christianity. God had set the seal of his approbation upon it, by repeatedly dispensing the gifts of his grace. Those who directed its affairs were wise and upright men. It had gained that general confidence which was the best token of the integrity of its guardians, and the usefulness of its labors. Suddenly it is plunged into affliction. Without any apparent adequate cause, it is subjected to a series of embarrassments which menace its total ruin. It has

hardly emerged from one difficulty before another succeeds. Its credit is impaired. Its friends stand aloof. Its enemies find a fulfilment of their sinister predictions, while the multitude of indifferent people see in its declining fortunes the folly or fanaticism of its founders. Such has been the experience, substantially, of more than one important institution, which has at length outrode the storm, and become fast anchored in the affections and respect of the entire community. It is finally manifest that the clamor which was raised against it was unfounded. It was condemned by those who would not, or did not, examine into the charges which were laid against it ; who were contented to join in an outcry or a suspicion which was popular ; or who were so much influenced by general rumor as to give it only a cold and hesitating support.

Hence we have hope that the American Education Society will come out of its present depressed condition. We have strong confidence that it has not seen its best days. We believe that the men who laid its foundations, who were regarded as wise men, (not a few of whom have gone to their reward in Heaven,) shall yet stand amply justified. It is experiencing the same afflictions that have been accomplished in many of its sister institutions that are in the world. *What* the Lord loveth, we may say, as well as *whom*, he chasteneth. Its afflictions, we trust, will produce patience, and patience experience, and experience hope.

At the same time, it is not easy to see fully all the occasions of the great embarrassments to which the Society is now subjected. Its annual resources since 1835 have been diminished more than one half. The number admitted to its patronage, during the last year, was but a little more than one-fourth of the number so admitted in 1838. Such a falling off in the means and consequent usefulness of this institution is not accounted for by the commercial relations of the country. None of its sister charities has been so crippled. The business arrangements of the community are no worse now than they were three or four years ago. Yet the Society has steadily declined in its means of fulfilling its engagements. Why should one mode of benevolent effort, which has been regarded as fundamental, be singled out as the object of particular suspicion and neglect ? Is the preaching of the gospel no longer the main instrumentality, not only

for the salvation of the soul, but for the production of every social good which is worth the name? Has the growth of the nation ceased to outstrip the means of grace? Is the tide of population from the old world setting back again? Is the cry of the famishing pagan, which *did* come on the four winds of heaven, hushed? None of all these things. The current which is flowing westward is as deep as ever. The souls that are dying in heathen lands are as numerous as ever. The preaching of the gospel remains *the instrumentality* which saves the soul. For other objects, which are deemed important, pecuniary resources are not withheld. What then are some of the causes why the Society in question is not favored with its appropriate share of encouragement? Why must urgent and reiterated solicitations be necessary in order that it should obtain the little pittance which it now has?

I. We shall attempt a brief answer to these inquiries.

1. There is an unfortunate association with the word *beneficiary*. It has come to mean one who receives a favor, but renders no equivalent; one who lives on the bounty of others, but makes no return. It has a portion of the odium which is attached to those who dwell in a poor-house. A beneficiary is a charity-boy, a mere pensioner. The church has taken him up in his destitute condition, and, in her great pity, is feeding and clothing him. The boon is so great and so undeserved that a whole life of earnest labor and of overflowing gratitude is demanded in return.

But is *his* case so peculiar? must *he* be marked as the only one in whom an extraordinary degree of thankfulness is becoming? Is the term *beneficiary* applicable to him only? Not by any means. The nine hundred students who have been educated in the oldest theological institution of our country are one and all charity students. A large part of their theological education has been furnished to them gratuitously. They are pensioners on the bounty of the rich and honored dead. And not they alone. Every teacher in that seminary is a beneficiary. He is living on charitable funds. He is as strictly indebted to the beneficence of others as either of his pupils is. And not he only. The founders of the institution were beneficiaries. Their ability to acquire and preserve their property was owing to the institutions of the gospel. What would their ships and warehouses have been

worth, if they had not been defended by that public sentiment which is created by the preaching of the gospel? Worth just as much as they would have been in the ports of the Barbary coast. These men, therefore, were beneficiaries to the very individuals whom they helped to educate. In a mere worldly point of view, they could not afford to dispense with the preaching of the gospel. It was the cheapest mode which they could adopt to render their own lives happy, and their property safe. Why then should one assisted by the Education Society be regarded as under *extraordinary* obligations to be grateful to his patrons? Because, it may be said, of the *mode* in which he is aided. The funds for his support were gathered from the *churches*. They were hard-earned. They were made up of the widow's mite and the poor servant girl's wages. Uncommon responsibilities are resting upon him who is thus sustained. But are not all professing Christians alike bound to labor for the salvation of men? Must you give yourself to an arduous work in some sickly region of the west, or under an equatorial sun, and must I, remaining at home, do nothing in contributing to your support, or in preparing you to labor? Is it charity in me so to do? I am giving a little portion of my *property* to assist in your education; while you give *yourself* to a life of toil of which I know nothing. No! you are the benefactor; I am the beneficiary. You are performing a part of the labor which belongs to me. We are both under equal obligations to our gracious Saviour, but you are willing to bear the heat and burden of the day, if I will contribute a little to help your outfit. A poor widow gives her mite to assist the son of another poor widow in becoming a missionary to the heathen. The first gives her money, but retains her son to be the prop of her declining years; the latter gives no money, but parts with her only son, and that son is a missionary, and goes out, perhaps, to be devoured by the cannibals of the Indian Ocean.* Which of those two young men is a beneficiary? Which of those two widows makes sacrifices for Christ? You have a son who is well qualified to be a missionary; but you think

* See the excellent remarks made at the last annual meeting of the American Education Society by the Rev. William A. Stearns, of Cambridge, Mass.

that he has learning and accomplishments which peculiarly fit him to labor in some honorable station at home. You cannot bear the thought of parting with him forever. But are not you and your son specially called upon to help that indigent youth who longs to carry the name of his Saviour to some distant region of the earth, if he can only have the adequate intellectual and spiritual preparation? Ought you to hesitate in aiding him for this enterprise? And after the utmost which you have done in a pecuniary way, which is the beneficiary,—you, who dwell in the bosom of your family, encircled with literary and religious privileges more than you can name, or he, who has hazarded his life on the high places of the field?

A small number of men in our country receive an annual pension of eighty or ninety dollars. But who are the beneficiaries? Those who pay these pensions, or the scarred and maimed veterans, the venerable relics of half a hundred battle-fields, who sowed in blood the ample harvests which we are now reaping? Who is the beneficiary; he who gives fifty cents a year to the Foreign Mission treasury, or he whose life-blood is burnt up under the blazing sun of the tropics, or who encounters a life of great self-denial in the unbroken forests of the West?

By these remarks we would not imply that gratitude is not becoming in one who is assisted in his education for the ministry. In proportion as he is qualified for the work to which he is looking forward, he will be free from all assumption, from all airs of self-importance, from all disposition to claim anything from his fellow Christians. At the same time there ought to be, as the apostle says, an *equality*. One man is not bound to perform the labors of every body else, and to wear an opprobrious epithet in addition. If it is his duty to spend his life among the heathen, then it is the duty of the churches to help him to get ready to go. They are not so much conferring a favor on him, as clearing their own skirts from the blood of the perishing pagan. It is not charity which they are exhibiting, it is obligation which not one of them can guiltlessly shake off. He is indeed bound to be humble, grateful, prudent,—but chiefly from his relations to his Saviour. He is not authorized to take any course which will diminish in his bosom that sense of manly self-respect without which a minister or missionary is worth but little.

2. Another difficulty arises from inadequate views of the importance of a protracted course of education. The subject is not easily apprehended on the part of many. It does not touch so many chords of sympathy in the human bosom as most other charitable objects do. It has but few tales of suffering to narrate which find a responsive echo in a thousand hearts. It has no direct relations either to the wants of the body or of the soul. It is based on something less tangible, which has fewer points of contact with the common apprehension. It proceeds on the assumption that those who aspire to be teachers in religion, must be men of patient reflection, of deliberate purpose, whose understanding is practised to discern good and evil, who possess that combined sound judgment and learning which is the result of the study of books and of men; who can stand up before others with something of that authority which good sense, correct taste, a disciplined understanding and unaffected piety never fail to command. These acquisitions, however, are the result of time, of long and careful attention, of habits of exact study, and of years of assiduous application to the Father of Spirits, who endows with a portion of his own wisdom him, and him only, who both hopes and quietly waits for the blessing.

It is difficult, however, to make these things obvious to the Christian public, to make them enter into and become part of the permanent convictions of the mass of Christians. They can see the value of the distribution of the Bible, or of the Saint's Rest, or of the erection of the Sailor's Home, or that a foreign missionary must have his daily bread; but they cannot exactly see the importance of spending ten of the best years of one's life in the schools, or what bearing it has upon the work of going out and telling men the simple story of the cross.

It is owing to this cause, in part, that the society has labored under difficulty from its foundation. Its aim is too intellectual, too far removed from the general sympathy. The time is too long between the sowing of the seed and the reaping of the harvest. Immediate, palpable result is the order of the day. The precept of the Scripture is reversed, and men choose to walk by sense, not by faith. The acquisition of ministerial education has too much to do with the future and the invisible to ensure a wide-spread and continued popularity.

3. Some prejudice has resulted from the fact that the plan of the Education Society appears to be exalting the claims, and multiplying the numbers of one of the learned professions. Why this incessant magnifying of a single class of men? Why this uninterrupted protrusion of the importance of the clerical function? Why must all other orders of society be, impliedly at least, dishonored by ringing perpetual changes upon the dignity of the ministerial office, which is held, at the best, but by an insignificant portion of the community? Must our eleven sheaves fall down and do obeisance to this solitary bundle of grain?

Complaints like these may not often take the form of words, but that they are felt by an increasing number of Christians in our country, there can be no doubt. The separation of society into distinct orders does not accord with some tendencies of the age. Resistance to it appears to be the right and duty of all who would aspire to the claim of freemen. Those who have not advanced thus far in opposition to the existing condition of things, experience some hesitation, or, at least, do not give their cordial support to an institution that seems designed to augment the factitious distinctions of society.

A sufficient reply to objections of this kind is found in the fact, that the Christian Ministry is of divine appointment, unequivocally and decisively, for all such as believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures; that without its active agency no other great interest of society is safe or can prosper; and that, if it is indispensable for one community, it is equally so for all communities. Thus the question of its increase is the same as the question, whether there shall be any ministry at all. It ought, also, to be recollected that this profession stands perfectly distinct from all others in its renunciation of earthly objects at the outset. It seeks *you*, not *yours*. It therefore comes into competition with no other interest. Its kingdom is not of this world. It is the servant of all for the good of all. It is the friend of all alike. It ought therefore to excite no suspicions, when in reality it affords the main safeguard for the most precious interests of man. The question of its increase is the question whether civilization, literature, national prosperity, shall advance, as truly as it is whether Christianity shall make any further progress.

4. Another, and a principal cause of the difficulties with which the Society has labored, is the alleged failure, intellectual or moral, of many who have been aided. The Society has been charged with an indiscriminate distribution of its funds. The worthy and the unworthy have alike shared its bounties. Deeply seated prejudices have been fostered in many communities, it is affirmed, by the delinquencies of those who were living on sacred funds.

It is not denied that there have been disappointed hopes; fond expectations have been blasted. In other words, imperfection has characterized this department of labor as it has every other. Directors and committees are not endued with the skill to divine. They lay no claim to the Apostolic gift of discerning of spirits. They know that to judge of human character is frequently a matter of great delicacy and difficulty. Nothing is more common than tardy growth and late development. The promises of spring are no certain index of the harvests of summer. Brilliant precocity not unfrequently sinks into a dull and stationary middle-age. Not a few men who have honored the ministerial office would have certainly been thrust back to their old calling, if those summary rules had been applied which some men would advocate.

A distinguished individual connected with Yale College, remarked in a public meeting, that in the examination of a candidate for the patronage of the Society, it was almost decided that his talents would not justify his reception. He was, however, received, and he has since been particularly instrumental in reducing a chaotic pagan dialect into a regular written form, and in translating into it the whole of the Bible. The same remarks are applicable to the early history of one whose course in the eastern hemisphere has been so much like that of his Lord in giving sight to the blind. His prayers would have been early stopped by our ardent judges of character. One of his fellow laborers gave no indications in his collegiate life of the eminence which he has since reached.

By the citing of these instances it is not intended to justify any negligence, any want of discriminating attention, any failure to adhere to strict rules on the part of those who administer the funds in question. But the longer one lives, and the more he has to do with forming an opinion of human char-

acter, especially in the young, the more necessity he will see for caution, for patience, for kind indulgence. It is the superficial judge only who is forward to form and pronounce a decision.

The sweeping condemnation which is often made on this point, is totally unauthorized. Were there space, it could be set aside by a minute specification of facts, beginning at any point almost on the globe, and stopping at nearly every Protestant missionary station from Lake Superior to Canton. It is a well known fact, that those who have been aided by Education Societies have been *volunteers* when any deadly breach was to be entered, when any exposed bastion was to be stormed, when the drum was beating for a forlorn hope. If others have shrunk from the perilous field, these have not; if others were ready to nestle down in the pleasant parishes of New England, these were not overforward to do so. The strongest statements on this point will be borne out, if any one will take the list of the Home and Foreign Mission Societies, and mark those who have preached Christ in the regions *beyond*, where he had not been named.

II. We are prepared to consider the question,—Is there now, and is there likely to be, a great deficiency in the number of ministers of the Gospel in our country?

It has been strenuously argued by an eminent and excellent individual, that the supply of preachers will keep pace with the demand; that in the natural order of things, without any extraordinary effort, the number of those who enter upon this work will correspond to the requisition which is made for their services. Such, it is said, is the principle of Political Economy. If, from any cause, the demand for a commodity exceeds the supply, there being more who wish to obtain it than can be supplied with it, there is produced an active competition among purchasers, and an immediate increase in the number of producers. This reasoning is doubtless correct in most departments of labor, manual, political, or literary. If there should be a great demand for school-teachers, there would be a rise in the amount of compensation offered, and a consequent increase in the number of those who would seek this employment.

But in respect to the religious interests of men, the case is widely different. The want of religious institutions exists where it is not felt. The need is urgent when the insensi-

bility to it is profound. Men are overtaken with a fatal malady, but they are utterly averse to the remedy. This very apathy is the strongest reason why the antidote should be applied. In this case we are not to wait for a demand. We are to go and create it. We are to tell men that they are in a starving condition. We are to make them hunger and thirst for the bread and water of life. We cannot afford, and they cannot afford, to wait till there is a voluntary application for relief. Ere that, they may be beyond redemption.

Besides, in our country, it is happily understood that none are to enter upon the work of preaching the Gospel, except those who have felt its saving efficacy. Accordingly, the number of educated men who assume the sacred profession becomes extremely limited. It is not a third, nor even a fourth part of those who graduate at our colleges. For a work so thoroughly spiritual, as is that of preaching the Gospel, most students feel little inclination. And the number is still further diminished by the constant self-denial incident to the work of the ministry. We have no sinecures, no chapels of ease, no dainty pluralities, no cathedral stalls, no alluring college fellowships. There is little leisure for literary studies, for pleasant literary companionship. Every thing must bear upon one object,—the preaching of the Gospel. Every book that is read, almost, has something to do with the construction or illustration of a sermon.

The prospect of ecclesiastical distinction can be but a feeble motive. Ministerial parity is the doctrine of seven-eighths of the people of the country.

Pecuniary motives are equally uninviting. Probably the annual average compensation of clergymen of all denominations throughout the United States, does not exceed three hundred dollars, if it does not fall short of that sum. It is generally understood that a minister who is governed by such considerations ought to vacate his office.

It is evident, therefore, that the principle of Political Economy can here find no place. The radical aversion of men to the Gospel shuts out that principle as inapplicable.

But the great deficiency in the number of the preachers of the Gospel, present and prospective, may be directly argued from various considerations.

In providing the means of grace, we are to remember, in the first place, the great number of sects. A town of five or

six thousand inhabitants must be sub-divided into ten or a dozen parishes. Two or three hundred individuals must set up their ecclesiastical banners, and lead a languishing life, in order that the rights of conscience may be maintained, or that some favorite dogma may be duly honored. This dividing process extends to every part of the United States. In the newly settled regions it is especially rife. A single community is frequently made up not only of the various sects which are indigenous to our soil, but of those of German, Irish, or Scotch growth. Each is pertinaciously attached to its peculiarities, and must have the Gospel preached in its own way, or not at all. As if these divisions were not minute and distracting enough, there is the spectacle of one of the largest and most enlightened denominations, completely bisected throughout the United States, and refusing to meet together, though adhering to the same formula of doctrine and modes of worship.

In making spiritual provision for our countrymen, therefore, this peculiarity must not be overlooked. To provide a competent clergyman for each one thousand of the population, though we are now immensely short of that provision, is, in effect, to withhold the Gospel from the great mass of the people. We must meet them as they are, not as we would have them be. We must conform to their peculiarities, if we would save their souls. They must have preachers with the technics of whose theology they can sympathize. To deny them this, is to exclude the mass of them from the pale of salvation.

Again, the population in some parts of the country will necessarily remain thin and scattered for a number of years. This is the case with large districts of the southern States. Compact villages, where a thousand souls can enjoy the pastoral superintendence of a single minister, are comparatively rare. And in the more densely peopled West, the restless spirit of emigration is always at work, breaking up or weakening the organized churches and societies. The heaviest draughts for new colonies are now made upon the older portions of the West. Ohio and Western New York are re-producing themselves on the farther bank of the Mississippi. Indeed there seems to be no barrier to this migratory life except the shore of the Pacific. The word *home* appears to have lost all its attractions, or to have been dropped from the

vocabulary, and the passion which has taken its place in the bosom is that for cutting down the primeval forest, and of plunging into solitudes hitherto unvisited.

But these roving Bedaween of our western wilds must be followed by the institutions of the gospel. They must be preserved from becoming the prey of thoughtless ignorance or of sophistical infidelity. Whatever comfort they leave behind them, they must not leave the institutions of the gospel. Whatever privations they shall suffer in their new, and, for a time, sickly abode, they must not be bereft of that which can alone console the dying parent, or carry the child's departing spirit to its gracious Saviour. In other words, this restless love of change and adventure will greatly augment the responsibilities of Education and Home Mission Societies. Two or three clergymen will be needed when otherwise one might be sufficient.

Once more, this country, like Rome, in its perhaps fabled early history, is the asylum of all nations, the resort of men of every tongue and lineage. Such is the overcrowded state of many of the countries of Europe, so near a starving condition are multitudes of the population, so much is human liberty abridged in the old despoticisms of the continent, so wide-spread and flattering are the reports there of our democratic equality, and otherwise happy state, that it seems altogether probable that the tide of emigration hitherward has, by no means, reached its height. We are called upon to grapple, not only with the vice and ignorance which are of native growth, but with much of that with which Europe is borne down.

A great proportion of these colonists, as is well known, are Roman Catholics, enveloped in the darkness which is the natural product of the Papal system. Multitudes of Protestants are such only in name. They know little of the gospel of Christ, and have less sympathy with our civil and sacred institutions. This heterogeneous mass are to be approached with candor, with all kindness, yet with the thorough conviction that if they cannot be woven, and fused into our system, and made with us one people, they will constitute a most malignant element for our utter destruction. Our only safety is in their conversion. Insensibility is ruin. If they get the mastery at our elections, retaining their European habits and views, we might as well at once give in our allegiance to

the old man at Rome, and receive as our protector some blood-thirsty Spanish-American wretch. We may depend upon it, that there is no other alternative. The gospel must find a lodgment in the hearts of these millions, or we may plunge into a sea of anarchy and blood like that with which the plains of Mexico have been for fifty years drenched. The preaching of the gospel is the only remedy. There may be admirable auxiliaries to this, but it is the living voice which is to pierce the vast sepulchres of the spiritually dead: it is mingled human and Christian sympathy, uttering itself through the eye, and giving vitality to every line of the countenance. We may talk, as we will, of the assimilating influence of our free institutions; we may laud as we may, the benefits of knowledge to the lower classes; there never was, and there never will be, any *national* civilization without the inculcation of inspired truth from the living lips and the burning heart. Greece and Rome never were civilized. Many of the freemen were; but how was it with the women almost without exception? How was it with the slaves, outnumbering, in some cases, the freemen twenty fold? It was the civilization of the ape, the refinement of the wolf.

Once more, the lives of clergymen are shorter at the present day than they were in the days of our fathers. There may not be a sufficient number of facts collected, the comparison of which would show how great is the diminution. There is, however, no reason to doubt, that the term of ministerial life is abridged several years on an average. Why should it not be so? This harp of a thousand strings is handled too roughly to endure. These delicate organs are too often strained to their utmost tension not to snap in sunder. How can two sermons be composed in six days, and three be preached on the Sabbath, and several lectures be delivered in the week, and some old feuds between church members be reconciled, and pastoral visitation gone over, without consuming the spirit and the body together? Instead of marveling that one young preacher falls before he has arrived at the anniversary of his ordination, the wonder is that scores of others do not.

This difficulty presses with peculiar weight upon our western brethren. They are often called to perform the pastoral labor of a county or of half a dozen counties, leaving their families perhaps in the midst of sickness and sorrow, or

bowed down under the disheartening effect of the principal malady of the country. It is no relief in such a case that one can preach without preparation. It is not very comforting to the nerves of a generous and high-minded man that he is able to give his hearers husks on the Sabbath. The reflection that one's mind is running to waste amid the always beginning, never ending calls for practical duty, will not be apt to lengthen out the life of a genuine scholar and minister. It is sad economy to send out an army just one-fourth large enough. It falls little short of a wanton waste of spiritual power to impose upon one man duties which could crush two men.

But such is the state of things in large districts of our country. While half a dozen men are in the process of education for the western States, the two or three who *were* in the field have fallen into the grave, or been disabled through excessive labors.

These considerations may be sufficient to show that there is, and that there is likely to be, a most deplorable deficiency in the number of preachers of the gospel. Particular facts, showing the same thing, might be multiplied almost without end. But it is not necessary. It seems like a work of supererogation to try to prove so plain a case.

III. The only remaining question, which we will briefly consider is this:—Are Education Societies fitted to supply this deficiency, at least in part? Is the system upon which they proceed a wise one?

In proof that it is, we remark that it is not a modern invention. It has been practised hundreds of years in all the principal countries of Europe. In the University of Paris as long ago as the 13th century, the pressure upon the poor students excited charitable benefactors to relieve it in an effectual manner. Houses were provided by individuals, as well as by religious orders, in which indigent scholars enjoyed the benefit of free lodgings. Free board was soon added, and in many cases small stipends or bursaries, in order to defray the necessary expenses of the schools, were procured. The same system has been pursued, to a great extent, in the Italian, Scotch, and English Universities. In some of the Scotch institutions one-third of the students are so aided. This generous assistance has been rendered in many cases by persons who encountered great difficulties themselves in

early life from their straitened circumstances. Education Societies are proceeding then, substantially, upon a plan which has been in use five hundred years. If this method of charitable aid had been unwise, if it had fostered indolent habits, if it had weakened the sense of moral obligation, or the motives for personal exertion in any considerable degree, would it not have been discovered in less time than five centuries? Some of the ablest men in every department of Church and State in England received their education in the charitable schools in and around the metropolis. The names of the Grants and the Thorntons of that country are written high on the same imperishable scroll as the Abbots, Boudinots, Phillipses, and Bartlets of our own land. Two hundred years ago, forty-four students, preparing for the ministry, were supported at Oxford and Cambridge Universities by an Education Society, framed with an exact system of rules, among whose trustees were Richard Baxter and Ralph Cudworth.

The plan is a wise one, from its peculiar adaptation to the state of our country. A great proportion of the families in the free States, probably from one-half to two-thirds are unable to defray the expenses of a liberal education for their sons. With frugal habits they can live comfortably from year to year. But to dispense with the assistance of the son, just at the age when his services begin to be valuable, and in addition, to expend directly six or eight hundred dollars, is entirely out of the question. Occasionally a young man of extraordinary energy will force his way over every impediment, and become, as it is said, the architect of his own fortune. There have been instances of this kind so marked that some have argued that we might rely upon this spontaneous, unassisted movement to fill the ranks of the ministry. Every youth, it has been contended, who is worth educating will, in some way or other, get the means. We reverse the order of Providence when we take away the motives for self-reliance.

But why, it may be asked, did not this self-supporting plan succeed before Education Societies were formed in our country? Why were not the ranks of the ministry full in 1816? On the contrary, why was there such a deplorable state of things in the lack of ministers, that there was a simultaneous inquiry all over the country: What shall be done? Here was, certainly, a long and favorable time in which to

try the experiment. There had been at the close of the last century, and at the beginning of this, extensive revivals of religion. And yet the ranks of the ministry remained mournfully and increasingly deficient. Why then did not a competent number of these self-sustaining men enter the sacred profession ? The failure shows, indubitably, that no adequate dependence can be placed on this source.

Again, the aid that is rendered enables the student to proceed in his calling without distracting anxieties. Nothing is more harassing to a scholar than perpetual pecuniary embarrassment, than the dread of incurring liabilities which he has no prospect of meeting. The mind must be free in order to act well. Depressing anxiety from any source cripples the will, palsies the resolution, and leaves the poor subject, in the midst of his unaccomplished studies, the prey of melancholy, if not of misanthropy. There are indeed some hardy spirits who can climb over these formidable steeps by the aid of a powerful body and an indomitable will. But their education will be marred and imperfect. It was a wise man who said that those *separated* themselves who would seek and intermeddle with all wisdom. Leisure, retirement, a tranquil state of the emotions, opportunities for acquiring habits of patient thinking, are absolutely necessary for one who is to be the public teacher of his fellow men. He will have experience enough of the stormy ocean which he is to buffet. He will not need to be in the ministry more than six months to learn by heart several chapters in the book of human experience. How inestimable, then, will be those mental and moral habits which will enable him to pursue his way with quiet decision, but which cannot be acquired, ordinarily, if the gripping hand of poverty has been upon him in his preparatory course. And if he is properly educated, he will not be a novice in the science of human nature. He has studied those books which have given him an insight into the subject, especially the book of his own heart, and as face answereth to face, so doth the heart of man to man.

There are three ways of rendering this assistance ; through private individuals, by a single church, or by an organized association. On the first method, no certain dependence can be placed. There is little responsibility. There will be no knowledge of a thousand cases of promising talent and piety. And it is generally an ungracious task to apply to an individ-

ual for pecuniary aid. The most deserving young men would be least inclined to do so.

To the second method, there are insuperable objections. The members of a church are liable to be biased for or against one of their own number. The youthful prophet, in these days, is frequently without honor in his own country. A church is not always the best judge of the literary promise of an individual. And then he must, almost necessarily, have a feeling of dependence upon his patrons, which does not exert the best influence upon his character. If there is a decided failure, the cause itself will be prejudiced in the view of that church for at least one generation.

Now an association comes in to his relief, with a well-digested plan, with rules which have had the test of many years' experiment, having no partialities for a particular part of the country, no favorite seminary of learning, but the impartial friend of all that will comply with its conditions.

It proposes to introduce into the ministry men of promising piety and of thorough education. And if there ever was a necessity for these two qualifications, they are indispensable now. What but piety can sustain the minister as he looks over his afflicted and distracted country? What but an unwavering trust in God can give him the heart to pray for his native land, when the flood-gates of the depravity of the old world are opened upon us, when patriotism in our rulers seems to be merged in a reckless party spirit, when pestilent religious delusions are popular in proportion to their absurdity and impiety.

Again, a thorough education for the ministry was never more urgently demanded than it is now. Never had the youthful preacher more occasion to be clad in the panoply of the Gospel. No language can adequately express the importance of his being familiar with the doctrines of the Gospel, with their mutual relations, and with the best methods by which they may be defended.

At no time since the Protestant Reformation has it been of more vital consequence to him to be versed in the history of the Church. Nothing would more contribute to his steadfastness, or to his power to grapple with the disorders of the present day. Scarcely any thing could furnish more pertinent proofs and illustrations to aid him in his work of preaching the Gospel, and of guiding the souls of men.

So likewise in respect to the interpretations of the Scriptures ; when multitudes are wresting them to their own destruction, putting upon them arbitrary meanings, deducing false inferences, placing their credibility on a sandy foundation, and exposing them to become the object of utter contempt. How imperative, then, is it upon every one who goes out into this world of delusion, that he should be armed at all points, well trained, thoroughly furnished.

But no less imperative is it that these youthful champions should not be borne down by pecuniary embarrassments in the early stages of their education ; that they should be aided so that they may enjoy a season of unbroken preparation.

If there be one agency which can save our great nation from going the way of every other republic—which can prevent her from becoming the scoff and jeer of all coming time, it is the agency which *might be* put forth in Education and Home Mission Societies. The latter are doing a service to our country worth more than all our fleets, and armies, and Congresses combined.

It is often said that our only hope is in revivals of religion. But can these be expected—we had almost said, how are they possible—without an able, stated, numerous ministry ? Without it, they are certain to end in the wild fire of the fanatic.

In pleading for the Education Society, we feel that we are pleading for one of the two or three instrumentalities which are to save our nation, and without which our power to bless the pagan world cannot exist. To let it languish is suicidal. We may depend upon it that it is an agency which is vital to the existence of every other.

We feel no envy at the success of the Foreign Missionary Society. Rather we rejoice that the friends of Christ have gathered round her in her darkest hours, and nobly sustained her. The churches of our land have given a most honorable testimony to their sense of the value of the Bible, in contributing more than three hundred thousand dollars in a year of pressing pecuniary embarrassment. That Society is of inestimable benefit in awakening and keeping alive a spirit of benevolence. All other institutions feel the salutary influence of this. No other could supply her place. She nobly goes in the van.

At the same time, her operations cannot proceed prosperously if the Education Society is abandoned. If the intimate connection of the two Societies is not seen now, it will be three years hence.

Just so will it be with other benevolent Societies. If you dry up the spring, you dry up the streams. If you break the connection at one point, you do at all others.

It has often occurred to us, that the people of the more favored parts of the Eastern States, of all others, will be led to judge erroneously in this matter, unless they cast their eye *beyond* their own small horizon. There is no want of ministers here. Why the necessity of increasing their number? But because there is no lack of civil liberty in this country, we might just as well argue that there is no lack in Spain, in Austria, in Turkey. Because we have an abundance of food, because the harvests are spreading and waving all around us; there are not fourteen hundred thousand persons in England starving at this moment. Because we live on a green island, an oasis of plenty, there is not a continent of barren and burning sand stretching all around us. Because we happen to see no spiritual want, therefore there is none in our immense western regions.

But let us lift up our eyes and look over the mountains. Let us believe credible and overwhelming testimony. Let our faith, if our eye cannot, affect our heart. Let us act as those ought to act who live, as we had almost said, in the garden of Eden. Let us feel, pray, labor to save our beloved country from the doom which seems to be menacing her more and more every day.

ARTICLE IX.

MUSIC PROGRESSIVE.

By Rev. John Richards, Pastor of the Church of Dartmouth College.

THE history of music, both as a science and an art, is involved in obscurity. As a science we do not know how much the ancients understood of it, and as an art, to what excellence they attained in the management of instruments and the voice. Very early music was cultivated as an art. Indeed we have one fragmentary notice of music before the flood, "And Adah bare Jabal; he was the father of such as dwell in tents and of such as have cattle. And his brother's name was Jubal: he was the father of all such as *handle the harp and the organ*. The Egyptians doubtless practised music, both vocal and instrumental; and the Hebrews, at least as early as Miriam celebrated the passage of the Red Sea with timbrels and with dances, saying, "Sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously, the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea." We hear of a band of instrumental music in the days of Nebuchadnezzar,—"At what time ye hear the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, psaltery, and dulcimer, and all kinds of music, ye fall down and worship the golden image which Nebuchadnezzar the king hath set up." In Grecian times we read of Timotheus, the first, and the second, who ravished the ears of monarchs and people.

But, as to what was the character of the ancient music, we do not know. If they had any method of notation to exhibit sounds to the eye, no fragments remain. Whether they were acquainted with harmony, or whether their strains were simple melodies, we do not know. The more general opinion is, that they were acquainted with melody only. Another opinion strenuously maintained is, that they were acquainted only with the minor mode; which must have given to their music a sombre character. This opinion is strengthened by reference to the present character of Chinese music. This nation seems to have remained stationary in improvement for many centuries; and so pertinacious of old customs are they, and so hostile to new ones, that we may with much confidence study the present in China, not only as an index, but

as a picture of the past, almost to the days of Noah. But in respect to this nation, it is well known that their music is confined to the barrenest melodies, and these in the minor mode, making their music as lugubrious to the ear, as their countenances are to the eye.

The progress of music from the days of Alexander to the close of the dark ages in Europe, it might be interesting to trace, were there time; but passing that whole subject, I go on to say that the full development of music, as a science and an art, was reserved for the western world as its theatre, and the three last centuries as its period. Then and there instruments were brought to a degree of excellence which the ancient and the middle world knew nothing of,—the system of notation, both invented and perfected,—the science of harmony analyzed and displayed,—modulation from key to key and from mode to mode introduced,—the full power and variety of the human voice explored, and finally the union of all these in the Opera and Oratorio.

That we may not discourse to no purpose by using terms unintelligible to some, we digress to explain a little the Opera and the Oratorio. In their musical characteristics they are essentially the same. They differ specifically in this respect—the Oratorio is sacred, the Opera secular. Both are dramatical; and while the Opera admits more action and exhibition of character, the Oratorio is confined chiefly to the drama of narration. In both a subject of thought is chosen and a unity preserved throughout. In the Opera a fine example is found in the *Tauberflöte* (*Magic Flute*) of Mozart, in the Oratorio, the *Messiah* of Handel and the *Creation* of Haydn. In all these the narration is conducted by a series of vocal recitations, that is, single voices, duets or dialogues of two voices, terzetts, of three voices, of chorusses and grand chorusses, in which many voices join to give utterance to the emotions which the subject is supposed to inspire. The whole is accompanied by such instruments as the genius of the composer perceives will heighten the effect. That this idea is not fantastic, but is in accordance with the nature of things, is manifest from the temple music of Jerusalem, of which we have some reason to believe a pattern was given to Moses in the mount. As examples, Psalms 21st and 84th, in their responsive and choral character, contain the elements of the Oratorio. More to the purpose, may be adduced the

Oratorio once performed in the skies in the hearing of the shepherds of Bethlehem. "And lo, the angel of the Lord came upon them, and the glory of the Lord shone around them ; and they were sore afraid. And the angel said unto them :

"Fear not ; for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be unto all people. For unto you is born this day, in the city of David, a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign unto you ; ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger.' "

Thus the recitation. Then the chorus—"And suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host praising God, and saying,

"Glory to God in the highest,
And on earth peace, good will toward men.' "

At one of the festivals at Rome, there is annually sung a composition entitled, "The Miserere"—a production of great power. The Popes had long forbid the choir from furnishing a copy on pain of excommunication. The youthful Mozart, when first he heard this production, went home and wrote down the whole from memory with absolute correctness, as was afterwards tested. O that there had been a Mozart—at least one—among those Bethlehem shepherds, that we might have had one specimen of the music of heaven for humble imitation here on earth !

The Oratorio, then, combines in its plan all the powers of music as a science and an art. It was reserved for these late centuries to comprehend and undertake this grand enterprise, and it may be said to have reached one climax, the climax of execution, soon after the days of Handel. At an Oratorio in London, 1791, there were assembled on one stage more than a thousand performers. Of these, 563 were vocalists, and 514 instrumentalists. Among the latter were

250 Violins,	40 Oboes,
50 Violas,	40 Bassoons,
50 Violoncellos,	12 Horns,
27 Dble. Basses,	14 Trumpets,
8 Drums,	12 Trombones,
1 Organ.	

In this exhibition it was found that 377 stringed instru-

ments could accompany a single voice without discord at false time, or violating the due proportion of vocal and instrumental sound ;—the single voice and the 377 stringed instruments produced one delightful blending of articulate and inarticulate sounds. The only deficiency remarked was the want of sufficient depth of bass ;—there being no instruments yet invented of sufficient magnitude, and withia the compass of human movement, unaided by machinery, to produce a bass proportioned to the other parts.

With an orchestra of such power and variety—with an execution so nice, and with the appearance of such a genius as Handel, this behoved to become an epoch in the history of music ; and that it should awaken and call into action kindred genius was to be expected. In the track of Handel followed Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven,—all masters of the Opera, masters of the Oratorio,—each having his peculiarities, so distinctly marked, that the practised ear at once distinguishes and recognizes their several productions.

In the compositions of these masters some confidently affirm that the ultimate climax of the science is attained ; that the *Messiah* of Handel, the *creation* of Haydn, the *Tauber-Flote* of Mozart, the *Mount of Olives* of Beethoven, as musical compositions, will never be surpassed. From this opinion I dissent. It may be that the mathematical relations of music are thoroughly understood, and the rules of counter-point, based on principles already known, as well digested as they ever will be. But it is the prerogative of genius to disregard rules, to soar above them, and, by seizing hold of principles hidden from the view of the common mind, to lay the foundation of new rules. Then again, as to variety on the basis of rules already laid down, there is a limitless field. Handel is not Haydn, Haydn is not Mozart, nor Mozart Beethoven. In Beethoven's mind there were undeveloped stores of variety, which his deafness and premature death forbade the world to enjoy. What hinders the rise of master-minds in periods yet to come, who by their variety—their musical idiosyncrasy, shall astonish and delight the world yet more and more ?

Again, the history of the celebrated *Miserere*, as performed at the Sistine Chapel at Rome, is instructive in this view.

Its power to awe, to melt, to entrance is indescribable, as there performed. One of the German princes desired a performance of this composition at his own court. A true copy was furnished and the performance had, but with no effect; and so great was the disappointment that the court at Rome was charged with sending a false copy. The investigation showed that the copy was a true one, and that the superior effect at Rome was owing to the peculiar management of the voice in respect to quality of tone. While the singers at Vienna struck the same note in the scale, with perhaps the same quantity of sound as those at Rome, and observed all the known rules laid down in books, still they missed the power of the composition in not attaining the quality of tone adapted to the subject, and which the choir of the Pope had gained by long practice—the practice of a life—and the traditionaly teachings of generations. This shows that the field of variety in music in one respect, viz., quality of tone, is far from being explored; and in other respects, as modulation, time, key, force or quantity of tone, we know it is literally endless. The peculiarities of Handel and his constellation of kindred genius may be exhausted, but other genius will arise to strike out new paths in composition, and open to view new modes of execution, to invent new instruments or increase the power of those already known.

Once more, the subjects on which to found the Opera and the Oratorio are not exhausted. Has Handel exhausted the subject of the Messiah? or Haydn that of the Creation? These subjects, either of them, but especially the former, we are taught are inexhaustible. Now, it is the subject that gives the strongest impulse to genius, and music more than beauty addresses itself to the emotions directly. It is more adapted therefore to become the handmaid of thought; and when the subject itself has thought that awakens emotion—deep and broad, and flowing as the sea; when such themes as, *God made the world and all things therein*, and, *God redeemed the world when lost in hopeless captivity*;—we say, when themes like these are proposed, the mind pure and enthusiastic alike in music and the thought cannot fail to kindle, and the subject cannot be exhausted; the music and the thought will act and re-act with mutual effect. The world will yet see other Oratorios like the Messiah, and on the same subject, that will call forth highest admiration, as well as become the

means of quickening devotion. And in the wide range of thought which lies open to the human mind, especially in the millennium, when all hearts shall be pure, is there any limit to subjects adapted to music, to be enforced and aided by it?

But we turn to a more interesting topic. Whether or not music has reached its climax in this world, have we reason to believe it is destined to an onward progress in the world to come? We answer this question in the affirmative; and though the discussion of it may lead to uncertain fields of hypothesis and conjecture, still it is a region in which one delights to wander, and which, with proper guards, need not exert any dangerous influence over us, but, on the contrary, may have a purifying and ennobling effect.

The principles of taste within us are enduring as the soul itself—they are co-essential, consubstantial with it. The emotions of beauty and sublimity will be awakened within us whenever the appropriate objects are presented. Now, hypothesis and conjecture apart, the Bible assures us that in the future world we shall have a body adapted to the new state that awaits us. "There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body." And although the phrase *spiritual body* is at first sight a little contradictory, the meaning doubtless is, that *here* there is a body adapted to the present state, and *there* a body adapted to the future state. It is explained in the context,—"As is the earthly such are they which are earthly; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly." And there can surely be no question but the heavenly body will be a material body. For it is the very body we now possess that is to rise from the grave and ascend up to meet the Lord in the air; even as it was Christ's veritable body that left the tomb, and which from the Mount of Olives did verily ascend up "till a cloud received him out of sight." Still it will be a body changed in its properties, endowed with new attributes, enrobed with glory and with powers which in this world it knew nothing of. And as the soul will be connected with a body, it follows, almost of course, that it will be conversant with material objects. The great and the minute, the distant and the near, the gross and the subtle will come under its observation; and whatever we may think of the three lower senses, it can hardly be ques-

tioned that that spiritual body will retain the two noblest ones—the sight and the hearing. There will, we think, be a spiritual ear. Not that the senses of that body will be limited to two—it may have many, such as it is impossible for us now to conceive of. But those of the eye and the ear we shall doubtless possess; and these, heightened in their powers, will be inlets of ideas and conduits of emotions in some measure closely analogous to our perceptions here. Man's chief end both here and there is to glorify God and enjoy him. Now, if the inspection of a passion-flower or a dew-drop awaken in us ideas of God's wisdom and skill before unknown, and their beauties charm us with emotions of delight before unfelt, and if the sight of heaven's concave produce the same ideas and emotions, yet heightened by the addition of sublimity, why may we not glorify God, and enjoy Him there by similar observations of his works, made under the higher advantages of a superior organ. One basis of eternal praise to God, undoubtedly will be, the display of his glorious attributes through the works of his hands.

Euler's theory of light is that all space is filled with a subtle fluid—it may be the electric fluid—and that the vibrations of this fluid, by impulses from luminous bodies, is the source of the perception of light by means of our visual organ. This theory is not without its strong arguments. Such a fluid may be equally a MEDIUM OF SOUND to the auditory organ of a spiritual body. In short, it is not unreasonable to suppose, nor visionary to hypothecate, that the spiritual body will possess powers of music analogous to those of this world, but inconceivably greater in degree. In short we do hypothecate that there will be an ear that can appreciate all sounds from the highest to the lowest, and of all variety of tone, that distance will present no obstacle to the consequence of sound, so that the amphitheatre for the Oratories of heaven may be, not the contracted space which the angels occupied in our atmosphere when they sung "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, good will to men," but a hollow sphere equal in diameter to a planet's orbit;—that the voice and other instruments of producing sound will not be like these of earthly mould—always getting out of tune, and in their nature and constitution imperfect, but strong, accurate, and in the highest sense very good.

Moreover, that the soul there, augmented in its stores of knowledge and enlarged in its capacities of emotion, will be in no want of subjects to explore, nor of power to comprehend and feel them ; but as genius here is stimulated to highest strains of music, in proportion as the subject is ennobling, so it will be there ; that as the subjects of the Creation and the Messiah are here the most exalted subjects, as they will be there ; that as here they can be but feebly comprehended through sin and earthly infirmities, there, on the contrary, there will be no impediments in the way of worthy conception and worthy celebration of them, and that as these subjects can never be exhausted, for the reason that God's creations are infinite in number, extent and variety, and his redeeming love in Jesus Christ, unfathomable in its depths, there will be in heaven a field of unknown variety and everlasting interest.

On this subject we may perhaps derive some light from the *Apocalypse* of St. John. This book in its form is scenic and dramatic,—in short an *Oratorio*, in which the destinies of the church, militant and triumphant, are represented from the time of John onwards.

“ After this I looked, and behold a door was opened in heaven, and a voice said, ‘ Come up hither and I will show thee things which must be hereafter.’ ” Chap. 4 : 1.

However commentators differ in the interpretation of the details of this mysterious book, they seem to agree mainly in this grand outline ;—that it foreshows the downfall, first of Judaism, next of Paganism, and thirdly of Satan in all other forms of delusion, by the final triumph of the church in the world, and its exaltation to the New Jerusalem in the next.

These may be called the three acts of the drama. Some make five acts by introducing two into the third. One commentator calls the first part of the first act the *Prolusion*, or the preparation and adorning of the scene. All this action is a series of recitations and dialogues between two or more, interspersed here and there with chorusses and grand chorusses.

Thus in the *Prolusion*, chap. iv, we have the quartett of the four beasts before the throne,

“ Holy, holy, holy LORD God Almighty,
Which was, and is, and is to come.”

And then the response of the twenty-four elders in a semi-chorus,

“ Thou art worthy, O LORD, to receive glory, and honor, and power;
For thou hast created all things,
And for thy pleasure they are and were created.”

And again, chap. v, when the Apostle’s tears are dried because the Lamb, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, has prevailed to open the book, the elders, in semi-chorus, fall down before the Lamb, and sing a new song, saying,

“ Thou art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof:
For thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood,
Out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation,
And hath made us unto our God kings and priests:
And we shall reign on the earth.”

And immediately was heard the voice of many angels round about the throne. This was a full chorus. And what a chorus it was! The number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, (the square of 10,000 is 100,000,000,) and thousands of thousands;—saying with a loud voice,

“ Worthy is the Lamb that was slain,
To receive power, and riches, and wisdom,
And strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.”

But even this is not the fullest chorus. There immediately succeeds another, of which there is no attempt at enumeration, and in which the Apostle heard every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, saying,

“ Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power,
Be unto him that sitteth upon the throne,
And to the Lamb, for ever and ever !”

To this magnificent chorus the four beasts again add their quartett, saying “ AMEN :” and the four and twenty elders again join in a semi-chorus, falling down and worshipping Him that liveth for ever and ever.

Again, chap. vii, the chorusses are introduced at the sealing

of the servants of God. A hundred and forty-four thousand are sealed with the mark of God in their foreheads, from out of all the tribes of the children of Israel. These form a distinct chorus by themselves—the representatives of the redeemed from the Jewish church, and which afterwards sing a “new song” on Mount Zion, which none but the redeemed can learn. Immediately after the sealing of these hundred and forty-four thousand, the Apostle beheld and lo, “a great multitude which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues, stood before the throne and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands ; and cried with a loud voice, saying,

‘Salvation to our God, which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb.’”

Here we have indeed the grand chorus of all the redeemed, and we have too the peculiarity of that new song which none but the redeemed could learn. It is, *Salvation by grace*. We *ascribe* our salvation to God and the Lamb—not unto ourselves. It is the same as, “Worthy the Lamb that was slain, for thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood.”

Responsive to this chorus of the redeemed sings another grand chorus. It is the chorus of angels—angels themselves are entranced and inspired by the wondrous harmony of the new song—“And all the angels stood round about the throne, and about the elders and the four beasts, and fell before the throne on their faces, and worshipped God, saying,

‘Amen ! Blessing, and glory, and wisdom,
And thanksgiving, and honor, and power, and might,
Be unto our God for ever and ever ! Amen.’”

Immediately after this—the close of the Prolusion—is a recitation of one of the elders, in reply to the inquiry concerning the redeemed, “what are these, and whence come they ?”

“These are they which have come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. Therefore are they before the throne of God and serve him day and night in his temple ; and he that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them. They shall hunger no more, neither shall they thirst any more ; neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat. For the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters ; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.”

In the close of this act, when the fall of Judaism is accomplished, at the sounding of the trumpet of the seventh angel, we have examples of two chorusses, thus: "And there were great voices in heaven saying :

'The kingdoms of this world are become
The kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ ;
And he shall reign for ever and ever.'

" And the four and twenty elders which sat before God on their seats, fell upon their faces, and worshipped God, saying,

" We give thee thanks, O LORD God Almighty,
Which art, and wast, and art to come ;
Because thou hast taken to thee thy great power, and hast reigned.
And the nations were angry, and thy wrath is come,
And the time of the dead, that they should be judged :
And that thou shouldest give reward unto thy servants the prophets,
And to the saints and them that fear thy name, small and great ;
And shouldest destroy them which destroy the earth.' "

In the second act—fall of Paganism—there are many examples. We quote two : first, chapter xv, where the apostle saw " as it were a sea of glass mingled with fire ; and them that had gotten the victory over the beast, and over his image, and over his mark, and over the number of his name, stand on the sea of glass having the harps of God. And they sing the song of Moses the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb, saying :

' Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty !
Just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints ;
Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name ?
For thou only art holy :
For all nations shall come and worship before thee ;
For thy judgments are made manifest.'

Again, chapter xix, an angel comes forth, and with minute and terrific detail, gives a recitative description of the destruction of Babylon, the symbol of the seat of the Pagan persecuting power ; and then another angel comes and confirms the account by a further recitative, and by casting a mill stone into the sea. And there is heard a *chorus of much people* in heaven, saying :

" Alleluia ! Salvation, and glory, and honor, and power, unto the LORD.
For true and righteous are his judgments ;

For he hath judged the great whore,
Which did corrupt the earth with her fornication,
And hath avenged the blood of his servants at her hand."

"And again they said :

"Alleluia!"

"And her smoke rose up for ever and ever. And the four and twenty elders and the four beasts fell down and worshipped God that sat upon the throne, saying :

"Amen; Alleluia!"

"And a voice came out of the throne, saying :

"Praise our God, all ye his servants,
And ye that fear him, both small and great."

And the apostle heard, obedient to this call, "as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunders," saying :

"Alleluia! for the LORD God omnipotent reigneth.
Let us be glad and rejoice, and give honor to him,
For the marriage of the Lamb is come,
And his wife hath made herself ready."

After this, in the third act, is recited the overthrow of Satan and the prosperity of the church on earth, and the transactions of the judgment day; and the act closes with a minute recitative description of the New Jerusalem, and the final establishment therein of all the redeemed—the church triumphant.

We see then that the *Apocalypse* is a series of recitations, duets (dialogues) and chorusses, with the accompaniment of instruments—"harpers harping with their harps." In it are all the essentials—it is the true type of the *Oratorio*.

And now is it a merely fanciful idea that *Oratorios* will be performed in heaven?—that there will be music there—music of the voice, and music upon strings? Some doubtless will say, it is merely fanciful, and that the language, imagery and arrangement, are only in accommodation to us while here in the body. In reply to this suggestion, we say, it is admitted

that, if there be nothing material and sensible beyond this world, still, God, in making a revelation showing things that must be hereafter, would use language such as we could understand, and employ figures and images drawn from this world to describe the things of the world to come: and therefore we cannot prove from the language and the images merely that there will be music in the heavenly world. But on the other hand, if there be something material and sensible beyond the present, would not God much more employ such language and such images? Now we do know that there is something material and sensible beyond the present. There is at least a spiritual body—a body adapted to the future state;—we do know that Christ ascended to heaven with a body, that that body was at once the pledge that the bodies of all the saints shall rise, and the type of those spiritual bodies. “Who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned *like* unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself.” But why the Captain of our salvation, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Lamb that was slain, our Saviour, furnished with a body? and why his saints furnished with a body like thereunto? Why, except that the soul be aided by the senses thereof in the perceptions of God’s glories, and in the emotions by which it shall the better love and praise **HIM THAT SITTETH ON THE THRONE AND THE LAMB** forever? To behold his glories, and to sound forth and hear his praise! Surely these faculties will aid the employments, and heighten the enjoyments of the heavenly world.

It is not fanciful then to suppose the imagery and dress of the Apocalypse intended to convey to us an idea, faint though it be, of actual music in the future world. Our greatest tendency to err doubtless is, in our inability to conceive of the power of the celestial senses, the celestial ear, the celestial medium of sound, the celestial voice, and the celestial instruments. The paucity and, poverty of the earthly materials with their perversion and abuse is so constantly before our minds, that it almost inevitably forces us to think it derogatory and mean to transfer the conception of any thing analogous to the heavenly world.

There was exhibited in the country, some twenty years since, a company of automaton figures, that were made to play a few airs upon horns, the clarionett, flute, and one artificial

windpipe to imitate the voice: and it was called "THE SALOON OF APOLLO." The mechanism was ingenious, but the musical effect mean. One could not help thinking, that if the god of the silver bow had happened along there, how quickly he would have shot their heads off as insolent lampooners of his art.

Again, Beethoven for years of the last period of his life, and when perfectly deaf, played on a piano without strings. Here his wildest—his sublimest strains were composed. Where was the music? not in his shattered ear—nor shattered instrument, but in his soul;—that without an instrument and without an ear, revelled, with almost insane pleasure, in the bare conceptions, aided only by the reminiscences of former sounds.

Such facts show us that the very poverty of the earthly materials, and the very disparagement we heap on them, when we think of the heavenly, betrays the aspiration of the mind. The mind, in respect to the objects of the eye and the ear, is reaching after something which the frailty and weakness of this mortal state denies. But it expects—it desires—it looks forward to—a state, where it shall drink in its fill of the emotions which it covets, with aidances adequate to its enlarged desires.

Therefore, my belief is, that there is another, a glorious theatre, in reserve for us, even a heavenly; where, with an ear that will never grow dull, a medium that will present no hindrance, a voice that will never break, a body that will bear all pressure of emotion, subjects of infinite variety, extent and grandeur, drawn from God's creative and redemptive acts; a scene, where we may praise him with all the powers of heart and tongue, where we may go on praising him with more and more of skill and enthusiasm and joy.

Therefore, our believe that the scenes of the Apocalypse are not arranged as they are, merely in accommodation to our earthly condition, but are intended to shadow forth to us some points of real analogy between the music we essay to perform here, and the music of the heavenly world, that we may in the future world in fact hear the very chorusses, and bear some humble part in them, which John, rapt in the trance of Patmos, heard. The chorus of unnumbered millions, the millions of redeemed sinners will be *sung and heard*; and it will be responded to by the chorus of unnumbered millions of angels, and they both will be like "the voice of many waters

and of mighty thunderings ;" no want, as in Handel's puny orchestra of a thousand performers, of bass deep-toned enough to balance other parts. There, genius, which in this world so quickly finds its limit through want of appropriate facilities, may soar at will; and with faculties unlike those in this world which grow weary and give out, will never need refreshment or repair. There, one shall not grow deaf with Beethoven, nor another die at thirty-six with Mozart, through sheer exhaustion of the body, nor a third expire with Haydn at the sound of canon bombarding Vienna; but above weariness, confusion and wreck shall sing on and sing on, in sweeter and yet sweeter, in louder and yet louder strains.

"There, no tongue shall silent be,
 All shall join sweet harmony,
 That through heaven, all spacious round,
 Praise to God may ever sound."

And here, there is a solemn thought. Can there be music hereafter in the soul that does not love God? Nay! music and hostility to God are incongruous ideas. The Oratorios of heaven will give no pleasure to those in whose hearts the love of God does not exist. If we enter the future state unreconciled to him, then farewell peace, farewell joy; farewell hosannas, hallelujahs, praises; farewell the company of the redeemed, the glorious church of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven, and farewell the chorus of angelic beings; farewell all that can purify and ennable the soul. That we had enjoyed something of music here, and felt longings of soul for something far beyond what the present state permitted to attain, but which we did hope to reach in that better and more glorious world; this will but aggravate our bitter disappointment. Nay, the capacities of music, the remembrance of earthly enterprise and enjoyment in the harmony of sweet sounds, will be turned into thorns and daggers of remorse. O, the powers of the immortal mind! its capacities of joy! its capacities of woe!—solemn thought! The heart says, would there were no woe! But reason—conscience—God—says there is. One of the grand chorusses of the Apocalypse is, the pæans of rejoicing for the victory of the Lamb over the enemies of his church. Some of these enemies are the apostate of this world. "And the smoke of their torment ascendeth forever and ever."

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTICES

1.—*Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Edited by George Ripley. Vols. XII, XIII. Human Life, or Practical Ethics. From the German of De Wette, by Samuel Osgood. 2 Vols. Boston: James Munroe & Co. London: John Green. 1842. pp. 777.*

De Wette is already known to us as a theologian. We are here made acquainted with him as an ethical writer. In Germany the different systems of Moral Philosophy are denominated, the Sentimental, the Rational, the Selfish, the Dogmatic or Theological, and the Eclectic. The first writes the philosophy of feeling, and gives to sentiment the chief place in morals, conferring on it a supremacy over reason. The second found its father in Kant, who laid the foundation of moral obligation in the nature of the soul itself, and almost excluding the affections, exalted the intellect above all else, and there placed the source of morals. Fichte almost froze up the affections, and looked with cold indifference on both revelation and faith. The third lays expediency as the corner-stone of the moral system, and builds upon it a vast pile, composed of calculations of consequences. The fourth sustains itself on a rigid supernaturalism, adhering strictly to the letter of the Scriptures, dogmatically interpreted, and rejecting all else as the basis of obligation. The fifth, or Eclectic School, to which De Wette belongs, makes much of sentiment, but combines with it somewhat of the rational system, and even allows expediency a place. It undertakes to harmonize rather than to separate theology and ethics, religion and morals, and propounds the system of Christianity as the perfection of both.

Those interested in such studies, will find in the present volumes, a beautiful richness of illustration, and an extended consideration of the practical duties of life; and although many readers will doubtless dissent from some of the author's principles, as from his application of them, the book merits a reading, as exhibiting the views of a philosophical and independent mind, and, at the same time, those which prevail to a great extent on the continent of Europe.

De Wette, we think, is not sufficiently governed in his ethics, by a regard for the Scriptures. He reasons and feels too much independently of them; and, although he need not lay in them the foundation of moral obligation, he ought to acknowledge their teachings to be right, and always consistent with the true foundation of morals, whatever that may be. That system which contravenes the truths of revelation, the principles of the Gospel, cannot be the right one.

In the chapter on "Veracity," we find a looseness, which we think the Bible will not warrant; nor the moral consciousness either. Falsehood is justified; is represented as necessary. So also on the dissertation on "Marriage," in which are some beautiful and excellent sentiments, the author is not limited in his views of divorce by the teachings of the Son of God, the true Light, but indicates a looseness, which would authorize frequent divorces, and tend greatly to interrupt the permanency of the marriage bond, and consequently the peace and prosperity of society. We prefer Christ's lessons on this subject to any other.

2.—*Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Edited by George Ripley. Vol. XIV. Songs and Ballads, translated from Uhland, Körner, Bürger, and other German Lyric Poets. With Notes, by Chas. T. Brooks. Boston: James Munroe & Co. London: John Green. 1842. pp. 400.*

In this volume we have presented to us a string of beautiful pearls; not only the "Strung Pearls" of Rückert, among which we find these elegant ones:

"Thou none the better art for seeking what to blame,
And ne'er wilt famous be by blasting others' fame,

"The flowers will tell to thee a sacred, mystic story,
How moistened earthly dust can wear celestial glory,
On thousand stems is found the love-inscription graven,
How beautiful is earth, when it can image heaven."

but many a lovely one from Uhland, Körner, Schiller, Novalis, and other of the lyric poets of Germany.

The typographical execution of the work is good, and the publishers merit commendation. We think the volume well worthy a place among the selected poetry of the day. It is pure in its character; and although there may be a very few sentiments that would not meet a response in all breasts, the

general tendency of the lyrics is to the elevation and purification of the spirit. They bring us into fellowship with nature, and lead us through nature, up to nature's great source.

3.—*Herodotus, from the text of Schweighæuser: with English Notes. Edited by C. S. Wheeler, A. M., Tutor in Greek, in Harvard University, 2 Vols. Boston: James Munroe, & Co. 1842. pp. 859.*

The publishers of these volumes of the father of history deserve great credit for the beauty of execution which appears in them; and the labors of the editor will call forth that tribute of praise which is his due, for the care manifested in presenting to scholars so beautiful and correct an edition of the great work of Herodotus. Great pains have evidently been taken in the correction of the sheets, in which the editor was aided by Mr. Sophocles, whose Grammar is so constantly referred to in the notes.

The map at the commencement of the first volume, is from Bæhr's edition, and the Life of Herodotus from K. O. Müller's History of Greek Literature.

The notes we think highly valuable, and generally just such as are needed in a text book for Colleges; yet from some experience had in teaching the Greek and other languages, we are inclined to think the way made too easy in some instances: e. g. in the first note, after so critical an analysis of the first line as is there given, we should have preferred to leave the translation to the pupil rather than to give it. So in 3, 1, 13, *οι -- οι ἀγαγῆς γενέσθαι to obtain by violence*, seems to us a translation of the words which any student of Herodotus would almost necessarily make. 4. 1. 27. *εἰμην] unless*. What tyro would not know that? 6. 1. 17. *ἔγισι] Translate here, empties*. This needs not to be told. There are many notes similar to these, which we think ought to be omitted, because the pupil should be left to exercise his own judgment in translation, and should also be obliged to refer frequently to his grammar and lexicon, rather than be relieved from the labor by a very convenient note. It strikes us also that, in 1. 1. 8. it is not correct to say, as the editor does, *ἔπι] denotes coming by land to*. All that *ἔπι* denotes there is *to*: and the 'coming by land' should have been given as *expletius*, and embraced in the marks which follow on Voltaire's mistake, or else have come under *ἀπικομένους*.

Jean Paul says: "So much toil and trouble are never sav-

ed as when the pupil relies on the book as a *vicarius* or *adjunct* of the teacher."

4.—*Thoughts on Moral and Spiritual Culture*, by R. C. Waterston. Boston: Crocker & Ruggles, and Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1842. pp. 317.

Here is a book of truly beautiful and at the same time useful thoughts, on interesting subjects—such as Childhood—Growth of Mind—Religious Education—Moral and Spiritual Culture in Day Schools—Home—Love of Nature—Death of Children, etc. Our notice is necessarily brief, but we can assure the reader that Mr. Waterston's pages will afford him pleasure and profit in the perusal. In the book, such truths as the following abound: "In the great work of educating mind, let us remember that nothing is worthy that name, which does not begin and end with God."

5.—*An Essay on Transcendentalism*. Boston: Crocker & Ruggles. 1842. pp. 104.

This is a little book, and a curious book, and, we think, a useless and hurtful book. If the principles and the religion taught here are the consequents of transcendentalism in philosophy, then wo to the man who is a transcendentalist! The author of this book is out upon the vasty deep, in a stormy night, without star or compass, and, unless Heaven avert, must be wrecked on the breakers of pantheism. This transcendentalism we have feared; for some, under its influence, seem to be swinging loose from the only safe anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast! It is a queer thing at best—sea-serpent like, here, there, everywhere, nowhere. One moment you see his head—or you think you do—then his tail, then his full length figure—and it is monstrous—then you are sure you have him, but he is off in the deep green seas, far away out of sight. The writer of this small volume, however, believes he has at length secured him, and is showing him off as a rare thing. Some of the features of the thing he has, which he calls Transcendentalism, are these: "It has nothing to do with the trinity or unity, the humanity or divinity of the Saviour." "The most religious man may be entirely ignorant of these and many other such things." "The great mass of men are governed by the instinctive sense and love of God." "It adopts no rules of faith or practice." "It has not been shown that the power of working miracles is not the

result of human perfection." "All of the Bible cannot be the word of God. If presented as such, it must be rejected." *Tan-tum sufficit.*

6.—*Life of Jean Paul Frederic Richter. Compiled from various sources. Together with his Autobiography. Translated from the German.* 2 vols. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1842. pp. 721.

The life of Jean Paul is here presented to the public in a style praiseworthy to the publishers, and the translation, we think, commendable, yet not as well expressed as it might have been in some instances. For example: "Once he read it whilst his father was giving a week-day's sermon, lying upon his breast in an empty loft." This makes the father to be lying on his breast in an empty loft, while delivering his sermon—rather a singular position, and an audience of emptiness!

But the volumes will doubtless be sought after by the reading community, containing as they do the Autobiography and Life of one of the most celebrated men of his age. Few there must be, who have not heard of Jean Paul, and who have not read occasionally extracts from his beautiful writings, which have excited a desire to become better acquainted with him. His name is among the household words of Germany: and well may it be, for few have exercised more influence over the German mind. He was a poet, but not a rhymers. His sentiments are uniformly clothed in the prosaic dress, but often breathe the very essence of poetry.

7.—*Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy. By M. Stuart, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary.* Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. 1842. pp. 146.

Few men in this country are as well qualified to write "Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy," as the author of the present volume. The science of hermeneutics lies at the basis of all sound exposition of the sacred Scriptures, and to that Professor Stuart has devoted a long life, furnished with the means of access to the best sources of knowledge. All men are liable to err, but certainly he, who is most familiar with the languages in which books are written, the laws of those languages, and the *usus loquendi* of the people who use them, is, *cæteris paribus*, best qualified to unfold the meaning of those books.

Yet some deem themselves fully competent to pronounce, with positiveness, on the signification of a text, or the intent of a prophecy, although they know but little of the laws of their own language, and nothing at all of those of the languages in which the Scriptures were penned. Piety is an excellent and a necessary qualification of an interpreter of God's word, but it is far from being the only one. Indeed a man may be a very pious, godly man, and yet be a very poor expositor of the sacred canon. But we intend no dissertation on this subject.

Professor Stuart's Hints are well worthy the careful consideration of philologists, and of all who profess to understand and interpret the Prophecies. For our own part, we are disposed to entertain the same views of the *double sense* with the author; and as to his rule for the interpretation of time, *days, months, years, etc.*, we find more to favor it, than we had supposed we should. Yet, it has occurred to us, that God having once announced to a prophet, and he to the people, that a day stands for a year, it would be natural for the same people afterwards to recur to this announcement and put the same interpretation on expressions of time, in other prophecies. And, in this view it may be said that such would be the natural understanding, unless there were an intimation of the contrary, or the context imperatively demanded the ordinary acceptance of the terms. The subject calls for investigation.

8.—*Dissertations on the Prophecies relative to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.* By George Duffield, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Detroit. New York: Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 434.

This volume is no crude affair, nor the result of hasty thought, but is the expression of a mind used to close thinking, and thorough investigation. Mr. Duffield has made the prophecies a subject of study for many years, and has long entertained the opinion that Christ's second advent will be personal and pre-millennial. His subsequent and latest researches have confirmed him in this opinion: and deeming it of much importance, he has here given to the world the reasons which operate in producing this conviction in his mind. Those reasons need to be well weighed, and coming from such a source, they will doubtless secure the attention they merit. The topics are—Duty of Studying the Prophecies—System of Interpretation—Outline of the Spiritual and Literal Systems of Interpreting the Prophecies—Traditionary

History—Principles applied and Second Coming of Christ shown to be Pre-millenial—Nature of the Day of Judgment—Season and Signs of Christ's Coming—Skeptic's Objection.—Under these topics there is no small amount of learning exhibited. We should be pleased to see the work reviewed.

9.—*The Claims of "Episcopal Bishops," examined in a Series of Letters, addressed to the Rev. S. A. McCoskry, D. D., Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Michigan.* By George Duffield, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Detroit. Second Edition. New York: Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 316.

This volume, by the same author as the above, will unquestionably be read with interest. It is composed of sixteen Letters, addressed to Bishop McCoskry, in reply to a sermon preached by the Bishop, in which he undertakes to prove Episcopal Bishops the successors of the Apostles, with the exclusion of other Protestant ministers. Mr. Duffield was requested by a number of his people to notice the Sermon, as it seemed to require it. He consented, and has briefly and effectually gone over the ground of controversy between Episcopalian and other Protestant Churches. We cannot here enter into the details of the argument, but think our Episcopal friends will find it a hard bone to gnaw, and fear that, in the attempt, they will wear off some of their ivory teeth. From present indications, it will be necessary for us to be prepared to meet the assumptions of those, who claim for themselves all Apostolic gifts, and acknowledge no covenanted blessings without the pale of their own church. This book offers to those, who are disposed to look at the subject, a convenient panoply, in which they will be able to ward off all the darts of their opponents. We ought to say, that the Bishop's sermon is bound up with the Letters, so that both may be seen side by side.

10.—*Life and History of Ebenezer Porter Mason; interspersed with Hints to Parents and Instructors on the Training and Education of a Child of Genius.* By Denison Olmsted, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College. New York: Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 252.

We are in this volume reminded, that the light dews of morning, which repose so gracefully on the petals of flowers

and spires of grass, and reflect so beautifully the early rays of the rising sun, soon evanish before those rays; and that some of the most lovely forms of earth fade soonest away. Such was E. P. Mason, the subject of this memoir. Of a delicate structure of body, of fine sensibilities, of pre-eminent genius, of soaring intellect, of high aspirations, earth was his home but a little while. He shone upon it like some brilliant dew-drop, reflecting the light of heaven, but soon passed away, into the atmosphere of the third heavens, and mounted among the stars, on which his admiring gaze was so often fixed. With how clear a vision, and with what amazing glory, must he now contemplate those reflections of the majesty of Jehovah!

Professor Olmsted says, with truth: "The impression made by his writings, is that of a disposition artless, affectionate, and benevolent; of a heart fraught with noble and exalted purposes, and strongly imbued by nature with the love of truth; and of intellectual capacities of the highest order, and finest proportions."

11.—*Elements of Chemistry.* By Robert Kane, M. D., M. R. I. A. etc. etc. An American Edition, with Additions and Corrections, by John William Draper, M. D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of New York, etc. etc. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. pp. 704.

This work is arranged for the use of Universities, Colleges and Schools, and seems to us, on a hasty review of it, well adapted to the purpose. It is sufficiently extended to unfold the present state of the science in its different relations, and as brief as it could be without the omission of much that is essential an ordinary knowledge of Chemistry. The general principles and facts of the science are here unfolded and abundantly illustrated, and its applications to Physiology and Pathology are treated of in accordance with the present state of knowledge on this subject.

12.—*Animal Chemistry, or Organic Chemistry in its applications to Physiology and Pathology.* By Justus Liebig, M. D., Ph. D., F. R. S., M. R. I. A., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Giessen. Edited from the Author's manuscript by William Gregory, M. D., F. R. S. E., M.R. I. A. etc. New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. pp. 356.

A note at the beginning of the book says: 'This edition is

printed from the *corrected* London copy, and is complete, with all the additions.'

The application of Chemistry to Physiology and Pathology is comparatively a recent application of it, and, unquestionably, one of the most interesting. When this science comes to aid us in discovering the proper functions of our several organs, the exact relations of different kinds of food to the human organism, and their precise influences on disease; when it discovers that the fat of the animal system is made out of sugar, etc. etc., it is coming near home to all of us, and must awaken a new interest in the minds of intelligent persons. Let such read and study this book.

13.—" *Principalities and Powers in Heavenly Places.*"
By Charlotte Elizabeth. With an Introduction, by the Rev. Edward Bickersteth. New York: John S. Taylor, & Co. 1842. pp. 298.

Charlotte Elizabeth's works have hitherto been among the most popular of foreign authors; and the present volume, we think, will be equally so. The subject is unusual in these days, but perhaps, for that very reason the more needful. And the fact that the authoress has taken the Bible as her only guide, without consulting commentators, will excite a special interest to know the results of her inquiries. Part I. treats of Evil Spirits. Part II. of Holy Angels. The nature and relations of both are fully considered; and we hope those who are skeptical on the subject of the Devil and his angels, will read this book, and ponder well the Scriptural evidence of their existence and activity. We are inclined to believe, that they have much more to do in the management of this world than has been generally supposed; and if they have, it is well for us to be aware of it. The fact that we cannot see an evil spirit, is no evidence of its non-existence—that we cannot feel it, no evidence that it is not nigh, even at the door of our hearts.

14.—" *The History of the Reformation of the Church of England.*" By Gilbert Burnet, D. D., late Lord Bishop of Salisbury. With the Collection of Records, and a copious Index. Revised and corrected, with additional Notes, and a Preface, by Rev. E. Nares, D. D. With a Frontispiece and twenty-two Plates, 4 vols. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842.

The publishers merit the thanks of the public for this

beautiful edition of Bishop Burnet's celebrated History of the Reformation. It is issued in four large octavo volumes, in large, clear type, and on good paper; so that those who read it in youth, and wish now, in old age, to re-peruse it, will find it well adapted to their impaired vision. This History has so long been a standard work among Protestants, and its character so well known, that it seems unnecessary more than to announce its re-publication. And yet we should be glad to dwell a little on its merits, had we the requisite space. We can only subjoin an extract from the editor's preface. "Scarcely any other book of equal importance, perhaps, stands so much in need of preliminary explanations, as this great work. And it must often, we think, have been a matter of just surprise to the readers of this History, that, in the editions hitherto published, the errors in the first and second volumes have been reprinted, which the author himself noticed at the end of the third volume. In the present edition, the text will be found corrected as it should be, and many explanatory notes added throughout the work." We must not omit to mention that the price of the four volumes is eight dollars.

15.—*General History of Civilization in Europe, from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution. By M. Guizot, Professor of History in the Faculty of Literature at Paris, and Minister of Public Instruction. Third American, from the second English edition, with occasional Notes, by C. S. Henry, D. D.* New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1842. pp. 316.

This being the third edition of the work, we shall be excused from repeating what has been said before, to recommend it to public attention. The author is so well known, and his talents so highly appreciated, that they are, in themselves, a sufficient recommendation. It is by no means an ordinary history, a mere tissue of facts; but rather, presuming the facts to be known, it is a philosophic generalization of them, an investigation of their causes and consequences, an embodiment of the *spiritual* of history, a revelation of the interior movements. Some such work needs to be studied in connection with more general histories, or rather subsequently to a pretty thorough knowledge of the facts of any particular period. In this relation it is well adapted to become a text book in Colleges; we should say, in the higher classes.

16.—*A Romæic Grammar, accompanied by a Chrestomathy, with a Vocabulary.* By E. A. Sophocles, A. M. Hartford: H. Huntington, Jun., 1842. pp. 264.

This Grammar of the modern Greek, coming from a native Greek, and one who has already proved his skill in the construction of a Grammar of the ancient language, must be presumed to be superior to any of those previously current. Our examination of it has satisfied us that it will furnish the best aid to those, who design making themselves acquainted with this relic of the beautiful language of Xenophon and Plato, sustaining about the same relation to it, as the Italian to the Latin. Greek scholars will very readily acquire a knowledge of the Romæic, just as Latin scholars find little difficulty in learning the Italian. We presume this language will ultimately be numbered amongst those modern tongues which it will be thought desirable to know.

17.—*Memoir of Mrs. Mary Lundie Duncan; being Recollections of a Daughter.* By her Mother. From the second Edinburgh edition. New York: Robert Carter, 1842. pp. 268.

We have seldom experienced as much pleasure in reading a memoir as this has afforded us. We could desire that every youthful Christian especially, might have the gratification and reap the benefit of its perusal. Such humility and loveliness have seldom existed in union with so much refinement of mind and taste, prompting so many caresses on the part of admirers. Mrs. Duncan appears to us one of the most transparent characters with which we have ever become acquainted. She lived and died an humble disciple of Jesus. The Tablet in the Parish Church of Cleish well describes her: "In the morning of her life, the sweet affections of her heart, and every energy of a powerful and highly refined intellect, were consecrated by the Holy Spirit to the service of Jesus Christ."

"Lovely alike in person and in character, she discharged with fidelity the duties of a wife and of a mother, and prayerfully sought to improve every opportunity of usefulness among the people of this parish; till, unexpectedly, but not unprepared, she fell asleep in Jesus, on the 5th day of January, A. D. 1840, aged 25."

We must add that, in the Appendix, will be found some beautiful poetry, better adapted to the comprehension of very young children, than most of the hymns in our juvenile collections.

18.—*Sacred Songs, for Family and Social Worship ; comprising the most approved Spiritual Hymns, with chaste and popular tunes.* Published by the American Tract Society. 1842. pp. 343.

“The design of this work,” as expressed in the Preface, “is to promote devotional singing in the closet, in the family, and in meetings for social worship. The aim has been to furnish a selection of Spiritual Hymns, classified in the order of subjects, with a nice adaptation of chaste and popular tunes, of sufficient number and variety to meet existing wants.” The Committee have enjoyed the counsel and aid of Messrs. Hastings, Mason, Kingsley, Pond, and other celebrated authors of sacred music. We are much pleased, both with the hymns and the music.

19.—*The Way of Life.* By Charles Hodge, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. Written for the Am. S. S. Union, and revised by the Committee of Publication. American Sunday School Union, Philadelphia. 1842. pp. 343.

The book is divided into nine chapters, embracing the following topics:—The Scriptures are the word of God—Sin—Causes of indifference to the charge of Sin—Conviction of Sin—Justification—Faith—Repentance—Profession of Religion—Holy Living. An enquirer after the way of Life, will here find counsel on all the great questions relating to his spiritual interests; and we fondly hope that the work will be instrumental in directing many a wanderer into the right path.

The style of the author is chaste and perspicuous, and his method of treating his subjects clear, forcible, and impressive. Professor Hodge has here, undoubtedly, performed a good work, which will cause his name to go down to future generations, and embalm it in the memory of multitudes. The book is as free from peculiar views as it could well be, and consequently has met the approbation of all schools. There are expressions in it, to which some would perhaps object, but, on the whole, the performance is commendable; and the spirit of it is such as will secure a candid reading.

ARTICLE XI.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

The "Archiv" of the city was blown up with the "Rathhaus," at Hamburg, and with it many most valuable documents connected with the history, not only of Hamburg, but of all the other principal cities and states of Europe, more particularly of England, have perished.—Wilhelm Schlegel announces a series of lectures on Ancient and Modern India.—The University of *Tübingen*, a few weeks ago, received a present from the Directors of the English East India Company, of sixty-seven Oriental works, chiefly in Sanscrit, printed at Calcutta.

Holland.

In a marsh, in the duchy of Limburg, a wooden bridge, 1250 ells long, and about three ells broad, has been discovered. The principal beams are as hard as stone, but the cross-beams are completely decayed. They are covered with an unctuous mass, supposed to have been a kind of cement.

France.

Marshal Soult has appointed a Commission charged to draw up and prepare for publication a grammar and dictionary of the Berber or Kabyle language. It has hitherto been supposed that the various dialects of Africa were more or less corruptions of the old Arabic. This error has now been satisfactorily removed. They bear no similitude either to the Arabic, the Coptic, or the Hebrew, though a few Arabic roots have been admitted into them.—In the Royal Library at Paris, a Bohemian manuscript was lately discovered, containing several theological essays by John Huss.

Italy.

A work of some importance to the scientific world has just been published, namely, a description of all the obelisks of Rome, accompanied by as complete an explanation as the recent discoveries relative to the Hieroglyphics of Egypt permitted.

United States.

Allen, Morrill & Wardwell will shortly publish at the Codman press: A Grammar of the German Language. By Geo. H. Noebden, L. L. D., etc. From the eighth London Edition, by the Rev. C. H. F. Biallobotsky, Ph. D. Revised and conformed to the present state of German Philology. By Barnas Seares, President of the Newton Theol. Seminary.—James Munroe & Co. have in press The Gorgias of Plato, with Notes by Prof. Woolsey:—also a new vol. by Mrs. Sigourney, descriptive of a Tour in England, Scotland and France, with engravings.—The next number of the Biblical Repository will contain the concluding article on Baptism by President Beecher.

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